Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory

Please add comments at the end, or at the end of the relevant section, and sign them with 4 '~' in a row. Thanks.

— JIP | Talk 20:27, 6 November 2005 (UTC)

only obsolete ships at Pearl -- carriers gone. Means something?

This article contains no discussion about why only obsolete old ships were in port at the time of the attack, while the valuable new aircraft carriers happened to be at sea. It's not good enough to say that they were only thought of as being useful for reconnaisance. The aircraft on them were fitted with guns and bombs - wheras reconnaisance aircraft would mainly need to fly economically. Does anyone know why the aircraft carriers were not in port on 7-Dec-41, please? --New Thought 16:29, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

"One rationale here, of many, relates to the on-going effort to bolster the B-17 fleet in the Philippines as a strategic force against Japan. See in Layton's text an insert of a chart showing the RoA (i.e., radius of action) of the B-17 C&Ds (as well as the B-24 C&Ds and the very "short-legged" B-18A). The carriers were used to place aircraft at Wake and Midway, those to act of air cover as the B-17s were being ferried during their hops to the Philippines. Of course, that is just one rendition of the story ... there are many others. -jamaksin"

I believe I can answer. Hopefully this site will help http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/ "An intersting site with much good material.

(However, a real bastion of objectivity for many, and not so for many others. -jamaksin")

Pure dumb luck. Fears of Japanese attacks on Midway & Wake →reinforcement transported by CV→no CVs in harbor. And Sara was under refit, ditto. This isn't in dispute. (I haven't seen the "escort B-17s" argument before, but I haven't read Layton, either...) Trekphiler 10:59, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

And you wonder why your comments were removed by the mods?(SS)

205.188.116.73 (AKA Jamaskin) please don't vandalize ("viz., Using exact references to make needed corrections to obvious errors of omission and bias - jamaksin") the page anymore and keep your comments here. Also please show me a copy of pg 111 from the NA. The doc that starts out "Station H November, 1941. Naval Movement reports...

If you can post any errors here, I would be happy to read them. (SS)

"Two specific citations - both within the public domain were provided in full - to this query and were posted as such. Along with those was a note regarding call sign HA N 8, also of 28 Nov. As these citations and note have been removed, I cannot help you. -jamaksin"

Put them here because my copy states: 28 Nov (Call) HA N 8 (Identification) (Blank) (Indicator) Code movement (Position) (Blank) (Time) 0810 (Sheet) 94069 I posted a copy here As you can see there are no handwritten comments on the original document in the code movement for call sign RU SI 8. Nor is there any comments written under HA N 8.

(SS)

(SS) - See Dr. Wilford's MA thesis as cited in article section for the FOIA-released version [Declassification Authority: OD3012, Initialed By: KG, NARA Date: March 5, 2000] of this document; fact-checked as correct (copyright 2001).

For the readership, in Stinnett's Day of Deceit (hardcover or paperback) on pages 50-51 are copies of the same IJN message. The one on page 50 was released in 1979, page 51 has the FOIA-released version without the redactions. This should be noted as to the types of information the FOIA process can reveal.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 12:54, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Seems to be some confusion. Obviously we are talking about different documents with different information ScottS 20:57, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

No confusion at all. You cite an earlier release, not the FOIA-released document. You also seem not to recognize that redactions also occur using "white out" tape or liquid. For an example of this method - See SRH-051 Interview with Mr. Ralph T. Briggs with date 13 January 1977. On the first page, just under "On-the-Roof Gang" is a faint "white out" tape mark, the next page has even more such "tape" marks.

[Should the readership wish to pursue the FOIA process for this document, understand that it can be very unpredictable.]

Dr. Wilford's MA thesis Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941 by Timothy Wilford, MA Thesis, Department of History, University of Ottawa, February 5, 2001, Copyright: Timothy Wilford, Ottawa, Canada, 2001. It is PDF file of approximataly 8.17 MB (197 pages) having significant appendix material. It is available from the following:

(a) University Microfilms Inc. (aka UMI)

    Bell & Howell Information and Learning
    300 North Zeeb Road
    Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
    (Toll-Free 1-800-521-0600)

(b) National Library of Canada

    Acquisitions and Bibliographic Services
    395 Wellington Street
    Ottawa, ON K1A 0N4

(c) ProQuest On-Line Service (This a subscription service at proquest.umi.com)

    Dissertations and Theses Database

(d) From Dr. Wilford himself with permissions for fair use

(d) Other individuals or other sources.

The Appendicies begin on page 143, the FOIA-released "Naval Movement Reports" for 28 Novemeber 1941 appears on page 154. To note, "blackout" and "white out" redactions are seen throughout these Appendicies.

To stress here - this document has a copyright. OK I wasn't sure what you were talking about. What's the cheapest way to get his article with all the context? I'll check it out. ScottS (talk) 17:44, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

The least expensive means of acquiring the complete thesis (197 pages) as you also express a desire for the "context" is from someone who will send a copy to you. Save that, a copy of just page 154 of the thesis may suffice. You may know someone who has access to ProQuest, for example. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:56, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:30, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

See Declassified document reproduced at the National Archives Authority: NND 003002 By: BA NARA Date: 9/14 62 StaHmovements pg 111 ~Scott There is nothing blacked out on the pg 111 document. —Preceding unsigned comment added by ScottS (talk • contribs) 21:10, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Wasn't the bulk of the US battleships at Pearl? That was hardly a collection of "old and obsolete" ships, to the naval establishment then it was THE warfleet. For the suggestion that only expendable ships were at Pearl to work,the USN ought to have kept back their newer, most modern battleships. It was hardly even possible to fully appreciate the impact of carrier-based airpower before the pacific war. And note that at Taranto (as well as at Pearl Harbor) the planes hit stationary ships, at least in the later case also achieving total surprise. It was only natural to assume that aircrafts would be unable to achieve this against a fully alert battlefleet maneuvring out in the ocean. thestor 12:34, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, no. The heavies were considered the "main fleet", but most of the BBs at Pearl that morning were old & slow by comparison to the newest, & obsolete for the duties they'd have been called on for when the PW started, i.e. TF escort (as I've said repeatedly on Talk:attack on Pearl Harbor, without anybody actually listening... Moreover, it wasn't "total surprise" nobody thought was achievable, but successful sinkings against maneuvering ships; JUDGEMENT & Mitchell's stunt were against anchored ships. Sinking PoW & Repulse put paid to that notion PDQ. Trekphiler 01:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

Okay then, but where were the brand new battleships of the USN during the attack then?

Atlantic Fleet, where the greater perceived threat was. Portsmouth, I think. Trekphiler 15:57, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

On reflection, I suppose the conspiracy loons think that is evidence of conspiracy, too. Trekphiler (talk) 12:55, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

Technical Assistance

I deleted this:

"Page 81, left-column has the text " ... Nevertheless some wireless communication had to take place, for it would be folly to expect the voyage for this armada of ships to co-ordinate without it. Short wave signals from Japan could be picked up by the larger ships but not the small craft - more especially the low-lying submarines - this was impossible, because of their aerials and the curvature of the earth. To solve this problem Nagumo's radio technicians had to resort to a subterfuge. High frequency (short wave) signals, picked up by one of the carriers, were re-transmitted simultaneously on a low frequency [sic longwave]. These short range signals the smaller ships could intercept, and the hoax worked almost perfectly because none of the US monitoring stations was looking for a Japanese signal in the low frequency band. However, ..." [Release of the classified CV AKAGI source materials would be very helpful here.]"

This is as mistaken as the belief of Lurline's radioman, based on an inadequate grasp of naval communications. Under radio silence, navies resort to older techniques, developed & used for decades before radio, blinker light & morse; when these are inappropriate, flag & semaphore, in use for over 200yr, are available. Trekphiler 12:36, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

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Odd. A verified and sourced quote from a known text [A. J. Barker's Pearl Harbor - Battle Book 10] - deleted. The "radioman" in question here (Grogan) held a US Navy reserve commission and had decades of military and maritime experience beginning with the US Navy in WWI; signal flags and narrow-beam blinkers of necessity mean "line of sight" and are useless in heavy weather (e.g., From Layton's And I Was There page 249 " ... Naguno's striking force had run into the first really big storm ...") and/or when vessels are scattered beyond the horizon.

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• Regardless of how necessary it was to use the radio, the source says that Nagumo used it. Generally it is assumed that a source has documents or interviews with survivors to back up such statements. Therefore, whether it was necessary or not, Nagumo used the radio (assuming the source is valid), and it should be noted. Whether said action was logical or not, Nagumo did it and the text should remain in the article if it is true. Fanra 13:17, 17 June 2007 (UTC)

Sorry but what source are we again discussing? There are also sources (Japanese survivors of the Kido Butai) claiming that radio silence was observed IIRC. What source is now claiming that the Japanese task force DID in fact break radio silence? thestor 07:44, 6 July 2007 (UTC)

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Besides Farago's The Broken Seal (Bantam paperback edition - POSTSCRIPT), also see Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined for one; of, course, Stinnett's Day of Deceit is another; and, Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth is another. And, as Prange flags SHIRIYA as part of the Kido Butai, also Prados' Combined Fleet Decoded. There are also several recent journal articles.

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To fact-check the above, see Farago's The Broken Seal (paperback edition), on lower page 381, regarding Grogan, is " ... whose own credentials included a reserve commission in the U. S. Navy with years of service in Naval Communications."

We are talking about the radiomen of the Lurline, right? So he may have had experience with radio communications. But did he actually claim to have intercepted transmissions from a Japanese task force NEARBY? Couldn't he have gathered Japanese communication from another source then the Kido Butai? Radio signals can go a heck long way, and a single radioman on a lone civilian freighter probably could not do a triangulation. Again, we have the testimony of Japanese survivors claiming that radio silence was observed during the travel to Pearl. thestor 07:39, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

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On Grogan ... "So he may have had experience ..." No, he definitively did have a US naval communications background - decades worth; no "may have..." about it.

Mention of "triangulation" - agreed. However, common practice then as now ... "relative bearings." These are used to determine the general direction of a signal source, and if multiple relative bearings are taken over time of the signal, movement in the source can be established.

All of the Japanese merchant fleet had returned to Home Waters; Grogan did not say Russian vessels - very easy for him to determine. He did use the call sign for Japanese shore stations. No doubt, his now "missing" radio log would be helpful.

Perhaps ... but we now have at least six (6) "broken radio silence" instances in the public domain (viz., Ranneft, Ogg, Grogan, 30Nov41 COMSUM14 AKAGI "tactical circuit" message, and "code movement" annotated report from STATION H on 28Nov41, and also from STATION H, submarine call sign WA HI 8 on 6Dec41) all occuring at approximately the same time. All are independent of each other. There are other examples. None, however, generated an action such as, e.g., CINCPAC: FLASH IMMEDIATE: UNKNOWN SIGNAL SOURCE APPROX N-NW PEARL ADVANCING WESTERLY X INVESTIGATE X REPORT X

On Japanese survivors ... Yes, yes, ... as Prange says. But we also have contradictory claims, some even from the Japanese. What we DO NOT have are the official records ... say, the US Navy Mid-Pacific RDF records for all monitoring stations (i.e., Hawaii, Samoa, Dutch Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, ...), nor various "Y" services such as - from Canadian records (Gordon Head, Esquimalt, ...), nor Dutch files (Batavia), nor British files (Singapore, Hong Kong), nor Australian/New Zealand RDF stations during this period. So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 even after numerous and quite specific FOIA requests? Any surmise?

[Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), on pages 266-67 shows an August 1941 disposition/RDF bearing chart for Call Sign "8E YU" - CV AKAGI, and on page 315 shows a handwritten STATION CAST RDF report (viz., TESTM dispatch) from 5 December 1941. Wilford's MA Thesis, on page 167, shows TESTM messages numbers 051515, 051525, and 051535 as sent to STATION HYPO, in their encoded and decoded form. To note, from TESTM 051535, "VICTOR" is the US Navy RDF monitoring station in America Samoa.

Mr. Stinnett and now Dr. Wilford are to be highly commended for their superlative efforts as these are the first public displays of this RDF data, which clearly demonstrate the US Navy's excellent RDF skills and in situ capabilites.]

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Unless you've got a source that isn't a conspiracy nut, I'm more inclined to believe the Japanese on this one. Their records, reproduced in Prange, Goldstein, & Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers, indicate the radio keys were removed. Moreover, "narrow beam blinker"? I'm thinking of 24" searchlights (if needed). And do you really believe professional navy navigators can't keep station in heavy weather? Or that they'd be beyond "line of sight"? Just how much separation do you think they were keeping from Akagi, anyhow? Over the horizon? "So, why are these all - US and Allied - RDF logs still classified in July 2007 "? BTHOOM. Considering the number of people in USG with the ability, & inclination, to classify things secret even as we speak, & a general tendency by bureaucrats & politicians not to want to release any information, I'm not too surprised by this; I can just hear the CIA & NSA wanks saying it'll compromise sources & methods. (Yeah, al Q still uses radios, that's the method... Or is it NSA/CIA persuading the carriers to give up your phone/email records, just like they did the cable coys, when that was against the law...?) Trekphiler 02:43, 27 July 2007 (UTC)

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"Over the horizon?" ...

Beyond the Horizon ... a few seeds along the way for those Baker Street irregulars;

A. Hawaii Operation, VADM Shigeru Fukudome, "US Naval Institute Proceedings", December 1955, pp. 1315-1331. Something about a Patrol Mission for three submarines (I-19, I-21, and I-23).

B. "Formation for Alert Steaming" from The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, on page 187.

Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi. Comment is due to fog, positioned some 8 miles away.

From The American Practical Navigator (aka Bowditch), Appendix, simplified formula to calculate the distance to the horizon from varying "lookout" heights. Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats, even with the I-boat being 8 miles "nearer" the horizon?

The answer begets a question: What good are these "patrol" I-boats on my flank? Sanity check?

C. From Layton's And I Was There, page 213, "Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...

So, let's see, curvature of the earth, following seas, ... Yup, beyond the horizon. Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless.

D. Also edited by Goldstein and Dillon, The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II, from "Japanese Monograph No. 102: Submarine Operations December 1941-April 1942", on page 235:

"Besides the above forces, attached to the Carrier Striking Force from the 6th Fleet to perform patrol duties, were the submarines I-19, I-21 and I-23. In addition to acting as the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, this unit was to rescue the crews of downed aircraft and be prepared to resist counterattack.

"... the Patrol Unit in front of the Carrier Striking Force, ..." Goldstein and Dillon contradict themselves.

Any surmise as to why? [Hint: Need to rationalize/cloud "radio silence" ...]

As another "sanity check" of Prange and associates, another question. Prange's At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, on page x of the Introduction, second to last paragraph has: "The Japanese put very little about the Pearl Harbor plan on paper, and what was available aboard four of the carriers of Nagumo's force (including his flagship, Akagi) went down at Midway in June 1942.

If this statement is so, where did the "papers" in the references used above (items B and D) come from? In Prange, there are many, many other errors.

Ahh, the vicissitude of ignorance...

" However, common practice then as now ... 'relative bearings.'" I recall seeing a source placing all of Grogan's bearings in the area of the Kuriles, hence a product of IJN's deception op...

"Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Submarine Division is shown on flank of Akagi", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Key word: "submarine". Able to submerge, hence gain invisibility. Didn't apply to carriers (or cruiser, or destroyers). Also, IJN submarines not notorious for comm silence. Not to mention, detecting sub message traffic wasn't indicative of anything, considering 1-6/12/41 was still peacetime...

"Patrol Mission for three submarines", "Layton's And I Was There, page 213, 'Three large submarines, ... scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ...'". Keyword(s): patrol & scouting. They were expected to signal to Kido Butai; their detection did not give away the position of the task force.

"Who sees farther, a lookout on AKAGI's island or a lookout on the I-boats". This is a misunderstanding of the nature of blinker signalling, I'm guessing. Akagi would see blinker from an I-boat at considerable distance, & a TF ship with their big-ass blinkers would be able to signal to an I-boat a fair distance off, but this misses the point. The question is, "Was radio necessary between members of the Kido Butai?" Answer, no, because DDs & CCs in company with Akagi would never be over the horizon. I-boats not an issue; for comm with them in company, they aren't over the horizon, either. Which is, more or less, what I said; your acceptance of the need for radio reflects the same ignorance Stinnett shows.

"Flags, blinkers, ... ain't gonna work. They are useless." Well, no, as noted. Ships in company, such as a task force escort group, have comm by flag or blinker for two centuries. Just because it's convenient for the conspiracy doesn't mean these methods cease to function. You need to explain why Akagi signalmen wouldn't use them, at all, which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; "fog" or "weather" doesn't get it, because a 24" searchlight is pretty d*mn effective in weather, & standing orders would serve for periods of fog (& it's not like the TF didn't know where they were bound, or what stations the other ships in the TF were keeping...). I frankly don't give a d*mn how experienced a radio operator Grogan was; his supposed evidence implies IJN signalmen were all incompetent, to a man, which I flat don't believe. Any questions? Trekphiler 00:18 & 00:22, 28 July 2007 (UTC)

A. Re: Kuriles - may want to check your comment - a citation would also help; "hence" as an implied QED is unsupportable here, got any cross bearings? Familiar with Rochefort's impressions of IJN radio deception efforts (See Layton, pages 228-229)? Of course, recall mention of those still classified RDF and "code movement" reports from the period - that curious pattern of FOIA denials.

[Another odd thing about the Kuriles, before 1941 the US Navy had a very detailed and complete set of charts for "Hitokappau Wan" (now O. Iturup), and yet in the APHB is the comment about an unknown port. But that is another thread ...]

B. Re: Patrol Unit of three I-boats. Patrol Mission SOP - surface cruising ahead of main force was then the norm; submerge to avoid detection. Why?

Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan. Who "sees" farther? (Recall Bowditch).

The tasking of a Patrol Mission is what? Does that change for "peace time" - a non sequitur.

From Japanese sources of the planning and operational aspects of the three I-boats (See "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II for I-boat specificatons), their patrol line advanced in front of the Striking Force main body, and well beyond visual range. It is hundreds of miles ahead in fact as the Japanese and Layton tell us.

So, how again does the main body of the Striking Force communicate with these I-boats? Or, what would cause such a need to contact these I-boats, established as "being over the horizon" ...?

C. Causes such as: (a) the known and several changes in course of the Striking Force, (b) the December 5th alert (See: The Pearl Harbor Papers, edited by Goldstein and Dillon, pages 38-39) which caused a immediate zig-zagging and wide dispersal of the main body, (c) weather (See: Morison's Two Ocean War, page 46), ..., etc.

[An aside here, when vessels within a convoy were alerted to the danger of attack (e.g., surface raider, submarines), what was their reaction, e.g., do they scatter? Or, if the convoy experienced heavy seas and poor visibility? And, did these "events" place any vessels beyond the horizon? What was done to re-group the convoy?]

And, lest we forget, Nagumo was sensitive to a timeline, as other Japanese operations were in process.

D. Re: those flags and blinkers. It is your statement " .. wouldn't use them, at all, ..." Where did this "..., at all" come from? Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that? The initial statement regarding flags and blinkers ... "line-of-sight".

Now - just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats - as they are far beyond "sight" ... patrolling hundreds of miles ahead of the Striking Force?

And, " ... which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply; ..." Citation? Context?

"Re: Kuriles". I'd cite if I could; I don't have it handy & can't recall it.

"Lookouts perched on the conning tower (now called the "sail") constantly scanning versus using a periscope - extended fully - to scan." That was American practise; I'm unconvinced IJN submariners did it. "just how can Akagi's signalmen, no matter how expert, use flags and/or blinkers to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats"? How does this necessitate Kido Butai radiating? Nagumo received reports, he didn't issue them. I notice you prefer to ignore that.

"C. Causes such as:" planned course changes? Are IJN navigators stupid? Incompetent? Weather: the same. The Kido Butai would not have been scattered beyond the horizon by a typhoon, much less a bit of heavy weather. And DDs would routinely "shepherd" (as they did for Atlantic convoys...), using flag & blinker to communicate as needed (& even merchantmen were capable of coping with that; for damn sure IJN signalmen could). Reaction to attack? This isn't PQ-17, it's a fleet task force, with six aircraft carriers and about a dozen destroyers; Pearl Harbor Papers records numerous "attacks" (always claimed successful, BTW) on phantom submarines, which was SOP throughout the war. So much for "time pressure". (BTW, what was the contingency plan for Nagumo being delayed?)

"Where is the citation from Stinnett's work (edition and page) which says that?" Stinnett (& you) claim Kido Butai was radiating. I say (& demonstrate why) there was no need for it. "which the continuous (or repeated) DF fixes imply"? This is Stinnett (& you) claiming Kido Butai was radiating. Demonstrate a need for it. "at all"? Any use of radio implies Nagumo's signalmen were too stupid to use flag or blinker; repeated use implies little or no use of flag or blinker, & demands IJN signalmen be incompetent, to a man. You offer no persuasive reason to use radio, & your excuses reflect an ignorance of TF operations. Take a look at Midway. Yamamoto continually recieved reports; he radiated none, to preserve radio silence (& thereby conceal his location...). Was Nagumo so stupid he didn't know this? (Stinnett, & you, imply as much.) Trekphiler 15:50, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

How, again, does Akagi communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats which are far beyond the horizon - for example, to notify them of a main body course change?

Where does Stinnett say that flags, blinkers WERE NEVER USED? (edition, page)

Also, where is the specific citation for "... which the continuous (repeated) DF fixes ..." Or, if that is a surmise, indicate as such. Here, it should be noted that the RDF logs remain classified.

Just a fact - naval communications RECEIVERS of this era did, as you say - "radiate" - whenever they had power applied. In fact, those frequencies were monitored.

"How, again, does Akagi communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats which are far beyond the horizon - for example, to notify them of a main body course change?" And, again, there is no need. It's not like the I-boats don't know what the objective is, or where Hawaii is. Or do you think their skippers aren't told in advance? Or that they aren't told what the TF's planned course is, including scheduled course changes? How stupid do you think the Japanese were, anyhow?

"Just a fact - naval communications RECEIVERS of this era did, as you say - "radiate" - whenever they had power applied. In fact, those frequencies were monitored." Yeah, trials have determined they could be detected at up to 70mi. I'm unaware of Kimmel or Short mounting sigint patrols to detect them. So? Oh, as I recall, Stinnett also claims tranmissions from Home Islands to Kido Butai. You presume they're being recieved, I take it, & somebody was picking them up. How close was Lurline? 1000mi? Quite a bit more than 70, no?

DF fixes? Stinnett (which I don't have handy...) goes on at length about it, which implies to me a fairly extensive comm traffic, which implies little/no use of flag/blinker. Which is what I've been saying all along. I don't recall ever saying (tho you're trying to make out I have) Stinnett expressly says it. "the RDF logs remain classified." So what are the claims by Grogan? Or are they classified, too? Its them that I question.

BTW, I see you have no answer for the rest, just the same old nonsense. And your interpretation of "radiate" is pretty thin. I'm using it in a way common now, i.e "transmit". Evidently you aren't aware of it. Trekphiler 01:58 & 02:02, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

Did the Striking Force experience any "un"-scheduled course changes? Anything odd occur the evening of 5 Dec 1941, for instance, that caused unease? [See The Pearl Harbor Papers (Goldstein and Dillon, editors), pps. 38-39, note 12 - as this is from Prange and associates, it must be so.]

How, again, does the main force communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats, which are far beyond the horizon? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 172.130.211.251 (talk) 16:17, August 23, 2007 (UTC)

"How, again, does the main force communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats, which are far beyond the horizon? " Have you not read a single word I've written? Read my lips: Kido Butai had no need to communicate with the Patrol Unit I-boats. It was the task of the Patrol Unit I-boats to communicate with (i.e., signal to) Kido Butai'. Kido Butai had no need to radiate. Which I've said at least three times, now. What part of that isn't clear to you yet?

"'un'-scheduled course changes" of 5 Dec 41? I repeat, do you think Japanese navigators are incompetent? That the task force is incapable of maintaining station? That DDs are incapable of finding & herding back "lost sheep", all crewed by professional sailors? I despair of finding reason. Trekphiler 13:09, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

"Captain Kijiro in charge of the three Kido Butai submarines stated that nothing of interest occurred during the transit to Hawaiian waters." So what would they be "communicating" about? (Oh, wait, I forgot, the Scouting Force was lost & had to signal to Nagumo for directions, because their navigators had forgotten how to take a sun sighting...) Trekphiler 11:53, 1 December 2007 (UTC)

As you seem to have missed it, or are perhaps ignoring it:

"Since skippers and crews of oilers were veterans who had grown up at sea for many years, they were able to master refueling works and others in a comparatively short period of training, but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ..."

To repeat ... but a difficult problem for them was to maintain formation at night without any lamps. Vessels that had been in formation in the evening often became lost to sight in the following morning. ...

Or lost to sight ...

Rengo Kantai Extracts by Ryunouke Kusaka, Chapter 12, The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans, editors Goldstein and Dillon, page 152. (Oh, yes, a Japanese source.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 13:00, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Huh?

I deleted

"For clarification of the possible neophyte naivete of Reference Note 4, other authors like Stinnett, and sans Zimmerman, however know that various terms were used for the IJN Operations Code. For example: from the Notes section of Stinnett's Day of Deceit (paperback edition), page 341, (1) note 31, from Whitlock is " ... We called the system the 5-Digit code." and (2) note 33, "In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland." (3) Kahn's Codebreakers (1967 edition, page 47) has "Five numeral intercept ..." (4) Layton's And I Was There on page 77, "This 'AN' cipher, later to be designated JN-25, was radically ..." (5) Holmes, in his Double-Edged Secrets uses "five-figure" exclusively thoroughout. (6) Wilford's Pearl Harbor Redefined, top of page 28 has: " ... to the USN as the 5-Numeral code, AN-1 code, ..." And, of course, (7) the "true copy" US Navy translation of SRN-116741 uses "Naval Code D" - an interesting message for several reasons."

Or, seven (7) specific citations to the IJN Operations Code - none being JN-25 (any version). From reference (2) above, Stinnett shows he clearly knows about "JN-25" but, more importantly, tells us why not to search the 1941 records for that nomenclature.

It's not clear to me what this is intended to explain or clarify, tho it smells like an apologia for Stinnett's ignorance of the JN-25 designator. It's not in question it was widely known as "5Num"; the question is, how could Stinnett not know "5Num" ="JN-25". Trekphiler 19:39, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

Stinnett correctly stresses "5Num" (or similar) and not JN-25 (any variant) for a very specific reason; clearly one that escapes you - or better, one for which you are not au fait. If you do not know that Stinnett "knows" the difference, then you seriously mis-read his book, i.e., if you read it at all. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.135.244.236 (talk) 22:05, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

"if you read it at all"? Stinnett makes a point in the book of denying he's ever heard of any connection between "5Num" & "JN-25" or being aware they're the same thing. "seriously mis-read his book"? He's so busy trying to find conspiracies, it's hard to take him seriously. He's contradicted by his own sources, & he can't see it. He can't get basic facts straight. And I misread him? Trekphiler 22:56, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

Your " ...denying he's ever heard of any connection between '5Num' & 'JN-25' ... " is demonstrably false. Another of your errant deletions above, from Stinnett, page 341, is found " ...and note 33, 'In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland.' " is, prima facie the "connection" which you erroneously deny. Stinnett knows the difference, and more over, the rationale.

When can we expect another contrition " ... I was wrong about that - again." anytime soon? Do brush up in this area - e.g., noodle SRN-116741! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.162.206.109 (talk) 11:05, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

Read it again. He expressly denies ever hearing of "5Num" being called JN-25; don't tell me it's not "Navy official", 'cause I never said it was. "noodle SRN-116741"? Bit hard, not living in DC... BTW, if you've got a beef with people using JN-25 (as you evidently do), blame Blair, Kahn, et al., who all call it that... Trekphiler 20:00, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

Your critical reading on this topic, even with those 25+ years you boast of, seem not to have profited you much. The 'hissy-fit" on Stinnett, now pointing to Kahn, ... is but another example. Kahn's citation in your yet another errant deletion has in fact the usage "Five numeral ..."

As to SRN-116741, in your lucubrations, and as a hint for you, See: Layton (which you should have read by now, and if not your lack of expertise is obvious), page 249, beginning with " ... But it is possible that OP-20-G ..." for a partial copy of this message. For a true and complete copy See: Rusbridger and Nave, Appendix 6, message beginning: "(da) KE SA 3 All Ships and Stations ..." If you are not aware of this text, another knock against your self-appointed expertise - your hole is getting deeper.

"So, now that you have "researched" SRN-116741 ... why is it so significant?" Good question. It doesn't bear on Stinnett's denial at all, so why are you making such a fuss? Or can't you stand your "hero" being flawed? Make a note. Kahn et al. have called it JN-25, whether always or not, and have continued to do so. So why is it Stinnett (our subject here, not the content of SRN-116741) denies knowing? Hell, he quotes Rochefort using JN-25, as if he (i.e., your hero) has never heard it before. Wherefore SRN-116741? (And don't count on me ever being contrite.) Trekphiler 06:09, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

Not to bore the readership, from above is " ...note 33, 'In 1941, the US Navy called the system the 5-Num code, not JN-25, according to Robert Hanyok, Center of Cryptologia History, Fort George C. Meade, Maryland.' Or, to the point, Stinnett wrote that note. Seems (a) he knows JN-25, and (b) also knows its many other designators and the dates that span their individual usage.

And, " ... don't count on me ever being contrite." As a remark - you already have been, lest you forget your "I was wrong about that." above. But, do keep digging. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:52, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

Bravo in your efforts to make this about me, instead of the content of the article. Trekphiler 13:24, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

If Im too brash with my changes let me know. I hope to to add more when time presents itself. I feel the page needs lots of work and clean up. I'd also like to better explain both sides of debate. Beware of fractured comments with ellipses from the usual suspect ScottS 10:08, 1 December 2007 (UTC) Scott

"If I'm (sic) too brash with my changes let me know." - will do. "I'd also like to better explain both sides of debate." - do let's, as facts are facts.

As a "test case" of intent and accuracy the two sides, and the tenets of Wikipedia's "Talk" page, consider two examples:

A. From the book review essay "Pearl Harbor Revisionism: Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit" by John C. Zimmerman (Intelligence and National Security, Volume 17, Number 2, Summer 2002, pages 127-146), on page 136, in the paragraph beginning "One of Stinnett's more controversial claims ...' is the sentence "However, all of the other Pearl Harbor literature calls it JN 25."

Is that Zimmerman sentence correct - Yes or No?

B. Jacobsen, comments on the testimony of Fabian, in Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Effort on JN-25B (Cryptolgoia, Volume 27, Issue 3, July 2003, pages 193-205). At the bottom of page 193, the ending sentence is "He also testified that all of their intelligence information came from traffic analysis, not cryptanalysis." This comment uses as its reference (footnote no. 5) the Hewitt Inquiry.

As taken from the Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry:

"Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic; rather than from the decryption of Jap messages."

Is Jacobsen misquoting Fabian's Hewitt Inquiry testimony - Yes or No? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 12:44, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

How many revisionist errors are highlighted within those texts? I would greatly suggest simply reading the FULL articles in the further reading section. Taking the just the first author mentioned as a test case, (upon reading the relevant text) who has made more errors. Zimmerman or Stinnett? The fact that you continue to focus on JN-25 terminology only highlights the shortcomings of your position. 67.126.206.163 16:26, 2 December 2007 (UTC) Last comment by Scott ScottS 16:27, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

For others an explanation. The problem is that Stinnett believes the terminology JN-25 is part of some sort of conspiracy. Stinnett believes that those who use JN-25 are (his own words "Unable to accept the truth and falsify the record." Over the history of Pearl Harbor works, very few authors in other Pearl Harbor literature solely refer to the code as a 5-Num” system or “Code Book D,”.

The 5-Num” system or “Code Book D is a designation that later changed to JN-25. But no authors have had some sort of ridiculous tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation of “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.”

Here is what author of "Battle of the Wits" Mr. Budiansky stated: I should also mention here that Mr. Stinnett has some tortured conspiracy theory that attempts to portray the designation “JN-25” as part of the “cover up.” In fact the documentary record is absolutely clear that the main Japanese Navy operational code, which Mr. Stinnett refers to as the “5-Num” system or “Code Book D,” is exactly the same code system that from 1942 on was usually designated by the U.S. as JN-25. Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25, regardless of the several different earlier designations that were used.

For more reading here is the last time he brought this point forward http://66.218.69.11/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=jamaskin+JN-25&fr=yfp-t-501&u=www.freerepublic.com/focus/user-posts%3Fid%3D125621&w=jamaskin+jn+25&d=DTQsDfL9Pp5W&icp=1&.intl=us ScottS 16:59, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

Seems there is just a partial reply to the "test case" - only question A being addressed. At the start of this "Talk" section is a list of seven citations, all non-JN 25. Zimmerman's qualifier of "all" is incorrect. There is an irony here, because on page 137 of Zimmerman's article are found "AN" and "AN-1" - so, in fact Zimmerman contradicts himself in his own article. [In your reply, you have "Everyone in the U.S. Navy who worked on it subsequently referred to it as JN-25,..." - suggest you check the publication date of Holmes text - as JN-25 never appears.]

To be noted also, question B is not addressed. So, is Jacobsen misquoting Fabian's testimony from the Hewitt Inquiry? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.162.112.48 (talk) 12:10, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

While that may be the case regarding Holmes it hardly undermines the position regarding Stinnetts pet JN-25 conspiracy theory. If your not going to address questions in return, then I'd say I'm quite happy with my current batting average. ScottS 17:54, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

Stinnett's point regarding JN25 is quite simple. He correctly stresses that the JN25 (in any variant) terminology was not used in 1941. He is in fact helping researchers by telling them not to waste their efforts by looking for the designation JN25 in the 1941 materials.

As the first "test case" reply was not as precise as it might have been, and is incomplete in not addressing item B (Yes, Jacobsen did misquote as shown.), but Budiansky was mentioned. A second "test case" may clarify and extend our consideration.

In a special issue focusing on INTELLIGENCE LIAISON - Liaison Among Nations, "Special Issue on American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000", Intelligence and National Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Summer 2000), with editors Stafford and Jeffreys-Jones, is a Budiansky article The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation, on pages 49-73.

Note 20, on page 71 of this article has:

"OG-20-GY, CNSG 5750/198, Crane Files. These files include month by month reports, each bearing a contemporaneous date-stamp, which tally OP-20-G's progress against JN-25 and all other codes that OP-20-G was working on throughout 1940 and 1941. JN-25 was at this time known as the 'AN' or the Japanese Navy 'Operations Code', and these reports unequivocally establish that the Operations Code was not being read by the United States prior to Pearl Harbor - unsubstantiated claims by Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorists to the contrary notwithstanding. See Stephen Budiansky, "Closing the Book on Pearl Harbor", Cryptologia, 24 (2000) pp.119-30"

Budiansky's cited usage is “AN” and not JN25A confirming Stinnett's point. “AN-1” (or JN25B) while also noted in the cited report, is not used in Budiansky's article..

Now, extending the scope, from The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing by David Kahn, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1967, page 47, is found:

"The information obtained, Rochefort said, 'was not in any sense vital.' Cavite was spottily reading JN25 messages - which revealed nothing about Pearl Harbor - until December 4, when the superencipherment was suddenly changed. ..."

The question: As Budiansky's " ... unequivocally establish that the Operations Code was not being read ..." is quite different from Dr. Kahn's " ... was spottily reading JN25 …” - one being mutually exclusive of the other - who is correct?

[N.B., From Dr. Kahn, it is December 4, 1941, and also note Cavite versus Corrigedor.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:41, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

"Stinnett's point regarding JN25 is quite simple. He correctly stresses that the JN25 (in any variant) terminology was not used in 1941. He is in fact helping researchers by telling them not to waste their efforts by looking for the designation JN25 in the 1941 materials."

Let's stick with the first point for now. It doesn't seem that simple. See quoted Stinnett ....believes that those who use JN-25 are (his own words "Unable to accept the truth and FALSIFY the record." We understand that JN25 wasn't terminology used in 1941 and wasn't used until early 1942. Why would Stinnett state that unless he thinks there's something more. Did he recently change his mind? He also stated: "By focusing on the wrong designator for Japan‘s naval code, Mr. Budiansky steers his readers in the wrong direction and prevents their accurate examination of Code Book D."

Also is there any reason why Stinnett mentions Budiansky having “close ties” to U.S. intelligence agencies.

I also see zero reply to my questions. Hmm... ScottS 15:44, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

So, as a recap from the about: (a) Zimmerman is incorrect, (b) Jacobsen misquotes, and (c) while Budiansky supports Stinnett's stance regarding JN25 usage in 1941, he is at variance with Dr. Kahn on the pre-Pearl Harbor JN25 messages read. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 16:46, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

I'm still waiting to finish the discussion on "a". Irony or not, YOU ARE the one who wanted to discuss "accuracy". ScottS 16:56, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Is the Zimmerman sentence referenced accurately quoted? Yes or No? Is the Zimmerman (simple declarative) sentence referenced correct? Yes or No? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:39, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

So you want a yes or no answer to a question you already know with the intent to fling mud rather than give people the context of the articles and debate? If you want a no answer (he was wrong) I'll be happy to give it. But I'm still waiting for more discussion and an answer. ScottS (talk) 17:40, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

Seems to me Stinnett is setting up a "straw man". By making it about whether it's "JN-25" or "Code Book D" or something else, he can avoid dealing with the substantive issue, i.e., there was nothing of consequence about Pearl Harbor in it. Not unlike th arguments above: apologia for Stinnett, not addressing the real issue. Trekphiler (talk) 08:12, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

Item A was a simple interrogative sentence. It was bounded as were the replies - "Yes" or "No." It simply asked a question about a sentence in Zimmmerman's article - nothing more and nothing less. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:20, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

Trekphiler, one suggestion is that it could be to mislead readers so that earlier JN-25A successes are applied to the more complicated JN-25B. Jamaskin here is taking the debate out of context and looking for any sort of victory he can get. Strawman is one good word out of many I would use in this little discussion.ScottS (talk) 16:57, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

"...in the paragraph beginning "One of Stinnett's more controversial claims ..." is the sentence "However, all of the other Pearl Harbor literature calls it JN 25." Or, one "context" explicitly and clearly provided. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:27, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

That must be why I had to explain the context. sigh....ScottS (talk) 16:51, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

Excepting your "context" (not to confuse the reader on JN25A and JN25B) is the wrong context. The proper context is that Stinnett is not making a controversial claim at all; Zimmerman is simply wrong in his assertion. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.244.43.222 (talk) 18:15, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

I think there's enough here for others to understand your disingenuous nature. ScottS (talk) 20:32, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

To the extent that you may now know the differences revealed in FOIA-released documents - perhaps. The difference between "blackout" versus "white out" redactions (from above) may be a step forward for you. Regarding FOIA, due credit is owned to Stinnett, Wilford, and others for their rigorous pursuit.

So, any surmise on why Sheet No. 94644 remains classified? Many FOIA requests for it have been denied. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:19, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

So what's your expiration date for non-sinister classification? 55 years 60 years...67.. years? ScottS (talk) 16:49, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

"non-sinister classification" ... ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 20:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

"Stinnett is not making a controversial claim at all"? That everyone who calls it JN-25 (including Rochefort, no less, who lost friends in the attack) is part of the conspiracy? Stinnett isn't making a controversial claim, he's making a lunitic claim. Not to mention his fundamental thesis implies Japanese incompetence & totally ignores the evidence of what FDR was actually doing (presumably because it's inconvenient to the conspiracy theory). Conspiracy is fashionable. Unfortunately for Stinnett et al., it's not nearly so commonplace as simple stupidity. Trekphiler (talk) 21:28, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

The "controversial claim" wording is Zimmerman's - not Stinnett. Zimmerman's statement is incorrect; the qualifier "all" makes it so, as the numerous references given show. Bounded question, bounded answer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 10:17, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

To others, see how this guy works. To jamaskin, I think you went to the Stinnett "Because I said so" school of debate. Your recent error was already pointed out to you. By the padding of your posts seems now your looking for a victory elsewhere. 68.125.142.2 (talk) 16:18, 8 December 2007 (UTC) ScottS (talk) 16:20, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

"... Stinnett 'Because I said so 'school of debate"? Perhaps Hegelian dialectic with supportive citations is more appropriate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 20:20, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

SRH-149

For those who are a bit curious and clearly at the will of the moderators, they might wish review the document found at "www.fas.org/irp/nsa/safford.pdf" (approx. 635 kb).

This is a document widely known in the Pearl Harbor lore as SRH-149 (SRH - Special Research History), and is of interest to many for several reasons, for example, the manpower levels applied to IJN codes in 1941, ..., etc.

It is titled A Brief History of Communications Intelligence in the United States, the author being Laurance F(rye). Safford, Captain, US Navy (Retired). This document's sub-title is Captain Safford's version of the pre-Pearl Harbor History, prepared 21-27 March 1952, (with special reference to coordination and cooperation).

Two items to note about this version of SRH-149:

(A) Title page for this document has "Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 10-27-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended." (E.O. 12958 - Executive Order No. 12958), and

(B) Within this "Declassified and approved for release by NSA ..." document, pages 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20 remain today heavily redacted.

(C) At the bottom of page 15 is a redacted message. It is an example to note - the Japanese send the same message twice, first "en clair" and then enciphered. So, for a document written in March 1952 (nearly 56 years ago) and partially declassified and released in October 2005 - just over two years ago - those who say ALL of the Pearl Harbor documents have long been - even decades ago - declassified and released into the public domain are incorrect.

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.44 (talk) 15:25, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

SMS

Question about "Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers" by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.

What does SMS mean? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.166.7.92 (talk) 11:10, 11 December 2007 (UTC) In the 1930s each command or ship in the Japanese Navy used a "one-up" reference system. A "one up" gave a consecutive number, 000 through 999 (and then repeated) for each successive administrative message. This reference number was called a Secret Message Serial number (SMS)ScottS (talk) 23:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

Radio Silence of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force Confirmed Again: The Saga of the Secret Message Serial (SMS) Numbers, by Philip H. Jacobsen, Crytpologia Volume 31, Number 3, July 2007, pages 223-232.

"Abstract:

By analyzing all the available Secret Message Serial (SMS) numbers originated by the Japanese CinC 1st Air Fleet, it is clear that no messages were sent by radio during the formation of the Strike Force during its transit to Hawaii. It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began. The Strike Force maintained strict radio silence and thus there was no Allied foreknowledge of the attack through radio communications - despite revisionist claims to the contrary."

A. Jacobsen's use of SMS is incorrect - twice. In the abstract and title (i.e., Secret Message Serial, an error which ScottS repeats) above as well as his review of Stinnett's Day of Deceit at www.amazon.com.(i.e., Station Message Serial), Jacobsen is wrong there also.

SMS stands for Secret Message Series. For an explanation of SMS's see Stinnett (paperback edition, Notes section, page 333, note 16). Note who Stinnett used to vouch for the meaning of SMS.

B. Further, "... By analyzing all the available ..." begs the question of those known but not available SMSs. These identified SMSs, even today are under FOIA requests as yet to be released to the public. Stinnett's note from above addresses this by commenting on a gap of thirteen messages in the SMS series, these being sequential messages. Such a gap gives pause to Jacobsen's claim of "confirmed" on its surface and his expertise suffers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 12:28, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Not that it matters, but I see nothing refuting Jacobsen's terminology. Stinnett's claims are between 606 and 620. Those dates are between Nov. 1 and Nov. 3. By looking at various other Secret Message Serial numbers in the article you can see the list of dates and numbers. ScottS (talk) 16:34, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Japanese on Radio Silence

From Jacobsen's abstract above is: "It was not until the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced that radio transmissions began."

Or beginning with the sortie from Hitokappu Wan until "bombs away" and the "Thunder Fish" launch - not a peep - all frequencies at all times. So says Jacobsen. [For a narrative of this attack, see "Torpedoing Pearl Harbor" by David Aiken, Military History December 2001 issue, pages 46-53, continued on 82.]

However, Jacobsen neglects some details. Some of these are from The Pearl Harbor Papers - Inside the Japanese Plans which provides another perspective - from the Japanese viewpoint.

Chapter 3, Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation AI written by Minoru Genda, on page 31, "... I will write some important points of it:

1. ...

2. Reconnoiter Lahaina Anchorage the night before the date of the attack by means of a submarine, and get a report.

3. ...

4. Reconnoitering the immediate front will be carried out by planes from the 8th Cruiser Division. The planes will not only search over Pearl Harbor but also the areas in the near vicinity. ..."

Chapter 4, Analysis No. 2 of the Pearl Harbor Attack again by Minoru Genda, page 40,

"We had already received a telegram from the dispatched submarine that the enemy fleet was not at Lahaina. ... On the seventh, when they come to 250 miles from Pearl Harbor, the two ships will send forth O-type sea planes for reconnaissance. All the fleet will act according to this certain information; the air raids on the eighth will be carried out."

Chapter 14, War Diary of the 5th Carrier Division, 1-31 December 1941 on page 225 is:

"From CO of 20 Subdiv, 1500 7 Dec., to COs of advance and Task Forces, received at 1606 7 Dec. (Telegram) The enemy fleet is not in the Lahaina anchorage. "

Chapter 15, War Diary of the 1st Destroyer Squadron, 1-31 December 1941, page 243:

"From skipper of I-72 on 1255 7 Dec., to Advance Force and Task Force, received on 1433 7 Dec. (Telegram) The enemy is not in the Lahaina anchorage. 1255 "

N.B., Dates and times were kept by the IJN relative to Toyko local time. Also, recall the placement of the International Date Line. And, within the book cited the usage of "signal" and "wireless" and "telegram" are not consist. The two messages above use telegram as a radio transmission. [Aiken also uses telegram.]

So, on the facts, provided from the Japanese "eyes" - Jacobsen is incorrect.

[Extant is a FOIA-released Station H Intercept Log is a 6Dec41 intercepted transmission from call sign WA HI 8 - a Kido Butai submarine.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.163.30.175 (talk) 13:19, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

Commander Genda who helped plan the attack stated "We kept absolute Radio Silence" I'm not interested in your poor speculation. Former Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka who was communications officer on the flagship Akagi, said he did not recall any ship dispatching a radio message before the attack. I see nothing in the Goldstein and Dillon "Pearl Harbor Papers" that refutes Radio Silence. Furthermore The Japanese after battle report clearly states "The success of the surprise operation was attributed to the following factors: ... 4. Concealment of the plan. ... STRICT RADIO SILENCE. In order to keep strict radio silence thorough steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strictest radio silence was perfectly carried out."

ScottS (talk) 16:50, 12 December 2007 (UTC)