Master–slave morality
Master-slave morality is a central theme of Friedrich Nietzsche's works, in particular the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality. Nietzsche argued that there were two fundamental types of morality: 'Master morality' and 'slave morality'. Master morality weighs actions on a scale of good or bad consequences unlike slave morality which weighs actions on a scale of good or evil intentions. What Nietzsche meant by 'morality' deviates from common understanding of this term. For Nietzsche, a particular morality is inseparable from the formation of a particular culture. This means that its language, codes and practices, narratives, and institutions are informed by the struggle between these two types of moral valuation. For Nietzsche, master-slave morality provides the basis of all exegesis of Western thought. With the Death of God, morality became historical: it was created by humankind, not by a transcendent deity. The strong-willed man created morality by valuation.
Master morality
Nietzsche defined master morality as the morality of the strong-willed. What is good is what is helpful; what is bad is what is harmful. Morality as such is sentiment. In the prehistoric state, "the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences"[1] but ultimately, "There are no moral phenomena at all, only moral interpretations of phenomena."[2] For these strong-willed men, the 'good' is the noble, strong and powerful, while the 'bad' is the weak, cowardly, timid and petty. The essence of master morality is nobility. Morality is designed to protect that which the strong-willed man values, and for slave and master, "Fear is the mother of morality."[3] Other qualities that are often valued in master moralities are open-mindedness, courage, truthfulness, trust and an accurate sense of self-worth. Master morality begins in the 'noble man' with a spontaneous idea of the good, then the idea of bad develops as what is not good. "The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords honour to things; it is value-creating."[4] In this sense, the master morality is the full recognition that oneself is the measure of all things. Insomuch as something is helpful to the strong-willed man it is like what he values in himself; therefore, the strong-willed man values such things as 'good'. Masters are creators of morality; slaves respond to master-morality with their slave-morality.
Slave morality
Unlike master morality which is sentiment, slave morality is literally re-sentiment--revaluing that which the master values. This strays from the valuation of actions based on consequences to the valuation of actions based on "intention".[5] As master morality originates in the strong, slave morality originates in the weak. Because slave morality is a reaction to oppression, it villainizes its oppressors. Slave morality is the inverse of master morality. As such, it is characterized by pessimism and skepticism. Slave morality is created in opposition to what master morality values as 'good'. Slave morality does not aim at exerting one's will by strength but by careful subversion. It does not seek to transcend the masters, but to make them slaves as well. The essence of slave morality is utility[6]: the good is what is most useful for the whole community, not the strong. Nietzsche saw this as a contradiction, "And how could there exist a 'common good'! The expression is a self-contradiction: what can be common has ever been but little value. In the end it must be as it has always been: great things are for the great, abysses for the profound, shudders and delicacies, for the refined, and, in sum, all rare things for the rare."[7] Since the powerful are few in number compared to the masses of the weak, the weak gain power by corrupting the strong into believing that the causes of slavery (viz., the will to power) are 'evil', as are the qualities they originally could not choose because of their weakness. By saying humility is voluntary, slave morality avoids admitting that their humility was in the beginning forced upon them by a master. Biblical principles of turning the other cheek, humility, charity, and pity are the result of universalizing the plight of the slave onto all humankind, and thus enslaving the masters as well. "The democratic movement is the heir to Christianity."[8]--the political manifestation of slave morality because of its obsession with freedom and equality.
- "...the Jews achieved that miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination--their prophets fused 'rich', 'godless', 'evil', 'violent', 'sensual' into one and were the first to coin the word 'world' as a term of infamy. It is this inversion of values (with which is involved the employment of the word for 'poor' as a synonym for 'holy' and 'friend') that the significance of the Jewish people resides: with them there begins the slave revolt in morals."[9]
Society
This struggle between master and slave moralities recurs historically. According to Nietzsche, ancient Greek and Roman societies were grounded in master morality. The Homeric hero is the strong-willed man, and the classical roots of the Iliad and Odyssey exemplified Nietzsche's master morality. He calls the heroes "men of a noble culture"[10], giving a substantive example of master morality. Historically, master morality was defeated as the slave morality of Christianity spread throughout the Roman Empire.
According to Nietzsche, the essential struggle between cultures has always been between the Roman (master, strong) and the Judean (slave, weak). He condemns the triumph of slave morality in the West, saying that the democratic movement is the "collective degeneration of man"[11]. Nietzsche claimed that the nascent democratic movement of his time was essentially slavish and weak[citation needed]. Weakness conquered strength, slave conquered master, re-sentiment conquered sentiment. This resentment Nietzsche calls "priestly vindictiveness", which is the jealousy of the weak seeking to enslave the strong with itself. Such movements were, to Nietzsche, inspired by "the most intelligent revenge" of the weak. Nietzsche saw democracy and Christianity as the same emasculating impulse which sought to make all equal -- to make all slaves.
References
- ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 62. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 96. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 123. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967). On The Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage Books. p. 39. ISBN 0-679-72462-1.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 63. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 122. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 71. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 125. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 118. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 153. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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(help) - ^ Nietzsche, Friedrich (1973). Beyond Good and Evil. London: Penguin Books. p. 127. ISBN 978-0-140-44923-5.
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- Solomon, Robert C. and Clancy Martin. 2005. Since Socrates: A Concise Sourcebook of Classic Readings. London: Thomson Wadsworth. ISBN 0-534-6332805.