Talk:T-10 tank

Duplicate

A duplicate of this article (I think) allready exsisted at Iosef Stalin tank. I'm no expert on tanks but from what I gather these are the same things. One should be merged into the other. I reccomend the stalin tank be moved here, but what do I know. Also the histories may need to be merged. I'd like some input from someone who knows anything about these tanks. (cross posted to the other article) BrokenSegue 04:37, 29 Mar 2005 (UTC)

They are related but different things, the T-10 was the finally development of that tank line. In this case I think it is better to have this as a seperate rather then with others. Muchenhaeser 21:46, 3 Apr 2005 (UTC)

So they have told on the other talk page. Thanks, I guess I just was confused,. BrokenSegue 01:25, 4 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Reverting

Muchenhaeser, I've reverted your last changes. I've tried to incorporate your additions as much as possible in my previous edits.

Now you're just adding incorrect information (there was no "rise of ATGMs" in the '50s and '60s; making "fewer" tanks doesn't help them "resist ATGM attack methods", and in fact the Soviets fielded more independent tank units), irrelevant info (U.S. introduction of the ATGM-launching Sheridan tank in 1966 didn't affect the Soviet phase-out of obsolescent heavy tanks which was already planned for years; no one was even considering building still heavier heavy tanks), and continuing to ignore spelling and the rules of grammar. —Michael Z. 2005-04-4 07:58 Z

I to incorporated your changes, then you removed them after so I have again had to re-incoporate them- I aplogize for the time before last where I did not check it and there were errors. As for the issue, The deployment of ATGMs (I dont just mean the sheridan) meant it was more usefull to deploy more, more mobile tanks. They Soviets were developing them as well, and they new that ATGMs could be made large enough to destroy medium or heavy tank regardless. The other issue, certainly, was it was very difficult to actually make a tank significantly more armored then the other MBTs due to the size and weight restrictions of the army's eqipment. Muchenhaeser 22:16, 4 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I've reverted again, Muchenhaeser. You're latest edits changed the sense of some factual information, added irrelevant fact, broke up the narrative flow of the section, and repeated a paragraph; essentially they left the article worse than before.

But mainly, I disagree that there are "competeting theories as to why this choice was made". If you can find a serious reference that supports the theory that heavy tanks were taken out of service in response to deployment of ATGMs, then I'll let it stay in.

• Bryan Perret, Soviet Armour Since 1945. (1987) Blandford Press, London. ISBN 0-7137-1735-1

According to p. 25, last paragraph of the chapter "The immediate post-war tank arsenal", which deals in part with heavy tanks:

The engagements of the Six-Day War, especially that at Rafah, merely emphasised what the Soviet Army already knew, namely that the heavy tank had had its day. Gun and ammunition technology had advanced so rapidly that the performance of the now-elderly 122 mm weapon was inferior to that of the 115 mm gun which armed the T-62 medium tank, while the British L7 105 mm gun adopted by NATO armies was quite capable of penetrating the armour of the IS-3 and T-10 at long range. Further, the lower speed of the heavy tanks rendered them incompatible with the sort of high-mobility operations for which the latest generation of Russian main battle tanks had been designed. By 1967 the process of withdrawing them from the first line of service was in hand, although large numbers of chassis were converted for use as missile carriers.

—Michael Z. 2005-04-5 15:07 Z

I did not disagree about this point, certainly the T-10 was outdated by then. However, this does not support your other ideas about heavy tanks (nor mine), nor how the newer heavy tank designs would have faired that were not put into production. I think its better if we stick to simpler information. I will add that quote though, that is a good one for the page. Muchenhaeser 17:41, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

What other ideas? This author directly states that the Soviets considered heavy tanks obsolete as a class, because of their basic characteristics ([im]balance of mobility, firepower, protection), and doesn't mention ATGMs. There's no point in replacing part of the article which already says this with a long quotation. —Michael Z. 2005-04-5 18:10 Z

Well maybe I haven't been understanding your point right (such as about wwii etc), but there is a big difference between declaring the heavy tanks of 1950s obsolete as compared to the medium tanks of 20 years later, which is what he was saying, as he did not mention newer heavy prototype designs. The newer MBTs may have been more advanced then the older T-10 in terms of armor and firepower, but this is ongoing trend and older "heavy" tanks had been passed from service as well (such as the KV-1). He compares the the weapons tech to the older T-10, but you know yourself there were better guns and bigger heavy tanks- just not in production. I agree though the quote could probably be trimmed down. Muchenhaeser 20:56, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

He wasn't declaring that a particular tank's technology was too old. He was saying that the Soviets realized that doctrine of using heavy tanks was obsolete.

I suspect the only advantage of the newer experimental tanks' 130 mm gun (a re-purposed old naval gun) was a larger HE charge for anti-personnel fire—I doubt it was a much more effective antitank weapon. And the larger ammunition would have probably reduced the ammo load and rate of fire to make the tank less effective than an IS-3 or T-10. They would also have had some perceived value to counter U.S. and UK heavies, but those were only built in very small numbers.

But the point isn't comparing the detailed characteristics of particular tank models, or incremental changes between successive versions. The people setting military doctrine in the 1950s & '60s would be considering heavy tanks as a class, and how they are employed by division commanders and above, in an asymmetrical war. They were planning for a war of bypass and attrition against NATO, while advancing across Europe at top speed, based on the practical lessons learned in the final advance on Germany. To them, the T-10 was today's IS-3 (and the Obiekt 770 was tomorrow's KV-1).

And none of the heavy tanks characteristics were very useful to them in such a war. Long range sniping at tanks? Hard to spot dug-in targets at 2,000 m during an advance. Powerful armour-piercing capability? Enemy strong points and heavy armour could be outmanoeuvred, flanked, bypassed, or if necessary, simply overwhelmed by many more medium tanks. large-calibre HE-frag for use against soft targets? A medium tank or two, that could put twice as many rounds on target, is more flexible and effective. Heavy armour? Makes it slow. Slow? Don't want it. It's significant that in the 1980s, the heavy tank's previous role was given to the T-80, the fastest MBT in the Soviet arsenal (in the world, probably).

Heavy tanks would continue to be too slow to keep up with the medium tanks and infantry carriers in an offensive conflict. And the faster mediums could carry a gun that was as effective. If a heavy tank is 150% as effective as a medium tank (yes, they generalized effectiveness that way), and in an advance only 50% of them will make it to a battle when it counts, then they are no good at all. And if a factory could build 125% as many medium tanks, and each medium tank could get 150% as many rounds off in an engagement...

And if the Soviets could have made decisions in WWII with the perspective of history, they probably would have not taken the time to re-tool factories to produce IS tanks, but would have built an extra 15,000 T-34/85s instead. (I know that's oversimplified, since the IS tanks inherited a lot of KV technology.)

To sum up, heavy tanks weren't good to "get there the fustest, with the mostest".

Yes, eventually ATGMS would enter into the equation, too. And a battlefield full of ATGMs would slightly favour a faster tank. But the Soviets already had lots of reasons to stick to more mobile tanks, starting from the last half of 1943.

ATGMs are also relevant from the Soviets' side, too. In the 1960s the long-range firepower of heavy tanks were partly replaced by infantry units' organic capability, by having an ATGM on every BMP. In the '70s, this capability was extended to the MBTs, in combination with their superior fire control. Still later, light reactive armour would also make a lighter tank as well-protected against ATGMs as a heavy, but by this time the point was totally moot. —Michael Z. 2005-04-5 22:48 Z

Ok you convinced me, I still believe the things I have read about the ATGMs but that was a very good analysis about the heavy tanks. You have convinved me about the heavy tank theory you presented, at least for a offensive war situation you describe there. So I guess add back in your theory- I will say though, that I dont think you need talk about WWII and that it would be good to keep the mention of the 770. Anyway 'tank' you for that perspective. Muchenhaeser 00:08, 6 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for keeping an open mind. And sorry for the long essay, but I wouldn't write so much if I didn't care. Cheers, Michael Z. 2005-04-6 18:35 Z

The discussion here is very interesting, but I want to correct some statements. Firstly, the soviet 130mm gun wasn't only a very powerful anti-infantry weapon and anti-fortification weapon, it was also the strongest anti-tank weapon of the time. So the next generation of soviet heavy tanks was also tasked to destroy ennemy tanks, but it was not their primary task. Secondly, You seem to think that the soviet WWII heavy tanks were not useful. In fact, they were very useful. In 1943, the soviet were in heavy need of a heavy vehicule to attack and destroy the nazi's fortifications. They were also in need of a tank that could fight at a equal term the Tiger and the panther. The T-34/85 was able to fight the panther and the Tiger (but not the King-Tiger), but it was not enough powerful to destroy the german's bunkers. So, at the time, a heavy tank was the best compromise because a heavy assault gun like the SU-152 was not enough mobile and flexible to fight tanks as they lack turrets and medium tanks were not enough powerful to be armed with heavy guns (the projects of rearming T-34/85 with 100mm and 122mm guns failed although they were post-IS-2 projects. But, after the war medium tanks became enough powerful to be armed with large caliber guns and heavy armor. By exemple, the T-55 is armed with a 100mm gun and the front of his turret is better protected than the IS-3's turret. At this time, the heavy tanks became obsolescent, but before that they were useful. Remember that the IS-2 was a heavy breakthrough tank, not like german's heavy tanks that were supposed to be anti-tank weapons. Kovlovsky

I'd like to learn more about the Soviet heavy tanks. It seems that right from 1939 they were continually in danger of being cancelled throughout the war, but through continual upgrades or design changes they managed to remain useful and stayed in service well into the late 20th century. —Michael Z. 2006-07-01 08:27 Z

Use of

T-10s (like the IS tanks they replaced) were deployed in independent tank regiments belonging to armies, and independent tank battalions belonging to divisions. These independent tank units could be attached to mechanized units, to support infantry operations and perform breakthroughs.

Thi is not exactly right. Until 1955 heavy tanks were a part of the tank divisions as one of three line tank regiments. Between 1955 and 1958 the regiments were regrouped into eight heavy tank divisions. These divisions were disbanded in early 1960s and individual battalions were assigned to Fortified Regions mostly along the chinese border at a rate of four battalions (four companies each) per region. Because there were insufficient number of heavy tanks, some T-34-85s were also used.--Mrg3105 02:34, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

I don't think that "T-10 served with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, Egypt, North Vietnam, and Syria" as stated in the last section. All known (to me) russian sources claim that T-10s were never ever exported anywhere. What happened I think, that the israelis counted some destroyed (and disfigured) arabian IS-3s as T-10s. 195.98.64.69 02:18, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

How many T-10s built?

How many T-10s were built after all? The infobox says 8,000, but it also says in the production history section that some 6000 Soviet heavy tanks were built after WWII (including IS-2, IS-3 and T-10).

Names

Don't know if this is relevant or not but in russia it is called the IP-8, IP-9, IP-10 or EC-8