Battle of Shiloh

Battle of Shiloh
	Part of the American Civil War
Date	April 6 – April 7 1862
Location	Hardin County, Tennessee
Result	Union victory
Belligerents
United States of America	Confederate States of America
Commanders and leaders
Ulysses S. Grant; Don Carlos Buell	Albert Sidney Johnston†; P.G.T. Beauregard
Strength
Army of West Tennessee (48,894) and; Army of the Ohio (17,918)	Army of Mississippi (44,699)
Casualties and losses
13,047 (1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, 2,885 captured/missing)	10,694 (1,723 killed, 8,012 wounded, 959 captured/missing)

The Battle of Shiloh, also known as the Battle of Pittsburg Landing, was a major battle in the Western Theater of the American Civil War, fought on April 6 and April 7 1862, in southwestern Tennessee. Confederate forces under Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard launched a surprise attack against the Union army of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and came close to defeating his army and blocking his invasion of Tennessee. Fierce Union resistance and the arrival of reinforcements from Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell turned the tide on April 7 and the Confederates were forced to retreat from the bloodiest battle in United States history up to that time.

Background and opposing forces

After the losses of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston withdrew his forces into western Tennessee, northern Mississippi, and Alabama to reorganize. In early March, Union Maj. Gen. man], commander of the Western Theater, responded by ordering Grant to advance his Army of West Tennessee (soon after the battle to be known by its more famous name, the Army of the Tennessee) on an invasion up the Tennessee River. (Due to professional and personal animosity toward Grant, Halleck initially designated Grant's subordinate, Maj. Gen. C.F. Smith, to lead the expedition, while Grant sat idly at Fort Henry. After President Lincoln intervened with Halleck and Smith was injured, Grant was restored to full command.)

Grant's orders from Halleck were to hook up with Buell's Army of the Ohio, marching from Nashville, and advance south in a joint offensive to seize the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, a vital supply line between the Mississippi Valley, Memphis, and Richmond.

Grant's army of 48,894 men^[1] consisted of six divisions, led by Maj. Gens. John A. McClernand, and Lew Wallace, and Brig. Gens. W.H.L. Wallace, Stephen A. Hurlbut, William T. Sherman, and Benjamin M. Prentiss. Five of the divisions were encamped on the western edge of the Tennessee River. Grant developed a reputation during the war for being more concerned with his own plans than with those of the enemy. His encampment at Pittsburg Landing displayed his most consequential lack of such concern—his army was spread out in bivouac style, many around the small log church named Shiloh (the Hebrew word that means "place of peace"), spending time waiting for Buell with drills, without entrenchments or other awareness of defensive measures. Lew Wallace's division was 5 miles downstream (north) at Crump's Landing, a position intended to prevent the placement of Confederate river batteries and to strike out at the railroad line at Bethel Station.

Buell's army of 17,918 men^[1] was a long way from Shiloh on the eve of battle. His four divisions were led by Brig. Gens. Alexander M. McCook, William "Bull" Nelson, Thomas L. Crittenden, and Thomas J. Wood.

On the Confederate side, Johnston named his newly assembled force the Army of Mississippi.^[2]He concentrated almost 55,000 men around Corinth, Mississippi, about 20 miles southwest of Grant's position. Of these, 44,699^[1] departed from Corinth on April 3, hoping to surprise Grant before Buell arrived to join forces. They were organized into four large corps, commanded by:

Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, with two divisions under Brig. Gen. Charles Clark and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham
Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, with two divisions under Brig. Gens. Daniel Ruggles and Jones M. Withers
Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, with three brigades under Brig. Gens. Thomas C. Hindman, Patrick Cleburne, and Sterling A. M. Wood
Brig. Gen. John C. Breckenridge, in reserve, with three brigades under Cols. Robert Trabue and Winfield S. Stratham, and Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen, and attached cavalry

Johnston's second in command was P.G.T. Beauregard, who urged Johnston to attack Grant. The plan was to attack Grant's left and separate the Union army from its gunboat support (and avenue of retreat) on the Tennessee River, driving it west into the swamps of Snake and Owl Creeks, where it could be destroyed.

Johnston's attack on Grant was originally planned for April 4, but the advance was delayed 48 hours. As a result, Beauregard feared that the element of surprise had been lost and recommended withdrawing to Corinth. But Johnston refused to consider retreat.

Battle, April 6

At 6:00 a.m. on April 6 1862, Johnston's army was deployed for battle, straddling the Corinth Road. In fact, the army had spent the entire night bivouacking undetected in order of battle just two miles away from the Union camps. Their approach and dawn assault achieved almost total strategic and tactical surprise. The Union army had virtually no patrols in place for early warning. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the night of April 5, "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." Unfortunately for Grant, his preparedness was greatly overstated. Sherman, Grant's senior commander in the encampment, refused to believe that the Confederates were anywhere nearby; he discounted any possibility of an attack from the south, expecting that Johnston would eventually attack from the direction of Purdy, Tennessee, to the west. Sherman should have known something was up. Early that morning Benjamin Prentiss had sent forward part of the 25th Missouri Infantry on a reconnaissance, and they became engaged with Confederate outposts at 5:15 a.m. The spirited fight that ensued did help a little to get Union troops better positioned, but the command of the Union army was figuratively asleep that morning.

Faulty planning on Johnston's part reduced the effectiveness of the attack. There were insufficient forces on the Confederate right to roll up the Union from that direction as planned. The corps of Hardee and Bragg began the assault with their divisions in one long line. As these units advanced, they became intermingled and difficult to control. Corps commanders attacked in line without reserves. Beauregard, serving in the rear as second in command, ordered the corps of Polk and Breckenridge forward on the left and right of the line, diluting their effectiveness. The attack turned into a simple, but massive, frontal assault, with insufficient mass to break through.

The assault was nevertheless ferocious, and in its face, some of the many inexperienced Union soldiers of Grant's new army fled for safety to the Tennessee River. Others fought well, but were forced to withdraw under strong pressure and attempted to form new defensive lines. McClernand's division temporarily stabilized the position. Overall, however, Johnston's forces made steady progress until noon, rolling up Union positions one by one.

General Grant himself was downriver about ten miles on a gunboat at Savannah, Tennessee, that morning. (On April 4, Grant had been injured when his horse fell, pinning him underneath. He was convalescing and unable to move without crutches.) He heard the sound of artillery fire and raced to the battlefield, arriving about 8:30 a.m. He worked frantically to bring up reinforcements that were nearby: Bull Nelson's division from across the river at the Landing; Lew Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. These reserves did not arrive hastily, however, due (perhaps) to decisions Wallace made.

Wallace's group had been left as reserves near Crump's Landing at a place called Stoney Lonesome to the rear of the Union line. Almost immediately after the appearance of the Confederates, Grant sent orders for Wallace to move his unit up to support Sherman, who was being hammered. Wallace later claimed there was ambiguity to Grant's order and he took a route different from the one Grant intended. Wallace arrived at the end of his march only to find that Sherman had been forced back, and was no longer where Wallace thought he was. Moreover, the battle line had moved so far that Wallace now found himself in the rear of the advancing Southern troops. A messenger arrived with word that Grant was wondering where Wallace was, and why he had not arrived at Pittsburg Landing, where the Union was making its stand. Wallace was confused. He felt sure he could viably launch an attack from where he was and hit the Confederates in the rear. Nevertheless, he decided to turn his troops around and march back to Stoney Lonesome. For some reason, rather than realign his troops so that the rear guard would be in the front, Wallace chose to march the troops in a circle so that the original order was maintained, only facing in the other direction. Wallace marched back to Stoney Lonesome and then to Pittsburg Landing, not arriving at Grant's position until about 7 p.m., at a time when the fighting was practically over. Grant was not pleased.

On the main Union defensive line, starting at about 9:00 a.m., about 2,500 men of Prentiss's division established and held a position nicknamed the Hornet's Nest, in a field along a road now popularly called the "sunken road", although there is no physical justification for that name. The Confederates assaulted the position for several hours rather than simply bypassing it; the latter course would have been a more sound tactical and strategic decision. The Confederates suffered heavy casualties during these assaults. The Union forces to the left and right of the Nest were forced back under the weight of the continued pressure and Prentiss's position became a salient in the line. Coordination among units in the Nest was poor and units withdrew based solely on their individual commanders' decisions. Regiments became disorganized and companies disintegrated. However, it was not until the attackers assembled 62 cannons to blast the line that they were able to surround the position and the Hornet's Nest fell after holding for seven hours. A large part of Prentiss's division was captured, but their sacrifice bought time for Grant to establish a final defense line near Pittsburg Landing.

On the Union right flank, resistance was stiff and Johnston's forces bogged down in a savage fight around Shiloh Church. Throughout the day, the Confederates repeatedly assaulted the Union right, which gave ground but did not break.

The Union survivors established a solid front around Pittsburg Landing, including a ring of over 50 cannons, and repulsed the last Confederate charge as dusk ended the first day of fighting. Naval guns from the river assisted the defense. The Confederates' plan had failed; they had pushed Grant to a defensible position on the river, not forced him west into the swamps.

In another setback, Johnston was mortally wounded at about 2:30 p.m. while personally leading attacks on the Union left. He had sent his personal surgeon away to care for troops, and in the doctor's absence, he bled to death from a leg wound that did not seem serious at first. This was a significant loss for the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis considered Albert Sidney Johnston to be the most effective general they had. (This was two months before Robert E. Lee emerged as the pre-eminent Confederate general.) Beauregard assumed command.

The evening of April 6 was a dispiriting end to the first day of one of the bloodiest battles in U.S. history. In the Civil War, medics were not sent into the field to collect and treat wounded soldiers. Hence, many soldiers were abandoned to bleed to death, or in the case of Shiloh, be eaten alive by scavenging animals as a thunderstorm went through the area. The desperate screams of soldiers could be heard in the Union and Confederate camps throughout the night. As the exhausted Confederate soldiers bedded down in the abandoned Union camps, Sherman encountered Grant under a tree, sheltering himself from the pouring rain, smoking one of his cigars, considering his losses and planning for the next day. Sherman remarked, "Well, Grant, we've had the devil's own day, haven't we?" Grant looked up. "Yes," he replied, followed by a puff. "Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though."

Grant had reason to be optimistic, for Don Carlos Buell's army had arrived that evening, in time to turn the tide the next day.

April 7

On April 7 1862, the combined Union armies numbered 55,000 men. Beauregard had planned to continue the attack and drive Grant into the river, unaware that he was now outnumbered. Union forces started attacking at dawn; Grant and Buell launched their attacks separately and coordination occurred only down at the division level. Confederate lines stabilized around 9:00 a.m. By 10:00, the Union attack proceeded in concert along the entire line. The weight of the attack, which included the efforts of 25,000 fresh troops, was too much for the Confederates to withstand.

Realizing that he had lost the initiative, and that he was low on ammunition and food and with 15,000 of his men killed, wounded, or missing, Beauregard knew he could go no further. He withdrew beyond Shiloh Church, using Breckenridge as a covering force, and began marching back to Corinth. The exhausted Union soldiers did not pursue much past their original encampments. The battle was over.

Aftermath

On April 8, Grant sent Sherman south along the Corinth Road in pursuit of the retreating Confederates. Meeting resistance from the cavalry screen under Nathan Bedford Forrest, Sherman abandoned the pursuit.

In late April and May the Union armies, under Halleck's personal command, advanced slowly toward Corinth and captured it (the Siege of Corinth), while an amphibious force on the Mississippi River destroyed the Confederate River Defense Fleet and captured Memphis. From these bases Grant pushed on down the Mississippi to besiege Vicksburg. After the surrender of Vicksburg and the fall of Port Hudson in the summer of 1863, the Mississippi was under Union control and the Confederacy was cut in half. Command of the Army of Mississippi fell to Braxton Bragg, promoted to full general as of April 6. He would lead it in the fall on an unsuccessful invasion of Kentucky, culminating in his retreat from the Battle of Perryville.

The two-day battle of Shiloh, the costliest in U.S. history up to that time, resulted in the defeat of the Confederate army and frustration of Johnston's plans to prevent the joining of the two Union armies in Tennessee. A total of 23,741 men were killed, wounded, captured, or missing, more than the American casualties of the American Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War combined. The dead included the army's commander, Albert Sidney Johnston; the highest ranking Union general killed was W.H.L. Wallace. Both sides were shocked at the carnage. Little did they know that three more years of such bloodshed remained in the war and that eight larger and bloodier battles were yet to come. Grant learned a valuable lesson on preparedness that (mostly) served him well for the rest of the war.

References

Daniel, Larry. Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War, Simon and Schuster, 1997, ISBN 0684838575.
Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
Hanson, Victor Davis, Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think, Doubleday, 2003, ISBN 0385504004.
McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States), Oxford University Press, 1988, ISBN 0-195-03863-0.

Notes

^ ^a ^b ^c Eicher, p. 222.
^ During the battle, correspondence referred to the army as the Army of the Mississippi, deviating from the general rule that only Union armies were named after rivers. It was also sometimes referred to as the Army of the West. The army was activated on March 5 1862, and was renamed by Braxton Bragg as the Army of Tennessee in November.

External links

Template:Geolinks-US-streetscale

Shiloh Order of Battle

[eicher222-1] Eicher, p. 222.

[2] During the battle, correspondence referred to the army as the Army of the Mississippi, deviating from the general rule that only Union armies were named after rivers. It was also sometimes referred to as the Army of the West. The army was activated on March 5 1862, and was renamed by Braxton Bragg as the Army of Tennessee in November.

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