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In moral and political philosophy, a throffer is a proposal (also called an intervention) that mixes an offer and a threat. A person presents a throffer when they make an offer that is wedded to a threat they will carry out if the offer is not accepted. The term was first used by political philosopher Hillel Steiner, in the 1970s, and other writers followed. However, not all philosophers and social scientists use the term. Though the threatening aspect of a throffer does not need to be obvious, and may not be articulated at all, an overt example of a throffer is

Kill this man and receive £100—fail to kill him and I'll kill you.[1]

Steiner differentiated offers, threats and throffers based on the manner in which compliance and non-compliance with the intervention differed from the norm in terms of preferability for the subject of the intervention. Steiner's account was criticised by philosopher Robert Stevens, who instead suggested that what was important in differentiating the kinds of intervention was whether performing and not performing the requested action was more or less preferable than it would have been were no intervention made. Other accounts have been offered by moral and political philosopher Kristján Kristjánsson and philosopher and legal theorist Micheal R. Rhodes. Kristjánsson's much broader account attests that any statement of the form "if and only if" is a throffer, as, while presenting an option ("if"), it serves to limit other options ("only if"). Rhodes is concerned with the question of what serves to motivate the agent who receives the proposal. With throffers, for Rhodes, it is always difficult or even impossible to determine whether an agent is motivated by the offer or the threat aspect of the proposal.

Throffers form part of the wider moral and political considerations of coercion, and form part of the question of the possibility of coercive offers. Contrary to received wisdom that only threats can be coercive, philosopher of law John Kleinig cites throffers lacking explicit threats as an example of coercive offers, while writers such as political philosopher Jonathan Riley and social philosopher Ian Hunt arguing that offers, threats and throffers may all be coercive if certain conditions are met. For legal theorist Peter Westen and philosopher of law H. L. A. Hart, by contrast, if a throffer is coercive, it is explicitly the threat aspect that makes it so. The pair also claim that not all throffers can be considered coercive.

Origin and usage

The term, which is a portmanteau of the words threat and offer,[2] was first used by philosopher Hillel Steiner in an article in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in volume 75, 1974–75.[3] Steiner considered the phrase "I'm gonna make him an offer he can't refuse" from The Godfather, which may initially seem to present an amusing irony precisely because watchers are able to recognise that the character is making a threat, not an offer. Steiner, however, was unhappy with claiming merely that an offer and a threat can be differentiated on the grounds that one promises to confer a benefit and one promises to confer a penalty, and so coined the term.[4] The "offer" that is made in The Godfather is, in fact, a throffer.[5] Political scientist Michael Taylor followed Steiner in using the term,[6] and he has been cited in place of Steiner.[7] The term has not been universally adopted; Michael R. Rhodes notes that there has been some "controversy" in the literature on whether to use throffer,[8] citing a number of writers, including Lawrence A. Alexander,[9] David Zimmerman[10] and Daniel Lyons,[11] who do not use the term.[12]

Definitions

In addition to Steiner's original account of throffers, other authors have offered definitions and ideas on how to differentiate throffers from threats and offers.

Steiner's account

In the article that introduces the term throffer, Steiner considers the difference between interventions in the form of a threat and those in the form of an offer. He concludes that the two are differentiated based on how the consequences of compliance or non-compliance differ for the subject of the intervention. For an offer, such as "you may use my car whenever you like", the consequence of compliance "represents a situation which is preferred to the norm." Non-compliance, that is, not taking up the offer of the use of the car, is identical to the norm, and so neither more nor less preferable. Threats, on the other hand, are characterised by compliance that leads to an outcome less preferable to the norm, with non-compliance leading to an outcome less desirable still. For instance, if someone is threatened with "your money or your life", compliance would lead to them losing their money, while non-compliance would lead to them losing their life. Both are less desirable than the norm (that is, not being threatened at all), but, for the subject of the threat, losing money is more desirable than being killed. A throffer is a third kind of intervention. It differs from both a threat and an offer, as compliance is preferable to the norm, while non-compliance is less preferable than the norm.[1]

For Steiner, all of offers, threats and throffers affect the practical deliberations of their recipient in the same way. What is significant for the subject of the intervention is not the extent to which the consequences of compliance or non-compliance differ in desirability from the norm, but the extent to which they differ in desirability from each other. This means that it is not the case that an offer necessarily exerts less influence on its recipient than a threat. The strength of the force exerted by an intervention depends upon the difference in desirability between compliance and non-compliance alone, regardless of the manner of the intervention.[13]

Stevens's account

Responding to Steiner, Robert Stevens provides examples of what he categorises variously as offers, threats and throffers that fail to meet Steiner's definitions. He gives an example of an intervention he considers a throffer, as opposed to a threat, but in which both compliance and non-compliance are less preferable to the norm. The example is that of someone who makes the demand "either you accept my offer of a handful of beans for your cow, or I kill you". For the subject, keeping the cow is preferred to both compliance and non-compliance with the throffer. Using this and other examples, Stevens argued that Steiner's account of differentiating the three kinds of interventions is incorrect.[2]

In its place, Stevens suggests that determining whether an intervention is a throffer depends not on the desirability of compliance and non-compliance when compared to the norm, but on the desirability of the actions entailed in compliance or non-compliance when compared with what their desirability would have been were no intervention made. He proposes that a throffer is made if P attempts to encourage Q to do A by increasing "the desirability to Q of Q doing A relative to what it would have been if P made no proposal and decrease the desirability to Q of Q doing not-A relative to what it would have been if P made no proposal". An offer, by contrast, increases the desirability to Q of Q doing A compared to how it would have been without P's intervention, leaving the desirability to Q of Q doing not-A as it would have been. A threat decreases the desirability to Q of Q doing not-A compared to what it would have been without P's intervention, while leaving the desirability to Q of Q doing A as it would have been.[14]

Stevens's account of Q's attempts to motivate P to do A
Q's intervention is a(n)... ...if Q believes that P feels...
...doing A... ...not doing A...
...before the intervention... ...after the intervention... ...before the intervention... ...after the intervention...
...offer... ...is less preferable than after. ...is more preferable than before. ...is equally preferable to after. ...is equally preferable to before.
...threat... ...is equally preferable to after. ...is equally preferable to before. ...is more preferable than after. ...is less preferable than before.
...throffer... ...is less preferable than after. ...is more preferable than before. ...is more preferable than after. ...is less preferable than before.

Kristjánsson's account

Kristján Kristjánsson differentiates threats and offers by explaining that the former is a proposal that creates an obstacle, while the latter is one kind of proposal (another example being a request) that does not.[15] He also draws a distinction between tentative proposals and final proposals, which he feels prior authors ignored.[16] A tentative proposal does not logically create any kind of obstacle for its subject, and, as such, is an offer. For instance, "if you fetch the paper for me, you'll get candy" is a tentative proposal, as it does not logically entail that a failure to fetch the paper will result in no candy; it is possible that candy can be acquired by another route. In other words, if the subject fetches the paper, then they get candy.[17] By contrast, if the proposal was a final proposal, it would take the form of "if and only if you fetch the paper for me, you'll get candy". This entails that candy can only be acquired if the subject fetches the paper, and no other way. For Kristjánsson, this kind of final proposal constitutes a throffer. There is an offer to fetch the paper ("if"), and a threat that candy can only be acquired through this route ("only if"). As such, an obstacle has been placed on the route of acquiring candy.[15]

Previous authors (Kristjánsson cites Joel Feinberg, Alan Wertheimer and Robert Nozick) provided moral and statistical analyses of various thought experiments to determine whether the proposals they involve are threats or offers. However, on Kristjánsson's account, all of the thought experiments considered are throffers. Instead, he argues, the previous thinkers' analyses attempted to differentiate offers that limit freedom from those that do not. They conflate two tasks, that of differentiating threats and offers and that of differentiating freedom-restricting threats from non-freedom-restricting threats.[18] However, he concludes that the thinkers' methods are also inadequate for determining the difference between freedom-restricting and non-freedom-restricting threats, for which a test of moral responsibility would be required.[19]

Rhodes's account

Michael R. Rhodes offers an account of threats, offers and throffers based upon the perception of the subject of the proposal (and, in the case of proposals from agents as opposed to nature,[8] the perception of the agent making the proposal.)[20] Rhodes presents seven different motivational-want-structures, that is, seven reasons why P may want to do what leads to B:

  1. W1 (intrinsic-attainment-want): "B is wanted in and of itself; B is perceived by P with immediate approbation; B is valued in and of itself by P.
  2. W2 (extrinsic-attainment-want): "B is perceived by P as a means to E where E is an intrinsic-attainment-want."
  3. W3 (compound-attainment-want): "B is both an intrinsic-attainment-want and an extrinsic-attainment-want".
  4. W4 (extrinsic-avoidance-want): "B is perceived by P as a means of avoiding F where F is perceived by P with immediate disapprobation (F is feared by, or F is threatening to, P)."
  5. W5 (complex-want-type-A): "B is both W1 and W4."
  6. W6 (complex-want-type-B): "B is both W2 and W4."
  7. W7 (complex-want-type-C): "B is both W3 and W4."[21]

Proposals that motivate P to act because of W1–3 represent offers. Those that do so because of W4 represent threats.[8] Rhodes notes that offers and threats are asymmetrical: while an offer requires only a slight approbation, a high degree of disapprobation is required before a proposal can be called a threat. The disapprobation must be high enough to provoke the "perception of a threat and correlative sense of fear".[22] Rhodes labels proposals that motivate P to act because of W5–7 throffers,[23] but notes that the name is not universally used.[8]

For Rhodes, throffers can not merely be biconditional proposals. If Q proposes that P pay $10,000 so that Q withholds information that would lead to P's arrest, then despite the fact that the proposal is biconditional (that is, P may choose to pay or not pay, which would lead to different outcomes) it is not a throffer. This is because choosing to pay cannot be considered attractive for P independent of Q's proposal.[24] P's paying of Q does not lead to the satisfaction of an attainment-want, which is a necessary condition for a proposal's being an offer under Rhodes's account.[25] The exception to this is when an agent offers to help another overcome a background threat (a threat that was not introduced by the proposal).[26] Biconditionals, in addition to either threats or offers, may contain neutral proposals, and so not be throffers.[25] The possibility of another agent's not acting is necessarily neutral.[27] Throffers are those biconditional proposals that contain both a threat and an offer, as opposed to biconditional proposals containing a threat and neutral proposal, or an offer and a neutral proposal. In the case of throffers, it is always going to be difficult or even impossible to determine whether an agent acts on the threatening aspect of the proposal or the offer.[28]

Throffers and coercion

Consideration of throffers forms part of the wider question of coercion and, specifically, the possibility of a coercive offer.[29] There has been a traditional assumption that offers cannot be coercive, and that only threats can be, but throffers can serve to challenge this assumption.[29][30] The threatening aspect of a throffer need not be explicit, as it was in Steiner's examples. Instead, a throffer may take the form of an offer, but carry an implied threat.[31] Philosopher John Kleinig sees a throffer as an example of an occasion when an offer alone may be considered coercive.[30] Another example of a coercive offer may be when the situation in which the offer is made is already unacceptable; for instance, if a factory owner takes advantage of a poor economic environment to offer workers an unfair wage.[32] For Jonathan Riley, a liberal society has a duty to protect its citizens from coercion, whether that coercion comes from a threat, offer, throffer or some other source. "If other persons ... attempt to frustrate the right-holder's wants, then a liberal society must take steps to prevent this, by law if necessary. All exercises of power by others to frustrate the relevant individual or group preferences constitute unwarranted 'interference' with liberty in purely private matters."[33]

Ian Hunt concurs that offers may be considered coercive, and claims that, whether interventions take the form of offers, threats or throffers, they may be considered coercive "when they are socially corrigible influences over action that diminish an agent's freedom overall." He accepts that a possible objection to his claim is that at least some coercive offers do seemingly increase the freedom of their recipients. For instance, in the thought experiment of the lecherous millionaire, a millionaire offers a mother money for treatment for her son's life-threatening illness in exchange for her becoming the millionaire's mistress. Joel Feinberg consider the offer coercive, but in offering a possibility of treatment, the millionaire has increased the options available to the mother, and thus her freedom.[34] For Hunt, Feinberg "overlooks the fact that the millionaire's offer opens the option of [the mother] saving her child on condition that the option of not being [the millionaire's] mistress is closed." Hunt does not see the mother as more free; "while it is clear that she has a greater capacity to pursue her interests as a parent once the offer has been made, and to that extent can be regarded as freer, it is clear also that her capacity to pursue her sexual interests may have been diminished."[35] Every coercive proposal, whether threat, offer or throffer, according to Hunt, contains a simultaneous loss and gain of freedom.[35] Kristjánsson, by contrast, argues that Feinberg's account of "coercive offers" is flawed because these are not offers at all, but throffers.[15]

Peter Westen and H. L. A. Hart argue that throffers are not always coercive, and, when they are, it is specifically the threat that makes them so. For a throffer to be coercive, they claim, the threat must meet three further conditions; firstly, the person making the throffer "must be intentionally bringing the threat to bear on X in order that X do something, Z1", secondly, the person making the throffer must know that "X would not otherwise do or wish to be constrained to do" Z1, and, thirdly, the threat part of the throffer must render "X's option of doing Z1 more eligible in X's eyes than it would otherwise be". As such, for the authors, there is the possibility of non-coercive throffers. The pair present three possible examples. Firstly, the case where the threat aspect of the throffer is a joke, secondly, a case when the offer aspect of the throffer is already so desirable to the subject of the throffer that the threat does not affect their decisionmaking, or, thirdly, when the subject mistakenly believes the threat immaterial because of the attractiveness of the offer when it is not.[36] Rhodes similarly concludes that if a throffer is coercive, it is because of the threatening aspect.[37] For him, the question is "whether one regards the threat component of a throffer as both a necessary and sufficient condition of the performance of a behaviour".[38] He argues that if the offer without the threat would have been enough for the agent subject to the proposal to act, then the proposal is not coercive. However, if both offer and threat aspects of the throffer are motivating factors, then it is tricky to determine whether the agent subject to the proposal was coerced. He suggests that differentiating between "pure coercion" and "partial coercion" may help solve this problem,[37] and that the question of coercion in these cases is one of degree.[39]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Steiner 1974–75, p. 39.
  2. ^ a b Stevens 1988, p. 84.
  3. ^ Carter 2011, p. 667.
  4. ^ Steiner 1974–75, pp. 37–8.
  5. ^ Bardhan 2005, p. 39.
  6. ^ Taylor 1982, p. 13.
  7. ^ Zimmerling 2005, p. 63.
  8. ^ a b c d Rhodes 2000, p. 39.
  9. ^ Alexander 1983.
  10. ^ Zimmerman 1981.
  11. ^ Lyons 1975.
  12. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 150, note 16.
  13. ^ Steiner 1974–75, pp. 40–1.
  14. ^ Stevens 1988, p. 85.
  15. ^ a b c Kristjánsson 1992, p. 67.
  16. ^ Kristjánsson 1992, p. 68.
  17. ^ Kristjánsson 1992, p. 66.
  18. ^ Kristjánsson 1992, pp. 68–9.
  19. ^ Kristjánsson 1992, p. 69.
  20. ^ Rhodes 2000, pp. 37, 66.
  21. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 31.
  22. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 37.
  23. ^ Rhodes 2000, pp. 49–55.
  24. ^ Rhodes 2000, pp. 42–3.
  25. ^ a b Rhodes 2000, p. 44.
  26. ^ Rhodes 2000, pp. 44, 57.
  27. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 56.
  28. ^ Rhodes 2000, pp. 63–4.
  29. ^ a b Anderson 2011.
  30. ^ a b Kleinig 2009, p. 15.
  31. ^ Burnell 2008, p. 423.
  32. ^ Kleinig 2009, pp. 15–6.
  33. ^ Riley 1989, p. 133.
  34. ^ Hunt 2001, pp. 141–2.
  35. ^ a b Hunt 2001, pp. 142.
  36. ^ Hart & Westen 1985, p. 582.
  37. ^ a b Rhodes 2000, p. 69.
  38. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 99.
  39. ^ Rhodes 2000, p. 100.

Cited texts

Further reading

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