Talk:Paul Feyerabend

Common Knowledge excerpt

Just removed a whole section:

"Over time, his works came to be used as the basis for many literary deconstructionists, and some radical feminist writers, who claimed that science (and sometimes, even mathematics and logic itelf) were social constructions; in this view, science has no special claim to proving truth, and no more utility than any other way of thinking about the world.

More recently Feyerabend took umbrage at this misunderstanding and mis-use of his work: "How can an enterprise {science} depend on culture in so many ways, and yet produce such solid results? ....Movements that view quantum mechanics as a turning-point in thought - and that includes fly-by-night mystics, prophets of a New Age, and relativists of all sorts - get aroused by the cultural component and forget predictions and technology." (Source: Paul Feyerabend. Atoms and Consciousness', in Common Knowledge Vol. 1, No. 1 1992: 28-32)"

The interpretation of what PKF says here is itself a misunderstanding. Between 1960 somthing and 1992 all PKF literature points to a Feyerabend who does not believe that science has any special claim to proving truth. After 1992, he still appears to be the essentially the same 'anything goes' philosopher he was in the 60's.

The small snippet from common knowledge is all anyone has been able to get their hands on (at least in this forum). My interpretation is that he is clarifying a point on culture. That science, and its results, are not purely social constructs. I can't believe that he radically altered his philosophy in the way described for the duration of one article. ---Chris

I am unsure that this should have been removed. It involves an important topic area that I believe the article is missing substantial information on as well as a direct quotation. Perhaps it could be worded differently, with reference to his attitude over time being removed. I don't believe that there should be a dichotomy created or perpetuated that contrasts 'anything goes' philosophers with those who are not 'anything goes' philosophers, however, and I don't see that argument as a particularly rational basis for your decision to remove this segment. I would suggest that it be added again reworded, but without any implication of a particular modification of his philosophy over time which seems to only be speculated (?please disprove me?). On second reading, the quote should probably remain removed due to its somewhat misleading appearance. Flying Hamster 09:15, 29 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I agree that the topic is interesting and perhaps important. My only beef with the excerpt is that no one seems to have read the entire Common Knowledge article. The first attempt here at an interpretation (which I removed) I still find implausible. Not because any dichotomy is traversed, but because this would have Feyerabend contradict himself to a remarkable degree. The sentence that reads "...science has no special claim to proving truth, and no more utility than any other way of thinking about the world", sound like something Feyerabend might have written. To say that he took umbrage at this presents an unlikely picture.

Now that does not mean that Feyerabend was not misunderstood. And the first part of the removed text (and the excerpt itself), refering to social constructions, does point to one possible misunderstanding without getting to the heart of the matter. Feyerabend's relationship to social constructivism is complex and not simply a matter of whether he was for or against it. If you want to re-introduce the passage it would certainly be a good place to explore this. -- Chris 12:20, 30 Dec 2004 (UTC)

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Have just completed first draft of Felix Ehrenhaft who is much referenced by PKF. I do have more (good stuff about charge on electron) to add but please use and contribute. Cutler 17:04, 10 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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Removed sentence on Wittgenstein. As far as I know, Feyerabend had only a brief acquaintance with Wittgenstein, having only met him when he attended Kraft's Circle while they were both still in Vienna. Sir Paul 06:10, Feb 15, 2004 (UTC)

Questions

(William M. Connolley 11:08, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) Lots of questions. Lets start with a few:

Feyerabend argued that adherence to any strict method would in the long run be counterproductive for the progress of science.

This is a strawman. Science doesn't progress to a strict method. Is F suggesting that it does?

He points out that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories gives an unreasonable advantage to the older theory.

Again, what is this supposed to mean? Relativity was not consistent with newtonian mechanics, which it replaced. F appears to be suggesting that there was a requiremtn for consistency with older theories - there is not.

He also argues that no interesting theory is ever consistent with all the relevant facts.

Again, some examples would be nice. What relevant facts is general relativity inconsistent with?

William. You might like to address your questions to the feyerabend forum ( http://bravus.port5.com/pkfdex.html ). The feyerabend mailing list has a very low traffic volume and I suspect your questions would get some attention. If that doesn't appeal to you, I would be interested in replying to your questions when I get time (sadly not in the near future). Chris 14:59, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 18:10, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) Thanks for the comment. I'm afraid I shall decline, though: I'll stick within the wikipedia forum. I'm sure that editing the article to include the points above will get attention enough :-)

Thanks for your comments, William. I’m not sure how to edit the article to clarify. Perhaps if I explain how I think F. was thinking, you might comment. I want to be clear that I am reporting F’s argument, not advocating it.

Feyerabend argued that adherence to any strict method would in the long run be counterproductive for the progress of science. I thought it clear in the article that for the most part F. is arguing against Imre Lakatos.

(William M. Connolley 21:45, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) No, this is not at all clear. The reference to L is as a collaborator - no hint that he and L disagree. If this quote is about a dispute between F and L, it should really say so. Its not clear from the L article, either.

The method of scientific research programs

(William M. Connolley 21:45, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) ?

does attempt to set out, as F. says “a methodology that a) does not issue orders and yet b) puts restrictions on our knowledge…” (AM, p. 14). Certainly F. is arguing that a zealous application of falsification would not lead to scientific progress. It’s not F. who is advocating adherence to a method – quite the opposite - but Popper and his disciples – who are certainly not made of straw.

If F is arguing against P, thats fine, the article should say so. At the moment, it looks like F is arguing with the weight of scientifc practice.

He also argues that no interesting theory is ever consistent with all the relevant facts. The examples F. uses are from Aristotle and Galileo. But to use your example, General Relativity (as formulated by Einstein) is not compatible with Quantum Mechanics – hence Einstein’s God does not play dice quote.

(William M. Connolley 21:45, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) No, twice over. The quote is not about that - its about E not liking QM much. But the key is *relevant* facts: gen rel is compatible with all known facts (?) on its scale - ie large scale. But yes, it doesn't fit in with small scale things.

The interesting stuff is string theory and other attempts to make the two compatible. Another example, at the other extreme, is the creationist’s theory that God did it. This is extraordinarily successful as an explanation – since it can explain literally everything. Yet it is also extraordinarily uninteresting, since it is consistent with all relevant facts.

He points out that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories gives an unreasonable advantage to the older theory. I suspect that Kuhn, as much as L., was his target here. There are two things going on. One is a logical argument, to the effect that being compatible with a defunct older theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory over an alternat theory covering the same domain. That is, if one had to choose between two theories of equal explanatory power, to choose the one that is compatible with an older, falsified theory is to make an aesthetic, rather than a rational choice. Hence, that theory can be said to have “an unfair advantage”.

OK, once again, it should be made clear who F is arguing with here, in the article itself.

The other is contrary to Kuhn’s contention that science is defined by its being a social enterprise amongst scientists that agree on a paradigm. Such a definition results in an approach to science that is susceptible to groupthink. F. is advocating the role of the Maverick in scientific progress. So, for example, Fred Hoyle was a brilliant scientist not because everyone agreed with him, but because everyone disagreed with him. A method that excluded the likes of Sir Fred would be impoverished.

If you would care to comment on the above, I’ll take a look at editing the article to make these points clearer.

I hope I've made it clear: what you've explained above is quite contrary to the impression I got from the article, which would benefit from explaining clearly who F is arguing with in each case. Also, it would be nice to have the quotes/ideas sourced to individual books/chapters where possible - otherwise its effectively impossible for the interested reader to look anything up.

Forgive me, William – I have the distinct disadvantage of having read the source material. F. and L. were friends and collaborators. They were also very, very critical of each other’s work. The two are not mutually exclusive. The Method of Scientific Research Programs is due to Lakatos. I will not provide full citations – partly out of indolence, and partly because it is an simple task for the interested reader to find the relevant sections in AM using the annotated TOC, and in so doing they will develop a greater understanding of F.’s work. Comments on the new edits welcome. Banno 03:02, 1 Apr 2004 (UTC)

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It was at the LSU that he met another of Popper’s students, Imre Lakatos. -- What does LSU stand for? When not expanded or linked to another page, this is nearly impossible to understand. In fact, I suspect it is incorrect, and that it really should be LSE. Can somebody please confirm and edit the page accordingly? MarkSweep 00:37, 18 Jul 2004 (UTC)

Confirmed and corrected. -- Chris 09:18, 23 Jul 2004 (UTC)

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Some comments about the questions above :

1.Feyerabend always said that science works and worked best without a strict method. F mostly argue against other philosophers of science who want science to be limited to one strict method ( Popper is the best example of this ). F is also opposed to what he calls "scientific education" in the education system, which conditions humans to one type of method( one "logic" as he says ) and therefore limit creativity, innovation and progress. All this is clearly enunciated in the introduction of Against Method.

2.Feyerabend and Lakatos have very similar views. The only major difference is that Lakatos argues that degenerating research programs are objectively inferior to those that are progressive, while F argues that it is not possible to judge objectively which research program is better since degenerating research programs may become progressive. Furthermore, only one chapter in Against Method is directed at Lakatos. It is fair to assume that most of the time, Feyerabend is not arguing against Lakatos but rather against Popper et al. Guillaume777 01:00, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

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AM 3rd [and final] ed. is in some ways a very different book from AM 1st ed.

some points:

AM 3rd ed. is much less provocative than AM 1st ed.

AM 1st ed. can be read as an "anti-science" book (unlike the 3rd ed.) IIRC in the preface (or intro?) to the 1st ed. PF said that the book was deliberately provocative because of the prevailing hegemony of science, and if and when the pendulum swung the other way he would write another book. AM 3rd ed. is arguably that "other" book.

Didn't the 1st ed. have "in science, as in organized prostitution and ..." all over the place? [In the 3rd ed. it doesn't occur at all. I never saw the 2nd ed., so I can't comment on it.]

-- mp from Calcutta India

Comment

Concerning this which appeared on this page:

William M. Connolley 11:08, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) Lots of questions. Lets start with a few:

Feyerabend argued that adherence to any strict method would in the long run be counterproductive for the progress of science. This is a strawman. Science doesn't progress to a strict method. Is F suggesting that it does?

Feyerabend does not suggest that it does, but many of his collegues do, for example, proponents of an inductive logic. So Feyerabend is not attacking a stawman.

Feyerabend's 'Trojan Horse' link mostly unrelated to Feyerabend

I think the link to John Kadvaney's website should be either deleted or moved to Imre Lakatos. It has very little to do with Feyerabend, and I could find no mention of a 'Trojan Horse', while there is plenty of extraneous information about Kadvaney's other research. Perhaps a link to one of the more specific subpages on that website is appropriate, but I couldn't find anything but the Feyerabend memorial that was really relevant.--ragesoss 23:26, 8 January 2006 (UTC)

Imre Lakatos

Lakatos was *not* a student of Popper's! -- DPR

For and Against Method

"They planned to write a dialogue volume, to be titled For and Against Method, in which Lakatos would defend a rationalist view of science and Feyerabend would attack it."

I changed this sentence. They did plan on writing a book on this topic, but For and Against Method isn't what it was to be titled (at least, I've seen no indication that this was to be its title). For and Against Method is the name of a book that was edited by Matteo Motterlini and included correspondence between Feyerabend and Lakatos and some other writings by Lakatos. --Deckard05 16:08, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

great work

This is a wonderful entry, and was very helpful to me. Kudos to those involved in it!

Kuhn and Beyond

I removed the following sentence: "Feyerabend extended well beyond Thomas Kuhn in his criticism and skepticism about the rationality of science." It's to simple of a statement to accurately describe Feyerabend's position. Feyerabend stated that Lakatos's model of science should replace Kuhn's (see "Consolations for the Specialist"). Given that many people consider Lakatos's model more rational than Kuhn's, I'm not sure if the sentence that I deleted is appropriate. On the other hand, in the same essay Feyerabend defends Kuhn against Lakatos, saying that "science is more irrational than Lakatos ... is prepared to admit." But he goes on to say that this doesn't mean he has changed his mind, it only means that he recognizes that science is much more complex than most people are willing to admit. If anything, Feyerabend isn't skeptical of science, he is skeptical of philosophy of science. He doesn't like it when philosophers of science try to box science in with rules that just don't fit how science actually works.