Somalia affair: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added

Inline

Revision as of 15:34, 24 July 2009

The Somalia Affair was a Canadian military scandal in the mid-1990s. It began with the brutal 1993 beating death of a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in the United Nations humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The crime, documented by grisly photos, shocked the Canadian public and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment that went beyond the two soldiers directly involved. Questions were asked about why the unit was chosen for that mission despite disciplinary problems. Perhaps most damaging to the leadership of the Canadian military was how it reacted after the events became public, as accusations of covering up the event surfaced.

Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being controversially cut short by the government, the Somalia Inquiry found deep problems in the leadership of the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada's elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, greatly damaged the morale of the Canadian Forces, and damaged both the domestic and international reputation of Canadian soldiers.

Background

Canadian forces were sent to Somalia to participate in Operation Deliverance, part of the American-initiated Operation Restore Hope supported by the United Nations. In March, 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II. Its goal was to deliver humanitarian aid and restore order to the African nation of Somalia which was suffering from a severe famine, general anarchy, and domination by warlords following the collapse of Siad Barre's Marxist government.

In 1992, Somalia was in chaos. Its people had suffered a long famine and vicious civil war. Intermittent civil war had been a fact of life since 1977 and the country was lawless and without government. Government had dissolved into rival factions of tribally oriented warlords. Relief workers attempting to deliver food and medical supplies were in constant danger of attack by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the people. The aid was stolen by the warlords and bartered for weapons, the famine becoming more severe as a result. As a result, the UN requested armed peacekeepers to assist the relief operations. The mission of Operation Deliverance was to provide a secure enough environment to ensure that aid reached the people of Somalia.

Deployment to Somalia

Canada, with a long history of participation in international peace and security missions, was one of several nations that agreed to send forces. Canadian forces at that time were stretched, however, with a number of other deployments, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. The Canadian military leadership, under the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, selected the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), as Canada's contribution to this peace-restoration operation. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in Cyprus as well as later peacekeeping tours there.

Canadian Airborne Regiment

There were serious concerns among Canadian leadership with regards to sending the Airborne, as the mission was seen as being outside its raison d'etre. Controlling a large area of a country required a mobile force, while the CAR was essentially a light infantry battalion, and only recently reorganized as such. There had also been recurring discipline problems and reports that some members of the unit were white supremacists, who were concentrated in 2 Commando (each company sized subunit was designated a Commando); one of the potential indications being the adoption of the Confederate States of America flag as the commando's barracks-room decoration.^[1] The Airborne consisted of distinct sub-units provided by each of Canada's regular infantry regiments; later, commander Lieutenant Colonel Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. The commanding officer of the CAR, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Morneault, declared this "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to leave it behind in Canada when he deployed. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu, an officer renowned for his rough-and-ready toughness.

The CAR was accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. These forces were deployed to Somalia in January 1993, setting up its tented patrol-base outside the town of Beledweyne. Their mission was to secure and bring order to the town and a 30,000 square kilometer area around it. The soldiers lived on hard rations, with limited water, but patrolled actively while also establishing effective relations with the local tribal leaders. The Canadian Airborne Regiment stood out as having rapidly brought a modicum of order to its assigned territory. However, much of the aid was still being siphoned by local warlords, and there was also a constant stream of locals pilfering from the Canadian camp itself.^[2] This theft from the camp was a major irritant, and also a risk to the safety of the soldiers. At least one commanding officer had tacitly encouraged abuse of any thieves who were caught.^[3]

Death of Shidane Arone

On March 16, 1993 the Airborne captured a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, who had sneaked into the camp. He was placed in an empty bunker, that had often been used as a cell, under the guard of Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Trooper (Private) Kyle Brown, both members of 2 Commando. Matchee, who had been drinking heavily, almost immediately began severely beating Arone, punching him in the ribs, hitting him in the head with his baton, and putting out cigarettes on his foot. Brown participated somewhat in this abuse, but was mostly an observer. He took sixteen photos of the beating, when these trophy-like pictures became public they would create a considerable furor. During the several hours the beating went on several other soldiers visited the bunker and observed the events; many others were within earshot of the bunker and could hear what was going on.

Matchee and Brown left the unconscious Arone after several hours of this torture. When an officer returning from patrol checked on Arone he found that he had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead. A death in custody automatically triggers an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged with the murder and National Defence Headquarters was advised. Master Corporal Matchee later attempted suicide; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial. Brown was found guilty of manslaughter.

Brown claimed in his defence that he informed every officer he could find of the happenings in the bunker, and requested that they intervene. Brown stated that when the officers declined to stop the torture, he began documenting the event with photographs. Brown later published a book in which he presented a case wherein he had been made the scapegoat for the incident and the officers who had not intervened were not brought to justice.

Charges subsequently laid against members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment suggested that sixteen people had passed through the area where Arone was tortured and that, during the night, his screams could be heard throughout the surrounding area. The Commanding Officer of the Airborne, Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu, was tried twice by courts-martial acquitted of wrong-doing both times. The Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, Major Anthony Seward, was also court-martialed under Article 124 of the National Defence Act (Negligent Performance of Duties). He was convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment in the Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks and dismissal with disgrace from the Canadian Forces. A number of his subordinate supervisors were also court-martialed and found guilty under Article 124.

Soon after the death of Shidane Arone came to public attention, other actions by the Airborne also began to be scrutinized. Days earlier, a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon had shot and killed a young Somali night-time infiltrator and seriously injured another. A temporarily attached Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, stated in letters home which he subsequently leaked to the press, that he judged, after seeing the body, that the death of one of the Somalis was an "execution". He subsequently accused the Reconnaissance Platoon commander, Captain Michel Rainville, of destroying his photographic evidence, but these accusations were never proven and the officer was tried and acquitted. Captain Rainville would later be charged with torturing one of his own soldiers in a mock-exercise, that included anal-rape and psychological torture.

Home-video footage of another trooper, Cpl Matt McKay, was found in which he was filmed uttering racist obscenities. Predeployment photographs of McKay performing a Nazi salute in front of a Swastika were also published. Video of brutal hazing rituals also came to light.

DND response

The debate over what led to the brutal events in Somalia, and why military leaders had sent a unit with known problems to that country were important ones, but the reaction to these events by the military leadership became the most important issue. DND headquarters in Ottawa was quickly informed about the death and arrest of the two soldiers. The political situation in Canada at the time was sensitive, with Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell in the midst of a leadership campaign to replace Brian Mulroney as leader of the ruling Progressive Conservative Party, and a federal election expected in the near future. Public relations relating to the incident were immediately taken over by Department of National Defence (DND) officials in Ottawa.

At first DND officials told the media, and also minister Campbell that Arone had likely died from natural causes. It took several weeks for the Canadian people to become aware of the actual events in Somalia. These reports, especially once Private Brown's picture became public created an outcry in Canada. The high regard the Canadian people had for their armed forces, especially the peacekeepers, was damaged. The reports also generated intense media interest, and how these investigations were dealt with would become the focus of public investigations. Highly placed members of the military leadership were accused of fraudulently altering documents prior to handing them over to journalists. The existence of other documents was denied, and some others were destroyed.^[4] Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.

Perhaps also overlooked in this tragedy was the use of the antimalarial drug, Lariam (Mefloquine), which produces some severe side effects in some people such as aggressive mood swings, neuropsychiatric disorders, manic behaviour, and hallucinations. Soldiers were given Lariam while on duty in Somalia, as this is an area affected by malaria. Roche U.S.A., the drug's manufacturer, conceded that Lariam can cause the severe side effects noted above.

Somalia Inquiry

The public outcry began in earnest in 1994. The new government of Jean Chrétien's Liberal Party initiated a highly visible Somalia Inquiry in 1994 under Federal Court Judge Gilles Létourneau. Officially known as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, its hearings were broadcast daily in both languages, nationally.

As the inquiry unfolded, home videos of initiation rites in the CAR's French-speaking commando found their way into the media. The new Minister of National Defence David Collenette argued that the videos were disgusting, demeaning and racist. With the continued accumulation of such politically damaging visibility, the Minister of National Defence ordered the Canadian Airborne Regiment disbanded in 1995. It has been suggested that this move was as much driven by budget cuts to the Canadian Forces as by the Somalia Affair, but there is no question that the affair gave the Minister the public support needed to disband the regiment.

The respected Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain, who had not supported the minister's disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud. His successor, Air Force General Jean Boyle was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrong doing under his command. Minister of National Defence David Collenette was also forced to resign, partially due to the affair.

The inquiry ran until 1997 when it was cut short by the government in the months before the 1997 election. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, noting that it was far exceeding its mandate, as it continued to focus on political and administrative aspects of Armed Forces overall management. Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry's attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister Doug Young in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.

The final report of the inquiry was a striking attack on the procedures, support and leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Many of the top officers in the Canadian Forces were excoriated, including three separate Chiefs of the Defence Staff. The CAR had been rushed into a war zone with inadequate preparation or legal support. Enquiry observer retired Brigadier-General Dan Loomis noted that the operation had changed, in December 1992, "from a peacekeeping operation, where arms are used only in self-defence, to one where arms could be used proactively to achieve politico-military objectives...In short the Canadian Forces were being put on active service and sent to war (as defined by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter)." Its deployment into "war" had never been debated in parliament and indeed the Canadian public had been led to believe by its government that the CAR was on a "peacekeeping" mission. After the events the leaders of the Canadian Forces had been far more concerned with self-preservation than in trying to find the truth. The inquiry report singled out Major-General Lewis MacKenzie as a major exception, as he took full responsibility for any errors he made.

Effect of the Affair on the Canadian Forces

The affair had a number of long lasting effects. While it is difficult to separate the effects of the affair on Canadian Forces morale from those of the concurrent defence spending cut, it did exacerbate feelings of distrust towards the media and politicians among many CF members.

At the same time, public trust in the Canadian Forces suffered and recruitment became more difficult. Public revulsion provided support for the sharp cuts to military spending introduced by the Liberal government. Many of the report's comments, along with the sustained media criticism of the military, led to the hasty imposition of policies designed to ensure nothing similar to the Somalia Affair could happen again. It has been argued that many of these practices, such as the micro-management of training, operations and disciplinary processes from NDHQ and the resultant restrictions on commanding officers, hamper the flexibility of operational units. Since the events in Somalia, Canada has become far less ready to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping efforts. Once playing an important role in the majority of UN efforts, in subsequent years Canada has been more ready to simply provide indirect support.

Canada was not the only country to face problems in Somalia. There were severe casualties on all sides in the warlord-dominated chaos. The Battle of Mogadishu resulted in 500-1000 Somali militia and civilian deaths, as well as eighteen American and two Pakistani deaths, following which the US decided to leave the country. Soldiers of other countries also faced charges of misconduct: Italian troops were photographed appearing to rape a Somali woman and Belgian soldiers took photographs of themselves urinating on and burning Somalis.

Other long term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of "zero tolerance" on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing. In the aftermath of the Somalia affair, video of brutal hazing rituals in the Airborne Regiment had been met with public outrage and disgust when they were made public.

Notes

^ Bercuson pg. 214
^ Bercuson pg. 211
^ Bercuson pg. 2
^ Bercuson pg. 7
^ Koring, Paul. The Globe and Mail. May 21, 1996. pg. A1

References

David Bercuson Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, & the Murder in Somalia 1997
Peter Desbarats Somalia Cover-Up; A Commissioner's Journal 1997
Sherene Razack. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism. 2004
Canadian Encyclopedia "Boyle maintains Innocence
CBC Archives - The Somalia Affair
Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia
Somalia Inquiry - official report (link to Executive Summary)
Somalia Online News and Discussions about Somalia

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-[[File:Shidane Arone.jpg|thumb|375px|A Canadian soldier poses alongside a Somalia youth he is beating to death.]]The '''Somalia Affair''' was a [[Canada|Canadian]] military scandal in the mid-1990s. It began with the brutal 1993 beating death of a Somali teenager, [[Shidane Arone]], at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in the [[United Nations]] humanitarian efforts in [[Somalia]]. The crime, documented by grisly photos, shocked the Canadian public and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment that went beyond the two soldiers directly involved. Canadian military leadership came into sharp rebuke after accusations of covering up the event surfaced when a [[Canadian Broadcasting Corporation|CBC]] reporter received altered documents.
+The '''Somalia Affair''' was a [[Canada|Canadian]] military scandal in the mid-1990s. It began with the brutal 1993 beating death of a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in the [[United Nations]] humanitarian efforts in [[Somalia]]. The crime, documented by grisly photos, shocked the Canadian public and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment that went beyond the two soldiers directly involved. Questions were asked about why the unit was chosen for that mission despite disciplinary problems. Perhaps most damaging to the leadership of the Canadian military was how it reacted after the events became public, as accusations of covering up the event surfaced.
 Eventually a public inquiry was called. Despite being controversially cut short by the government, the Somalia Inquiry found deep problems in the leadership of the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of Canada's elite [[Canadian Airborne Regiment]], greatly damaged the morale of the Canadian Forces, and damaged both the domestic and international reputation of Canadian soldiers.
-It has been compared to "a Canadian version of...the [[Pentagon Papers]]", or [[My Lai]], but critics noted that while My Lai had occurred in a hostile environment where American soldiers were being killed by an invisible enemy every day, the Canadian troops in Somalia had not suffered any casualties or extreme stress, and the only provocation that Canadians faced was petty theft from their base.<ref name="desb"/>
 ==Background==
-[[File:Italo beled weyne.jpg|thumb|250px|An Italian stationed in [[Beledweyne]], the central city where Canadians were also deployed.]]
+[[Image:Somalia&land_map.png|right|thumb|250px|The nation of Somalia. Canadian troops were based outside of [[Beledweyne]] in the centre of the country]]
-Canadian forces were sent to Somalia to participate in [[Operation Deliverance]], part of the American-initiated [[Operation Restore Hope]] supported by the United Nations.<ref name="marten">Swanenburg, Marten. "Accountability of Peace Support Operations", p. 265</ref>
+Canadian forces were sent to Somalia to participate in [[Operation Deliverance]], part of the American-initiated [[Operation Restore Hope]] supported by the United Nations. In March, 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II. Its goal was to deliver humanitarian aid and restore order to the African nation of [[Somalia]] which was suffering from a severe famine, general anarchy, and domination by warlords following the collapse of Siad Barre's Marxist government.
-In March 1993, the operation was to come under UN command and was renamed UNOSOM II. Its goal was to deliver humanitarian aid and restore order to the African nation of [[Somalia]] which was suffering from a severe famine, general anarchy, and domination by warlords following the collapse of Siad Barre's Marxist government.
 In 1992, Somalia was in chaos. Its people had suffered a long famine and vicious civil war. Intermittent civil war had been a fact of life since 1977 and the country was lawless and without government. Government had dissolved into rival factions of tribally oriented warlords. Relief workers attempting to deliver food and medical supplies were in constant danger of attack by armed gangs, who would hold the goods hostage for the loyalty of the people. The aid was stolen by the warlords and bartered for weapons, the famine becoming more severe as a result. As a result, the UN requested armed [[peacekeeper]]s to assist the relief operations. The mission of Operation Deliverance was to provide a secure enough environment to ensure that aid reached the people of Somalia.
-In January 1993, commander Carol Mathieu gave verbal orders allowing Canadian soldiers to shoot thieves under certain conditions; and on February 10 they fired on a crowd approaching a [[Red Cross]] distribution centre.<ref name="desb"/> Seven days later, they fired at a Somali demonstration killing one and wounding two others.<ref name="desb"/>
 ==Deployment to Somalia==
-Canada, with a long history of participation in international peace and security missions, was one of several nations that agreed to send forces. Canadian forces at that time were stretched, however, with a number of other deployments, most notably in the former [[Yugoslavia]]. The [[Minister of External Affairs]] [[Barbara McDougall]] noted that the mandate would be to "shoot first, ask questions later" to try and bring peace to the country where it was noted that food aid was being stolen by militias and warlords.<ref name="journal">Prouse, Robert. [http://www.commando.org/somalia.php Somalia Journals]</ref>
+Canada, with a long history of participation in international peace and security missions, was one of several nations that agreed to send forces. Canadian forces at that time were stretched, however, with a number of other deployments, most notably in the former [[Yugoslavia]]. The Canadian military leadership, under the government of [[Prime Minister of Canada|Prime Minister]] [[Brian Mulroney]], selected the [[Airborne Regiment (Canada)|Canadian Airborne Regiment]] (CAR), as Canada's contribution to this peace-restoration operation. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in [[Cyprus]] as well as later peacekeeping tours there.
-The Canadian military leadership, under the government of [[Prime Minister of Canada|Prime Minister]] [[Brian Mulroney]], selected the [[Airborne Regiment (Canada)|Canadian Airborne Regiment]] (CAR), as Canada's contribution to this peace-restoration operation. The Airborne had long been seen as the elite of the Canadian Forces, and in 1974 had performed admirably in combat operations in [[Cyprus]] as well as later peacekeeping tours there. However, General Beno informed General [[Lewis MacKenzie]] that training in the CAR was a "critical" problem due to [[Paul Morneault]]'s leadership.<ref name="desb"/> It was debated whether to substitute another regiment, or cancel the mission entirely, but it was finally decided that to admit that the "elite" Canadian forces were incapable of handling a routine mission would have been a "national disgrace".<ref name="desb"/>
 ==Canadian Airborne Regiment==
+There were serious concerns among Canadian leadership with regards to sending the Airborne, as the mission was seen as being outside its raison d'etre. Controlling a large area of a country required a mobile force, while the CAR was essentially a light infantry battalion, and only recently reorganized as such. There had also been recurring discipline problems and reports that some members of the unit were [[white supremacist]]s, who were concentrated in 2 Commando (each company sized subunit was designated a Commando); one of the potential indications being the adoption of the [[Confederate States of America]] flag as the commando's barracks-room decoration.{{ref|flag}} The Airborne consisted of distinct sub-units provided by each of Canada's regular infantry regiments; later, commander [[Lieutenant Colonel]] Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. The commanding officer of the CAR, Lieutenant Colonel [[Paul Morneault]], declared this "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to leave it behind in Canada when he deployed. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel [[Carol Mathieu]], an officer renowned for his rough-and-ready toughness.
-{{Rquote|right|We promised them peacekeepers, and...we sent them thugs.|[[Rex Murphy]]<ref>[http://archives.cbc.ca/emissions/emission.asp?page=27&IDLan=1&IDEmission=736&IDClip=11518 CBC: The National - Archives]</ref>}}[[File:Cpl McKay 1.ogv|thumb|left|Cpl. McKay speaks of the "niggers" around him in Somalia]]
-Only recently deemed a light infantry battalion, some leaders expressed concern that it the Somalia mission did not fit the Regiment's mandate or abilities. The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada's regular infantry regiments. Later, Lt. Col. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. The commanding officer of the CAR, Lt. Col. [[Paul Morneault]], declared this "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel [[Carol Mathieu]].<ref>Fisher, Luke. [[Macleans]], [http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0010376 Airborne's Hazing Exposed], January 30, 1995</ref>
-There had been recurring discipline problems, and an ongoing investigation into their base of [[CFB Petawawa]] as a hotbed of [[white supremacist]] activity in 2 Commando.<ref name="whit"/> This included the adoption of the [[Rebel flag]] as the commando's barracks-room decoration.<ref name="berc"/> The flag had initially been presented as a gift from American soldiers, and gradually became an unofficial symbol, although successive [[commanding officer]]s had tried to ban its usage.<ref name="desb"/>
-The CAR was accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the [[Royal Canadian Dragoons]]. These forces were deployed to Somalia in January 1993, setting up its tented patrol-base outside the town of [[Belet Huen]].  Their mission was to secure and bring order to the town and a 30,000 square kilometer area around it, where much of the humanitarian aid was still being siphoned by local warlords. There was a constant stream of locals pilfering from the Canadian camp.<ref name="berc"/> At least one commanding officer had tacitly encouraged abuse of any thieves who were caught.<ref name="berc"/>
-[[File:Christpher Robin has KKK emblazoned on back as part of Hazing ritual in CAR.png|thumb|Pte. Robin has '''KKK''' written on his back]]
-Footage depicting racist actions of Cpl. McKay and Pte. Brocklebank was later discovered. McKay stated that "we ain't killed enough niggers yet", and pre-deployment photographs showed him wearing a [[Hitler]] shirt in front of a [[Swastika]].<ref>Leyton-Brown, David. "Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs", 199. p. 120</ref> Brocklebank was seen "uttering racist and violent epithets on a video taken by [CAR] soldiers".<ref name="threat"/>
-[[File:Cpl Collard of the CAR simulates oral sex on a toy gun as part of a hazing ritual.png|thumb|left|Cpl. Collard simulates oral sex on a toy gun in the hazing video.]]
-Video of brutal [[hazing]] rituals also came to light, including a video from the summer of 1992 which showed 1er Commando engaging in "hijinks" ranging from smearing [[faeces]] on each other, to [[bestiality]]; the black soldier Christopher Robin was shown on all fours with a leash, led around like a dog, with the phrase "I Love [[KKK]]" written on his back, while surrounding soldiers screamed about [[White Power]] and jeered at the "nigger".<ref name="desb">Desbarats, Peter. "Somalia cover-up: A commissioner's journal", 1997</ref>
-Mike Abel, the only Canadian to die in the Somali operation, was alleged a member of the [[KKK]]; although colleagues disputed the evidence that racist literature had been found in his belongings, pointing out that it just floated around the camp and everybody read it.<ref name="ogle">Ogle, James & Darnell Bass. "What Manner of Man", p. 144 &163</ref><ref>Taylor, Scott R. [[Esprit de Corps]], "Mysterious, suspicious and preventable deaths in the Canadian forces.", July 1, 1997</ref>
-==March 4th killing==
-[[File:Shidane Arone chunk 1 chunk 1.ogv|thumb|250px|Pte. David Brocklebank describes his operation as "snatch niggers".]]
-On March 4, two unarmed Somalis were shot in the back,<ref name="national">[[Canadian Broadcasting Corporation|CBC]] [[CBC News: The National|The National]], [http://archives.cbc.ca/emissions/emission.asp?page=47&IDLan=1&IDEmission=736&IDClip=4322 Somalia debacle a high-level cover-up], July 2, 1997</ref> one fatally, after Canadian troops laid an ambush to try and catch petty thieves stealing from the military base in [[Belet Huen]]. This followed from a decision by Captain [[Michel Rainville]] to re-label petty theft by Somalians as "sabotage", a distinction that meant deadly force could be used to defend the base.<ref name="desb"/> Rainville relied on the argument that a [[fuel pump]]  used to service American [[MedEvac]] helicopters had been stolen deliberately to hinder the military effort, while critics pointed out that any saboteurs likely would have ignited the thousands of gallons of fuel surrounding it.<ref name="desb"/>
-Rainville enlisted Corpoal Ben Klick of the [[PPCLI]] to lay in a truckbed at night, awaiting potential "saboteurs" with a rifle. From his position, he watched two infiltrators approach bread and water that the Canadians had laid out as [[bait]]. Fifteen minutes after first noticing the pair, other soldiers opened fire at them. In the end, 29-year old Ahmed Arush was killed, and Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie was wounded.<ref name="desb"/><ref name="armstrong"/>
-It was noted that one of the two Somalis had been carrying a ceremonial dagger in his clothing,<ref name="armstrong"/> and the body of Arush was loaded into a [[body bag]] and placed inside a [[Bison personnel carrier]].<ref name="desb"/> There, a medical technician re-opened the bag and took [[Polaroid]] photographs for an unknown reason, some suggest to document the shooting, others suggest as a "trophy".<ref name="desb"/>  The photos showed gaping wounds in Arush's neck and the side of his face, with his skull twisted out of shape by the force of the gunblast. His [[intestines]] protruded from his stomach, and his right eye is missing.<ref name="desb"/>
-An Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, examined the body and judged the death "suspicious", suggesting that Arush had been lying prone on the ground when he was killed.<ref name="desb"/> He also noted that the amount of [[omentum]] which had passed through the first wounds suggested the 29-year old Arush had been breathing for at least 2 or 3 minutes before the final gunshots to his head were fired.<ref name="armstrong">O'Reilly, Michael. [[CMAJ]], [http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/300/cdn_medical_association/cmaj/vol-158/issue-2/0244.htm MD at centre of Somalia controversy finds peace in Northern Ontario], 1998</ref>
-After the examination, Arush's body was then used for medical practice for soldiers, demonstrating how to stab a [[tracheotomy]] into a wounded man's throat to allow him to breathe, and then used to demonstrate the proper preparation of a body for transportation. The body was then returned to the body bag, and sent into town.<ref name="desb"/> For the next two weeks, Colonel Allan Wells approached Vice-Admiral [[Larry Murray]] asking to send [[military police]] to Somalia to investigate the shooting, but was rebuffed.<ref name="desb"/> When [[Chief of Defence Staff]] [[John Rogers Anderson]] visited the military base on March 8-9, he visited the wounded Somali recovering in the Canadian hospital.<ref name="desb"/>
+The CAR was accompanied by a helicopter squadron and a squadron of the [[Royal Canadian Dragoons]]. These forces were deployed to Somalia in January 1993, setting up its tented patrol-base outside the town of [[Beledweyne]].  Their mission was to secure and bring order to the town and a 30,000 square kilometer area around it. The soldiers lived on hard rations, with limited water, but patrolled actively while also establishing effective relations with the local tribal leaders. The Canadian Airborne Regiment stood out as having rapidly brought a modicum of order to its assigned territory. However, much of the aid was still being siphoned by local warlords, and there was also a constant stream of locals pilfering from the Canadian camp itself.{{ref|pilfering}} This theft from the camp was a major irritant, and also a risk to the safety of the soldiers. At least one commanding officer had tacitly encouraged abuse of any thieves who were caught.{{ref|abuse}}
-At the subsequent inquiry, Klick defended Rainville, heavily criticising his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu, and testified that an American Special Forces[[NCO]]  had interrogated the wounded Somali who confessed to being a saboteur; although this contradicted all other evidence, including the statements of the American soldier who never mentioned any interrogation.<ref name="desb"/> In 1994, the Ministry of Defence engaged in an undercover attempt to discredit Armstrong's findings, phoning Allan Thompson of the [[Toronto Star]] and offering to leak to him  the pathology report by James Ferris conducted two months after the killing, which found the decomposing body showed none of the signs Armstrong had suggested. Thompson took his evidence of a preconceived "leak" from the Ministry to the subsequent inquiry, where they added weight to Armstrong's findings.<ref name="desb"/> While his commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu described Armstrong as bordering on insanity at the inquiry, the only evidence he produced was that he liked to climb onto the roof of the hospital at night in Somalia and watch the stars.<ref name="desb"/>
 ==Death of Shidane Arone==
-[[File:Clayton Matchee Image 2.jpg|right|thumb|250px|Matchee, seen in one of sixteen pictures taken by Brown during the beating death of Arone.]]On March 16 1993, Michael Sox found Shidane Abukar Arone hiding in a [[portable toilet]] in an abandoned American base across from the Canadian base and, believing he was attempting to sneak into the Canadian base to steal supplies, turned him over to another soldier, who led the teenager to a [[bunker]] being used to house [[munitions]].<ref name="whit">Whitworth, Sandra. "Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping", p. 92</ref><ref name="diplo">Coulon, Jocelyn. "Soldiers of Diplomacy", [[University of Toronto Press]], p. 94</ref> Arone protested, claiming he had simply been trying to find a lost child.<ref name="whit"/><ref name="threat"/>
+On [[March 16]], [[1993]] the Airborne captured a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, who had sneaked into the camp. He was placed in an empty bunker, that had often been used as a cell, under the guard of [[Master Corporal]] [[Clayton Matchee]] and Trooper (Private) [[Kyle Brown (Canadian soldier)|Kyle Brown]], both members of 2 Commando. Matchee, who had been drinking heavily, almost immediately began severely beating Arone, punching him in the ribs, hitting him in the head with his baton, and putting out cigarettes on his foot. Brown participated somewhat in this abuse, but was mostly an observer. He took sixteen photos of the beating, when these trophy-like pictures became public they would create a considerable furor. During the several hours the beating went on several other soldiers visited the bunker and observed the events; many others were within earshot of the bunker and could hear what was going on.
-At 21:00, Sgt. Boland replaced [[Master Corporal]] [[Clayton Matchee]] as guard of the prisoner, and ordered that his foot bindings be removed, and replaced with [[fetters]] as the ropes were too tight.<ref name="threat"/> Warrant Officer Murphy took the opportunity to kick Arone "savagely", which was later claimed to be implicit permission to abuse the prisoner.<ref name="threat"/> At this time, Matchee began his abuse of Arone by removing the captive's clothing and using it to crudely [[waterboard]] the youth until Boland objected, and Matchee left the bunker.<ref name="threat"/>
+Matchee and Brown left the unconscious Arone after several hours of this torture. When an officer returning from patrol checked on Arone he found that he had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead. A death in custody automatically triggers an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged with the murder and [[Department of National Defence Headquarters (Canada)|National Defence Headquarters]] was advised. Master Corporal Matchee later attempted suicide; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial.  Brown was found guilty of manslaughter.
-At 22:00, [[Trooper]] [[Kyle Brown (Canadian soldier)|Kyle Brown]] took over guard duty, and brought Matchee back with him. Brown punched Arone in the jaw, and was told by Boland "I don't care what you do, just don't kill the guy", to which Brown replied that he wanted to "kill this fucker".<ref name="threat"/> Boland then joined Matchee and Matt McKay for [[beer]]s in the [[mess hall]], where Matchee spoke about what he wanted to do to Arone, and suggested he might put out cigarette butts on his feet. McKay suggested that Matchee might use a [[MRE|ration pack]] or [[phone book]] to beat the youth, as it would not leave any traces.<ref name="threat"/>
-[[File:Somalia breaking arms and legs of niggers.ogv|thumb|left|Video of a Canadian Airborne soldier boasting of breaking the limbs of Somalis]]
-Matchee and Brown, both members of 2 Commando, then proceeded to beat Arone.<ref name="diplo"/> Matchee used a ration pack to beat the youth, as well as a [[broomstick]], and according to some accounts, [[sodomise]]d the teenager with it.<ref name="threat"/> Brown participated in the abuse, but was primarily an observer and took sixteen "trophy photos" of the beating, including one of Matchee forcing Arone's mouth open with a baton, and one of himself holding Pte. David Brocklebank's loaded pistol to Arone's head.<ref name="threat"/><ref>Sjolander, Claire Turenne. "Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy", 2003. p. 81</ref><ref>Dawson, Grant. "Here is Hell", 2006. p. 157</ref><ref>Born, Hans. "The Double Democractic Deficit", p. 94</ref> At approximately 23:20, Master Cpl. Giasson entered the bunker, Matchee showed him Arone, who was now semi-conscious and bleeding, and boasted that "in Canada we cannot do that, and here they let us do it".<ref name="threat"/>
+Brown claimed in his defence that he informed every officer he could find of the happenings in the bunker, and requested that they intervene.  Brown stated that when the officers declined to stop the torture, he began documenting the event with photographs. Brown later published a book in which he presented a case wherein he had been made the scapegoat for the incident and the officers who had not intervened were not brought to justice.
-Estimates have ranged from 15-80 other soldiers could hear or observe the beating, but did not intervene.<ref name="threat"/><ref name="diplo"/> Corporal MacDonald, acting as [[duty signaller]] that night, was asked by Sgt. Major Mills about "a long dragged out howl" heard from the vicinity of the bunker, but MacDonald refused to stop playing [[Game Boy]] to investigate. Later, Matchee came by to borrow a cigarette from MacDonald and mentioned that "now the Black man would fear the Indian as he did the white man", and MacDonald went outside to check on Arone's status. He saw Matchee hitting him in the face with the baton, and reported that the prisoner was "getting a good shit-kicking" to Sgt. Gresty, before retiring to bed for the night.<ref name="threat"/>
+Charges subsequently laid against members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment suggested that sixteen people had passed through the area where Arone was tortured and that, during the night,  his screams could be heard throughout the surrounding area.  The Commanding Officer of the Airborne, Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu, was tried twice by courts-martial acquitted of wrong-doing both times.  The Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, Major Anthony Seward, was also court-martialed under Article 124 of the [[National Defence Act]] (Negligent Performance of Duties).  He was convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment in the [[Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks]] and dismissal with disgrace from the [[Canadian Forces]].  A number of his subordinate supervisors were also court-martialed and found guilty under Article 124.
-Arone fell unconscious after several hours of beatings, after shouting "Canada! Canada! Canada!" as his last words.<ref name="diplo"/> When Brown mentioned the event to Captain Hillier, the officer noted there "would be trouble" if the prisoner died, and went to check on the youth whom he found had no pulse, and base medics confirmed that the boy was dead.<ref name="threat">Sherene Razack. ''Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism.'' 2004</ref> It was later discovered that Arone had burn marks on his penis, and that he had been anally raped with a broom handle.<ref name="bleat">Worthington, Peter. "Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown", p. 112</ref>
+Soon after the death of Shidane Arone came to public attention, other actions by the Airborne also began to be scrutinized. Days earlier, a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon had shot and killed a young Somali night-time infiltrator and seriously injured another.  A temporarily attached Air Force flight surgeon, Major Barry Armstrong, stated in letters home which he subsequently leaked to the press, that he judged, after seeing the body, that the death of one of the Somalis was an "execution". He subsequently accused the Reconnaissance Platoon commander, Captain Michel Rainville,  of destroying his photographic evidence, but these accusations were never proven and the officer was tried and acquitted. Captain Rainville would later be charged with torturing one of his own soldiers in a mock-exercise, that included anal-rape and psychological torture.
-A death in custody automatically triggered an investigation, and two days later Matchee and Brown were arrested and charged with the murder and [[Department of National Defence Headquarters (Canada)|National Defence Headquarters]] was advised. Matchee later attempted to hang himself in his cell; the attempt failed but caused massive brain damage, making him unfit to stand trial.  Brown was found guilty of manslaughter.
+Home-video footage of another trooper, Cpl Matt McKay, was found in which he was filmed uttering racist obscenities. Predeployment photographs of McKay performing a [[Nazi salute]] in front of a [[Swastika]] were also published. Video of brutal [[hazing]] rituals also came to light.
-The Officer Commanding of 2 Commando, Major Anthony Seward, was also court-martialed under Article 124 of the [[National Defence Act]] (Negligent Performance of Duties).  He was convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment in the [[Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks]] and dismissal with disgrace from the [[Canadian Forces]].
-==Response==
+==DND response==
 The debate over what led to the brutal events in Somalia, and why military leaders had sent a unit with known problems to that country were important ones, but the reaction to these events by the military leadership became the most important issue. DND headquarters in Ottawa was quickly informed about the death and arrest of the two soldiers. The political situation in Canada at the time was sensitive, with Minister of National Defence [[Kim Campbell]] in the midst of a leadership campaign to replace Brian Mulroney as leader of the ruling [[Progressive Conservative Party of Canada|Progressive Conservative Party]], and a federal election expected in the near future. Public relations relating to the incident were immediately taken over by [[Department of National Defence]] (DND) officials in Ottawa.
-{{Rquote|right|The Canadian military seems to have blind confidence in mefloquine, even though it carries warnings that those with judgment jobs, like neurosurgeons or airline pilots, shouldn't use it. But it is apparently safe for young men with loaded weapons. Does that make sense?|[[Peter Worthington]]<ref>Worthington, Peter. [[Edmonton Sun]], "Did we poison our Somalia soldiers?", January 3, 1998</ref>}}
-At first DND officials told the media, and also minister Campbell that Arone had likely died from natural causes. It took several weeks for the Canadian people to become aware of the actual events in Somalia. These reports, especially once Private Brown's picture became public created an outcry in Canada. The high regard the Canadian people had for their armed forces, especially the peacekeepers, was damaged. The reports also generated intense media interest, and how these investigations were dealt with would become the focus of public investigations. Highly placed members of the military leadership were accused of fraudulently altering documents prior to handing them over to journalists. The existence of other documents was denied, and some others were destroyed.<ref name="berc">[[David Bercuson|Bercuson, David]] "Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, & the Murder in Somalia" 1997</ref> Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.
+At first DND officials told the media, and also minister Campbell that Arone had likely died from natural causes. It took several weeks for the Canadian people to become aware of the actual events in Somalia. These reports, especially once Private Brown's picture became public created an outcry in Canada. The high regard the Canadian people had for their armed forces, especially the peacekeepers, was damaged. The reports also generated intense media interest, and how these investigations were dealt with would become the focus of public investigations. Highly placed members of the military leadership were accused of fraudulently altering documents prior to handing them over to journalists. The existence of other documents was denied, and some others were destroyed.{{ref|cover}} Criticism also focused on the fact that it took five weeks to order a high-level investigation into the events in Somalia.
-Some, including [[Member of Parliament]] [[John Cummins]], quickly pointed out that three of the four men facing the most serious charges had been given ''Lariam'', a brand-name of [[Mefloquine]], injections to combat [[Malaria]] before deploying; as was standard with most other Canadian soldiers at the time. The drug was known to cause paranoia, lack of judgment, neurosis and other mental side effects, and some have suggested it bore some responsibility for the soldiers' actions.<ref name="ogle"/>
+Perhaps also overlooked in this tragedy was the use of the antimalarial drug, Lariam ([[Mefloquine]]), which produces some severe side effects in some people such as aggressive mood swings, neuropsychiatric disorders, manic behaviour, and hallucinations. Soldiers were given Lariam while on duty in Somalia, as this is an area affected by malaria. Roche U.S.A., the drug's manufacturer, conceded that Lariam can cause the severe side effects noted above.
-==Legal proceedings==
-Pte. Brocklebank was charged with negligent performance of military duty, as prosecutors alleged he was bound by the [[Fourth Geneva Convention]] to ensure the safety of civilian prisoners. He was acquitted because the court found that the Convention did not apply to the Somali peacekeeping mission since there "was no evidence of an armed conflict".<ref>TMC Asser Institute, "Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law", p. 365</ref>
-==McAuliffe's request for documents==
-In September 1995, [[Canadian Broadcasting Corporation|CBC]] reporter [[Michael McAuliffe]] requested access to 68 [[Response to Query]] forms to supplement his earlier informal gleanings about the Canadian military operation, but the documents were altered before being released to him, in order to make them agree with the information he'd been given earlier.<ref name="desb"/> In addition, invented financial charges were tagged onto his request, claiming that it had taken  413 [[man-hour]]s and subsequently would cost McAuliffe $4,080, although the documents were in fact readily available.<ref>Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces  to Somalia, Document Book 103, tabs 12 & 13.</ref><ref>Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces  to Somalia, Testimony of Lt. Brayman, transcript pp. 12947-12948 & 13079-13080</ref><ref>Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces  to Somalia, Testimony of Nancy Fournier, Transcript pp. 12048-12050</ref>
-While giving McAuliffe misinformation informally was not illegal, it was a crime for the government to release forged documents in response to an [[Access to Information]] request.<ref name="desb"/> The question quickly emerged of whether [[Chief of Defence Staff]] [[Jean Boyle]] had known about the altering, and if he bore responsibility for it even if he were ignorant of his underlings' doings.<ref name="desb"/> On September 5 1995, a clerk at the NDHQ was discovered collecting Somalia-related documents for a [[burn bag]] to be destroyed.<ref name="desb"/>
 ==Somalia Inquiry==
-{{Rquote|right|Also mitigating, to a certain extent, is the fact that these individuals must be viewed as products of a system that placed great store in the "can do" attitude. The reflex to say "yes sir" rather than to question the appropriateness of a command or policy obviously runs against the grain of free and open discussion, but it is ingrained in military discipline and culture. However, leaders properly exercising command responsibility must recognise and assert not only their right, but their duty, to advise against improper actions, of failing to do so means that professionalism is lost.|Commission of Inquiry, 1997<ref name="small">Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, "Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair", pp. 953.</ref>}}
 The public outcry began in earnest in [[1994]].  The new government of [[Jean Chrétien]]'s [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberal Party]] initiated a highly visible Somalia Inquiry in 1994 under Federal Court Judge Gilles Létourneau. Officially known as the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, its hearings were broadcast daily in both languages, nationally.
 As the inquiry unfolded, home videos of [[initiation]] rites in the CAR's French-speaking commando found their way into the media. The new Minister of National Defence [[David Collenette]] argued that the videos were disgusting, demeaning and racist. With the continued accumulation of such politically damaging visibility, the Minister of National Defence ordered the Canadian Airborne Regiment disbanded in 1995.  It has been suggested that this move was as much driven by budget cuts to the Canadian Forces as by the Somalia Affair, but there is no question that the affair gave the Minister the public support needed to disband the regiment.
-The [[Chief of the Defence Staff (Canada)|Chief of the Defence Staff]] General [[John de Chastelain]], who had not supported the minister's disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud.  His successor, Air Force General [[Jean Boyle]] was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrong doing under his command. [[Minister of National Defence (Canada)|Minister of National Defence]] [[David Collenette]] was also forced to resign, partially due to the affair.
+The respected [[Chief of the Defence Staff (Canada)|Chief of the Defence Staff]] General [[John de Chastelain]], who had not supported the minister's disbandment order of the Airborne, resigned under a cloud.  His successor, Air Force General [[Jean Boyle]] was forced to resign only a few months after accepting the role when, in a gesture uncharacteristic of military tradition, he blamed his subordinates for previous wrong doing under his command. [[Minister of National Defence (Canada)|Minister of National Defence]] [[David Collenette]] was also forced to resign, partially due to the affair.
+The inquiry ran until [[1997]] when it was cut short by the government in the months before the [[Canadian federal election, 1997|1997 election]]. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, noting that it was far exceeding its mandate, as it continued to focus on political and administrative aspects of Armed Forces overall management. Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry's attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister [[Doug Young]] in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.
-On April 8, 1996, Boyle called a halt to all normal duties and announced the entire Canadian military would begin searching for documents relating to Somalia.<ref name="desb"/>
-The inquiry ran until [[1997]] when it was cut short by the government in the months before the [[Canadian federal election, 1997|1997 election]]. The government was critical of the direction of the inquiry, noting that it was far exceeding its mandate.<ref name="national"/> Eggleton suggested that the events had happened four years earlier, and it was time to "move on".<ref name="national"/>
-Indeed, the conduct of the new government after the Somalia affair and the search for documents now absorbed much of the inquiry's attention, as reflected in its report. The inquiry had run long over its allotted timeframe and budget. The decision to end the inquiry received visible media attention and may have contributed to the defeat of the new Defence Minister [[Doug Young]] in the 1997 election. The inquiry was never able to examine top level governmental decision-making, nor did it actually examine the alleged events in Somalia.
 The final report of the inquiry was a striking attack on the procedures, support and leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Many of the top officers in the Canadian Forces were excoriated, including three separate Chiefs of the Defence Staff.  The CAR had been rushed into a war zone with inadequate preparation or legal support. Enquiry observer retired Brigadier-General Dan Loomis noted that the operation had changed, in December 1992, "from a peacekeeping operation, where arms are used only in self-defence, to one where arms could be used proactively to achieve politico-military objectives...In short the Canadian Forces were being put on active service and sent to war (as defined by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter)." Its deployment into "war" had never been debated in parliament and indeed the Canadian public had been led to believe by its government that the CAR was on a "peacekeeping" mission.  After the events the leaders of the Canadian Forces had been far more concerned with self-preservation than in trying to find the truth. The inquiry report singled out Major-General [[Lewis MacKenzie]] as a major exception, as he took full responsibility for any errors he made.
-==Aftermath of the Affair==
+==Effect of the Affair on the Canadian Forces==
 The affair had a number of long lasting effects. While it is difficult to separate the effects of the affair on Canadian Forces morale from those of the concurrent defence spending cut, it did exacerbate feelings of distrust towards the media and politicians among many CF members.
 At the same time, public trust in the Canadian Forces suffered and recruitment became more difficult. Public revulsion provided support for the sharp cuts to military spending introduced by the Liberal government.  Many of the report's comments, along with the sustained media criticism of the military, led to the hasty imposition of policies designed to ensure nothing similar to the Somalia Affair could happen again.  It has been argued that many of these practices, such as the micro-management of training, operations and disciplinary processes from NDHQ and the resultant restrictions on commanding officers, hamper the flexibility of operational units. Since the events in Somalia, Canada has become far less ready to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping efforts. Once playing an important role in the majority of UN efforts, in subsequent years Canada has been more ready to simply provide indirect support.
-In 1999, judge [[J. Douglas Cunningham]] dismissed an appeal for financial compensation by Arone's parents Abubakar Arone Rage and Dahabo Omar Samow, ruling that their use of a litigation guardian, Abdullahi Godah Barre, was inconsistent with the legal requirement, and they should have traveled to Canada to launch the suit themselves. <ref name="marten"/><ref>Scott, Craig. "Torture as Tort", p. 33</ref>
-Brown later co-operated on a book in which it was suggested he had been made the scapegoat for the incident and the officers who had not intervened were not brought to justice.<ref name="bleat"/>
 Canada was not the only country to face problems in Somalia.  There were severe casualties on all sides in the warlord-dominated chaos.  The [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]] resulted in 500-1000 Somali militia and civilian deaths, as well as eighteen American and two Pakistani deaths, following which the US decided to leave the country. Soldiers of other countries also faced charges of misconduct:  [[Italy|Italian]] troops were photographed appearing to rape a Somali woman and [[Belgium|Belgian]] soldiers took photographs of themselves urinating on and burning Somalis.
-Other long term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of "zero tolerance" on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing.
+Other long term effects on the Forces included the adoption of sensitivity training, including SHARP (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention) training, which became mandatory for every single member of the Forces, and was accompanied by a declaration of "zero tolerance" on racism and harassment of any kind, including hazing.  In the aftermath of the Somalia affair, video of brutal hazing rituals in the Airborne Regiment had been met with public outrage and disgust when they were made public.
-==External links==
+==Notes==
+*{{note|82nd}} Bercuson pg. 214
-*[[Canadian Broadcast Standards Council]], [http://www.cbsc.ca/english/decisions/1995/950119.php Canada AM: Airborne Hazing], complaint brought by a viewer to [[CTV]]'s decision to broadcast hazing footage she deemed "too explicit".
+*{{note|flag}} Bercuson pg. 211
+*{{note|pilfering}} Bercuson pg. 2
+*{{note|abuse}} Bercuson pg. 7
+*{{note|cover}} Koring, Paul. ''[[The Globe and Mail]]''. May 21, 1996. pg. A1
+==References==
+*[[David Bercuson]] '' Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, & the Murder in Somalia'' 1997
+*[[Peter Desbarats]] ''Somalia Cover-Up; A Commissioner's Journal'' 1997
+*Sherene Razack. ''Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism.'' 2004
+* [http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0010641 Canadian Encyclopedia "Boyle maintains Innocence]
 * [http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-71-723/conflict_war/somalia/ CBC Archives] - The Somalia Affair
 * [http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm  Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia]
+* [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/vol0/index_e.asp Somalia Inquiry] - official report (link to Executive Summary)
-*Mock, Karen R. [[Department of Education|U.S. Department of Education]], [http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_SearchValue_0=EJ525298&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=EJ525298 The Somalia Inquiry: What Does It Have to Do with Us?], 1996
+* [http://www.somaliaonline.com Somalia Online] News and Discussions about Somalia
-==References==
-{{reflist|2}}
 [[Category:History of Somalia]]
 [[Category:Military history of Canada]]
 [[Category:Military scandals]]
-[[es:Asunto de Somalia]]