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Philosophy of conspiracy theories

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Philosophy of conspiracy theories is the academic study by philosophers of the phenomenon and history of conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory is generally understood as an explanation of an event or situation that invokes a conspiracy by sinister and powerful actors, often political in motivation,[1][2] when other explanations are more probable.[3] The term has a pejorative connotation, implying that the appeal to a conspiracy is based on prejudice or insufficient evidence.[4] Some philosophers believe this should not be the case.

Psychologists attribute finding a conspiracy where there is none to a mental illness called illusory pattern perception.[5][6]

History

The debate in analytic philosophy regarding conspiracy theories began in the mid-1990s when Charles Pigden challenged Karl Popper's position.[7] Popper, an influential philosopher of science, described what he called the "conspiracy theory of society", according to which history is a product of conspiracy, intended by some individuals or groups. Popper argues that this view must be wrong because not everything is intended.[8][9] Although Popper's critique has been and continues to be influential,[10] Pigden has maintained that Popper's argument does not apply to most conspiracy theories, which do not posit complete control of events.[11][12] Pigden also points out that when a conspiracy fails in some way, a theory about the conspiracy is still a conspiracy theory and may still play an explanatory role.[13]

Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories", which originally appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a prima facie case against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted.

In 2007, a special issue of Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge", argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with prima facie scepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities.[14][15] Charles Pigden frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief". He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory".[16] More recently, philosophers and social scientists engaged in arguing over the nature of conspiracy theories and pejorative implications over policies and funding, to the extent this debate has been classified as a "cross-disciplinary disagreement"[17].

Pejorative implications

Philosophers M Dentith and Brian Keeley have argued that defining conspiracy theories as being prima facie unlikely may result in prematurely dismissing theories that posit conspiracies.[18] Dentith, Keeley, and Basham favor minimalist definitions, defining "conspiracy theories" as theories involving conspiracies as a significant cause.[19] This has been criticized by Coady as capturing too many false positives, including, for example, the official account of 9/11.[20] Coady has suggested that a characteristic feature of conspiracy theories is their opposition to some official account.[20][21]

The term "conspiracy theory" typically implies oppressive or sinister intent.[22] The following philosophers have argued that such language overstates the case:[23][24][25]

  • Steve Clark (who argues that a dismissive attitude to conspiracy theories is generally justifiable) points out that Elvis Presley conspiring to fake his own death would not have been an example of nefarious intent, and that popularizers of that conspiracy theory have portrayed Elvis sympathetically.[26]
  • Daniel Cohnitz argues that in most versions of the Paul Is Dead conspiracy theory, the surviving Beatles and their co-conspirators had the non-malevolent motivation of trying to save the world from collective grief, and that some believers in chemtrails say they might be spreading chemicals for a beneficial purpose. Consequently, for Cohnitz, sinister intent should not be taken as a necessary component of the definition.[27]
  • Pigden characterizes conspiracy theories as positing "morally suspect" enterprises.[28]

Susan Feldman has pointed out that beliefs designated as conspiracy theories may purport to explain, not events that have occurred or facts that are widely known, but "hidden facts".[29]

Coady suggests that the phrase "conspiracy theory" should not be used, while Dentith and Keeley maintain that it should continue to be used and to be discussed.[30]

See also

References

  1. ^ Goertzel, T (December 1994). "Belief in conspiracy theories". Political Psychology. 15 (4): 731–742. doi:10.2307/3791630. JSTOR 3791630. "explanations for important events that involve secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups"
  2. ^ "conspiracy theory". Oxford English Dictionary (Online ed.). Oxford University Press. (Subscription or participating institution membership required.) "the theory that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of a conspiracy between interested parties; spec. a belief that some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible for an unexplained event"
  3. ^ Aaronovitch, David (2009). Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History. Jonathan Cape. p. 253. ISBN 9780224074704. Retrieved 17 August 2019. It is a contention of this book that conspiracy theorists fail to apply the principle of Occam's razor to their arguments.
  4. ^ Byford, Jovan (2011). Conspiracy theories : a critical introduction. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780230349216. OCLC 802867724. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  5. ^ Dean, Signe (October 23, 2017). "Conspiracy Theorists Really Do See The World Differently, New Study Shows". Science Alert. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
  6. ^ Sloat, Sarah (October 17, 2017). "Conspiracy Theorists Have a Fundamental Cognitive Problem, Say Scientists". Inverse. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
  7. ^ Butter, Michael; Knight, Peter (2019), "The History of Conspiracy Theory Research", Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, p. 39, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0002, ISBN 978-0-19-084407-3
  8. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 15–16.
  9. ^ Popper, Karl (1972). Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. Routledge Kegan Paul. pp. 123–125.
  10. ^ Coady, David (2006). Conspiracy theories : the philosophical debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. p. 5. ISBN 0-7546-5250-5. OCLC 60697068.
  11. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 16–17.
  12. ^ Pigden, Charles (1995). "Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 25 (1): 3–34. doi:10.1177/004839319502500101.
  13. ^ Coady, David (2006). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. p. 5.
  14. ^ Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4 (2): 132.
  15. ^ Dentith, M R. X. (2018). "When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation", p. 4. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  16. ^ Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4.2: 133.
  17. ^ Freiman, Ori (2019). "The Philosophy of Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously". Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 8 (9): 51–61.
  18. ^ Dentith, M R.X. and Brian L. Keeley (2019). "The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview", p. 291, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge (284-294).
  19. ^ Dentith, M R. X. (2019). "Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence". Synthese 196, p. 2244; doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1532-7.
  20. ^ a b Coady, David. (2003). "Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories". International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17.2, pp. 200-201.
  21. ^ Coady, David. (2006). "An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories", pp. 2-3. In Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, edited by David Coady. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate: 1-11.
  22. ^ "conspiracy theory". Oxford English Dictionary (Online ed.). Oxford University Press. (Subscription or participating institution membership required.) "the theory that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of a conspiracy between interested parties; spec. a belief that some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible for an unexplained event"
  23. ^ Coady, David (2006). "An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories", p. 1. In Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, edited by David Coady. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate: 1-11.
  24. ^ Keeley, Brian L. (2007). "God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory", Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, p. 141.
  25. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?" Social Epistemology 32.1, pp. 30-32.
  26. ^ Clarke, Steve (2002). "Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 32 (2): 131–150. doi:10.1177/004931032002001.
  27. ^ Cohnitz, Daniel. "Critical Citizens or Paranoid Nutcases? On the Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories". Retrieved November 3, 2019.
  28. ^ Pigden, Charles (2006). "Complots of Mischief", p. 157. In David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
  29. ^ Feldman, Susan (2011). "Counterfact Conspiracy Theories". International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 25 (1): 15–24. doi:10.5840/ijap20112512.
  30. ^ Dentith, M R.X. and Brian L. Keeley (2019). "The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview", p. 29w, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge (284-294).

Further reading

  • 2007. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2. (Special Issue: Conspiracy Theories)
  • 2018. Argumenta 3.2 (issue #6) (Special Issue: The Ethics and the Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories) Open access.
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