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1995 Zapatista Crisis

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The 1995 Zapatista Crisis refers to the aftermath of the 1994 Zapatista uprisings, which began as a result of the 1991 revision of Article 27 of Mexico's Constitution. This revision caused unrest in Chiapas's Southern Mexican state, as many indigenous tribes believed the article's revision negatively affected them due to the new economic policies. Violence ensued over several years, and the many peace deals proposed by the Mexican government were rejected. In the early days of the new government administration, President Ernesto Zedillo took a series of decisions that contradicted decisions from the earlier administration.

Political context

1994 Mexico Political Assassinations

Prior to the 1994 Mexico general election and the presidential inauguration, there were politically motivated assassinations directly tied to the 1994 Presidential elections and internal warfare between factions of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Luis Donaldo Colosio, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's handpicked successor and PRI presidential candidate, was assassinated on March 1994,[1] and Ernesto Zedillo, financial policy expert and Colosio's campaign manager, was the new PRI presidential candidate despite never holding an elective office before nor serving as a member of the PRI's inner circle. The other high-level political assassination was José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, PRI Secretary-General and President Salinas' former brother-in-law. The murder laid bare the conflict among the political elites.[2]

Government Investigation

The Mexican government investigated the political crimes, and to give credibility to the investigations of these political crimes, President Zedillo appointed Antonio Lozano Gracia, a member of the opposition political party National Action Party (PAN), as Attorney General. Raúl Salinas de Gortari, the older brother of former president Salinas, was implicated and arrested for Francisco Ruiz Massieu's assassination with President Zedillo's approval of the arrest, breaking with the tradition that sitting presidents protect their predecessor. President Zedillo received lukewarm support from his own party PRI, and as a series of crises struck his administration, he had no secure influence in the PRI to back him.[2]

Lacandon Jungle secret meeting

On January 5, 1995, the Secretary of Interior Esteban Moctezuma began a secret meeting process with Subcomandante Marcos called "Steps Toward Peace" They took place in the village of Guadalupe Tepeyac, belonging to the municipality of Pantelho, Chiapas. Important specific agreements that both parties agreed to comply with were reached, in which the Mexican army withdraw of particular points, such as San Andres Larrainzar, and Marcos accepted a group of citizens to be involved in a formal negotiation to start in a couple of weeks. Due to the fast progress of talks in the steps toward peace, the possibility of an agreement looked very close, and thus Marcos wrote, "I am being threatened by unemployment".[3][4]

Identity

During the investigative stage to identify Subcomandante Marcos, the Mexican government speculated that he was a dangerous guerrilla fighter. This theory gained much traction at the end of 1994, after the dissident Zapatista Comandante, Salvador Morales Garibay, gave away his former fellow Zapatistas' identity to the Mexican government, among them Marcos. They all were indicted for terrorism, arrest warrants were issued, and arrests were made in military action. The Mexican government alleges some Zapatistas to be terrorists, among them Marcos. There was a storm of political pressures for a short military solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis. On February 9, 1995, in a televised special Presidential broadcast, President Ernesto Zedillo announced Subcomandante Marcos to be one Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, born June 19, 1957, in Tampico, Tamaulipas to Spanish immigrants, and a former professor at Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana School of Sciences and Arts for the Design. After the government revealed Marcos's identity in January 1995, Max Appedole, an old friend with Marcos and classmate with the Jesuits at the Instituto Cultural Tampico, made a direct intervention in the conflict. Max played a significant role with the Mexican government to avoid a military solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis, by demonstrating that contrary to the accusations announced by President Ernesto Zedillo, Rafael Guillén was not a terrorist. Max Appedole identified his linguistic fingerprint-based in Marcos's specific, unique way of speaking, recognized his literary style in all Marcos manifestos published in the media, and linked them to the literary tournaments organized by the Jesuits. He confirmed that he had no doubt that Marcos was his friend Rafael Guillén, and that Guillen was a pacifist. Max Appedole thus closed the first successful Linguistic Profiling Confirmation Case in the history of Law Enforcement. This new science was developed based on these achievements, giving way to what is now called forensic linguistics; this motivated a new Division of forensic linguistics Criminal Profiling in Law Enforcement.[5][6][7][8]

The military site

Once Subcomandante Marcos was identified as Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, on February 9, 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo took a series of decisions that completely broke with the previous strategy. The action plan previously defined, and the agreements he authorized his Secretary of Interior Lic Esteban Moctezuma to compromise with Marcos just three days before in Guadalupe Tepeyac. Zedillo ordered the Mexican army to capture or annihilate Marcos. This was done without consulting his Secretary of Interior, without even knowing exactly who Marcos was; with the PGR's single presumption that Marcos was a dangerous guerrilla, President Ernesto Zedillo decided to launch a military offense to capture or annihilate Marcos and the Zapatistas.[9] Arrest warrants were made against Marcos,[10] Javier Elorriaga Berdegue, Silvia Fernández Hernández, Jorge Santiago, Fernando Yanez, German Vicente, Jorge Santiago, and other Zapatistas. At the Lacandon Jungle, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation came under Mexican Army military siege. Javier Elorriaga was captured on February 9, 1995, in a military garrison at Gabina Velázquez in Las Margarita's town and later taken to the Cerro Hueco prison in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas.[11] On February 11, 1995, the PGR claimed they captured 14 persons presumed to be involved with the Zapatistas, of which eight already being turned to the Judicial Authorities and seized a critical arsenal.[12] The PGR arrested the San Cristóbal de Las Casas Catholic Bishop, Samuel Ruiz García, for allegedly concealing the Zapatistas guerrilla activity. In response, Mexico-Vatican diplomatic relations deteriorated,[13] partly because of the May 24, 1993, political assassination of a Prince of the Catholic Church, Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo of Guadalajara, Mexico, that the PGR had left unsolved.

Marcos's resolve was put to the test in his camp in the Lacandon Jungle when the Zapatistas were under the Mexican Army military siege. Marcos's response was immediate, sending Esteban Moctezuma the following message: "See you in hell". Conflicting signals got strengthened in favor of a fast military solution. The facts seemed to confirm Manuel Camacho Solis's 16 June 1994 accusations that his resignation as the Chiapas Peace Commissioner was due to sabotage done by the presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo.

Mexico Secretary of the Interior Lic. Esteban Moctezuma believed a peaceful solution was possible. He attempted to reach a peacefully negotiated solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis, betting it all on a strategy to reestablish the Mexican Government Zapatista Army of National Liberation dialog to search for peace, demonstrating Marcos genuine pacifist disposition and the consequences of a military solution. Making a strong position against the February 9 actions against Peace, Secretary of the Interior Esteban Moctezuma submitted his resignation to President Ernesto Zedillo, which was not accepted. For these primary reasons, the Mexican army eased actions, giving an opportunity that Marcos capitalized on to escape the military site he was placed in the Lacandon Jungle.[14]

Faced with this situation, Max Appedole asked for help from Edén Pastora, the legendary Nicaraguan "Commander Zero", to prepare a report for under-Secretary of the Interior Luis Maldonado on Marcos's degree of pacifism, if any.[15] The document concluded that the complaints of marginalized groups and the radical left in México had been vented through the Zapatistas movement, while Marcos maintained an open negotiating track. If Marcos were eliminated, his function as a safety-valve for at social discontent would cease and more-radical groups could take his place. These groups would respond to violence with violence, threatening terrorist bombings, kidnappings and even more belligerent activities. The country would then be plunged into a very dangerous downward spiral, with discontent surfacing in areas other than Chiapas.[16]

Presidential Decree for the Dialog, the Reconciliation, and a peace with dignity in Chiapas Law

On March 10, 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo and Secretary of the Interior Esteban Moctezuma signed the Presidential Decree for the Dialog, the Reconciliation, and a peace with dignity in Chiapas Law. It was discussed and approved by the Mexican Congress.[17]

Restoration of the peace talks

On the night of 3 April 1995 at 8:55 pm, the Secretary of Interior, Lic. Esteban Moctezuma sent Luis Maldonado to deliver a letter to representatives of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The letter expressed the Secretary of Interior's commitment to a political path to resolve the conflict.[18]

In contrast to many other talks—with broad media exposure, strong security measures, and great ceremony—Maldonado decided on secret talks, alone, without any disruptive security measures. He went to the Lacandon Jungle to meet with Marcos; the secret negotiations took place in Prado Pacayal, Chiapas, and were witnessed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Batel. Marcos and Maldonado established parameters and a location for the peace dialogue between the parties. Secret negotiations to restart the dialog between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and the Mexican government were initiated. These negotiations took place to establish parameters and base for the peace dialog between the parties. After several days of unfruitful negotiations, it was very early in the morning nonstop into the next day without reaching any specific agreements. In a strategically calculated move, Luis Maldonado proposed a definitive suspension of hostilities and distention measures always proportionally higher to the Mexican government to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. On his way out, Luis Maldonado said:

"If you do not accept this, it will be regretted not having made the installation of the formal dialog in the time established by the Peace Talks Law".

Marcos took this as a direct threat, so he did no longer reply.

The Subcomandante Marcos gave a message to the Witness of Honor Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Batel:

You have been witness to the fact that we have not threatened or assaulted these people, they have been respected in their person, property, their liberty, and life. You have witnessed that the Zapatista Army of National Liberation has a word and has honor; you have also been witness to our willingness to engage in dialog. Thank you for taking the trouble to come all the way down here and have contributed with your effort to a peaceful settlement of the conflict; we hope that you will continue contributing in this effort to avoid war and you and your family continue accepting to be witnesses of honor in this dialog and negotiation process.

Finally, he asked the witness of honor to accompany Secretary Moctezuma negotiator Luis Maldonado in his way out, all the way to Ocosingo, to verify they are leaving well and unharmed. (April 7, 1995, meeting ended at 4:00 a.m.)[19]

Peace

Without much hope of dialogue, it was already in hostile conditions as the Secretary of Interior negotiator Luis Maldonado began his return to Mexico City. When passing by the Ejido San Miguel, a patrol of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation beckons them to stop, surprised without even knowing what was happening, he was handed a radio, by means of which Mexico under-Secretary of Interior Luis Maldonado achieved with the Subcomandante Marcos the re-initiation of the Dialog with all the necessary agreements per the Law to start the formal Peace Talks dialog between the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and the Mexican government. The Zapatista's charismatic leader, Marcos, led the Zapatistas movement to leave arms aside and start the dialog for a peace agreement.[20][21]

Protocol

By April 9, 1995, the Dialog Protocol's Bases and the harmony, peace with justice and dignity agreement Negotiation between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas got signed. On April 17, 1995, the Mexican government appointed Marco Antonio Bernal as Peace Commissioner in Chiapas.[22] Peace Talks between the Mexican Government and the Zapatistas started in San Andrés Larráinzar on April 22, 1995. The Zapatistas rejected the Mexican Government proposal. Peace Talks Dialog reinitiated on June 7, 1995, they agree with Alianza Cívica Nacional y the Convención Nacional Democrática to organize a national Consultation for Peace and Democracy. The Bases for the Dialog Protocol was renegotiated, in La Realidad Chiapas. October 12, 1995 Peace Talks Dialog is resumed in San Andres Larráinzar, Chiapas.[23]

The other agenda

The rocky road to peace between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas was due mostly to the initiatives promoted by the PGR. On October 23, 1995, to derail the Peace Talks Dialog, the PGR arrested and send Fernando Yañez Muñoz to prison. Once again, not only the Peace Talks got seriously disturbed, these actions violated the governing peace talks Law, which granted a guarantee of free passage to all of the Zapatistas during the negotiations and suspended all the arrest warrants against any of them. On October 26, 1995, the Zapatista National Liberation Army denied any association with Fernando Yañez Muñoz, and announced a Red Alert. Marcos returns to the mountains. On October 26, 1995, the PGR dropped all charges against the alleged Comandante German. The COCOPA agreed with the determination. The next day on October 27, 1995, Fernando Yañez Muñoz was freed from the Reclusorio Preventivo Oriente.[24] He said, "I was arrested for political reasons and I guess I am set free for political reasons. My arrest was with the objective purpose of sabotaging the peace talks."[25] On 29 October 1995 the Zapatistas lifted the Red Alert and negotiations resumed.

Secret meetings

Steps Toward Peace

In contrast with many other talks, with a broad media exposure, strong security measures, and great ceremony, Secretary of the Interior Esteban Moctezuma, went for the secret talks, alone, without any security measures, without the reflectors glitter, which could disrupt the talks, so he went to find a solution in the Lacandon Jungle to meet with Marcos. Important agreements were reached between the two, they called them: Steps Toward Peace. They demonstrated their sense of will, affinities and confidence were dispensed with mutual respect, and a significant track of understanding got established. When the 1995 Zapatista Crisis started, it paved the way for what they were called

Secret negotiations

To which under-Secretary of Interior Luis Maldonado attended to find a solution, alone, without any security measures, or media coverage, he went to the Lacandon Jungle to negotiate with Marcos and that he did, Luis Maldonado restored the conditions for the Peace Talks. These simple acts of courage, determination, and confidence were later matched by Marcos probing to be useful to help keep the faith in the works for a peaceful solution, through negotiation, champion by Esteban Moctezuma, from the Mexican Secretary of Interior during the series of clashes promoted by the PGR to derail peace.

The San Andrés Accords

On 16 February 1996, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and Mexican government, signed The San Andrés Accords. With the Terms of Peace and the Constitutional change that guarantees the rights to the Indigenous peoples of Mexico. Approved by the Commission on Concordance and Pacification COCOPA, a bicameral Legislative Commission formed in March 1995 by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, integrated by Deputies and Senators, of all the political Parties in Mexico to assist in the peace dialog process in the context of the 1995 Zapatista Crisis.

With delegates from 42 countries. On 27 July 1996, the EZLN organized the First Intercontinental Gathering for Humanity and against the neoliberal practice.

Executive decision

Time showed that the fight against a military solution to the conflict and the strategy to achieve a peaceful solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis was legal, politically, and honorably correct, saving many lives in México. After a rocky start because of conflicting intelligence that caused the 1995 Zapatista Crisis President Ernesto Zedillo was heading to a Military solution, and when the intelligence issue was cleared, confirming that Subcomandante Marcos was no terrorist but a pacifist by nature, as well as all the other conclusions that Secretary of Interior Esteban Moctezuma also gave to the President Ernesto Zedillo with the purpose of trying to avoid a bloodbath of the Mexican indigenous people, as well to prevent other also terrible repercussions of an immoral and unnecessary tragic outcome.

President Ernesto Zedillo to avoid innocent blood-shedding, change the course of action doing the opposite of his February 9, 1995, television appearance. For that Zedillo endured heavy political criticism at the time, he demonstrated a humility of a Man of State, President Ernesto Zedillo did not accept Secretary of Interior Esteban Moctezuma resignation and ask him to restore Dialog conditions to achieve a peaceful solution to the 1995 Zapatista Crisis. On March 10, 1995, President Ernesto Zedillo and Secretary of Interior Esteban Moctezuma sign the Presidential Decree for the Dialog, the Reconciliation and a peace with dignity in Chiapas Law. The governing Law that warrants to have only one agenda in all of President Zedillo Administration, as well the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional to achieve an honorable peace and it is now a universal reference and example of respect to people honor and dignity.

Release of the prisoners

On appeal, the Court dismisses the previous condemnatory Sentence for the alleged Zapatistas Javier Elorriaga Berdegué and Sebastian Etzin Gomez given on May 2, 1996, for the crime of terrorism, with 13 and 6 years of imprisonment respectively and they were released on June 6, 1996.[26] The EZLN suspends their troops Alert Status.

References

  1. ^ Levi, Issac A. (24 March 1994). "Colosio: From Poor Beginning To Top Politico With PM-Mexico-Candidate Killed, Bjt". AP NEWS. Retrieved 29 September 2020.
  2. ^ a b Andrés Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, and Mexico's Road to Prosperity. Boston: Little Brown and Company 1996, pp. 111-127; 316-318
  3. ^ Zedillo rompió acuerdo de paz con el EZLN
  4. ^ "«Renuncia en Gobernación". Archived from the original on 2013-11-02. Retrieved 2013-07-28.
  5. ^ «Marcos en la mira de Zedillo»
  6. ^ Sí es Sebastián Guillén»
  7. ^ Otra Campana Pintada de Azul»
  8. ^ "Maestros y condiscípulos de Tampico recuerdan a Rafael Guillén»". Archived from the original on 2013-10-17. Retrieved 2013-07-28.
  9. ^ "Memoria Política de México". Archived from the original on 22 December 2015. Retrieved 14 December 2015.
  10. ^ tvinsomne (23 September 2009). "PGR ordena la captura y devela la identidad del Subcomandante Marcos (9 de febrero 1995)". YouTube. Retrieved 16 February 2019.
  11. ^ ""La Jornada: mayo 4 de 1996»". unam.mx. Retrieved March 13, 2018.
  12. ^ "U.S. military aids Mexico's attacks on Zapatista movement". afn.org.
  13. ^ Jornada, La. "A 15 años de relaciones entre México y el Vaticano – La Jornada". jornada.unam.mx. Retrieved March 13, 2018.
  14. ^ México, El Universal, Compañia Periodística Nacional. "El Universal – Opinion – Renuncia en Gobernación". eluniversalmas.com.mx. Retrieved March 13, 2018.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  15. ^ "Tampico la conexion zapatista". Archived from the original on 3 November 2013.[1]
  16. ^ "Marcos, en la mira de Zedillo - Proceso". 5 August 2002. Archived from the original on 17 October 2013.
  17. ^ "«Peace Talks Presidential Decree»". Archived from the original on 2013-11-02. Retrieved 2013-08-04.
  18. ^ Salas, Javier Rosiles. "MORENO VALLE-TV AZTECA: EL TÁNDEM POBLANO". Archived from the original on 24 July 2016.
  19. ^ "«Sobre mis pasos de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano»". Archived from the original on 2013-11-02. Retrieved 2013-07-28.
  20. ^ "«Renuncia en Gobernación»". Archived from the original on 2013-11-02. Retrieved 2013-07-28.
  21. ^ «Diputados Convergencia»
  22. ^ "Los caminos de Chiapas: agosto 2006". Archived from the original on 6 November 2013.
  23. ^ «Chronology»
  24. ^ «alzamiento y lucha Zapatista Pag. 7»
  25. ^ "LIBERADO SUPUESTO LÍDER GUERRILLERO EN MÉXICO - Archivo Digital de Noticias de Colombia y el Mundo desde 1.990". Archived from the original on 4 November 2013.
  26. ^ «La Jornada: 16 meses despues»
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