Double-aspect theory: Difference between revisions

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* [[Thomas Nagel]]. <ref>Nagel, T. ''The View from Nowhere'', Chapter III p28 </ref>
* [[Thomas Nagel]]. <ref>Nagel, T. ''The View from Nowhere'', Chapter III p28 </ref>
* [[David Chalmers]] who explores a double-aspect view of information, with similarities to [[Kenneth Sayres]]' information-based neutral monism.
* [[David Chalmers]] who explores a double-aspect view of information, with similarities to [[Kenneth Sayres]]' information-based neutral monism.

==See also==
*[[Anomalous monism]]
*[[Property dualism]]

==External links==

*[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/#9.4 Neutral Monism in Relation to Dual Aspect Theory]

==Notes==
{{Reflist}}

[[Category:Theories of mind]]
[[Category:Monism]]


{{philo-stub}}

Revision as of 16:36, 27 May 2013

For the Canadian constitutional theory, see Double aspect

In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements to determine whether the group is mental, physical, both, or neither, double-aspect theory requires the mental and the physical to be inseparable and mutually irreducible (though distinct).[1]

Dual-aspect theory is akin to neutral monism. This diagram contrast it with physicalism and idealism, as well as Cartesian dualism.

Double-aspect theorists include:-

  1. ^ Leopold Stubenberg. "Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Schopenhauer
  3. ^ Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere, Chapter III p28