|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Stub-class, Mid-importance)|
Just to note that Spinoza appears as an example of a neutral monist (in the neutral monism and main Spinoza article) rather than a double-aspect theorist. I'd suggest removing Spinoza as an example here, or clarifying his inclusion (e.g. is it debated? is he dual-aspect in his early work and neutral monist in his later?) Dentalplan (talk) 00:39, 30 December 2009 (UTC)
- I'd say it's pretty clear that Spinoza is actuall neither, though he espouses views which are antecendent to both Talonxpool (talk) 17:24, 30 June 2011 (UTC)
- A lot of opinion without much citation there. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (see below) says
The Christian philospher's views are in no way related to the double-aspect theory, as such I am removing them. It might be a good idea to start a seperat article for the Christian philosopher, though he doesn't seem to be very notable.Talonxpool (talk) 17:24, 30 June 2011 (UTC)
Oxford Companion to Philosophy
double aspect theory. The view, derived from Spinoza, that certain states of living creatures have both mental and physical aspects. Perception and thought, for example, are processes in the brain, but not just physical processes, because some brain processes have experiential or cognitive aspects which are inseparable from their neurophysiological character. Double aspect theory therefore attempts to identify the mental and the physical without analysing either in terms of the other, thus avoiding both *dualism and
materialism. If true, it would explain how the causes of our actions can be simultaneously physical and mental. However, it is obscure how such apparently different things could really be aspects of one thing. A related modem view is Donald Davidson's *'anomalous monism', according to which every mental event is identical to a physical event, but mental properties cannot be analysed in physical terms.