Imagocracy

Imagocracy (from the Spanish imagocracia) is a form of governance where censorship and propaganda—particularly through media manipulation—rather than violent coercion, significantly influence on public opinion and policy to maintain power. In an imagocracy, primarily observed in so-called informational autocracies or spin dictatorships, the focus is on propaganda techniques such as spin, disinformation, and maintaining psychological control by instilling fear of the 'Other.'

The term imagocracy captures the idea that in modern society, where media and visual culture are pervasive, the image and the data projected by leaders or movements can be as important, if not more important, than their actual actions or beliefs. An informational autocracy does not use violence or direct repression on its political opponents. It also creates its own institutions that mimic democratic institutions. The final characteristic of these regimes is that they have little support with the educated elite, but have wide support among the less-educated masses.

Etymology

The term imagocracy was likely first coined in Spanish (as imagocracia) by Peruvian politician Manuel Dammert in 2001 to describe Alberto Fujimori's style of governance:

A dictatorship that constructs and dominates the images of social life to perpetuate the hidden power of a corrupt mafia that keeps sterilized the vacuous institutions of representative democracy … its source of power lies in the domination of the image, whose representation alienates individuals. This social relation, converted into everyday routine and instituted as the vortex of social reproduction is the foundation of its existence as a dictatorship and the engine that calls for its perpetuation.

The informational autocracy concept was proposed by Russian economist Sergey Guriyev and British-American political scientist Daniel Treisman in a 2020 paper (later as spin dictatorship in their 2022 book):

Dictators survive not by means of force or ideology but because they convince the public—rightly or wrongly—that they are competent. Citizens do not observe the leader's type but infer it from signals in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media. If citizens conclude that the leader is incompetent, they overthrow him. The dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings—but he must finance such spending at the expense of the public's consumption.

Regimes

Alberto Fujimori's Peru

Alberto Fujimori's Peru is considered the world's first imagocratic regime. Its reliance on the yellow press, rather than open repression, to destroy political opposition—contrary to the historical norm in Latin America—has been particularly noted.

Media manipulation ‧ Fujimedia

"By controlling the media, one controlled the ratings. And by controlling the ratings, one controlled politics."

Alberto Fujimori's campaign against the Shining Path, a Maoist guerrilla group, was marked by harsh measures, including the stigmatization of the Andean population as "leftist terrorists." This strategy exploited historical biases against small ethnic minorities, particularly those associated with terrorism, allowing Fujimori to leverage public fear to his political advantage. His administration faced severe criticism from human rights organizations, which accused the government of being complicit in the murder of journalists by right-wing paramilitary groups. In response, Fujimori labeled these activists as the "legal arm" of terrorism and issued threats of life imprisonment for those who criticized the military.

Fujimori also cultivated an image as a technocratic leader, preferring the title of "manager" over that of politician, to project a blend of visionary leadership and administrative efficiency. Alongside his security chief, Vladimiro Montesinos—often considered the true power behind the throne—Fujimori used media manipulation as a key tool in his governance. Instead of relying solely on slander against political rivals, Fujimori sought to co-opt media owners. By the early 1990s, six of Peru's seven major television stations were privately owned, and Montesinos bribed these media moguls to ensure self-censorship and favorable coverage of the government.

By the end of the decade, Montesinos was paying over $3 million per month to these television stations for their cooperation. Despite their official independence, these outlets maintained only a superficial appearance of objectivity. The regime further benefited from the creative talents of the private sector's producers and writers, who indirectly supported the government's messaging. Fujimori extended his control beyond news, effectively weaponizing entertainment to shape public perception and consolidate his power.

Censorship and coercion

The strategies employed by spin dictators like Fujimori marked a departure from the traditional methods of authoritarian control characterized by overt censorship and the use of fear. Historically, dictators sought to wield absolute power, but Fujimori's approach was deliberately nuanced and covert. In the context of a globalized economy, maintaining an absolute monopoly on information was increasingly seen as counterproductive, as it could hinder progress and draw unwanted attention. Fujimori recognized that a total information monopoly was not only unnecessary but also undesirable, as it could provoke public curiosity and inadvertently spread the very information the regime sought to suppress—a phenomenon known as the Streisand effect.

Fujimori's model of control was characterized by its subtlety. Rather than overtly censoring dissenting views, the regime aimed to subtly skew news coverage, ensuring that viewers remained unaware of the manipulation. This approach was designed to avoid the impression that the government had anything to hide, thereby preventing the public from seeking out alternative sources of information.

When coercion was necessary, Fujimori and his chief of intelligence, Montesinos, preferred to keep it out of sight, relying on regulatory pressures or business deals to achieve their ends. A notable example occurred in 1997 when Baruch Ivcher, a television magnate, turned against the government. Ivcher's Channel 2 broadcasted damaging exposés of Montesinos and the National Intelligence Service (SIN). In response, Montesinos initially attempted to bribe Ivcher, offering him $19 million to relinquish control of the station's news programming. When Ivcher refused, Montesinos resorted to a legal maneuver, stripping Ivcher, a naturalized Peruvian citizen of Israeli origin, of his citizenship. Since only Peruvian citizens could own a television station, a compliant judge was then able to reassign Ivcher's shares to more loyal supporters of the regime.

Unlike traditional autocrats who might have resorted to violence, Montesinos recognized the potential backlash such actions could provoke. When one of his aides suggested making death threats against Ivcher, Montesinos dismissed the idea, citing the negative consequences faced by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Despite Montesinos' aversion to overt violence in this instance, he was not above using bloodshed when it served his purposes, as evidenced by his earlier deployment of death squads against peasants during the conflict with the Shining Path. However, the actions taken against Ivcher proved costly for the regime. In Lima, protests erupted in response to Ivcher's mistreatment, and the Catholic Church condemned the revocation of his citizenship as "illegal and dangerous." The U.S. Congress and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights also denounced the measure, a fact that underscored the international repercussions of the regime's actions.