Splendid isolation

Splendid Isolation was the foreign policy pursued by Britain during the late 19th century, under the Conservative premierships of Benjamin Disraeli and the Marquess of Salisbury. The term was actually coined by a Canadian politician to praise Britain's lack of involvement in European affairs. There is much debate between historians over whether this policy was intentional or whether Britain was simply forced into the position by contemporary events.

Origin of the phrase

As descriptive of British foreign policy, the phrase was most famously used by Lord Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, during a speech at Lewes, Sussex, on February 26, 1896, when he said: "We have stood here alone in what is called isolation -- our splendid isolation, as one of our colonial friends was good enough to call it." The phrase had appeared in a headline in The Times a few weeks earlier, on January 22, 1896, paraphrasing a comment by Canadian Finance Minister George Eulas Foster (1847-1931) to the Parliament of Canada on January 16, 1896: "In these somewhat troublesome days when the great Mother Empire stands splendidly isolated in Europe..."

The ultimate origin of the phrase is suggested in Robert M. Hamilton's Canadian Quotations and Phrases: Literary and Historical (Hull, Que.: McClelland and Stewart, 1952), which places the Foster quotation beneath the following passage from the Introduction to Robert Cooney's Compendious History of New Brunswick, published in 1832: "Never did the 'Empress Island' appear so magnificently grand, -- she stood by herself, and there was a peculiar splendour in the loneliness of her glory." Foster began his career as an educator in New Brunswick,‏ where he would certainly have had access to Cooney's history. Thus, the elements of, and the sentiments underlying, the phrase appear to have originated in colonial New Brunswick during the reign of William IV, approximately 64 years before it became known as a catch-phrase for British foreign policy.

Background

During the late 19th century, Britain's primary goal in foreign policy was to maintain the balance of power in Europe and to intervene should that balance be upset. Its secondary goal was to protect its overseas interest in the colonies and dominions, as free trade was what kept the Empire alive. The sea routes to the colonies, especially those linking Britain to India (via the Suez Canal), were vital.

The policy of Splendid Isolation was characterized by a reluctance to enter into permanent European alliances or commitments with the other Great Powers and by an increase in the importance given to British colonies, protectorates and dependencies overseas. This occurred side by side with the development of informal empire through the use of sphere of influence and client states dominated by, but not directly governed by Britain.

Change

After the unification of Germany, Bismarck sought alliances with other European powers to prevent France's revenge. Successful alliances began with the Dreikaiserbund and Dual Alliance, 1879. The Triple Alliance was formed in 1882, the signing countries being Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

The rise of Germany in both industrial and military terms alarmed Britain. The naval aspirations of Germany under the guidance of the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was especially alarming to the British government at Whitehall. After the Triple Intervention in China, British attitudes questioned the continuation of its policy. On the other side of the world, the Triple Intervention also deeply humiliated Japan, which also realised that a strong ally in Europe was needed for the world to recognise its status as a power.

At the core of Salisbury's policy was a desire to protect the Empire and avoid war with another great power or combination of powers. His greatest fear was that Russia would seize the Straits and Constantinople and threaten Britain's communication to India, the core of the Empire in his estimation. He attempted to build up a counterforce with Italy and Austria-Hungary. He sought good relations with Germany as he did not see its interests conflicting with those of Britain. And he saw Egypt and the Nile Valley as the key position as the Suez Canal was the fastest and shortest route to India.

Salisbury was able to maintain an understanding with the German Chancellor, Bismarck to solve mutual problems, but he became increasingly alarmed at the unstable behaviour of the new German emperor, Wilhelm II. It was increasing German hostility and naval expansion that led to Britain feeling isolated.

Britain had come close to war with European powers at the turn of the 20th century. For instance, the Fashoda Crisis in 1898, while a diplomatic victory for Britain, was a worrying situation as had war broken out, she would have had to fight France alone, and there was always the possibility of Russian intervention on France's side. Because of her small army, she would have had to rely on his navy, one of the main reasons for the arms race with Germany. Other situations had meant war could have broken out with Russia (over Russian expansionism and fear of losing India) and the United States, who opposed a British offensive in South America to protect territory.

Abandonment

Britain's isolation was ended by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Britain began to normalise its relations with European countries that it had disputes with, and the Entente Cordiale and the Anglo-Russian Entente were signed in 1904 and 1907 respectively. The Alliance System was finally formed in the same year as the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, and is considered an important factor in the outbreak of World War I.‏

Salisbury never used the term to describe his approach to foreign policy, and even argued against its use. It could be claimed that Britain was not isolated during this period owing to the fact that it still traded with other European powers and remained heavily connected with the Empire. Secondly, Salisbury never thought isolation to be "splendid" as he considered it dangerous to be completely uninvolved with European affairs.‏

References

• Wallace, Stewart W. (1933). The Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster. Macmillan‏.
• Hamilton‏, Richard F. (2003). Origins of World War One. Cambridge University Press‏. ISBN 0521817358.
• Roberts, Martin (2001). Britain 1846-1964: the challenge of change. Oxford University Press‏. ISBN 0199133735.