|WikiProject Philosophy||(Rated Start-class, Low-importance)|
"It is easier to see how the fact that one's thought about a desk is causally related with a desk can bear on the fact that person's thought is about a desk than it is to see how the fact that one's thought is made up of hydrocarbons can bear on the fact that one's thought about a desk is about a desk."
- I'm thinking about a desk right now; what makes that thought "about" the desk instead of about the moon, or about nothing at all? It is easier to see that this aboutness comes from the fact that my thought is causally related to the desk, than it is to see that this aboutness comes from the hydrocarbons that compose the thought. Better? 188.8.131.52 (talk) 21:57, 21 February 2011 (UTC)
- First, it's a direct quote so it's irrelevant whether it makes sense. Second, you're mistaking your inability to parse it for it not making sense; it actually makes fine sense: ""It is easier to see how [the fact that one's thought about a desk is causally related with a desk] can bear on [the fact that person's thought is about a desk] than it is to see how [the fact that one's thought is made up of hydrocarbons] can bear on [the fact that one's thought about a desk is about a desk]." -- 184.108.40.206 (talk) 21:42, 12 June 2015 (UTC)
I eliminated the first sentence of the second paragraph stating that mental states reduce to brain processes. Searle's view is explicitly nonreductionist.
- Searle's view (or his claims about it) is inconsistent. Being non-dualist, Searle necessarily thinks that mental states are produced by (can be reduced to) biological activity.
Also eliminated the part that says Searle treats consciousness as an "emergent property" of the brain. He never speaks of it in these terms.
In fact, he explicitly denies that consciousness is an emergent property, claiming that he doesn't know what that means.
In fact, Searle says the following: "consciousness is a causally emergent feature of systems. It is an emergent feature of certain systems of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of systems of molecules" [Rediscovery of the Mind, 112]. What are you guys talking about? 220.127.116.11 (talk) 22:02, 21 February 2011 (UTC)
The article reads:
Searle believes that consciousness "is a real part of the real world and it cannot be eliminated in favor of, or reduced to, something else" whether that something else is a neurological state of the brain or a software program. [...]
On the other hand, Searle doesn't treat consciousness as a ghost in the machine. He treats it, rather, as a state of the brain.
Am I slightly confused about the meaning here, or is the author? Because if consciousness is identical to the state of the brain, surely it can be reduced to the firing of neurons and the balance of chemicals? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 18.104.22.168 (talk) 00:25, 25 July 2008 (UTC)
More precisely, Searle says that consciousness is "caused by and realized in" a state in the brain. He certainly wouldn't want to use the term 'identical,' because consciousness has certain first-person experiential properties that brain states don't have. He talks in terms of "causal reduction," though, saying that while consciousness can be "causally reduced" to neuronal firings, it maintains ontological independence.
Why is the page itself listed as a reference? Quite circular.LéVeillé 06:08, 19 November 2011 (UTC)