Talk:Meta-ontology/Archive 3

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What is meta-ontology?

In a recent post, Snowded has said the following:

"Neither Carnap or Wittgenstein would even consider they were doing meta-ontology, they were discussing what for them (and many current philosophers) are fundamental issues in ontology. Meta-ontology is a term used by some philosophers to describe one aspect of ontology considered as a whole. We therefore report on what those philosophers say and how they illustrate it."

To my mind this is a proposal for an algorithm, if you like, for determining what meta-ontology is about:

To determine the answer to "what is meta-ontology?", the procedure is to search the philosophical literature and determine what philosophers say is meta-ontology.

That seems quite reasonable, and the answer is that all philosophers agree with what Inwagen defined meta-ontology as, namely, as summarized by Hofweber

"the study of meta-ontology is saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered."

With this point established, it would appear that WP editors can exercise their judgment upon whether a particular philosophical dispute falls under the definition of meta-ontology, or not. However, Snowded does not agree.

Snowded's stance is that any material that is included in the article meta-ontology must be identified explicitly by the participants or by a reputable third party as belonging to meta-ontology.

So, as Snowded says above, "Neither Carnap or Wittgenstein would even consider they were doing meta-ontology" and consequently the only excuse for including Carnap in the article is that Inwagen said that the Carnap-Quine debate was meta-ontology when he coined that term.

Now, nobody in their right mind would deny that Wittgenstein is addressing "how the questions ontology aims to answer should be understood". But, because Inwagen did not bring up Wittgenstein, we cannot include any reference to Wittgenstein in Meta-ontology until some or another philosopher is found that says Wittgenstein's critique of Carnap's methodology is properly considered to be meta-ontology.

Snowded's perspective strikes me as much too limiting upon what can be included in Meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 19:33, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

As I said before - go to the ontology page and see if you can get editors to agree that material relating to your definition should be here rather than the main article. I doubt they will agree but you can try. The definition and use of the term is not universal. So if the material is specific to how philosophers talk about meta-ontology specifically then its fine here. If it is the general field not specific then it belongs in Ontology. Writing in parallel is a Coatrack ----Snowded ^TALK 19:50, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You suggest the definition by Hofweber is not widely accepted. Do you have any other definition you can source? Or do you interpret [your stand that "My definition or your definition do not matter, it's what sourced material says about the subject that we include, not the speculations of individual editors." to mean that Hofweber's definition is, in effect, my definition because I chose it, and is not that of all "sourced material"? And any attempt to find other definitions (which I challenge you to do) is futile because a comparison of the results simply would be speculation? Or, are you suggesting editors cannot use a definition (it's beyond their perquisites), but a better approach is using a vote by editors of Ontology to decide what goes here and what goes into Ontology? Brews ohare (talk) 20:17, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Re "it would appear that WP editors can exercise their judgment upon whether a particular philosophical dispute falls under the definition of meta-ontology, or not." — In the case of editors exercising their judgement and disagreeing or are unsure about whether it is meta-ontology, how do you think article development should proceed under those circumstances? --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:05, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob; if one or several definitions were brought forward it would be easy to decide whether particular material by Wittgenstein fell under one or more of these definitions. If the argument arose that some thought it did, and some thought it did not, perhaps all would have to agree to disagree. But what we have here is a delaying tactic, refusal to advance any definition, preventing focus on particulars. Brews ohare (talk) 20:17, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

A delaying tactic for what purpose? --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:26, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob: I'll rephrase. Without a definition for meta-ontology, it is impossible to decide whether (for example) Wittgenstein's critique of Carnap is meta-ontology or not. That leaves only one way to do it: find a source that says "Wittgenstein's critique of Carnap is meta-ontology". That is how Snowded wants to do it, but that seems unnecessarily restrictive. I can't read his mind, but he has moved to merge this article with Ontology, he wants to exclude material from this article by one means or another, and he has made disparaging remarks about the topic. All this suggests he is not interested in developing this subject as an independent article. Brews ohare (talk) 20:38, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

You might want to reassess Snowded's position since he wrote recently,

"Agree, the referenced material you provide below can develop material."[1]

"Summarising Hale & Wright without extensive quotation seems reasonable, suggest you draft something here first."[2]

--Bob K31416 (talk) 20:54, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, my point was that meta-ontology as a subject is not accepted by all philosophers, so its not a matter or providing another definition. Other philosophers do not think it is a valid term, or maybe just a phrase, the subject matter being the provenance of ontology. Now you have taken a position since your first attempt to change the lede of the philosophy page that metaX is different. You keep trying to make this personal which it isn't and to ascribe motives to people that they do not hold. Please stop it. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:06, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, Do you think this article should be developed further? --Bob K31416 (talk) 21:10, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

If there is substantial material from Philosophers who consider meta-philosophy a valid concept yes. At the moment the material seems slight so I would prefer a section in the ontology article unless and until more material is available. The additions you provided could swing that judgement. I have a general concern (which I may take to Arbitration Enforcement although I am reluctant to do that) over this (and several other philosophy articles) that Brews is repeating the mistakes he made on Physics articles which got him an indefinite topic bad. That is to say he is taking up a particular view or perspective and pursuing it through the use of primary sources, in effect original research. A view that has been supported on the two RfCs he has called. Its worth having a look at both of them as all editors disagree, but any editor who disagrees is subject to multi-level interrogation. I always thought the point of an RfC was to allow other editors not to comment, not to repeat the same arguments! ----Snowded ^TALK 21:18, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Re "At the moment the material seems slight so I would prefer a section in the ontology article unless and until more material is available. The additions you provided could swing that judgement." — Then let's wait and see. I should clarify that I only suggested a few references, and note that those references contain more references on meta-ontology, and so on. Regards, --Bob K31416 (talk) 21:30, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Re "Brews, my point was that meta-ontology as a subject is not accepted by all philosophers, so its not a matter of providing another definition." Snowded can you provide some documentation to the effect that meta-ontology is not a proper sub-field of ontology and is rejected by many philosophers? So far your argument boils down to its not having an article of its own separate from ontology in some standard encyclopedia. That is not rejection of the term, but possibly indicative of insufficient importance at the moment for a general work to treat it separately. WP is not subject to the print limitations of a general encyclopedia. Brews ohare (talk) 23:10, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Re "Other philosophers do not think it is a valid term, or maybe just a phrase, the subject matter being the provenance of ontology." I'd guess that almost every philosopher, certainly Hofweber, thinks that meta-ontology is a branch of ontology. That is not an issue: the issue is only whether as a sub-topic it rates its own article on WP. I'd say there are tons of stubs on WP that have much less going for them than this article on meta-ontology.

With metaphilosophy you raised somewhat similar objections that metaphilosophy could not stand on its own feet separate from philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 23:10, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, you've argued against it in multiple fora but it's pretty obvious reliable sources must specifically describe the material as meta-ontology for it to be included here. Rather than another WP:TENDENTIOUS argument that policy is "too limiting", put the effort into (at least) mentioning those major figures of the last fifty years whom reliable sources have identified, e.g. Putnam, Hirsch, Sider...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:23, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews your own references make it clear the word is not universally accepted - look back at the earlier discussions. Per MachineElf I think you do now face a choice between accepting what other editors have told you on multiple articles and focusing on sourced material or facing a second reference to Arbcom ----Snowded ^TALK 04:00, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: I have followed your suggestion earlier and have mentioned all the reputable sources you bring up and suggested they be sourced. Snowded will have none of it. Snowded has a revolving door of objections that he never supports but simply recycles, shifting the basis of objection to avoid coming to grips with anything of consequence. Simply put there is no interest in this article, and no intention of assisting with some compromise solution. That's not fine, but so what, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 04:49, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews you are right, I have consistently said the same things and when you have challenged that on RfCs you have not been supported. Where you have put in material related to the subject I have accepted or modified it. I have no intention on compromising with an approach which breaks wikipedia policy ----Snowded ^TALK 05:15, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, I didn't say you should have "suggested they be sourced" and the ad nauseum attacks against Snowded are highly WP:DISRUPTIVE. Quite simply, if you've nothing worthwhile to contribute to the article, your work is done here... time to WP:LETGO.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:28, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf, Perhaps it would be better to discuss these personal issues on user talk pages and follow Wikipedia:Talk page guidelines, "The purpose of a Wikipedia talk page (accessible via the talk or discussion tab) is to provide space for editors to discuss changes to its associated article or project page." --Bob K31416 (talk) 11:56, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Why don't you address that to Brews Bob? Not helpful.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 14:36, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

No problem. Consider it addressed to everyone here. Also addressed to everyone, please note that if someone doesn't heed that advice is no justification for another editor to act the same way. This is similar to the following gem of advice from WP:BATTLE, "If another user behaves in an uncivil, uncooperative, or insulting manner, or even tries to harass or intimidate you, this does not give you an excuse to respond in kind. Address only the factual points brought forward, ignoring the inappropriate comments, or disregard that user entirely."

And as a practical matter, if one is trying to build a case for admin action against an editor, being a combative participant would mean that the plaintiff is also a party to disruption. So the basic point is: discuss personal issues, threats of admin action, etc, on the user's talk page, rather than disrupt discussion for improving the article on the article talk page. --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:09, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, Re "Brews your own references make it clear the word is not universally accepted" — Actually, that might be something to put in the article. Do you have any reliable source regarding criticism of the subject? --Bob K31416 (talk) 10:54, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Yes, Snowded. I made this same request earlier and obtained no response. Brews ohare (talk) 13:32, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Williamson for a start - just check out the conversation with multiple editors when Brews attempted to force this into the lede of Philosophy which is a great example of tendentious editing. Otherwise I'm not trying to build a case for admin action, although I am very close to doing so. I am trying to get Brews, who could be a valuable editor, to realise that if he doesn't modify his behaviour then his existing blocks and topic bans will just get extended. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:59, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

I looked over there and found,

"The philosophy of philosophy is automatically part of philosophy, just as the philosophy of anything else is..."

— Timothy Williamson, The philosophy of philosophy, Preface, p.ix

That doesn't seem to support your comment, "Brews your own references make it clear the word is not universally accepted". For example, meta-ontology can be an accepted term for a subfield of philosophy. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:18, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

But that is the whole meta debate (or rather difference). Some people (Brews seems to favour them) think that a philosophical subject can not examine itself so a meta discipline is needed. Others take the opposite position, some just use the word without meaning anything much by it. What you have is a fashion, it may sustain itself, it may not. But its not mainstream ----Snowded ^TALK 19:43, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

I wasn't trying to debate any of these issues with you, but rather looking for sourced material for the article along the lines of your comments about the topic. Regards, --Bob K31416 (talk) 21:00, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I also wonder whether in fact you have any reputable sources for your remark that 'meta-ontology' is widely viewed as a 'fashion' that may soon dissipate. Brews ohare (talk) 23:24, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

We do have a few well-known philosophers who think, whatever its prospects, meta-ontology is a current topic worth publishing papers about. Thomasson, Eklund, Inwagen, Hirsch, Schaffer, Yablo...Brews ohare (talk) 00:15, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob, I was not debating I was explaining the source. Brews please get a grip. I said it was not clear if the word was a fashion or not. It's an opinion, the difference between us is I am not trying to insert my opinions into the article. You are again being obdurate in your statement I did not say it was widely viewed as a fashion. Please read what other editors say and think before you react. ----Snowded ^TALK 11:16, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

I'm happy to have clarified that your objections are admittedly just your opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:24, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Again, that is not what I said. But par for the course in trying to deal with you. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:57, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Enough already

I've been watching this drama unfold for the last few weeks. Snowded (and to a lesser degree, Machine_elf): If you honestly do believe that Brews' behaviour here and elsewhere warrants sanction then stop talking about it and actually do something about it. File an RFC, file an arbitration action, something. Continuing to bait and joust with him on this talk page in the guise of a content dispute while occasionally darkly muttering about 'sanctions' makes you no less of a disruptive troll than the entire comminity already knows Brews himself to be - regardless of the fact that you are in this case correct. And, worse, when the inevitable time does come (dare to dream) when he finally pushes things too far and gets hauled up before Arbcom or whoever, he will be able to point to your behaviour and claim that he was victimized. And then, instead of getting indef blocked or banned forever (which should have happened years ago) he will, once again, get Just One More Chance. 70.215.22.186 (talk) 13:39, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

70.215.22.186|70.215.22.186: It is interesting that you can see the behavior of Snowded and MachineElf is less than helpful, and yet attribute the problems in adding to meta-ontology entirely mine and worthy of "getting indef blocked or banned forever". Doesn't seem like a balanced assessment to me. Brews ohare (talk) 14:28, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

FWIW Brews, I think the only thing keeping your physics topic ban alive is a chilling reluctance to admit what a shameful fiasco became of that edict sheltering a privileged segment of the community from being peeved by a redoubtable excommunicant.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 04:51, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

70.215.22.186 I am always reluctant to attempt sanctions on an editor. I think its better to try and work with them to modify the behaviour and to give fair warning if you think its getting to the point where a report may have to be made. Brews does seem to have modified his behaviour to a degree since I made that warning last week ----Snowded ^TALK 04:54, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Skepticism

Skepticism seems to be used as the name of a subfield of meta-ontology. Is that supported by the source? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:33, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Just noticed that an attempt to provide a ref was made, but unfortunately there is a technical problem with the cite. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:41, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

I see that the cite was fixed and refers to a doctoral dissertation titled Metaontological Skepticism. Is that an accepted term for a subfield of meta-ontology or just a title of a dissertation? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:50, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Looks like things are being quickly worked out between editors on the article page, so I'll take a break from commenting here. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:05, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

That paper and perhaps a book by the same name seem to be about it... but the addition to the article didn't attempt to cite them. In fact, I found nothing in the citations provided that would support the original research characterizing deflationary approaches, for the most part, as somehow falling under that rubric.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 22:29, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

The introduction of the technical term deflationary approaches is yours, MachineElf. Personally I favor some circumlocution that an ordinary person could grasp. I assume the 'rubric' you refer to is 'meta-ontological skepticism', which (unlike deflationary approaches) is self-explanatory as the topic is aspects of meta-ontology that are skeptical of ontology. It is the title of Swetly's doctoral dissertation, which certainly doesn't place it in widespread use. So the impression that it is an established term is properly avoided. However, simply as a designation it does appropriately describe what is being discussed. Brews ohare (talk) 23:20, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

Needless to say, the edit was "mine" as opposed to yours... perhaps you mean to imply WP:OR on my part? But as you've been so keen on citing Thomasson, I don't see how you could. While I applaud your concession that a circumlocution you favor is more properly avoided, I don't see how Swetly's admittedly novel jargon "metaontological skepticism" is at all self-explanatory. The remainder of his dissertation argues against the broad characterization which you copied almost verbatim from Swetly's dissertation without citing it:

For [[Eli Hirsch]], ontological disputes are nothing over and above but trivial disputes about how we should use certain expressions. Hirsch holds that for any ontological position a language exists whose ontological vocabulary (as for instance the existential quantifier) possesses such a meaning that the claims of this ontological position come out true in this language.<ref name=Hirsch/><ref name=Hirsch1/>

In fact, you misattributed it to Hirsh, the second citation of which you even re-added after I removed it for failing WP:V.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:24, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Leading sentence of section 'Deflationism'

The statement: "A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true, [21]" is inaccurate in three ways: (i) the issue is not akin to 'whether numbers exist is meaningful only on a common sense level' It is perfectly obvious to one and all that 'numbers' are meaningful throughout mathematics whether they have any other meaning or not, never mind at a common sense level. (ii) the meaning of number on a common sense level is not trivial, and certainly not trivially true (read Wittgenstein), and (iii) the source cited in support of this statement An Easy Approach to Ontology is not about numbers at all, nor is it about whether ontological questions are meaningful only at a common sense level. Basically the paper is a proposal for a manifesto for handling existence questions. According to Schaffer, Thomasson provides "an elegant and insightful defense of a common sense worldview". But the point of citing Thomasson here is not her program, but to establish that: "But lately a different line of inquiry has emerged: Are existence debates in ontology genuine debates? Are they resolvable? Or is something wrong with them that makes them not worth pursuing?" Brews ohare (talk) 23:48, 23 April 2013 (UTC)

As the opening paragraph of Thomasson's "An Easy Approach to Ontology" attests, the exemplar of whether "number exist" is merely canonical Brews, this has nothing to do with math. You seem to be arguing a strawman or otherwise imagining some kind of false dichotomy of folk-mathematics... but the "perfectly obvious" way that numbers are said to exist by those who speak of them, mathematicians for example, is exactly what's meant by the common sense level on which that's trivially true. It appears you might be surprised to learn what deflationist claims are actually about... see, for example, page 2 of Thomasson's "Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology":

The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”... But although Carnap uses specific questions as his examples of internal existence questions, that is not to say that general existence questions could not be asked—and answered—as internal questions. They certainly can be answered that way, as we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209).

She then quotes Carnap regarding the purportedly deep (i.e. non-trivial) philosophic sense of the question, (i.e. the "external" or meaningless question, per Carnap's distinction) as one asked “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers”. Of course, the derelict apparati of logical positivists like Carnap and Wittgenstein carry no weight without somehow rehabilitating a verificationist theory of meaning and given that her particular deflationist agenda is the "easy" recovery of everyday common sense objects, she's quick to offer a "pragmatic" reconstruction in which philosophers might reasonably be said to engage (as opposed to senseless prattle) but nonetheless... “Reconstrued as practical questions about the advisability of adopting a certain linguistic framework, there is here again no special philosophical or ontological insight into reality involved.”

Regarding the complimentary quote from Schaffer's paper, "The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects", why would I be arguing with that much less Thomasson's deflationary approach?—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:24, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: Your lengthy analysis is not responsive to the issue raised. Brews ohare (talk) 14:22, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

False, the "sentence in question" is actually

"A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true, thereby accounting for the lack of progress in resolving a purportedly deeper philosophical sense of the question."—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:22, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

To elaborate, here is the sentence in question again "ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true". Here are some difficulties I have with this formulation:

(i) numbers are meaningful (among other ways) in the sense of mathematical tautological systems. For example, in set theory, which is capable of acting as an axiomatic foundation for modern mathematics, natural numbers can be represented by classes of equivalent sets. Mathematicians also refer to other items as numbers, that are not 'natural' numbers, like complex numbers, for example. Their uses for number are not at a "common sense" level, and contrary to the present assertion, the 'common sense' view is not the way mathematicians think of numbers as mathematicians. Moreover, 'common sense' has to be understood as a reader will understand it (unless one is supplied a technical meaning), and it is misleading to say that "numbers exist only on the common sense level". MachinieElf some rewording is needed.

(ii) usage of 'trivially': the 'common sense' notion of number is not readily established at an ontological level, and Wittgenstein has explored this matter in detail. Also, 'trivial' in the sense of Carnap and so forth refers to 'tautological' and that is not the view of numbers within deflationism. MachineElf, there is a problem here with the wording. Some rephrasing is needed.

(iii) the original purpose of citing Thomasson was simply to establish that some controversy over the nature and value of ontology exists, as indicated in the quotation from Thomasson in the footnote. The footnote to Eklund establishes this point later, and possibly the skepticism he notes should be moved toward the beginning of this paragraph to better motivate this discussion. If the reference to Thomasson is to be re-purposed to introduce the role of deflationism, some more detail about Thomasson would help the reader. For example, Thomasson describes her 'easy approach' and says:

"But while the easy method yields answers to existence questions, it also deflates those questions so that there is nothing particularly deep or philosophical about them: they are to be answered simply by a combination of conceptual and empirical enquiry. The result is a sort of Carnapian deflationism about existence claims: Existence claims must be made using a language, and (if they are to be meaningful and truth-evaluable) must involve using the meaningful terms of that language with their extant application conditions."

This quotation introduces the concept of 'deflation' in terms a reader can understand, and makes clear why Thomasson is associated with deflationism. I'd add here that deflationism in this connection appears to be about demoting existence issues to pragmatic as opposed to deep philosophical issues. Although the deflationary theory of truth uses the term 'deflation' as applied to 'truth', it doesn't help to aid understanding of deflationism in general terms.

MachineElf: Please understand that this is not a quarrel with yourself but with the wording of this sentence, which seems unclear and can be misleading in its present form. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

You're simply rehashing the same obscurant strawman arguments without acknowledging anything whatsoever I've actually said. I didn't waste my time providing an informative response in order for you to posture about refusing "a quarrel" but I'll give you one: stop whining about people ignoring the tendentious objections that inevitably follow when you don't get your way.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:46, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Deflationism

Is the section on Deflationism connected to The Deflationary Theory of Truth? If so, perhaps a link to this article and to the WP article Deflationary theory of truth may be in order. If this is the intended meaning of this term in this article on meta-ontology, the explanation given, that: "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true", is ambiguous because "trivially true" is often meant in the sense of tautologically true, while deflationism as described in the linked articles does not refer to tautology, but to the argument that statements like "it is true that snow is white" means nothing more than "snow is white", so the attribution of truth in such statements adds nothing and is a meaningless appendage. Brews ohare (talk) 03:49, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Incorporating the term deflationism into the article doesn't appear supported by a source. Also, the use of the term meta-ontological skepticism, as if it were an accepted name of a sub-field of meta-ontology is not supported by a source. The source was commenting on a debate where the field of ontology was criticised, which seems to have been the main point of the section, yet a clear statement of this was removed. Therefore I have reverted to the version of 16:42, 23 April 2013. Suggest that editors not re-introduce these problems. Thanks. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:54, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews' suggestion here is not a source for this article. Apparently you've read neither the sources for this article nor the discussion above, which you've both failed to engage... WP:IDHTx2.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 03:50, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Pardon me for overlooking in your Talk page comments your source "The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects" which obviously refers to "deflationary". However, I don't see it as a source in the article. Did you want to add it? --Bob K31416 (talk) 04:42, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

I presented "The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects" in this early edit. However, this source assumes we know already what 'deflationary' means. The point of my comment was that it would be helpful to link The Deflationary Theory of Truth to assist a reader unfamiliar with this term. MachineElf's comment could be taken as a dismissal of the Stanford Encyclopedia source because it does not relate deflationism to skepticism about metaontology, but I was just looking for a general explanation to the reader unfamiliar with this term. Brews ohare (talk) 07:21, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

I added a wikilink to Deflationary theory of truth, which includes "The Deflationary Theory of Truth", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, as an external link. --Bob K31416 (talk) 13:37, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

I added Schaffer's criticism with ref "The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects". --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:03, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

I've started a new page Deflationism that might simplify matters. Brews ohare (talk) 18:08, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Looks like another Coatrack article to me. Same material you have been cycling over several articles. It was previously agreed to redirect so I have restored that position as it was based on a consensus. If you want to change it get agreement first ----Snowded ^TALK 18:15, 25 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, why would I "dismiss" the SEP article (linkable... but only tenuously relevant, at best) because it doesn't support the fringe terminology you prefer?—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:09, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob K, no worries... good adds.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:09, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: I don't know why you insist on casting us as in opposing sides of a hostile debate. All I said was exactly what you said above: you dismissed the Stanford Encl. article on ‘The Deflationary Theory of Truth’ because you thought it did not pertain to 'my fringe terminology'. But that was not, I repeat, the purpose of citing this source; the citing of this source was intended to clarify for the uninitiated what deflationism meant. That purpose would be served still better by referring to an article like the proposed article Deflationism. Brews ohare (talk) 00:22, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Stop trying to play the victim Brews... You did not cite this source and Bob K's wikilink to deflationary theory of truth is more than sufficient, (your attempts to subvert it notwithstanding).—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:28, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: Your italics don't negate the fact I cited this work as a proposal for clarification. Your link labeled as follows: (your attempts to subvert it notwithstanding). makes no sense at all in this context. I'm sorry, MachineElf. I'm sure you are trying your best. Brews ohare (talk) 02:43, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

LOL, you call your talk page link a "cite", too funny... still, not as funny as bragging it though. No one's here to talk about what you've written on talk pages.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 07:31, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

In the footnote for the lead sentence of this section, the quote doesn't mention "deflationism" or seem to apply to the sentence.[3] --Bob K31416 (talk) 02:21, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

Expanded the quote.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:48, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

e/c Switched Thomasson cites / added Putnam...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 03:04, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

Considering the timing of your recent significant edits, was all that precipitated by my above comment, which I thought was about a relatively minor issue that could be easily fixed? If so, I'm sorry I mentioned it and regret getting involved in what may be a difficult and unstable editing environment. There may be a clash of personalities here and if so, that is so unfortunate and I have sympathy for all those involved. But maybe I have the wrong impression. In any case, I wish everyone well. --Bob K31416 (talk) 10:42, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

Could do without the drama Bob—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:55, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Symons

Addition of John Symons (2010). "Chapter 16: Ontology and methodology in analytic philosophy". In R. Poli, J. Seibt, eds (ed.). Theory and applications of ontology: philosophical perspectives. Springer. pp. 349–394. ISBN 9789048188444. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) (on-line version here) to the Further reading section is not just adding to the Carnap-Quine coverage, although this source does an admirable job of expanding upon the terse coverage in the Meta-ontology article. If one looks at this extensive review article, it also covers Frege (whose name has come up already in connection with meta-ontology but has not yet made it into the article) and Strawson and Kripke and Barcan-Marcus (all described as pivotal in the transition from a linguistic to a realistic orientation). This 'transition' has yet to make it into Meta-ontology either. Altogether, inclusion of this source is a useful addition for the reader. It seems to me simply arbitrary to remove it from the further reading list on the pretext that this list is too long already. Brews ohare (talk) 19:02, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Rereading this chapter, I find that it is more an historical account than a careful explanation of positions. I wonder what others think about it. Brews ohare (talk) 20:08, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

The idea of this section is that it contains major and notable works. At some point one has to cry halt which I did as you seem to just be adding anything you consider relevant. Also you argue above an indirect not a direct connection to the subject so all the objections raised to your attempt to coatrack this article apply. ----Snowded ^TALK 21:38, 26 April 2013 (UTC)

Although Symons provides historical context, my second reading suggests to me that his summary of positions isn't clear enough. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

Proposed replacement for lead paragraph in Meta-ontology#Deflationism

Without detailing his reasoning, MachineElf replaced the following lead paragraph from Meta-ontology#Deflationism:

The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain views of ontology that maintain there are no 'deep' philosophical issues buried in existence questions. Eklund, for example, considers the contemporary meta-ontological debate, for the most part, to be whether such deeply philosophical questions are genuinely worthwhile. According to Thomasson, some deflationists argue that the questions of ontology are irresolvable, some that they are moot, but the majority demote these debates to pragmatic questions about the appropriate use of language. Thomasson has proposed a combined conceptual and empirical approach focused upon the rules of given languages, so-called application conditions. Schaffer declares a skepticism toward the deflationist meta-ontology views of Thomasson, but supports her ontology.

Notes

Here's the other version that is presently in the article.

A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true, thereby accounting for the lack of progress in resolving a purportedly deeper philosophical sense of the question. Eklund, for example, considers the contemporary meta-ontological debate, for the most part, to be whether such deeply philosophical questions are genuinely worthwhile. The deflationist meta-ontology view of Thomasson has been criticized as being inconsistent because it says that certain ontological questions are unanswerable, but her view of ontology answers them.

Comments — lead paragraph Deflationism

The above paragraph is an improvement over the present lead paragraph in the section Meta-ontology#Deflationism. It is an improvement for these reasons:

1. It correctly states the modern usage of 'deflationism' in the context of metaontology in a simple clear manner. The statement in the article now: "A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true" is unnecessarily narrow in scope and obscure.
2. It states clearly what the three schools of deflationism are, according to Thomasson.
3. It presents the views of Schaffer and Thomasson more clearly.

• This lead paragraph should replace the present one. Brews ohare (talk) 15:42, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

You are repeating a tendency to take one source as uniquely authoritative. Neither is your implication that the other text is incorrect, correct it just explains it in a simpler way. ----Snowded ^TALK 22:37, 29 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I have used the same sources as before. I do not think that deflationism is restricted to the idea that "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common-sense level in which they are trivially true." As Thomasson points out with sources that can be cited if you insist, there are several forms of deflationism. Brews ohare (talk) 01:22, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

The subject deserves a short summary paragraph which it has, if you have a source from a non-protagonist in the debate which summarises difference schools then that might have value. Otherwise my previous comments, as stated by me, not as restated by you apply ----Snowded ^TALK 04:20, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Very well. Karen Bennett “Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology”. Thomasson summarizes this work by Bennett saying it says that that ontological questions are genuine questions, but at least in some cases they are too difficult: their answers are not discoverable—little justification can be found for taking either side. Here is an excerpt from Bennett:

I shall continue to use 'dismissivism' as the generic label for the view that there is something deeply wrong with these debates...One crucial question, then, is what flavor dismissivism might come in. Another question is whether we should believe that any particular version of it is true. And a further question is how, at least roughly, we should go about deciding whether any particular version is true."

Bennett suggests that 'deflationism' is an appropriate alternative term to 'dismissivism' for the first two of her questions.

A different type of deflationism as dismissal is: Stephen Yablo (2009). “Must Existence Questions have Answers?” Thomasson's summary of this paper (in part) is that Yablo holds that ontological questions are moot. Here is a quote from Yablo:

" This paper concerns itself with two meta-ontological questions, one theoretical and one practical. The practical question, FUTILITY: are debates about the existence of a given type of entity X as futile and pointless as they can sometimes seem?; and the theoretical question, VACUITY: is anything genuinely at issue in debates about the existence of X?"

Some liberties have been taken with this last quote which omits some text in the original.

These two sources demonstrate forms of skepticism about ontology other than the difficulties based upon the idea that ontological debates are merely arguments over usage in different languages.

You may object that because Thomasson mentions these philosophers, they are ipso facto what you term 'protagonists of the debate' that there are several types of objections. However, that seems to stretch a point, there is no 'debate' about there being different kinds of objections except here on WP, and what these two cited authors say supports Thomasson's assertion that there are indeed different grounds for deflationism besides those based upon usage in language. Thomasson herself does not draw upon this variety of objections, and her work largely falls under the language category.

You could, of course, have looked up these sources yourself if your doubts pained you sufficiently, or simply taken it on faith that Thomasson would not indulge in WP-type nonsensical distortions of works she cites. In any event, as you now can see, the proposed paragraph is entirely accurate, unlike the version presently in Meta-ontology#Deflationism, and the proposed paragraph defines 'deflationism' both more clearly and more generally than the present version. Brews ohare (talk) 05:26, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

You are writing essays from primary sources Brews and continue to try to engage other editors in extensive discussion of that original research. Lets see what other editors say ----Snowded ^TALK 05:38, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: As you know WP policy concerning additions to already existing articles, which presumably have established notability already, allow use of primary sources to establish points discussed in the article. In any event, the present issue, which is of your own creation, is that there is some uncertainty as to whether there are several different kinds of deflationism, and it is clearly established here that there is no debate. Brews ohare (talk) 13:52, 30 April 2013 (UTC)

But the relevance of the material needs sourcing Brews. You can't just make word connections on google searches and insert quotes strung together with your synthesis. In addition to say that a field is classified into certain types you need more than one author. To give you an example I have award winning articles in refereed journals on complexity theory in social systems and I have a classification of approaches to the field, but that is particular to me it is not universal to the field. So if an editor tried to use my classification on those articles I would revert them as I have for yours ----Snowded ^TALK 02:39, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

I'll try to be clear here, Snowded. Your claims that it is only 'word connections' and 'google searches' involved here is unsupported and inaccurate. The quotations show existing usage of 'deflationism' as employed by well established published philosophers, and the quotations are used in exactly the same fashion a dictionary uses quotations to illustrate usage. The illustrated usage clearly exists in philosophical texts. There may be other usages as well, but that does not detract from the existence of those illustrated. Brews ohare (talk) 04:45, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

See multiple answers to near identical points made by you, from me and other editors over multiple articles ----Snowded ^TALK 09:08, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: This reply is unresponsive to my comment above, providing no clue what you are talking about, and suggesting I am dragging things out here when you simply never respond to direct questions, requiring repeated requests from me to be specific. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

• Just a side comment regarding the process here. Currently I see a long discussion between Brews ohare and Snowded. Is there any movement towards agreement about anything? If not, any suggestions for how to reach any agreement? Unfortunately, I have to confess that for now I'm not up to spending the time doing the studying of the topic and reading the discussion in order to make a contribution to the discussion. Discussions between just two editors can go on endlessly, unless they find creative ways to find some points of agreement. --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:06, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob K31416: You have made a clear summary. Snowded has reverted simple additions to Deflationary theory of truth, Model-dependent realism, and Meta-ontology, and so far as I can see, is unwilling (to put it mildly) to help out on Talk pages, often criticizing me instead of the subject matter. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Re Your and Snowded's roles in Wikipedia, here's what I wrote previously on my talk page, "I looked at Snowded's contribution list before and noted that in general he doesn't appear to contribute content but rather oversees that the content is proper. Which is fine. And I think that you are mainly a content contributor. From the article Yin and Yang, 'Yin and yang are actually complementary, not opposing, forces, interacting to form a whole greater than either separate part; in effect, a dynamic system.' "

So, there's a need to move from opposing to complementary forces. I hope you two can figure out a way. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:25, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Thanks, Bob. Brews ohare (talk) 17:30, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob, I'm doing my best to to leave Brew's content when I can, but there are only so many times you can be expected to repeat the same point on the talk page. When Brews has raised an RfC (three times now) he has not been supported by other editors. I think he genuinely things that writing essays on the subjects based on google searches or tracking names is the right way to work here. He now seems to be gathering all the rejected material into a draft article on "pluralism" where he is going to encounter the same issues again. If you check his RfC response, he can't leave other editors comments alone if they disagree with him. Maybe you could coach him a little? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Snowded (talk • contribs) 10:30, 3 May 2013‎ (UTC)

What I might try is moderating the discussion, which means having the two of you addressing me instead of each other, and I will complete the communication by choosing what I think is useful for making progress. Also, I might express my opinion. Its all voluntary of course and anyone, including me, can drop out at any time.

Brews ohare, It seems that one criticism is that you continue to propose additions that have not been able to attain consensus previously. --Bob K31416 (talk) 11:48, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, From Brews ohare comments in the next section, perhaps it would be better to defer discussion of problems you may have with his behavior as an editor and instead focus on the aspects of the proposal. Could you give one aspect of the proposal that you don't like that might be less contentious than other parts? If all of the aspects seem about the same in this regard, just arbitrarily pick one. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:38, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Not a question of "don't like", Bob K.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 21:18, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob, Brews has not answered your question he has simply asserted his position again with no new arguments. Reasons have been given by myself and Machine Elf for rejecting the proposed change I'm not sure why you would want me to repeat them. However if you can get Brews to actually answer the question you asked I'll look to summarise it. ----Snowded ^TALK 04:47, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, I think it would be difficult to settle the issue of the whole paragraph at once, so I tried to simplify it by trying to focus on one aspect of it. Regarding the issue of editor behavior, Brews ohare has declined to discuss his behavior here, and I think he has that right because this Talk page is for improving the article, rather than discussing editor behavior. For the latter, user Talk pages or dispute resolution should be used.

Getting back to the proposal, which is the topic of this section, what problem do you see with the first sentence of it,

"The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain views of ontology that maintain there are no 'deep' philosophical issues buried in existence questions.

--Bob K31416 (talk) 11:37, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

The current wording is far clearer, using an example readers will understand and is in the normal style (i.e. following from the title). Brews then follows that phrase with his own selection of what he things is relevant (a problem with his edits on several articles). The proposed change adds little of value. There is clearly, after many days of discussion, no consensus for any change other than Brews continued advocacy. Your question to him is therefore very relevant, and his refusal to address it is significant. Wikipedia editors have to accept from time to time that they cannot get agreement at which point they need to move on. ----Snowded ^TALK 11:52, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, You expressed several points, all of which are worth considering. However, to simplify the discussion I would suggest focusing on the first point and deferring the others to after the first point is settled. Regarding "The current wording is far clearer, using an example readers will understand and is in the normal style (i.e. following from the title)." — here is the first sentence of the paragraph that is currently in the article.

"A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true, thereby accounting for the lack of progress in resolving a purportedly deeper philosophical sense of the question."

First off, focusing on just the numbers example in the first sentence, "ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist":

Brews ohare, What do you think of including this numbers example in the first sentence? In the case of your proposal, it would be an addition at the end, "...there are no 'deep' philosophical issues buried in existence questions, such as whether numbers exist.--Bob K31416 (talk) 12:35, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: I'd accept the formulation you state here. The example of 'number' is discussed by Wittgenstein (§68 in Philosophical Investigations), who has analyzed at length the "ordinary usage" meaning of 'number' as an illustration of his rather complex ordinary language approach to ontology. Wittgenstein's approach is referred to by Manley as an example of 'deflationism'. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

I'll be on the road for a few days, so response may be slow. Brews ohare (talk) 13:23, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare, No problem for me regarding your road trip and response time.

Is the beginning phrase of the proposal, "The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain views of ontology..." another way of saying, "The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain meta-ontological views..."? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:37, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

As I've said, whether numbers exist is simply a canonical example and it's used by Thomasson... nothing to do with Wittgenstein etc. It's obviously more clear to just give the deflationary argument than mince about with versions of "The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied..."—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:00, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf, I'm trying to proceed in small steps so that there is a better chance of reaching agreement. I would like to consider your points soon, but not yet. --Bob K31416 (talk) 21:27, 4 May 2013 (UTC)

The second version is more focused: go with it, I'd say. Brews ohare (talk) 01:06, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare, Do you see any significant difference in meaning between this revised beginning phrase of the proposal, "The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain meta-ontological views that maintain..." and the beginning phrase in the current version of the article, "A deflationary meta-ontological view argues..."? --Bob K31416 (talk) 03:02, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Yes. there is a difference. The second version has a link to Deflationary theory of truth. In its present form, Deflationary theory of truth does not cover the meaning of 'deflationism' as it is meant in the discussion here. On the other hand, if the link is dropped, and the sentence is altered to become: "A deflationary meta-ontological view is one that argues that...", going on to provide the definition in this context, then that would be fine. The first form: ""The word 'deflationism' is sometimes applied to certain meta-ontological views that maintain..." also is fine. Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

The issue of whether the Wikipedia article Deflationary theory of truth covers the way deflationism is discussed in the present article, has some similarity to the issues of using Wikipedia as a source and NOR because it is being concluded that the meaning of the term "deflationary" in the context of the reliable sources cited, is defined in the article Deflationary theory of truth. For now, are there any objections to dropping the wikilink so that the text becomes just "deflationary", with the understanding that this issue can be brought up separately on this talk page in another section? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:35, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

I don't see any need to drop it, and I fail to see why readers should not have the benefit of a link. If it was the only thing stopping Brews accepting the current text and it was somewhere in the article OK. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:22, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Based on the discussion so far, here's a revised version of the proposed first sentence to be considered, with the link alternative in brackets.

"A deflationary [deflationary] meta-ontological view argues that there are no 'deep' philosophical issues buried in existence questions, such as whether numbers exist."

Snowded, Do you see any problem with this sentence, including the cites? --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:45, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Its not wrong per se, but it lacks the clarity of the present version. For example the phrase "only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true" is important. ----Snowded ^TALK 23:05, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Thought Bob's suggesting the link he added be dropped? though unnecessarily, I agree.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:16, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, Here's a revision based on your comment.

"A deflationary [deflationary] meta-ontological view argues that there are no 'deep' philosophical issues buried in existence questions, such as whether numbers exist, and that ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true."

Does this work for you? --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:31, 5 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: the phrase "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true" means little to me. What exactly is the 'trivially true' meaning of the question: "what is a number?" on a 'common sense' level. I'd suggest that Wittgenstein directly answered the question of what the ordinary usage of the concept 'number' is, and I suppose 'ordinary usage' has something to do with 'common sense'. However, Wittgenstein's analysis is not 'trivial'. If you can dig out some sensible simple explanation of "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true", I'd be surprised. Brews ohare (talk) 00:31, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

One way to avoid a quagmire here is to say (in some way or another) that deflationism is skeptical about existence debates within ontology, rather than trying to describe what exactly about ontology is OK, like, for instance "ontological questions are meaningful only only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true". Brews ohare (talk) 02:37, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded or MachineElf, Could you give the excerpt from the source that supports the info "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true"? --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:42, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

There was #page2Thomasson...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:57, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Here's the excerpt from MachineElf's link.

"The metaphysician’s existence questions are generally expressed as highly general questions such as “Do numbers exist?”... But although Carnap uses specific questions as his examples of internal existence questions, that is not to say that general existence questions could not be asked—and answered—as internal questions. They certainly can be answered that way, as we can get trivial entailments from, e.g. ‘five is a number’ to ‘there are numbers’ (1950, 209)."

MachineElf, I'm having trouble connecting the info, "A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ... ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true", with the excerpt. For one thing, what is the definition of "internal questions"? --Bob K31416 (talk) 03:23, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Then read it in context.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:58, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: The quote above discusses 'internal questions', which is Carnap's designation for matters that are decided within a 'framework'. They are tautological in nature, and as such have no 'real' content but are 'trivial' (i.e. matters of convention adopted within the 'framework'), and have no philosophical interest to Carnap. They have nothing to do with 'common sense' because they are formal creations like math that have no connection to the 'real' world. You might say its a contrast of the 'conceptual' with the 'factual'.Brews ohare (talk) 14:24, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

In summary, the quote is irrelevant to establishing any meaning for the phrase "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true" Brews ohare (talk) 14:28, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

The phrase "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true" can be interpreted within the above context of Carnap's terminology as incorrectly mixing together the 'trivial' tautological 'internal' issues with 'external' common-sense issues. It may be that a different interpretation that makes sense can be devised, but then this phrase should be redrafted to avoid incorrect ambiguity. Brews ohare (talk) 14:49, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob, as an aside, you might find helpful The Structure of Carnap’s Linguistic Frameworks. Brews ohare (talk) 15:52, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf, I just read the context of your excerpt. It doesn't seem to support the statement ""ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level". Your excerpt mentions answers to internal questions, such as "five is a number", and it mentions answers to general internal questions, such as "there are numbers", but the source goes on to say, "that metaphysical questions, e.g. about the existence of numbers, can't be intended as general internal questions...". Also, on the next page the source mentions that these metaphysical questions are "ill-formed pseudo questions". So it looks like the source doesn't support, but actually contradicts the statement, "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level". --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:07, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Please no more segregating my posts by formatting. As I said, [Thomasson] then quotes Carnap regarding the purportedly deep (i.e. non-trivial) philosophic sense of the question, (i.e. the "external" or meaningless question, per Carnap's distinction) as one asked “neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers”.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:13, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, Would you care to comment on my last message? --Bob K31416 (talk) 21:16, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

I'm teaching at the moment so limited access but sure. What we have is the needs to quickly summarise a complex field. We are not trying to string together quotations. I'm with MachineElf on this and I think as long as you attempt on sentence at a time this will go no where. Assuming it is worth editors time when only one editor is advocating change then a better approach would be to agree the essence of what is needs to be said, and the sources then agree the form of words. That said I am loosing my patience for multiple discussions with Brews over multiple articles where he is a lone voice. Sooner or later enough is enough. I appreciate what you are trying to do, hence the suggestion----Snowded ^TALK 22:40, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Well, I'm leaving now. I felt that Brews ohare has been cooperative with my efforts to find agreement between him, Snowded, and MachineElf. --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:17, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Pity I thought your idea was a good one, but the focus on one sentence at time was not getting anywhere. As far as I can see Brews is asserting his version (see below and above). Hence my suggestion that you take a similar approach but focus on the principles of what needs to be said, then agree the wording. It's a thankless task however so I can understand that you may wish to withdraw. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:46, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob K31416: I am sorry about your decision. It was a big commitment on your part, and thank you for your efforts. Your participation here has been a healthy development, and was beginning to show success. Hope you reconsider. Brews ohare (talk) 14:07, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Your approach seeking agreement on the first sentence is a good one. There are, after all, only three sentences altogether in the article's lead deflationism paragraph, and the lead sentence is the one that is controversial. The second sentence about Eklund is the same in all versions, and the last is simply a matter of describing Thomasson's position. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

Overview for Bob

Bob: You are offering yeoman service here. Thank you.

There are a few different proposed additions. One involves a proposal at Model-dependent realism, which perhaps should be addressed on its own Talk page. Here, the proposal on Meta-ontology and also with the proposal on Deflationary theory of truth the issue is the use of the term 'deflationary'.

I've provided lots of sources that use these terms in the proposal on Truth, one being Manley's Introductory Chapter to David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman (ed.). Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link). Here is Manley's description: (page 4)

"In opposition to mainstream metaphysics, there is a broad range of views. Consider an arbitrary dispute in metaphysics that gives rise to deflationary intuitions. At one end of the spectrum will be those who dismiss the dispute as entirely misguided, on the grounds that nothing substantive is at issue. Motivated in part by intuitions of shallowness, they argue that the dispute is mainly verbal, or that the disputants are not making truth-evaluable claims at all. This approach, which I will call strong deflationism, has a very impressive pedigree: versions of it have been defended by, among others, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Austin, Rorty, and Putnam."

— David Manley, A guided tour of metametaphysics, p. 4

The point here, as described above by Manley, and by the other sources quoted at Truth, is that 'deflationism' and the adjective 'deflationary' are used to describe a variety of skeptical views of ontology. The two mentioned by Manley are that onological disputes (i) are not making truth-evaluable claims at all or (ii) are mainly verbal. The issue is not whether these claims are right or wrong, but simply to make clear the usage of the terms by a variety of philosophers on both sides to describe the debate.

MachineElf's lead paragraph, attempting to define 'deflationary' positions, is hard to fathom because it uses imprecisely the words: 'common sense level' and 'trivially true' that have multiple meanings especially in philosophy, and cites as an example the concept of 'number', a topic with a very involved philosophical background. Worse, it amounts to misdirection: the positions outlined by Manley do not refer to ontological disputes being 'trivially true at a common-sense level', a murky concept. This paragraph also is an incomplete description of philosophers' variety of positions encompassed under 'deflationism', as provided in the quotations at Truth; what Manley calls "a broad range of views". Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

In my opinion, this proposal on Meta-ontology is easier to understand and more accurate than the present lead paragraph and should replace it. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

In short, you're still complaining because you didn't get your way.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:52, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare, Thanks for the compliment. Regarding the other section where I am trying to moderate the discussion, I'm looking forward to your response there and don't feel rushed. Regards, --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:03, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: My exposition above was intended to lay out the issues here by presenting the proposal in the context of the definition of 'deflationism'. To determine for yourself what should go into the article, this is my viewpoint. You can solicit what others have to say by way of contrast. I was unable myself to obtain any such analysis from them. I do not intend to involve myself in various accusations about my defects as a contributor, nor to engage in further dissection of contrary opinion, should some be presented. I leave that to you. If I am missing some points you would like further addressed by me as matters evolve, please tell me. Brews ohare (talk) 18:20, 3 May 2013 (UTC)

Thomasson's papers

There are two closely related papers by Thomasson:

"Carnap and the Prospects for Easy Ontology", forthcoming in Ontology after Carnap, ed. Stephan Blatti and Sandra LaPointe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"The Easy Approach to Ontology: A Defense", forthcoming in Philosophical Methods, ed. Matthew Haug. London: Routledge.

The issue has arisen as to whether these papers can be interpreted as supporting the statement that "ontological questions are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true".

It seems that reference to a 'common sense level' and to ontological questions being 'trivially true' on that level cannot be based upon any direct statement in these two papers. Any attempt to draw this conclusion from Thomasson's works appears likely to require a lengthy presentation, and may prove unsuccessful. It would seem appropriate in the context of a very brief account in meta-ontology#deflationism either (i) to find a source that more directly supports this statement, or (ii) to reword this statement in a form more easily sourced. Brews ohare (talk) 18:18, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

These papers build upon one of Thomasson's books, see "Chapter 2: Analyticity and conceptual content". Ordinary objects. Oxford University Press. 2007. pp. 28 ff. ISBN 0199764441. Brews ohare (talk) 14:19, 7 May 2013 (UTC)

#that_discussion_is_happening_here.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 18:46, 6 May 2013 (UTC)

Introduction of term 'meta-ontology'

Snowded, you removed the sub-section Coining of the term with the one-line comment "Blatant original research". Apparently this term has some meaning to you that I don't understand. All this section says is that Inwagen defined 'meta-ontology' and refers to his two publications where he provided his definition. Maybe you can tell me what is 'original research' about this? Maybe you think the sentence "The process of assessment of these ontologies is 'meta-ontology'." says something different from what Inwagen says? If so, why not propose some alternative wording instead of removing the entire subsection as 'original research'? Brews ohare (talk) 23:02, 15 May 2013 (UTC)

I repeat my request on another article (it was a little provocative for you to introduce it here after it had already been rejected) - show a third party source which supports the edit. At the moment its your conclusion from primary sources ----Snowded ^TALK 23:17, 15 May 2013 (UTC)

I gather that you doubt that Inwagen can take credit for the term 'meta-ontology'. It may be that this word was 'in the air' as another application of the prefix meta as in metatheory. However, Inwagen's article called 'meta-ontology' is widely recognized as a classic and whatever else one might say, this article made the term 'meta-ontology' a popular word in discussing the subject. The general view is as expressed by Berto:

For van Inwagen the question of meaning of existence, as addressed in books like the one you have in your hands, needs to be dealt with at the meta-ontological level. This is the main idea of Meta-Ontology, an essay by van Inwagen that has quickly become a classic. What he means by "meta-ontology", in fact, is a discourse dealing (a) with the methodology of ontology, that is roughly, with the issue of the tools and procedures to be used in ontological investigation; and (b) with the question (or, if one likes, the intension) of being.

— Francesco Berto, Existence as a real property: the ontology, p. 32

Snowded, perhaps you would accept the modest claim that Inwagen made the term popular through his widely read work "Meta-Ontology"? Brews ohare (talk) 04:56, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

Brews I don't 'doubt' I just want claims sourced; its why I am not prepared to engage in speculative conversations with you over content. If you have understood that it might reduce tension and stop some of your strawman restatements and pejorative remarks. Yes that source is OK for the 'modest claim'. It could be a sentence in the lede - it fact it was once until you removed it I think. It does not justify a whole section ----Snowded ^TALK 04:59, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi Snowded: You hope that I "have understood that it might reduce tension and stop some of your strawman restatements and pejorative remarks". This comment is in fact pejorative and insulting, unlike my mild remark that you might have some 'doubt' about Inwagen's role. Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 16 May 2013 (UTC)

As I suspect you know I was referencing remarks here and on other articles not your comment above. The point Brews is that you keep seeing this as an argument about what is or is not the case (hence the strawman restatements and frustration/anger on your part). The real issue which, I hope you can grasp, is that my concern is that any claim is properly sourced through third party reliable sources. Not the opinion of any editor derived from primary sources (even if I agree with their conclusions). ----Snowded ^TALK 06:44, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

Well, it is nice that the explanation of your importunities affords their repetition. In the present instance, there is a difficulty with the treatment of how the Carnap-Quine debates relate to Inwagen's article Meta-Ontology. The specific aspects of these debates that Inwagen labeled 'meta-ontology' are not separated from the larger debate, blurring the distinction between 'ontology' and its sub-field of 'meta'-ontology. The section Coining of the term attempted to correct that matter, but somehow discussion of this content has become derailed to become a secondary matter of etymology. Perhaps the header should have been Defining the term, but the content of this section is useful regardless of the header. Brews ohare (talk) 15:10, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

The section did nothing to meet the issue you have mentioned. I am however encouraged that you are starting to see that generic discussion triggered by a first reference does not belong here unless it is directly relevant to the article. I look forward to you proposing ways to cut down material accordingly. Adding the section you originally proposed really does not help. It should never have been put on the rails in the first place. Oh, and if you mean "importunities" in the sense of 'perservering' then I'm OK with it, otherwise read up on WP:NPA along with WP:OR and WP:AGF. Then you can write another essay on why wikipedia is in the wrong .... ----Snowded ^TALK 16:56, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

I think one of the issues here is whether Inwagen coined the term "meta-ontology". The fact that he refers to it as if he was the first to use the term, suggests he probably did, but it's not conclusive. It's hard to say that there wasn't any published mention of it before Inwagen, and it's nearly impossible to conclude that there wasn't any prior unpublished mention of it. From what I've read here it seems that Inwagen probably coined the term and I personally wouldn't object to someone saying that in the article. However, if someone did object on the grounds of NOR, I would have to support requiring a reliable source for the statement that Inwagen coined the term, according to WP:V. I wouldn't consider using WP:IAR to include it because I think there is enough possibility that it may be misinformation. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:31, 17 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Your analysis is perfectly accurate. Whoever coined the term, the point of the section Coining the term is really to separate from the entire Carnap-Quine debate the specific portion that Inwagen labeled 'meta-ontology', whether he did so according to the definition of the time, or according to his own definition.. I thought this splitting up of the subject mattered. Snowded doesn't, or at least, is determined to make it as difficult as possible. Brews ohare (talk) 01:37, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Re "separate from the entire Carnap-Quine debate the specific portion that Inwagen labeled 'meta-ontology' " — Perhaps you could present here with ref for review, the statement regarding this that you would like to add? The wording could avoid the word "coining" and say something like, in 1998 Inwagen called such and such "meta-ontology". --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:31, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

Possible addition before section on 'deflationism'

Only a portion of the debate between Quine and Carnap on ontology is properly called 'meta-ontology'.[1]

[1] Inwagen referred to this portion as follows: "Quine has endorsed several closely related theses that I have referred to, collectively, as his 'meta-ontolgy'. These are...those of his theses that pertain to the topic 'ontological commitment' or 'ontic commitment'." Peter van Inwagen (2008). "Chapter 6: Quine's 1946 lecture on nominalism". In Dean Zimmerman, ed (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 125 ff. ISBN 0191562319. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

Brews ohare (talk) 04:46, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Before getting into the details of the addition, it suggests to me that I need some clarification regarding the section Carnap and Quine of this article. Is the section Carnap and Quine only about the part of the debate called meta-ontology by Inwagen? --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:10, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: It's a bit murky. The discussion concerns the analytic/synthetic distinction. So it is a comparison of ontologies: Carnap says both exist and both are philosophically trivial. Quines says the distinction is false. Now that is probably ontology. However, when you ask how you arrive at these positions, and whose methods for settling the matter are best, that is meta-ontology. As you can imagine, there is no sharp division here. So, IMO this short insertion is not adequate to the problem of helping the reader figure this out. However, in trying to solve this problem I am intimidated by Snowded's harsh response to any attempt. Brews ohare (talk) 17:04, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Its hardly harsh to day that given the subject the only use of Quine/Carnap is to illustrate the issue. If the term was coined by Inwagen then there has to be a secondary source which says that. If you want to extend to the analytic/synthetic distinction then you again need a secondary source that links that to meta-ontology. You cannot determine that for yourself. ----Snowded ^TALK 20:01, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

If Inwagen has specified what part of Carnap and Quine is what he calls meta-ontology, then it seems that according to Inwagen, the rest isn't meta-ontology, or at best may or may not be meta-ontology, in which case a source would seem to be needed to say that anything else of Carnap and Quine is meta-ontology. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:34, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

Agree----Snowded ^TALK 21:17, 23 May 2013 (UTC)

As indicated in Peter van Inwagen (2008). "Chapter 6: Quine's 1946 lecture on nominalism". In Dean Zimmerman, ed (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 125 ff. ISBN 0191562319. Quine has endorsed several closely related theses that I have referred to, collectively, as his 'meta-ontolgy'. These are...those of his theses that pertain to the topic 'ontological commitment' or 'ontic commitment'. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) So, Inwagen has been clear about what he calls meta-ontology, but to understand his statement, and to understand why a separation has been made, one needs a bit of background. WP can take one of two approaches: just state what Inwagen says, and let the reader figure it out by reading other WP articles and outside sources. Or, enough background can be provided to enable the reader to follow Inwagen, and to understand why separating meta-ontology from ontology is useful. If this is the direction chosen, it should be made clear what is background and what is meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 00:39, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

(Unfortunately, Google Books isn't allowing me access to Chapter 6 of the book.)

I presume from the Inwagen quote that the endorsed theses are Quine's, although I'm not sure, since it seems odd to refer to someone endorsing their own ideas. Anyhow, it's not clear why most of the section is about Carnap when Inwagen only said that Quine's theses are meta-ontology. Perhaps all the Carnap material in the first part of the section is what you mean by background? --Bob K31416 (talk) 03:11, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: That's odd; the link works for me. By background I mean that the meta-ontological issues have to be identified. To do that one has to present Carnap's ontology (analytic + synthetic) then Quine's (neither one) and then explain the methodology by which each defended their choices, or perhaps how anyone might go about defending the choices. Without a trial balloon for such an exposition, it will be hard to progress. Brews ohare (talk) 05:32, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

This time, Google Books let me look at pages 126–139 of Chapter 6, 125–145. (I've seen this access variability before with other books of Google.)

In pages 126–139, I didn't notice any mention of Carnap. Returning to the proposed addition and its source, was there any mention in Chapter 6 of the Quine/Carnap debate? If so, could you give the excerpt? --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:06, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Looking at Inwagen's presentation, it is all devoted to Quine.

To quote Inwagen:

"It's all there [in Quine's 1946 lecture] (That is, all the meta-ontological theses that are on display in "On What There IS" are presented in the lecture.)...True, it is set out in the course of Quine's attempt to clarify certain question of ontology - not meta-ontology, but ontology proper, the study that attempts to answer the question "What is there?" - but that's by far the best way to present a meta-ontology. The most effective way to present a meta-ontology is to display that meta-ontology at work, to use it to clarify ontological questions. The central ontological question that Quine addresses in the lecture is: What are the obstacles that face nominalism - the obstacles that face nominalism whether the nominalist recognizes them or not?"

Inwagen's final conclusion after analyzing several sentences using Quine's method of translation into symbolic form is:

"Quine's lecture is not to be measured by its failure...Its value is to be found in its demonstration, by example, of the way in which an ontological project should be undertaken...Its value lies in its contributions to meta-ontology, not in its contributions to ontology."

In my words: what Quine says about ontology and the analytic/synthetic distinction is rubbish, but his approach to addressing the question is valuable.

So there is no mention here of Carnap. Of course, Quine's original intent was to discredit Carnap, and there is lots of reference to Carnap in Quine's writings. So one is presenting only one side of the issues by omitting mention of Carnap. Brews ohare (talk) 14:19, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

By the way, the later work on deflationism supports Carnap, not Quine, so it is important for clarity to include Carnap somewhere. Brews ohare (talk) 14:21, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Since Carnap isn't mentioned in the source, the proposed addition isn't supported by the source. One thing to keep in mind in situations like this, is that the reader may look to the source for verification of the statement. --Bob K31416 (talk) 14:33, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

What you seem to suggest is the proposed addition be changed to read: "Although Quine engaged in 'ontology', Inwagen has said the value of Quine's work is in its methods of doing 'ontology', that is, its 'meta-ontology'.[1]"

Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Perhaps muddying the waters, the analytic/synthetic distinction was challenged by Quine because he thought the 'analytic' laid claim to some kind of knowledge outside of empirical science. Quine's aims were to argue that philosophy is a part of science and had no special claims to a higher or more abstract stance for criticism. Possibly his real accomplishment is the reverse: to show the adopted stance of objectivity in science is a chimera because the entire project is infected by the contamination of common language concepts into its abstract formulations. Brews ohare (talk) 15:23, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Re "the value of Quine's work is in its methods of doing 'ontology', that is, its 'meta-ontology' " — It is my understanding that this isn't meta-ontology. The study, analysis, etc., of the methods is meta-ontology. On second thought, perhaps you could give the excerpt from Inwagen that you are using for this, and I'll consider it some more. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:34, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: Here's Inwagen (emphasis mine):

"Quine's lecture is not to be measured by its failure...It is to be measured by the enduring value of the tools that he introduced to define and clarify that goal [the nominalist project]. Its value is to be found in its demonstration, by example, of the way in which an ontological project should be undertaken...Its value lies in its contributions to meta-ontology, not in its contributions to ontology."

— Peter van Inwagen, Quine's 1946 lecture on nominalism, p. 142

The nominalist project is described by Douglas Patterson (2008). New essays on Tarski and philosophy. ISBN 9780199296309.. Patterson's full paper can be found by Google search using the words Patterson Tarksi nominalism.

Bob, I am unclear about your remark that 'methods' of doing 'ontology' is not 'meta-ontology'. In my mind Inwagen's paper says the opposite: methods of Quine are his meta-ontology, Quine's ontology is the result of applying his methods (unsuccessfully). Brews ohare (talk) 18:52, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

You're still using primary sources to derive conclusions --Snowded ^TALK 21:45, 24 May 2013 (UTC)

In his latest version of the proposed addition, it looks like Brews ohare is presenting a conclusion of Inwagen. --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:05, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Your latest version doesn't seem to have much substance beyond praise for Quine. Would it be better to present what Inwagen says is Quine's meta-ontology contribution, i.e. what Inwagen is praising? --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:05, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

What Inwagen is praising, as I understand it, is Quine's procedure for translating a statement to reveal its ontological commitment. This translation uses logical symbols like ∨ ∃ ∈. I'm not too interested in going into all that. Brews ohare (talk) 03:43, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

That may be prudent because of NOR too. The other source you provided, Inwagen 1998, seems like a good source for Quine's meta-ontology. Perhaps there could be a separate section for Quine's meta-ontology and a separate section for Carnap's meta-ontology, instead of the combined section? --Bob K31416 (talk) 13:57, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Hi Bob: That sounds good, but it is difficult to execute. The problem basically is this: Carnap proposed the analytic/synthetic distinction, and that sets up his ontology. He arrived at this position as an evolution from logical positivism. So one could attempt to extract from this course of events some meta-ontological principles that were used to arrive at the analytic/synthetic distinction, but that would be WP:OR unless one could find in the later writing by Thomasson, Eklund and so forth some explicit analysis of this kind directly saying that 'such-and-such' meta-ontology underlay the Carnapian ontology. That might be possible, but at the moment I don't know where to find that. In the case of Quine, we have his critique of Carnap, and Inwagen has labeled some of Quine's argument as meta-ontology. So in principle one could work backwards to suggest that Inwagen has implicitly identified Carnap's meta-ontology However, again that looks very close to being WP:OR. The safest way to proceed is that in the article now: lay out Carnap's ontology, lay out Quine's ontology, and lay out how Inwagen describes Quine's response as introducing meta-ontological principles. At the moment, I don't thank the article is clearly structured along this paradigm, leaving the reader muddled over what are the meta-ontological aspects. Brews ohare (talk) 15:00, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

As a first step toward a clearer development, I have added a prologue to the Carnap-Quine section. I also broke this section in two, with two new headers. What is obviously missing at this point is the final section outlining Inwagen's identification of meta-ontological principles. titled, perhaps, Comparison. Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Seems like Inwagen is only discussing Quine's meta-ontology, not Carnap's. In the two Inwagen sources about Quine discussed so far, the only mention of Carnap is in one footnote. --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:28, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Bob: It seems you are suggesting that Carnap's views be dropped from the article or greatly minimized. If that is to be done, we need a link to an article on Carnap's frameworks approach where his views are explained. Otherwise there is inadequate context - the article is not supposed to be a research proposal for the reader, but to lay things out. Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

It might be noted that the section on Deflationism also depends upon an understanding of Carnap's views. Brews ohare (talk) 15:53, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

At the moment, the articles Analytic–synthetic distinction Logical positivism Rudolf Carnap Philosophy of science do not contain a good discussion of Carnap's views, and 'frameworks' are hardly mentioned if at all. Brews ohare (talk) 16:06, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Re Carnap, I can see how you might have gotten that impression from my message, but I didn't mean to suggest dropping or minimizing him. For example, I think his meta-ontology of internal and external questions relative to a framework is significant. There seems to be sources mentioned so far for Carnap's meta-ontology, and probably more sources too. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:51, 25 May 2013 (UTC)