Talk:Preparedness paradox

Did you know nomination

{{Did you know nominations/Preparedness paradox}}

Different meanings?

"Preparedness paradox" seems to have been used occasionally, but with different meanings. I've added a 2014 use in the context of CBRN terrorism, and a 2017 use re aerospace and defence. Is there a source for the definition in the introduction? Has the term been used before 2014? Best wishes, Pol098 (talk) 17:32, 3 May 2022 (UTC)

• If you read into the article, you'll see that it was used in 1949. --evrik ^(talk) 17:37, 3 May 2022 (UTC)

Thanks. A Google search finds nothing pre-2014; I hadn't checked the article carefully... Best wishes, Pol098 (talk) 17:55, 3 May 2022 (UTC)

... and the interview of Juliette Kayyem defines the term as in the introduction. Pol098 (talk) 18:15, 3 May 2022 (UTC)

Levee paradox – doesn't follow the definition given in the lead

The "levee paradox" seems to have absolutely nothing to do with the preparedness paradox as described in the article. It instead is an example of risk compensation. The hypothetical scenario that would fall under the "preparedness paradox" would be if, after the levees were constructed at great expense, and the feared scenario never materialized (because the levees were effective in reducing damage), citizens or officials were then to declare the expense was unnecessary, as the predicted disaster did not occur, and would be less likely to support measures in the future due to a perceived lack of danger – we shouldn't take warnings seriously because the risk is overstated by scientists or public officials. Or, along the same vein, if the damage was significant, but was still mitigated thanks to levees, but the levees were dismissed as unnecessary because they didn't prevent all major damage, and would be less likely to support preparedness measures in the future due to the perceived lack of benefit – we shouldn't take warnings seriously because the measures proposed will provide no protection anyway. WP Ludicer (talk) 03:45, 26 May 2022 (UTC)

• Maybe the language could be refined. I encourage you to upgrade it. --evrik ^(talk) 16:16, 26 May 2022 (UTC)

Given that the source cited for the paragraph does not mention levees or rivers in any way, I have removed it as an example.

I've also removed the photo of Chernobyl (which is not mentioned anywhere in the article text, and whose caption doesn't have anything to say about the preparedness paradox) and added one of the Fukushima Daiichi plant (which is mentioned in the text). --Lord Belbury (talk) 13:40, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

• Somehow, the text about Chernobyl got stripped out> i added it back in.

As for the levee paradox, if the example is not clear, please edit it to make it clearer. The citation for the levee section is actually: https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/ajem-jul-2018-flood-levee-influences-on-community-preparedness-a-paradox/ --evrik ^(talk) 16:14, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

It doesn't need to be edited to be made clear; it's clear. It needs to be excised because it is not an example of the preparedness paradox as defined in this article. It would, however, fit with risk compensation, like I said. The only connection to "preparedness paradox" in the cited article is the use of the words "preparedness" and "paradox". I honestly don't know how to be any clearer on that. The Chernobyl example is also completely irrelevant, as discussed below. Not wanting to pay for additional safety measures because of a perceived lack of risk is simply underestimating the risk. There's no paradox. WP Ludicer (talk) 14:02, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

• The underestimation of the risk may be because they thought they were sufficiently prepared. It also helps set up Fukushima - where they should have prepared - but didn't because they thought they had prepared. --evrik ^(talk) 20:02, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

I agree, this does seem to be describing (and to be a good example of!) risk compensation rather than the preparedness paradox, at least the way that this article defines that paradox. The "Background" section looks similarly off-topic, drawn from sources that happen to use the phrase "preparedness paradox", but don't seem to be actually talking about the subject of the article, as it is set out here. --Lord Belbury (talk) 16:16, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

• I think that the example fits, but do encourage you both to edit the page to make this work, or show how these aren't really examples. --evrik ^(talk) 20:02, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

I agree with WP Ludicer that the example is clear and works, but it just isn't an example of the preparedness paradox: to "make this work" it should be moved from this article to the risk compensation article. Ludicer's first comment in this thread is convincing, and your argument for inclusion ("The underestimation of the risk may be because they thought they were sufficiently prepared.") doesn't seem to match the given definition of the paradox. --Lord Belbury (talk) 20:42, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

Checking the text while wondering whether Fukushima would be a good lead image, I'm not sure that that's an example of the preparedness paradox either. That it suffered heavy damage because of a lack of preparation due to the perception of less risk depends on where that perception came from: was it from a power station in a similar location which survived (through preparation) a similar disaster, creating the illusion that its preparation wasn't necessary? Or did they measure the risk in isolation and decide it was small enough to not invest in the necessary preparation?

Evrik's where they should have prepared - but didn't because they thought they had prepared comment about Fukushima above sounds again like risk compensation rather than the preparedness paradox. --Lord Belbury (talk) 18:24, 19 July 2022 (UTC)

Chernobyl

New section for this: Evrik has added the text that Chernobyl "should have been a warning" to operators at Fukushima, but that isn't what Ban Ki-moon is quoted as saying ("Knowledge gained from the tragedy at Chernobyl is helping other people and communities around the world to protect themselves and to recover from trauma, including during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear emergency of 2011.") and neither Evrik's interpretation nor Ban's statement seems to be an example of the preparedness paradox. Did they mean to add a different source?

Chernobyl would only be an example of the paradox if it had been a relatively minor accident, prevented by adequate preparation, and which caused people to question the need for the preparation. But Chernobyl was the worst nuclear accident in history. --Lord Belbury (talk) 16:31, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

• @Lord Belbury: If you want to swap the photo at the top with another example. Go for it. If my language is imprecise, go ahead and fix it. The point is, given the disaster at Chernobyl, people should have been prepared. They didn't prepare because of the cost. --evrik ^(talk) 16:42, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

I'm unable to find any sources talking about Chernobyl as an example of the preparedness paradox, and don't personally see how it applies: if the operators of Fukushima recalled the Chernobyl disaster but failed to prepare due to budgetary constraints, that doesn't sound like an example of the preparedness paradox, and isn't a good reason to draw the reader in by talking about how Chernobyl could have been (but wasn't) prepared for. So my fix on current sourcing and understanding would be to remove the mentions of Chernobyl. --Lord Belbury (talk) 17:15, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

I just swapped out the Ban-ki Moon citation above with this one:Acton, James M.; Hibbs, Mark (2012-03-06). "Why Fukushima Was Preventable". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It is clear that the two major nuclear accidents before Fukushima—Chernobyl in 1986 and Three Mile Island in 1979 (which involved extensive damage to nuclear fuel but a relatively small release of radiation)—were preventable ... There is a growing body of evidence that suggests the accident was the result of failures in regulation and nuclear plant design and that both were lagging behind international best practices and standards. Had these been heeded and applied, the risks to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station would likely have been recognized and effective steps to prevent a major accident could have been taken. In this sense, we believe the Fukushima accident—like its predecessors—was preventable.

--evrik ^(talk) 19:37, 13 June 2022 (UTC)

I'm not sure I see how this is an example of the preparedness paradox, as this article defines it. There might be something to be said for Three Mile Island's "relatively small release of radiation" leading later (pre-Chernobyl!) regulators to mistakenly believe that nuclear meltdowns weren't that a big deal, but this isn't being said in the source or the article. --Lord Belbury (talk) 11:14, 17 June 2022 (UTC)

Then go ahead and add it. --evrik ^(talk) 20:03, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

Maybe I'll look into that some time, but this section is about the use of the Chernobyl lead image and Chernobyl/Fukushima example. --Lord Belbury (talk) 20:14, 23 June 2022 (UTC)

Preparedness paradox reverts

Please respond to the open threads at Talk:Preparedness paradox saying why the Chernobyl and levee content belongs in that article.

Creating a new article and asking that other editors who have concerns to "go ahead and fix it", so long as they do not fully remove any of the content, is not a constructive way to write articles. As the sole editor arguing for inclusion, the WP:ONUS is on you to see that a consensus is reached on whether verifiably true statements such as damages attributed to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster could have been easily reduced if the reactor and sarcophagus had been re-ensured with additional concrete and steel bars prior to the accident or construction [of levees] leads to a reduced awareness of and preparation for floods or breaches are examples of the preparedness paradox. --Lord Belbury (talk) 17:47, 19 July 2022 (UTC)

• Fixing it does not mean removal of the content. I think that it appropriate. The levee section gives content. Want a new lead image? Okay, what? --evrik ^(talk) 18:04, 19 July 2022 (UTC)

(I posted the above to Evrik's talk page, they decided to delete it unarchived from there and post it here instead.)

No, it's not appropriate to inform other editors that they will only be able to change, but not remove, the paragraphs and images you have added. I don't have a better lead image in mind, but that's not a reason to keep the current one. --Lord Belbury (talk) 18:18, 19 July 2022 (UTC)

Since the sarcophagus was built after the accident it doesn't make sense to have reinforced it before the accident, and thus before it was built and needed. Julian Silden Langlo (talk) 14:04, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

RfC on examples

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.

Feedback taken is that Chernobyl is not an example; the levee example is poorly stated; the third may be the case for Onagawa given more information (which is not present in the article right now, its preparation is praised as successful), but is not the case for Fukushima. Some of this had already been removed from the article during the RfC. Lord Belbury (talk) 15:42, 14 September 2022 (UTC)

---

Are the following three situations examples of the preparedness paradox, as the article defines it?

1. ...damages attributed to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster could have been easily reduced if the reactor and sarcophagus had been re-ensured with additional concrete and steel bars prior to the accident.
2. Levees are structures which run parallel to rivers and are meant to offer protection from flooding. Paradoxically, their construction leads to a reduced awareness of and preparation for floods or breaches.
3. Even though the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant was closer to the epicenter of the earthquake, it withstood the cataclysm because of the preparations made by the facility's owners. On the other hand, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant suffered heavy damage because of a lack of preparation due to the perception of less risk.

-- Lord Belbury (talk) 09:43, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

1. No. Any example of a disaster being worse because it was not prepared for does not go in this article.

2. No. This article is not moral hazard. It is also not about a disaster being worse because it was prepared for. It is not about a disaster being worse at all.

3. Maybe. The example of the Onagawa Plant could be with more information, but the example of Fukushima is not.

I think it will be hard coming up with clear examples for this article, because the fundamental property of the topic of the article is something not happening. Loki (talk) 14:50, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

I have to agree with Loki's third point and want to bring up another — that because this idea is inherently non-defining to the potential examples we could include, there will always be an element of personal opinion as to whether a particular event qualifies as an example of this paradox or its consequences. It might be worth more to look at examples of things that have not happened rather than incidents that did occur. For example, there have been plenty of nuclear reactor accidents, but the number of functional reactors that were built in a routine manner and decommissioned just as quietly without anything of particular interest happening along the way vastly outweighs the number that have gone catastrophically wrong. We would need a reliable opinionated source that this could create the illusion that the risks of a nuclear meltdown are not as severe as they truly are for the very reason that those risks have so seldom been made a reality (if, that is, I am understanding the topic of this article correctly). If we're going to cite specific incidents like the above, we would need to say, "XYZ of ABC Publication argues that DEF incident qualifies as an example of the paradox in some way," because as I said that's really all they're ever going to be — examples in the opinion of so-and-so, impossible to say as defining to the nature of the topic in question. Zeke, the Mad Horrorist ^{(Speak quickly)} _{(Follow my trail)} 16:49, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

There are a few relatively clear examples. For instance, the Y2K bug not being as bad as advertised is likely to have been an instance of this paradox. But like its article says, not everyone agrees that all the preparation for it was really what made it not a big deal. And I think that's going to be a pretty big theme across examples: because the key feature of the paradox is something not happening, it's hard to be sure if it didn't happen because of the preparation or if it just was never going to happen in the first place.

On a partially-related note: I think the "levee paradox" mentioned in the article is an example of the paradox, it's just poorly stated in the article as written. A levee (preparation) makes flooding appear to not be a concern (nothing happening), when actually flooding is being stopped by the levee (the paradox). This then causes people to not properly prepare for floods, causing worse disasters, but those are a consequence of the paradox, not the paradox itself. Loki (talk) 17:39, 27 July 2022 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Removing levee content again because it is not an example

Read the lead. Then read the paragraph I deleted. The latter does not follow logically from the former. If someone wants to expand the lead to explain that the paradox has multiple meanings, by all means – go ahead. But as it stands, the levee stuff does not belong here. Period. If you are really determined to add it back, please explain how preparedness making the disaster worse accords with this definition:

The preparedness paradox is the proposition that if a society or individual acts effectively to mitigate a potential disaster such as a pandemic, natural disaster or other catastrophe so that it causes less harm, the avoided danger will be perceived as having been much less serious because of the limited damage actually caused.

The idea of a "levee paradox" is certainly a related phenomenon, but it's not the same one. WP Ludicer (talk) 20:29, 4 January 2023 (UTC)

See what I said in the RFC above. In the levee paradox, preparation makes flooding appear to not be a concern, when actually flooding is being stopped by the preparation. That's classic preparedness paradox. This reaction then itself makes future disasters worse, but that's a consequence of the paradox, not the paradox itself. Loki (talk) 23:35, 16 May 2023 (UTC)