User:56osmunka/1xi
Reaserch Notes!
November 1
Imre Nagy was not informed of the Kremlin’s decision to intervene militarily in Hungary. However, he immediately learnt that the direction of the Soviet troop movements had changed. Reports from Záhony, Nyíregyháza and Miskolc in the east of the country made plain a situation that was more or less confirmed by Soviet Ambassador Yury Andropov, when he summoned the Hungarian prime minister to his office. Responding to a question from Nagy, Andropov said the task of the new troops entering Hungary was to cover the troop withdrawal. Nagy was also receiving reports of troop movements within the country, as the Soviets sealed off airfields, for which Andropov gave the same explanation.
It could be assumed that Moscow had decided on a military solution again, although the government had not been officially informed of the fact, which was evidence that the CPSU <Communist Party of the Soviet Union> did not trust it any more. This predicament placed two alternatives before Nagy. One was to fall in behind the Soviet army as it restored order, in which case he would have a chance of remaining in power, provided he took the political steps the Soviets expected. Although the chances of that were slim, there was little hope in the other course, which he eventually chose to pursue. In the early afternoon of November 1, Yury Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, was invited to attend a government meeting. When Andropov again failed to explain the threatening Soviet manoeuvres adequately, the government decided to renounce the Warsaw Pact and declare Hungary’s neutrality, calling upon the four permanent members of the UN Security Council to guarantee this. The logic behind this desperate move was that renouncing the Warsaw Pact would remove the Soviet Union’s right to intervene. Rather than offering armed assistance to an ally, they would be attacking a sovereign <sovereignty>, neutral, independent state. This was the only hope of restraining the Soviets from attacking the country and receiving effective international support and protection.
The decision to pursue this course was a unanimous one. However, Andropov indicated in that day’s report to Moscow that Ferenc Erdei, Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Tildy had supported Imre Nagy’s proposal strongly, while János Kádár and István Dobi (president of the Presidential Council) had taken note of it ‘not exactly with gratification’. This perceived division could also have reinforced the Soviet resolve to set up a counter-government. The Soviets chose János Kádár as one of the leaders of this, although he was a member of the Imre Nagy government and described the revolution in a radio broadcast on November 1 as a ‘glorious uprising of our people’. In this broadcast, he mentioned the domestic forces acting against the revolution, but given more emphasis to threat from outside (from the East).
However, by the time the speech was broadcast, Kádár was no longer in the Parliament building. He and Ferenc Münnich had talks in the afternoon with Soviet Ambassador Andropov, and went to the Soviet Embassy. Then they were taken in an armoured vehicle to the Soviet headquarters at Tököl, from where they flew to Moscow the next day. They told no one they were leaving. Members of the government were still looking for them on November 3, fearing they had been taken prisoner by the Soviets (or possibly the rebels).
Hungary’s declaration of neutrality did not have the desired diplomatic effects. The West, in the tense atmosphere of the Suez crisis, was reluctant to pick up the gauntlet of Hungary. The development influenced public opinion and social organizations in Western countries, rather than politicians.
Hungary’s declaration of neutrality displeased American policy-makers in various ways. The State Department thought it did not go far enough. They would like to have left open the possibility of Hungary, as an independent country, becoming a Nato member one day. A mere weakening of the Soviet side did not meet their requirements. President Eisenhower thought that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to watch its satellite break away. So any official recognition of Hungary’s neutrality would have disagreeable consequences if Hungary were drawn back into the Soviet camp by force of arms. So the measure by which Imre Nagy hoped to gain diplomatic protection for his country did not have the desired effect, although at home it completed the consolidation, by meeting the last of the revolution’s major demands. November 1
Imre Nagy was not informed of the Kremlin’s decision to intervene militarily in Hungary. However, he immediately learnt that the direction of the Soviet troop movements had changed. Reports from Záhony, Nyíregyháza and Miskolc in the east of the country made plain a situation that was more or less confirmed by Soviet Ambassador Yury Andropov, when he summoned the Hungarian prime minister to his office. Responding to a question from Nagy, Andropov said the task of the new troops entering Hungary was to cover the troop withdrawal. Nagy was also receiving reports of troop movements within the country, as the Soviets sealed off airfields, for which Andropov gave the same explanation.
It could be assumed that Moscow had decided on a military solution again, although the government had not been officially informed of the fact, which was evidence that the CPSU <Communist Party of the Soviet Union> did not trust it any more. This predicament placed two alternatives before Nagy. One was to fall in behind the Soviet army as it restored order, in which case he would have a chance of remaining in power, provided he took the political steps the Soviets expected. Although the chances of that were slim, there was little hope in the other course, which he eventually chose to pursue. In the early afternoon of November 1, Yury Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, was invited to attend a government meeting. When Andropov again failed to explain the threatening Soviet manoeuvres adequately, the government decided to renounce the Warsaw Pact and declare Hungary’s neutrality, calling upon the four permanent members of the UN Security Council to guarantee this. The logic behind this desperate move was that renouncing the Warsaw Pact would remove the Soviet Union’s right to intervene. Rather than offering armed assistance to an ally, they would be attacking a sovereign <sovereignty>, neutral, independent state. This was the only hope of restraining the Soviets from attacking the country and receiving effective international support and protection.
The decision to pursue this course was a unanimous one. However, Andropov indicated in that day’s report to Moscow that Ferenc Erdei, Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Tildy had supported Imre Nagy’s proposal strongly, while János Kádár and István Dobi (president of the Presidential Council) had taken note of it ‘not exactly with gratification’. This perceived division could also have reinforced the Soviet resolve to set up a counter-government. The Soviets chose János Kádár as one of the leaders of this, although he was a member of the Imre Nagy government and described the revolution in a radio broadcast on November 1 as a ‘glorious uprising of our people’. In this broadcast, he mentioned the domestic forces acting against the revolution, but given more emphasis to threat from outside (from the East).
However, by the time the speech was broadcast, Kádár was no longer in the Parliament building. He and Ferenc Münnich had talks in the afternoon with Soviet Ambassador Andropov, and went to the Soviet Embassy. Then they were taken in an armoured vehicle to the Soviet headquarters at Tököl, from where they flew to Moscow the next day. They told no one they were leaving. Members of the government were still looking for them on November 3, fearing they had been taken prisoner by the Soviets (or possibly the rebels).
Hungary’s declaration of neutrality did not have the desired diplomatic effects. The West, in the tense atmosphere of the Suez crisis, was reluctant to pick up the gauntlet of Hungary. The development influenced public opinion and social organizations in Western countries, rather than politicians.
Hungary’s declaration of neutrality displeased American policy-makers in various ways. The State Department thought it did not go far enough. They would like to have left open the possibility of Hungary, as an independent country, becoming a Nato member one day. A mere weakening of the Soviet side did not meet their requirements. President Eisenhower thought that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to watch its satellite break away. So any official recognition of Hungary’s neutrality would have disagreeable consequences if Hungary were drawn back into the Soviet camp by force of arms. So the measure by which Imre Nagy hoped to gain diplomatic protection for his country did not have the desired effect, although at home it completed the consolidation, by meeting the last of the revolution’s major demands. [1]
Notes and References
[edit]- ^ Hu Rev Research Inst. http://www.rev.hu/history_of_56/ora2/index.htm