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October 27

The Political Committee of the HWP, on October 26, had committed itself to a radical change of political line. This the Central Committee would have endorsed, had it not been deflected by the arguments of members of the Military Committee. However, it became clear next day that the assessment of the situation and the solutions proposed by Antal Apró and his associates bore no relation to the truth. The heads of the Military Committee had won over the Central Committee with two assertions. (i) They had claimed that there were no broad masses of workers on the rebel side, and those who had drifted towards it could be won back by limited reforms. In other words, the communist party of the working class’s was not being confronted by the working class. So the crisis could be handled or resolved by military means, alongside political measures that would not jeopardize the retention of power. (ii) They had warned that the Political Committee’s reappraisal of the events and the whole situation was pushing the party towards a legitimacy crisis.

By October 27 it was clear that the first assertion did not correspond with the truth. Indeed the contrary was true. The programmes of the workers’ councils, established in large numbers after the Central Committee’s appeal, featured the same proliferating demands that were reaching Imre Nagy and the central authorities from other revolutionary organizations all over the country. They too called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the struggle, from Budapest and from the whole country. They too demanded the dissolution of the ÁVH and all remnants of the Rákosi regime from public life, an amnesty for those who had taken part in the fighting, and the introduction of a multi-party system. So the working class supported not only the demands, but the armed insurgents, calling for an amnesty for them. Moreover the economic platform put forward by the workers’ councils coincided with the ideas of the party opposition: scope for some private ownership and enterprise, while maintaining the socialist character of the economy as a whole.

It had to be recognized that the party’s mass basis of support could not be retrieved with limited reforms. The workers had not even reacted to the promises addressed to them. Furthermore, the new government, proclaimed to be a national one, proved to be stillborn. The real shift towards coalition government that it represented was too cautious, because all the prominent candidates of the Nagy group had been omitted. Of the two Smallholder politicians included, Tildy did not possess the political prestige and weight that the communist leaders assumed and hoped he had. Far from regaining the confidence of the public, the appearance of the new government generated a new wave of civil disobedience, with piles of protest telegrams arriving to demand the dismissal of individual ministers.

Despite Antal Apró’s confident claim that the Military Committee was master of the situation, the moves to defeat the armed uprising brought no success. The attacks designed to break up armed groups in Budapest failed, while the provinces were lost to party control. Only Lajos Gyurkó, in the Kecskemét district, waged a consistent and ever more relentless battle. On the 27th he sent in fighter planes against unarmed demonstrators in Tiszakécske, in a massacre that left 17 people dead and more than a hundred injured. Except in the area controlled by the 3rd Army Corps, there were only sporadic military moves against rebels and protesters. Parts of the country (including several county seats and other towns) were already being run by local bodies brought forth by the revolution. Even in other places, the old set of functionaries could only retain influence by sharing power—by establishing new, ostensibly revolutionary organizations themselves, or having the old council and the new, revolutionary council exercise authority together.

As the hopes inspired by the Military Committee were dispelled, the other question also had to be addressed: the problem of the party’s legitimacy. When Apró and his associates presented a choice between socialism and capitalist restoration, no Central Committee member, of course, could have expressed a preference for the latter. But events after the meeting, especially on the 26th and 27th, gave reason for reflecting on whether the right question had been put. Were these really the exclusive alternatives? Would rejection of the insurgents’ demands and military confrontation really be the most effective way to continue building socialism?

Not only Donáth, branded dangerous and excessively radical, but the hesitant Kádár thought that exclusive use of Soviet troops to crush the uprising would greatly impede the building of socialism in Hungary in the long term. (Donáth thought it would rule it out altogether.) On the other hand, it could be seen from the news reaching the political leaders, especially Imre Nagy, that most of the rebel demands were directed against the existing form of socialism, not socialism itself. Many (including Nagy) could ascertain that there were forces aiming for complete restoration of the capitalist system. Nonetheless, it was clear that the object of the most generally and forcefully expressed programmes was not to reject socialism entirely, but to repair its mistakes and satisfy the basic national demands. A high proportion of those involved in the uprising could be comrades-in-arms with the party in its efforts against those aiming for total restoration. It could also be ascertained that the provinces were lost to the existing power of the party, but people there could be recruited to a policy of remedying the mistakes committed. The new county and city bodies formed in various parts of the country were headed by people with whom the party could cooperate. The Debrecen Socialist Revolutionary Committee had some party members among its leaders, and included the commander of the local guard. One of the leaders of the Borsod County Worker’s Council was Rudolf Földvári, the county first secretary of the HWP. The Gyõr National Council was run by Attila Szigethy, the local member of Parliament and former deputy chairman of the county council. The revolutionary council elected in Békés County included the county chief of police, while in Szolnok the town’s military commander was on it, and so on.

In other words, there would be much greater chances of retaining socialism if the authorities (the party, or rather the government headed by Imre Nagy) were headed by anti-Stalinist forces. This would gain them the right to a place in the political arena after the ceasefire, where they could struggle by political means for the future of socialism, rather than relying only on weapons. Putting the uprising down with the help of Russian bayonets would make it impossible to build a democratic form of socialism, against the opposition of the defeated people. So the Rákosi form would certainly be restored. Victory for the armed uprising, on the other hand, would sweep away not only Stalinism, but all socialist efforts.

The last opportunity arose on October 27 for the party reformers, above all Imre Nagy, to decide on a radical change. There is no evidence available that they knew the hard-liners were planning a military dictatorship. However, the prime minister would have noticed that his adherents were being sent off from the party centre on various pretexts. He also knew the military leaders were planning a brutal, final showdown with the Corvin köz unit, which would not have spared the civilian population. Another blood bath would conclusively eliminate all chance of a reconciliation.

A scene in Corvin köz, with a captured Soviet 122 mm howitzer Furthermore, one group in the party leadership had decided upon stern measures that had only been threatened so far. These included using the terms of the state of emergency, and arming functionaries and former World War II partisans who were thought to be reliable, which would have escalated the fighting into a bloody civil war.

On the other hand, October 27 brought personnel changes that improved the position for Imre Nagy. Ernõ Gerõ, the main leader of the hard-liners, had been removed from the top position in the party on October 25. On the 27th András Hegedüs, the main opponent of Nagy and the reforms, was dropped from the government.

The deciding nudge for the prime minister was probably his meeting with a group styled the Angyalföld Workers’ Delegation. Two workers from Budapest’s 13th District were brought to him in the afternoon, by some close associates of his. For once Imre Nagy could hear what the real objectives of the working class’ were, while his former adherents and true comrades criticized him strongly for his moves since October 23. They sought to persuade him to recognize the movement as a national democratic revolution, to come forward and head it, and by moving his office from the party headquarters to Parliament, to make it clear that the government was running the country, not the single party.