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Hong Gyeong-nae
Hangul
홍경래
Hanja
洪景來
Revised RomanizationHong Gyeong-rae
McCune–ReischauerHong Kyŏng-rae

Hong Gyeong-nae (1780–1812) was a rebel leader in the Joseon Province of Pyeongan in present-day Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, during the early 19th century. He was born in Yonggang, to a family of  Namyang Hong lineage. [1] His background is uncertain. By some accounts he was a fallen yangban (social and political elite).[2] However, the best evidence is that he was an educated commoner and professional geomancer.[3] A rebellion was instigated by Hong Gyeong-nae and the yangban of Pyeongan Province unhappy with their treatment by the central government, and an oppressive de facto tax regime based on government administered high-interest loans and perhaps by rivalries among yangban groups. They were joined by impoverished farmers following a year of exceptionally poor harvest, who nevertheless were forced to contribute to a “grain fund” which amounted to an exorbitant tax. On January 31, 1812 (solar calendar), he led an insurrection against the Joseon Dynasty , which was initially quite successful. At its height, the rebellion controlled most of the area north of the Cheongcheon River, including the town of Jeongju, which was fortified to withstand invasions from Manchuria (part of the Qing Empire). Whenever the rebels took over a district, they opened the government granaries and distributed the grain to the people. However, the rebels suffered disastrous defeats in the battles of Pine Grove and Four Pine Field and were forced to withdraw to Joeonju, which came under siege by government forces. The rebellion was put down a few months later on May 29, when the government forces breached the town wall with a gunpowder charge. Hong Gyeong-nae was killed in the fighting. Other rebel leaders were also killed in battle or executed. Thousands of people caught up in the uprising, including boys as young as 10 years old, were executed as well.[4] Although it failed, the Hong Gyeong-nae rebellion may have provided momentum for other popular armed uprisings in different parts of Korea seeking a more just society.[5] The culmination of these was the Donghak Rebellion in 1894, centered in southern province of Jeolla.[6][7]

Life[edit]

Hong Gyeong-nae was born in Yonggang, in the southern part of Pyeongan province, one of the eight provinces of Joseon (Korea) to a family of the Namyang Hong lineage[1]. While some scholars have indicated that he was a yangban;[2] this idea may have stemmed from a fictionalized account of his life based on a Chinese novel translated into Korean. The best evidence is that he was a somewhat educated commoner, perhaps a member of the provincial military. His learning allowed him to become a professional geomancer.[3] As such, he had more opportunity to travel than would ordinarily be the case, because one of the tasks of a geomancer was to find auspicious locations for gravesites. Hong claimed that the gravesite he had chosen for his father was very auspicious and it would protect him. He travelled extensively to find auspicious sites for his clientele in various places. This helped enable him to understand their discontents and to spread a revolutionary ideology.[8] He relied on two basic arguments to gain supporters for the revolution:

1. The Confucian precept that the hardships in the lives of the people and the natural disasters that had recently occurred were a sign/result of the withdraw of the Mandate of Heaven from the ruling dynasty. Government corruption and events such as famine, winter lightning and earthquakes were linked to the perpetual dynastic cycle in which one dynasty is replaced by another.[9]
2. The fall of the dynasty and establishment of a new nearly utopian dynasty was predicted long ago in the secret writing of the Jeonggamnok. This work predicted that a True Man with the sur name Jeong (Chŏng) would lead an army to bring about this change. Even the year, 1812, was purported to be predicted.[10][11] Rebel instigators claimed that their followers would be the vanguard of True Man Jeong’s army and they employed a figurehead leader with that name.

Although negatively portrayed in government documents, Hong appears to have been a strong and capable leader. He displayed exemplary Confucian behavior when he ordered a proper burial for an illustrious government official, who had been killed by the rebels and was regarded as “righteous” for maintaining his loyalty to the existing dynasty.  He also directed that the body of another man who died resisting the rebellion, a well-known filial son, to be taken away by his son for a proper burial and said that he regretted his death.[12]

He was described as physically powerful and a master of martial arts. He directed preparations for the war and personally commanded the rebellion. However, there was some dissention among rebel leaders over strategy.[13] Two leaders, whose plan for a speedy attack on government forces after their initial defeat was not adopted, concluded that the rebellion would be lost. In an attempt to redeem themselves in the eyes of the government, they tried to assassinate Hong with swords, but he was able to fend them off and they were killed. The resulting delay was highly detrimental to the rebels because it allowed the government forces to regroup.[14] Hong continued to lead the rebel force until the walled town of Jeongju, where the rebels were besieged, fell. He was shot and killed in this last battle which ended the rebellion and was posthumously punished.[13]

Other rebel leaders[edit]

Wu Kun-cheok (U Kunch'ik) was a professional geomancer and used his knowledge of secret prophecies to recruit sympathizers to the rebel cause. He first met Hong Gyeong-nea at the Blue Dragon Temple where they had studied. They met again in 1801 when they discussed the possibility of rallying supporters for a rebellion. When the rebels launched their first attack he dressed in a crane like robe and carried a white feathered fan. He appears to have been the director of a gold mine which raised money for the rebellion. He also mastered martial arts and personally commanded rebel forces in some battles.  At the end of the rebellion, he escaped from Jeongju, where Hong Gyeong-nae and other rebels were besieged by government troops but was captured a few days later.  While under interrogation, he claimed that he was forced to join the rebellion, but evidence indicates that he was one of the masterminds. His claim was not accepted and he was executed.[15]

Kim Sar-yong (Kim Sayong) was a yangban.  Although poor, he had many family connections with officials in Pyeongan Province, which helped him recruit them to the rebel cause.  He led one of the two rebel armies.  His army was the first to enter Jeongju and it captured the district seats, garrisons, and other strategic locations west of Jeongju.  However, his army was defeated at the battle of Four Pine Field and subsequently dispersed by government forces.  He then joined the remaining rebels in Jeongju, where he was killed in battle.[16]

Hong chong-gak (Hong Ch’onggak), also known as Hong Bong-ui, was a poor peddler and famously strong. He was appointed head of the second rebel army which led the first attack at Kason on January 31, 1812.  He captured a number of important towns/strategic locations east of Jeongju but a delay on his planned advance on Anju due to an internal rebel dispute allowed the organization of a regional government army that defeated his army at Pine Grove.  He then joined the rebel force at Jeongju where he aided in its defense. However, he failed to recognize the danger posed by the tunneling efforts of the government forces which were used to place a gunpowder charge under the wall.  After Jeongju fell he was captured and executed.[17]

Kim Chan-si was a yangban who had passed the lower level civil service exam.  Government reports indicated that he was in debt which led him to join the rebels.  He was liked among the local yangban which help in recruiting others.  He composed a puzzle like song which foretold the fall of the Joseon dynasty in 1812 which was incorporated into the Jeonggamnok.[18] He also composed the rebel manifesto (written in literary Chinese), which was intended to provide justification for the rebellion.  After the battle of Pine Grove, he joined other rebels in a camp north of Jeongju.  When it was apparent the tide was turning against the rebels, he went on a mission to recruit help from sympathizers along the border region near the Amnok (Yalu) river.  However, while  on the way, he was beheaded as he slept. The betrayer sold his head to another who attempted to get a reward from the government, however both men were executed.[19]

Counter-rebel leaders[edit]

Lee Young-sik (Yi Yŏngsik) was the magistrate of Gwaksan (Kwaksan).  He was captured by the rebels but escaped with the aid of a loyal military officer. His two brothers and a son became victims of the rebels.  After his escape he went to Jeongju to warn of the rebel threat, but it was too late. He then went to Anju where he led reinforcements that assured victory at the battle of Pine Grove (Songlim ) nearby. He also led the regional army at the battle of Four Pine Field (Sasongra) and was victorious there as well.[20] The loss of these two battles was disastrous for the rebels.

Lee Hae-seung (Yi Haesŭng) was the army inspector of Anju military headquarters.  He led the regional government force at Pine Grove.  After it appeared that the rebels had the upper hand, reinforcements led by Lee Young-sik assured victory for the regional force.  A report by a central government army officer indicated that he was cowardly and had to be driven out of the gate to take part in the battle. However, after the victory he became vicious and greedy.  It took 30 horses to carry way the goods he took after the battle.  His troops also ransacked and burned rebel held towns which were recaptured.  They also took part in the siege of Jeongju.[21]

Other important government officers included: Pak Kip’ung (Park Ki-pung) was the supreme field commander of the central government pacification force. He arrived at Jeongju on February 15, 1812 and took overall charge of the siege.  Pak was replaced by Yu Hyowon due to his inability to put down the rebellion. Yu arrived at Jeongju on April 9. The force surrounding Jeongju also included a large contingent of Pyeongan provincial troops.  There were over 8,000 government troops deployed throughout the siege.[22]

Background of discontent[edit]

A number of social, political, economic, and intellectual factors potentially led up to the rebellion. Among those considered by Sun Joo Kim, author of a treatise on this topic include:

  • Poverty and discontent among the farmers in Pyeongan Province. These were brought on by the naturally low fertility of soils in the area compared to those in the southern part of Korea, poor weather conditions at the time which led to partial crop failure, and high interest rates on loans which were extracted despite the poor harvest.[23]
  • Particularly high de facto tax rates for more well off landowners. These took the form of grain fund and monetary loans which had to be paid back at high interest rates.[24]
  • Cross border trade policies and taxes on imported goods from China which negatively impacted Pyeongan merchants.[25]
  • Signs and prophetic works, particularly the Jeonggamnok, which foretold that the Joseon (Yi) dynasty would fall and be replaced by a new more just dynasty.[26]
  • Rivalries among the yangban triggered by government policies to encourage or force movements of yangban from the south to Pyeongan Province as a way of better integrating it into the Joseon political fabric. However, this policy stoked tensions between the established yangban organizations and the newly arrived yangban.[27]
  • Discrimination against high level civil service examination passers from Pyeongan Province at the Joseon court.[28]

Sun Joo Kim favored this last cause (Discrimination against those from Pyeongan Province) as the primary cause. She noted key evidence for this conclusion was the manifesto posted by the rebels in the early stage of the rebellion which begins:

The central government abandoned (Pyeongan) Province as one abandons rotten earth. Even when the slaves of powerful families saw men from (Pyeongan) Province, they always called them “the common rabble from (Pyeongan). How unfair and what a source of resentment this is for the people of (Pyeongan) Province! . . . [29]

Another scholar of the rebellion, Anders Karlsson, disagreed with this assessment and offered counter arguments. He noted that in his view the manifesto, which was written in classical Chinese, would have been unintelligible to the predominately uneducated army or even most of its leaders. He suggested that perhaps its primary purpose was to legitimize the rebellion and seek the support of those members of the educated elite that had not already joined the rebels.[30] His own work emphasized the importance of the ideologies espoused in the prophetic works.[31] However, in the end he concludes that the relative importance of the various potential causes remains an unanswered question.[32]

Preparation[edit]

December 1810 to January 1812: The material preparations for the rebellion appeared to have begun in 1810 when Hong Gyeong-nea and Wu Kun-cheok met again at the Blue Dragon Temple.  Hong Gyeong-nea was accompanied by a man named Jeong Chem-in (Chŏng Chemin) who was to be the figurehead leader of the rebellion, thus fulfilling the prophesy in the Jeonggamnok that a man named Jeong would lead an army which would overthrow the Joseon dynasty. Hong Gyeong-nea also stated that thousands of Ming dynasty troops were secretly stationed in the area and would join the rebels once the rebellion began. In the manifesto written to justify the rebellion, these troops were referred to using a term that implied that they were Ming soldiers (i.e., descendants of the previous Chinese Ming dynasty subjects), which would have been viewed more favorably by the Korean yangban. This promise did not materialize but it was useful for recruiting purposes.[33]

A network of yangban fifth columnists and field officers were recruited by use of rebel family connections and friendships within yangban organizations. The networks were also useful for raising money to buy materials needed by the rebels. Rank and file soldiers were recruited by advertising for gold miners. This was an effective mechanism because the famine had caused many farmers and peddlers to be desperate for a way to make a living. Even bankrupt yangban responded to the advertisement although menial work was normally distained.[34]

A secret base was established at Dabog (Tabok) village. Hong Gyeong-nea moved his family there including his mother, wife, sons, brothers and nephews. As noted above two armies were constituted there and equipped with uniforms and weapons: one under the leadership of Kim Sar-yong and the other under Hong chong-gak.[35]

Rebellion[edit]

January 31 to February 15, 1812: In the early stages of the rebellion, the rebels appeared to be quite successful. The starting date had been set for February 1, but the campaign had to be launched on January 31 because district leaders had become suspicious. The first district town to be captured was Kasan, located only a few miles from their secret base at Dabog. The attack was led by Hong Chong-gak, who led a force of 30 to 40 cavalrymen and about 150 foot soldiers. A clerk of the district office welcomed the rebels, but the magistrate refused to submit and was killed along with his son. The following day Hong’s army moved to Bakcheon (Pakch'on) by way of the ferry station downstream and set up its basecamp there. A dispute over strategy led to an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hong Gyeong-nae and a delay in the further advance of Hong's army. The dissidents had hoped to move swiftly to Anju, the walled city south of the Cheongcheon River, before the government had a chance to prepare for an attack, but their plan was not adopted.[36]

Map of important sites relevant to the Hong Gyeong-nae rebellion of 1812 in northern Pyeongan Province, Joseon (Korea)

Meanwhile the rebel army led by Kim captured Gwaksan (Kwaksan) were they were greeted by the fifth column. The wounded magistrate escaped first to the fortified town of Jeongju where he warned of the impending attack on the town. The warning was of no avail because the fifth column was able to take over.  The armies of Kim and Hong converged on Jeongju from February 2 to 4.[37]

The combined force of the two rebel armies under the command of Kim took over Seongcheon on February 4 after it surrendered without a fight.  However, the walled town of Guseong (Kusŏng) was successfully defended.[38]

Hong replenished his forces at Jeongju and marched northeast to take over Tacheon on February 7.  The town fell easily because the magistrate fled before Hong’s army arrived. Kim’s army was also successful. By February 10, an important granary south of Guseong and the district seat at Cheolsan (Ch'ŏlsan) had been captured. At that point, the rebels controlled much of the Pyeongan Province north of the Cheongcheon River. Whenever rebel took over a district, they opened the government granaries and distributed the grain to the people as a way of gaining support. They also took government funds to use as pay for their peasant soldiers.[39]

The walled town of Yeongbyeon (Yŏngby'ŏn), which was a natural fortress was a notable exception to the success in the east.  A rebel network in the town was discovered before an attack by the rebels could be mounted and the leaders were executed. Government troops from Guseong (Kusŏng) also arrived and the town was successfully defended.[40]

In addition, the failure to move swiftly to Anju allowed time for a regional force to be organized there.  By the time, Hong’s army moved to attack Anju, they were met by the regional government forces assembled from surrounding districts as well as forces who had fled from rebel captured areas to the east.  The battle occurred at Pine Grove, about 10 ri (4 kilometers) north of Anju, where the rebels suffered a disastrous defeat on February 11.  The Anju force was led by Lee Hae-seung but he received crucial reinforcement from Lee Young-sik.[41]

Even after the defeat of Hong’s army at Pine Grove, Kim’s army captured the district seat at Yeongcheon (Yongch'ŏn) and other strategic facilities. There were plans to capture the walled city of Uiju, but these failed when the military leader there who had planned to join the rebels changed his mind and even executed his own wife and son who were rebel sympathizers.[39] However, prospects for the rebels were greatly diminished following a battle between Kim’s army and that of Lee Young-sik. As previously noted, Lee was the magistrate of Gwaksan who had escaped. He was able to reorganize an army and had provided crucial reinforcements at the battle of Pine Grove. The battle between Kim and Lee occurred at the battle of Four Pine Field on February 20.  Kim’s rebel army suffered a disastrous defeat.  Continued attacks from government forces caused Kim’s army to disintegrate and his soldiers were dispersed.  He then joined the rebels at Jeongju where preparations for defense of the fortress were underway.[42]


Siege of Jeongju[edit]

February 15 to May 29, 1812: The siege of Jeongju began with the arrival of the regional army under the command of Lee Hae-seung on February 15, 1812, which was joined by seven provincial companies from Pyongyang and the central government pacification army from Seoul. The pacification army was led by Park Ki-pung and he took control of the siege. The government forces totaled over 8,000 throughout the siege.[43] The population within the town was about 4,000 including children and the elderly.  There were about 360 trained rebel soldiers. Having witnessed the destruction of the regional force and arriving conscripts, the population was committed to the defense; they presumably assumed that they had no other choice. Initially, morale was high and the defenders were able to repulse many attacks in which government troops attempted to scale the walls or to breach one of the gaits.  Major attacks occurred on February 17 and 19. An attack on February 27 included a cart loaded with gunpowder intended to destroy the gate, but it got stuck and never reached the gate.  Attacks on March 16 and April 6 included battle carts intended to allow soldiers to fire down on the defenders, but these failed as well.[44]

While rebel morale was high at first, it began to falter as food and supplies dwindled.  Hong Gyeon-nea tried to lift spirits by claiming that Qing troops were on the way to break the siege.  He declared that they would arrive on May 29.[45]

Meanwhile there was a change in leadership of the government force. Yu Hyowon was named the new leader of the pacification army.  The army embarked on a plan to dig two tunnels (on the east and north side of the town) under the wall and to plant gunpowder charges there.  The rebels were fatally dismissive of the tunnels.  On May 29, the same day that Ming troops were expected by the rebels, a gunpowder charge was exploded in the north tunnel.  The wall was breached and that finally allowed the government forces to enter the city. Hong Gyeong-nae was shot and killed in the fighting. Other rebel leaders, including Wu Kun-cheok and Hong chong-gak, were captured and executed. In addition, nearly 3000 people were arrested and about 2000 executed, including boys as young as 10 years old. The rebellion was thus concluded.[46]

Legacy[edit]

The rebellion was a great concern to the Joseon government.  It concluded that the main causes of the rebellion were corrupt officials and excessive taxation during the famine.  Lee Hae-seung was identified as a prime example of a corrupt official. Relief measures for the province were initiated. These included: cancelation of taxes until there was a good harvest, forgiveness of loans, and the holding of a provincial civil service examination to facilitate advancement of scholars from the area.[47] P166-167  Nevertheless, it provided momentum for other popular armed uprisings in different parts of Korea seeking a more just society.[5] The culmination of these was the Donghak Rebellion in 1894, centered in southern province of Jeolla.[6][7] Pratt page 378; Kim Jinwung page 301.

In popular culture[edit]

Sources[edit]

  • EncyKor "홍경래" [Hong Kyung-rae]. Encyclopedia of Korean National Culture. Retrieved 8 April 2021.
  • Jorgensen The Foresight of Dark Knowing: Chŏng Kam Nok and Insurrectionary Prognostication in Pre-modern Korea. Translated by Jorgensen, John. Hawai'i University Press. 2018. ISBN 9780824875381., 451 pages
  • Kim, Jinwung A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict. Indiana University Press. 2012. ISBN 9780253000248., 720 pages
  • Kim, Sun Joo Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion. University of Washington Press. 2007. ISBN 9780295989310., 294 pages

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b EncyKor/Hong Kyung Rae.
  2. ^ a b Pratt 1999, p. 178.
  3. ^ a b Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 107-109. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  4. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  5. ^ a b Yoon 2014, p. 16.
  6. ^ a b Pratt 1999, p. 378.
  7. ^ a b Kim Jinwung 2012, p. 301.
  8. ^ Yoon 2014, p. 15.
  9. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 79-80. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  10. ^ Karlsson 2001, p. 267.
  11. ^ Jorgensen 2018, p. 169-172.
  12. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 108. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  13. ^ a b Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 109. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  14. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 131. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  15. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 109-110. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  16. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 112, 131-133, 142. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  17. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 130-131, 140, 164-165. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  18. ^ Karlsson 2001, p. 266.
  19. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 111, 123, 143. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  20. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 132, 140, 142. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  21. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 141, 153. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  22. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 153, 161. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  23. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 16, 78-79.
  24. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 72-78.
  25. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 80-89.
  26. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 98-104.
  27. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 24-34.
  28. ^ Kim Sun Joo & 2007}, p. 35-47.
  29. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 1. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  30. ^ Karlsson 2009, p. 214.
  31. ^ Karlsson 2001.
  32. ^ Karlsson 2009, p. 215.
  33. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 122-123. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  34. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 125-126. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  35. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 108, 130. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  36. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 130-131. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  37. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 131-132. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  38. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 132. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  39. ^ a b Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 133-134. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  40. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 134. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  41. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 140. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  42. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 157. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  43. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 153. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  44. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 159-160. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  45. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 163. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  46. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 164-165. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)
  47. ^ Kim Sun Joo 2007, p. 166-167. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKim_Sun_Joo2007 (help)

See also[edit]


Category:Joseon Dynasty people Category:1780 births Category:1812 deaths