Operation Kingfisher was a US Marine Corps operation that took place during the Vietnam War. The operation was executed in the western part of Leatherneck Square near Con Thien, lasting from 16 July to 31 October 1967.
Order of Battle
- United States Marine Corps
- 3rd Battalion 3rd Marines
- 2nd Battalion 4th Marines
- 3rd Battalion 4th Marines
- 2nd Battalion 9th Marines
- 3rd Battalion 9th Marines
- 3rd Battalion 26th Marines (7–11 September).
- North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
Following the conclusion of Operation Buffalo and Operation Hickory II, III MAF launched Operation Kingfisher in the same general area with the same objective of blocking the entry of NVA forces into Quang Tri Province.
This period saw only minor contact with the NVA.
2/9 Marines, supported by a platoon of M-48s, 3 M50 Ontos and 3 LVTEs moved north along Provincial Route 606 to make a spoiling attack into the DMZ, the unit made no contact with the NVA and set up a night defensive position near the Ben Hai River. The following morning as the unit was returning along the same route a command detonated mine exploded wounding 5 Marines. The NVA then opened fire with small arms and mortar fire and attacked the armored vehicles with RPGs. The NVA attempted to hug the US column negating the use of air support and the column broke up into several separate firefights. The isolated Marine Companies set up night defensive positions and were eventually relieved by 3/4 Marines on the morning of 30 July. Marine casualties for the operation were 23 dead and 251 wounded, while the NVA suffered 32 killed and a further 175 believed killed.
On the morning of 4 September, 3/4 Marines engaged an NVA force 1.5 km south of Con Thien, trapping the NVA force between two Companies of Marines. The NVA lost 38 killed and 1 captured, while the Marines lost 6 dead and 47 wounded.
On 7 September 3/26 Marines supported by M-48s encountered an NVA force 4.8 km south of Con Thien. The NVA lost 51 killed, while the Marines lost 14 killed.
On the evening of 10 September 3/26 Marines engaged the 812th NVA Regiment 6 km southwest of Con Thien. Some of the attacking NVA were wearing USMC helmets and flak jackets and they were well supported mortars and 140mm rockets. An RPG destroyed a flamethrower tank, but the NVA were unable to penetrate Marines lines and US artillery boxed in the Marines forcing the NVA to withdraw by 20:30. The following morning 140 NVA bodies were found around the Marine lines, the Marines had lost 34 dead and 192 wounded.
On the morning of 13 September, an NVA Company attacked the northeastern sector of the Con Thien base, but they failed to penetrate the base and were forced back by Marine small arms and artillery fire.
On the afternoon of 14 September 2/4 was moving north out of Cam Lo on MSR route to Con Thien. Echo Company lost 5 Marines due to NVA artillery.
The day before Hotel Company patrolled this area west of Phu Oc and found nothing. The next morning on 21 September three companies (E,F & G) of 2/4 conducted a large sweep east of Con Thien just below the Trace. As the units advanced through the hedgerows the companies came under sniper, mortar and then heavy artillery fire. In the 3 pronged attack Fox Company was hit first and the hardest. Echo Company coming down from the Trace also ran into major problems. Golf Company, originally the blocking force for the other two companies was now attempted to outflank the NVA positions, but they were caught in an open rice paddy and was forced back by small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. The 3 companies disengage so that fixed wing aircraft and Naval gun fire could be brought in for support. Hotel Company was brought up to recover some of the dead, wounded and destroy some of the equipment that was left in the field. By dusk the fighting had died down. The Battalion leaned later that the supporting arms helped destroyed 2 other NVA units (800 men) that were on their way to support the 90th NVA regiment. The Marines reported 31 killed (3 Navy Corpsman) and 118 wounded. LCPL Jedh Colby Barker would be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in this battle. The NVA were estimated to have lost 39 killed. At the end of the day the Marines left 15(?) bodies in the field of battle. On 10 October 2/4 went back in and retrieve their dead.
At 01:25 on 14 October NVA artillery hit 2nd Battalion 4th Marines position around Washout Bridge between the C-2 Strongpoint and the Con Thien Combat Base. A night-ambush squad reported that a large NVA unit was moving past its position towards the bridge. Marine snipers using Starlight Scopes saw the NVA massing in front of Hotel Company position for an attack. The Marines opened fire first with tanks and machine guns causing the NVA to attack prematurely. The NVA failed to penetrate the companies wire and withdrew. At 02:30 the NVA attacked Golf Company, by destroying 2 machine gun position with RPG's. The NVA penetrated the wire and overran the Company command post (CP) killing the Company commander Capt. Jack W. Phillips, his forward observer (FO) and 3 Platoon leaders; these young 2nd lieutenants just arrived in country. Capt. James W McCarter was ordered to take over command of Company, but he was killed by NVA fire before he could reach the Command Post. Fox Company was ordered to support Golf Company and sweep through the area and drive the NVA out. The Marines were also supported by AC-47; the Marines called them "Puffs". Finally the NVA was forced to withdraw by 04:30. The Marines had lost 21 dead and 23 wounded. SGT Paul H. Foster was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in the battle. The NVA had lost 24 killed. The bridge was renamed "Bastards Bridge".
On 25 October 2/4 Marines began a sweep north along Route 561, there was no enemy contact but progress was slowed by heavy undergrowth and the unit set up a night position. That night NVA rockets hit the 2/4 position killing the Executive Officer, Major John Lawendowski and wounding the commanding officer Lt.Col. James Hammond and two others of the command group who were evacuated by helicopter. The regimental operations officer Lt Col. John C. Studt was flown in to take over command of 2/4.
On 26 October, 2/4 Marines, less Fox Company which remained at the night position to guard a stock of ammunitition, moved north and secured the objective by 13;00. The Battalion then came under NVA mortar and small arms fire. A UH-34D helicopter of HMM-363 was shot down as it attempted pick up casualties, killing the pilot and door gunner, another UH-34 attempted to land but was damaged and made a forced landing at the C-2 Strongpoint. Lt Col Studt called for reinforcements and Fox Company moved north to the Battalion position, while two Companies from 3/3 Marines moved north from the C-2 Strongpoint arriving at the 2/4 position at dusk. The NVA probed the Marine position with direct and indirect fire and ground attacks before withdrawing around 02:00 on 27 October. The following morning the Marines counted 19 NVA dead but were unable to police the area due to NVA mortar and artillery fire. The Marines had lost 8 dead and 45 wounded in the period from 25–27 October. 2/4 started this operation with 952 field Marines and by the end (6weeks) of the operation they had only about 300 Marines fit for duty.
Operation Kingfisher concluded on 31 October, the Marines had suffered 340 dead and 1,461 wounded. According to calculations by the American command, the NVA had suffered 1,117 killed and 5 captured. However, the losses inflicted on the NVA are debatable (these numbers are in clear conflict with the number of NVA's weapons were captured by the U.S: only 155 NVA's weapons were captured, a ratio of bodies were claimed to weapons seized of 7:1). Tactical victories were claimed by both sides.  Operation Kingfisher was followed immediately by Operation Kentucky.
- Telfer, p.139
- 41 U.S. Marines in 11 Days of Fighting, Associated Press, September 23, 1967, retrieved March 8, 2010
- Telfer, p.132
- Telfer, p.125
- Telfer, pp.125–128
- Telfer, p.133
- Telfer, p.134
- Telfer, p.135
- Telfer, p.136
- Telfer, p.137
- Telfer, p.138