Religious Freedom Restoration Act
|Long title||An Act to protect the free exercise of religion.|
|Enacted by the||103rd United States Congress|
|Effective||November 16, 1993|
|Stat.||107 Stat. 1488|
|Title(s) amended||42 U.S.C.: Public Health and Social Welfare|
|U.S.C. sections created||42 U.S.C. ch. 21B § 2000bb et seq.|
|United States Supreme Court cases|
|City of Boerne v. Flores|
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (also known as RFRA), is a 1993 United States federal law aimed at preventing laws that substantially burden a person's free exercise of their religion. The bill was introduced by Howard McKeon of California and Dean Gallo of New Jersey on March 11, 1993. The bill was signed into law by President Bill Clinton and was passed by a unanimous U.S. House and a near unanimous U.S. Senate with three dissenting votes. It was held unconstitutional as applied to the states in the City of Boerne v. Flores decision in 1997, which ruled that the RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress's enforcement power. But it continues to be applied to the federal government, for instance in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, because Congress has broad authority to carve out exemptions from federal laws and regulations that it itself has authorized. In response to City of Boerne v. Flores, some individual states passed State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts that apply to state governments and local municipalities.
This law reinstated the Sherbert Test, which was set forth by Sherbert v. Verner, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, mandating that strict scrutiny be used when determining whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, guaranteeing religious freedom, has been violated. In the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress states in its findings that a religiously neutral law can burden a religion just as much as one that was intended to interfere with religion; therefore the Act states that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” The law provided an exception if two conditions are both met. First, the burden must be necessary for the “furtherance of a compelling government interest.” Under strict scrutiny, a government interest is compelling when it is more than routine and does more than simply improve government efficiency. A compelling interest relates directly with core constitutional issues. The second condition is that the rule must be the least restrictive way in which to further the government interest. The law, in conjunction with President Bill Clinton's Executive Order in 1996, provided more security for sacred sites for Native American religious rites.
Background and passage
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies to all religions, but is most pertinent to Native American religions that are burdened by increasing expansion of government projects onto sacred land. In Native American religion the land they worship on is very important. Often the particular ceremonies can only take place in certain locations because these locations have special significance. This, along with peyote use are the main parts of Native American religions that are often left unprotected.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that Congress shall not pass laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court interpreted this as banning laws that burdened a person's exercise of religion (e.g. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). But in the 1980s the Court began to allow legislation that incidentally prohibited religiously mandatory activities as long as the ban was "generally applicable" to all citizens. Also, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, intended to protect the freedoms of tribal religions, was lacking enforcement. This led to the key cases leading up to the RFRA, which were Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Lyng, the Court was unfavorable to sacred land rights. Members of the Yurok, Tolowa and Karok tribes tried to use the First Amendment to prevent a road from being built by the U.S. Forest Service through sacred land. The land that the road would go through consisted of gathering sites for natural resources used in ceremonies and praying sites. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an adequate legal burden because the government was not coercing or punishing them for their religious beliefs. In Smith the Court upheld the state of Oregon's refusal to give unemployment benefits to two Native Americans fired from their jobs at a rehab clinic after testing positive for mescaline, the main psychoactive compound in the peyote cactus, which they used in a religious ceremony. Peyote use has been a common practice in Native American tribes for centuries. It was integrated with Christianity into what is now known as the Native American Church.
The Smith decision outraged the public. Many groups came together. Both liberal (like the American Civil Liberties Union) and conservative groups (like the Traditional Values Coalition) as well as other groups such as the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Association of Evangelicals joined forces to support RFRA, which would reinstate the Sherbert Test, overturning laws if they burden a religion. The act, which was Congress's reaction to the Lyng and Smith cases, passed the House unanimously and the Senate 97 to 3 and was signed into law by U.S. President Bill Clinton.
Challenges and weaknesses
The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Antonio wanted to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. But a Boerne ordinance protected the building as a historic landmark and did not permit it to be torn down. The church sued, citing RFRA, and in the resulting case, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA, stating that Congress had stepped beyond their power of enforcement provided in the Fourteenth Amendment. In response to the Boerne ruling, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000, which grants special privileges to religious land owners.
Thus the RFRA was ruled unconstitutional for state and local applicability; however, it still applies to the federal government. The Act was amended in 2003 to only include the federal government and its entities, such as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. A number of states have passed so-called mini-RFRAs, applying the rule to the laws of their own state, but the Smith case remains the authority in these matters in many states.
The constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government was confirmed on February 21, 2006, as the Supreme Court ruled unanimously against the government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), which involved the use of an otherwise illegal substance in a religious ceremony, decisively stating that the federal government must show a compelling state interest in restricting religious freedom.
Other weaknesses still exist in the fact that, despite congressional resolution, unofficial religious antagonism still exists today through adverse legislation and judicial and executive decisions. Also, even with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, many members of the Native American Church still had issues using peyote in their ceremonies because of the Smith case. This led to the Religious Freedom Act Amendments in 1994, which states, "the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremony purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any state. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation."
Applications and effects
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act holds the federal government responsible for accepting additional obligations to protect religious exercise. In O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons it was found that the RFRA governs the actions of federal officers and agencies and that the RFRA can be applied to "internal operations of the federal government."
As of 1996, the year before the RFRA was found unconstitutional as applied to states, 337 cases had cited RFRA in its three year time range. It was also found that Jewish, Muslim, and Native American religions, which make up only three percent of religious membership in the U.S., make up 18 percent of the cases involving the free exercise of religion. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was a cornerstone for tribes challenging the National Forest Service’s plans to permit upgrades to Snow Bowl Ski Resort. Six tribes were involved, including the Navajo, Hopi, Havasupai, and Hualapai. The tribes objected on religious grounds to the plans to use reclaimed water. They felt that this risked infecting the tribal members with “ghost sickness” as the water would be from mortuaries and hospitals. They also felt that the reclaimed water would contaminate the plant life used in ceremonies. In August 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected their RFRA claim.
In the case of Adams v. Commissioner, the United States Tax Court rejected the argument of Priscilla M. Lippincott Adams, who was a devout Quaker. She tried to argue that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, she was exempt from federal income taxes. The U.S. Tax Court rejected her argument and ruled that she was not exempt. The Court stated: "...while petitioner's religious beliefs are substantially burdened by payment of taxes that fund military expenditures, the Supreme Court has established that uniform, mandatory participation in the Federal income tax system, irrespective of religious belief, is a compelling governmental interest." In the case of Miller v. Commissioner, the taxpayers objected to the use of social security numbers, arguing that such numbers related to the "mark of the beast" from the Bible. In its decision, the U.S. Court discussed the applicability of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, but ruled against the taxpayers.
Notes and references
- Religious Freedom Restoration Act full text at http://www.prop1.org/rainbow/rfra.htm
- Utter, Jack (2001). American Indians: Answers to Today’s Questions. University of Oklahoma Press. p. 159. ISBN 0-8061-3309-0.
- Ross, Susan (2004). Deciding communication law: key cases in context. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 0-8058-4698-0.[page needed]
- Waldman, Carl (2009). Atlas of the North American Indian. New York: Checkmark Books. ISBN 978-0-8160-6859-3.[page needed]
- Duthu, Bruce N. (2009). American Indians and the Law. London: Penguin Books. pp. 111–2. ISBN 978-0-14-311478-9.
- Kuhn, Cynthia; Swartzwelder, Scott; Wilson, Wilkie (2008). Buzzed: The straight facts about the most used and abused drugs from alcohol to ecstasy. ISBN 978-0-393-32985-8.[page needed]
- Nussbaum, Martha (2008). Liberty of Conscience: in defense of America's tradition of religious equality. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-05164-9.[page needed]
- Hamilton, Marci (2005). God vs. the gavel: religion and the rule of law. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85304-0.[page needed]
- Sullivan, Winnifred (2005). The impossibility of religious freedom. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-11801-9.[page needed]
- Canby, William C. (2004). American Indian Law. St. Paul: West Publishing. p. 344. ISBN 0-314-14640-7.
- Sisk, Gregory (2006). Litigation with the federal government. American Law Institute. ISBN 0-8318-0865-9.[page needed]
- Richardson, James (2004). Regulating religion: case studies from around the globe. New York: Kluwer Academic. ISBN 0-306-47886-2.[page needed]
- 535 F.3d 1058
- RFRA Land Use Challenges After Navajo Nation v. U.S. Parks Service, University of Houston Law Center.
- See Adams v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 137 (1998), at .
- See Miller v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 511 (2000), at .