Saudia Flight 163

Saudia Flight 163

CG render of HZ-AHK
Accident summary
Date	19 August 1980
Type	In-flight fire in cargo hold, pilot error
Site	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Passengers	287
Crew	14
Injuries	0
Fatalities	301 (all)
Survivors	0
Aircraft type	Lockheed L1011-200 TriStar
Operator	Saudia
Tail number	HZ-AHK
Flight origin	Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi, Pakistan
Stopover	Riyadh International Airport, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Destination	Jeddah International Airport, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Saudia Flight 163 was a scheduled passenger flight of Saudia that caught fire after takeoff from Riyadh International Airport (now the Riyadh Air Base) on a flight to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 19 August 1980. All 287 passengers and 14 crew on board the Lockheed L-1011-200 TriStar registered HZ-AHK, died after the aircraft made an emergency landing back at the Riyadh airport.

At the time, the incident was the second deadliest single aircraft disaster in history, after Turkish Airlines Flight 981. It was also the highest death toll of any aviation accident in Saudi Arabia and the highest death toll of any accident involving a Lockheed L-1011 anywhere in the world.

Passengers and crew

Saudi officials said that most of the passengers were Saudis or Pakistanis, with many of the passengers being Pakistani religious pilgrims. The aviation directorate stated that 82 of the passengers boarded in Karachi and, of the passengers who boarded in Riyadh, 32 were religious pilgrims from Iran. Diplomats in Jeddah said that in addition to the Iranian, Saudi and Pakistani passengers, there were four Koreans, three Britons, two Thais, one Finn and one Irishman on board the flight. The crew included six Filipinos, three Pakistanis, and one Briton. Both the pilot and co-pilot were Saudi nationals with the flight engineer being a US national.^{[citation needed]} Also 1 American

Fire

Flight 163 took off at 18:08 GMT to complete its final leg to Jeddah. Almost seven minutes into the flight, the crew received warnings of smoke in the plane's aft cargo compartment, C3. The next four minutes were spent by the crew trying to confirm the warnings, and by the Flight Engineer going back into the cabin to confirm the presence of smoke in the cabin. The Captain decided to return to the airport. The thrust lever for the number 2 engine (center engine) later became stuck as the fire burned through the operating cable, the engine was shut down on final approach.

The aircraft Captain declared an emergency and returned to Riyadh International Airport and landed safely. After touchdown, contrary to the captain's declaration of an emergency landing, the airplane continued to a taxiway at the end of the runway and exited the runway, stopping on the taxiway 2 minutes 40 seconds after touchdown. The airport fire rescue equipment were stationed at the landing section of the runway expecting an emergency stop and evacuation. Why the captain did not immediately order an emergency evacuation of the aircraft is unknown. Because the fire rescue equipment was further down the runway it took extra time to arrive at the aircraft, which had used the entire length of a 4000 m runway to slow and exit onto a taxiway. The aircraft stopped on the taxiway facing the opposite direction from landing. On arrival at the aircraft the rescue personnel did not immediately attempt to open any of the aircraft doors as the engines on the wing were still running, the remaining 2 engines were shut down 3 minutes and 15 seconds after the aircraft came to a stop. There was no external fire visible at this time, but flames were observed through the windows at the rear of the aircraft. 23 minutes after engine shut down, the R2 door (second door on the right side) was opened by ground personnel, whereupon the aircraft burst into flames, and was consumed by fire. Autopsies were conducted on some of the non-Saudi nationals including the American flight engineer. All had perished from smoke inhalation and not burns which indicated that they had died long before the R2 door was opened.

One final transmission was received after the plane stopped, indicating that the emergency evacuation was about to begin. All of the victims were found in the forward half of the fuselage.

It took 23 minutes from the engine shutdown until the fuselage was accessed. Saudi reports stated that the crew could not get the plug-type doors to open in time. This later proved false as all doors had functional emergency opening devices. It is assumed that most passengers and flight attendants had become incapacitated during the landing roll or would not have attempted to open a door on a moving aircraft. It is known that the aircraft remained pressurized during the landing roll as the cabin pressurization system was on standby and the aircraft was found with both pressurization doors almost completely closed. These pressurization doors should have opened completely on touchdown to depressurize the aircraft. The crew were found still in their flight station seats. The source of the fire in the C3 is unknown.

Aftermath

The investigation revealed that the fire had started in the aft C3 Cargo compartment, the cause of the fire was never determined. The fire was intense enough to burn through the cabin floor, causing passengers seated in that area of the fire to move further forward in the cabin prior to the emergency landing.

Walter Muller, a former chief of the Policy Analysis Division of the Federal Aviation Administration, filed a lawsuit against Lockheed, Saudia, and Trans World Airlines, an American airline that trained Saudi pilots and supervised the Saudi maintenance program. Muller's brother, Jack A. Muller, and his sister in law, Elizabeth S. Muller, died in the fire. Muller's suit stated that Lockheed allowed for "dangerous materials to be incorporated in the fuselage," that there was no vent system to distribute the gases away from the passengers, and that a sufficient oxygen system did not exist. Muller's suit accused Saudia of not properly maintaining the aircraft and providing safety for passengers and accused TWA of not properly maintaining the Saudia aircraft and not properly training crew.

After the event, the airline revised the emergency procedures and training. Lockheed also removed the insulation from above the rear cargo area, and added glass laminate structural reinforcement.

The National Transportation Safety Board recommended that aircraft use halomethane extinguishers instead of traditional hand-held fire extinguishers.

See also

• Swissair Flight 111
• Air Canada Flight 797
• ValuJet Flight 592
• China Airlines Flight 120
• Varig Flight 820
• South African Airways Flight 295
• List of accidents and incidents on commercial airliners

External links

External images
	Airliners.Net Picture of Saudia 163

• Final Accident Report - General Authority of Civil Aviation
• Picture at PlaneCrashInfo.Com
• Cockpit voice recorder transcript
• AirDisaster.Com Description (Main Database)
• PlaneCrashInfo.Com article on Saudia 163
• Busby, Michael, Death of an Airliner: The Appalling Truth About Saudia Airlines Flight 163, 2010.
• Witkin, Richard. "Fire on Saudi Plane Believed to Have Started in Cabin; Cockpit Escape Hatch Not Used." The New York Times. 21 August 1980. A1.