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The group attribution error is an attribution bias analogous to the fundamental attribution error in that it refers to people's tendency to believe either (1) that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole, or (2) that a group's decision outcome must reflect the preferences of individual group members, even when information is available suggesting otherwise. The fundamental attribution error is similar in that it refers to the tendency to believe that an individual's actions are representative of the individual's preferences, even when available information suggests that the actions were caused by outside forces.

Type I

To demonstrate the first form of group attribution error, research participants are typically given case studies about individuals who are members of defined groups (such as members of a particular occupation, nationality, or ethnicity), and then take surveys to determine their views of the groups as a whole. Often the participants may be broken up into separate test groups, some of which are given statistics about the group that directly contradict what they were presented in the case study. Others may even be told directly that the individual in the case study was atypical for the group as a whole. Researchers use the surveys to determine to what extent the participants allowed their views of the individual in the case study to influence their views of the group as a whole and also take note of how effective the statistics were in deterring this group attribution error. Ruth Hamill, Richard E. Nisbett, and Timothy DeCamp Wilson were the first to study this form of group attribution error in detail in their 1980 paper Insensitivity to Sample Bias: Generalizing From Atypical Cases. In their study, the researchers provided participants with a case study about an individual welfare recipient. Half of the participants were given statistics showing that the individual was typical for a welfare recipient and had been on the program for the typical amount of time, while the other half of participants were given statistics showing that the welfare recipient had been on the program much longer than normal. The results of the study revealed that participants did indeed draw extremely negative opinions of all welfare recipients as a result of the case study. It was also found that the differences in statistics provided to the two groups had trivial to no effect on the level of group attribution error [1].

Type II

To demonstrate the second form of group attribution error, researchers typically give participants three pieces of information about a group's decision: (1) the percentage of group members in favor of a particular group decision outcome, (2) the decision rule used by the group to convert that percentage into an outcome, and (3) the final group decision outcome itself. The researchers usually hold the percentage of group support for the outcome constant and vary the decision rule to produce different outcomes. For example, all participants might be informed that 57% of a group favors a presidential candidate, but some participants are told that the decision rule used by the group is simple majority rule while other participants are told that the decision rule is two-thirds majority. Thus, participants in the majority rule condition learn that the candidate is successfully elected (because 57% is greater than 50%) whereas participants in the two-thirds rule condition learn that the candidate has failed to be elected (because 57% is less than 67%). All participants are then asked to infer the group's opinions about the candidate. The results typically show that participants are more likely to infer that the group supports the candidate in the successfully elected condition than in the failure to elect condition, even though in both conditions support for the candidate is identical (57%).

The second form of group attribution error was first reported by Scott Allison and David Messick in 1985. In their study the researchers did multiple experiments presenting participants with group decisions made on the national, state, and local levels. Participants were presented with situations in which a matter of public policy was determined by a single leader with no popular vote, a popular vote of over 90% of the population, and a popular vote which included approximately 50% of the population. If no group attribution error were present, the participants would be expected to conclude that in the 90% vote the views of the individuals were reflective of the group decision, in the 50% vote they may or may not be, and in the leader decision there is no evidence that the individual views reflect the group outcome. Allison and Messick discovered instead, however, that the participants associated the individual views with the group outcome in all three cases, clear evidence of group attribution error [2].

Limiting Group Attribution Error

Follow-up research by Leila Worth and others attempted to identify the limits of the effect. These studies have shown that the error becomes stronger in perceptions of groups that are viewed as (a) more dissimilar to one's own group, (b) more monolithic, and (c) adversarial to one's own group. The error tends to disappear in perceptions of one's own group. Group members are more likely to attribute the decisions of their own group to structural constraints placed on the group, such as its decision rules, whereas members tend to attribute the decisions of another group to its members' attitudes. This tendency to draw different conclusions between in-groups and out-groups reflects a connection between group attribution error and ultimate attribution error. Additional research on the group attribution error, conducted by Diane Mackie and Scott Allison, has shown its consequences for making erroneous judgments about changes in group attitudes over time.

See also

• Fundamental attribution error
• Ultimate attribution error
• Ingroup bias
• Attribution theory
• Attribution bias
• List of cognitive biases
• Outgroup homogeneity bias
• Outcome bias

References

• [1] Hamill, Nisbett, & Wilson (1980). Insensitivity to Sample Bias: Generalizing From Atypical Cases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 39, No. 4, 578-589.
• [2] Allison, S. T. & Messick, D. M. (1985). The group attribution error. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21, 563-579

Further reading

• Allison, S. T., Mackie, D. M., & Messick, D. M. (1996). Outcome biases in social perception: Implications for dispositional inference, attitude change, stereotyping, and social behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 28, 53-94
• Mackie, D. M., & Allison, S. T. (1987). Group attribution errors and the illusion of group attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 460-480
• Worth, L. T., Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1987). Impact of a group's decision on perceptions of one's own and others' attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 673-683.

Category:Cognitive biases Category:Attitude attribution Category:Group processes