Ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan

This article focuses on ethnic minorities in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Demographics

According to the 1999 census, ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan represent 10% of the population, including Lezgins (the largest minority group, making up 2.2% of the population), Russians (1.8%), Armenians (1.5%), and others, such as Talysh, Tats (Muslims and Judeo-Tats), Avars, Georgians, and Ashkenazi Jews, which comprise the remaining 3.9% .

However according to Prof. Svante, Cornell:

In Azerbaijan, the Azeri presently make up over 90 per cent; Dagestani peoples form over 3 per cent, and Russians 2.5 per cent. 6 These figures approximate the official position; however, in reality the size of the Dagestani Lezgin community in Azerbaijan is unknown, officially put at 200,000 but according to Lezgin sources substantially larger. The Kurdish population is also substantial, according to some sources over 10 per cent of the population; in the south there is a substantial community of the Iranian ethnic group, of Talysh, possibly some 200,000 –400,000 people.

Background

According to Professor Douglass Blum:

Finally, Azerbaijan presents a somewhat more ambiguous picture. It boasts a well-established official national identity associated with claims of a unique heritage based on an improbable blend of Turkism, Zoroastrianism, moderate Islam, and its historical function as 'bridge' between Asia and Europe along the Silk Road. At the same time there remain strong local allegiances and ethnic distinctions, including submerged tensions between Azeris, Russians, and also Lezgins and Talysh (besides Armenians), as well as stubborn religious cleavages (roughly two thirds of the Islamic population is Shi'ite one third Sunni). This persistence of parochialism is hardly surprising inasmuch as there has been little historical basis for national identity formation among Azeri elites, who were significantly affected by russification and are still generally lukewarm in their expressions of pan-Turkism. Perhaps the most powerful source of social cohesion and stale legitimacy is the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which has at least generated some degree of collective identity as victim of Armenian aggression perhaps a slender reed on which to construct a national identity conducive to developmental state building in the future.

Linguistic rights

Article 21 ("State Language") of Section II of the Constitution of Azerbaijan states :

*I. The Azerbaijani language shall be the State language of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

• II. The Republic of Azerbaijan shall ensure the development of the Azerbaijani language.
• III. The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the free use and development of other languages spoken by the population.

Furthermore, Article 45 ("The Right to Use Native Language") of Section III of the Constitution of Azerbaijan states :

*I. Every Person shall have the right to use Native language. Everyone shall have the right to be raised and get an education, be engaged in creative activities in Native Language.

• II. No one can be deprived of the right to use Native Language.

According to the 2007 report by the Council of Europe's Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) :

The languages of national minorities living in Azerbaijan are taught in public schools in regions where these minorities live compactly. In general, two hours a week are devoted to teaching minority languages from the first to the fourth grade. Apart from a great number of Russian schools, especially in the capital city of Baku, there are also some Georgian and Jewish schools in Azerbaijan. ECRI notes that the Azerbaijani authorities have recently made efforts in order to improve the quality of teaching of several minority languages, including Lezgin and Talysh. They have published textbooks in these languages to replace old or foreign textbooks which were not appropriate. However, according to several sources, the textbooks for learning other minority languages such as Tat and Avar are still unsuitable. In addition, there are too few teachers for these minority languages, and the teachers are poorly trained. The Azerbaijani authorities have stated that the Ministry of Education is taking measures to improve the situation with regard to these issues.

General representation in public and political life

According to the Resolution on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities issued by the Council of Europe in 2004:

Azerbaijan has made particularly commendable efforts in opening up the personal scope of application of the Framework Convention to a wide range of minorities. In Azerbaijan, the importance of the protection and promotion of cultures of national minorities is recognised and the long history of cultural diversity of the country is largely valued;

- The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its consequences have considerably hampered efforts to implement the Framework Convention. Despite the general spirit of tolerance in Azerbaijan, the continued occupation of large parts of Azerbaijani territory and the displacement of a high number of people have caused tensions which have resulted in disconcerting manifestations of intolerance. It is to be hoped that a lasting and peaceful solution to the existing conflict will be found and that efforts to that effect will be accelerated. The eventual solution should protect the rights of all persons concerned, in conformity with the territorial integrity of the country and other principles of international law;
- Certain general human rights issues - including concerns as regards freedom of expression and the process of registration of non-governmental organisations - have an impact also on the protection of national minorities and need to be addressed by the authorities as a matter of priority;
- Despite certain positive legislative initiatives, there are a number of shortcomings in the legislation pertaining to the implementation of the Framework Convention. The 2002 Law on the State Language contains regrettable reductions in the legal guarantees relating to the protection of national minorities. These put at risk, for example, certain commendable practices in the field of electronic media. The process of amending the said law should be pursued further with a view to making it compatible with the Framework Convention;
- There is a need to couple the Law on the State Language with improved legal guarantees for the protection of national minorities in such fields as minority language education and use of minority languages in relations with administrative authorities, with a view to consolidating and expanding the positive practices that exist. Priority should be given to the adoption of a new law on the protection of national minorities, providing the necessary guarantees for the implementation of the relevant minority language standards;

- Azerbaijan should consider developing further the consultation structures for representatives of national minorities in order to improve their participation in decision-making.

According to the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the human right's body of the Council of Europe :

ECRI notes the general view that national minorities are well represented in public and political life and particularly in parliament. However, there is currently no specific public body where representatives of national minorities could express their views on the public affairs of interest to them. It has been so since the disappearance of the Council for National Minorities, which was originally set up in 1993 and which does not meet anymore. According to several sources, national minorities generally hesitate to come forward to claim their linguistic and cultural rights, particularly due to the general climate resulting from the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It seems that those who have tried before to publicly defend national minorities' rights have at the least experienced accusations of “working for the enemy” or of “separatism”, for instance by some media or some politicians.

Assimilation

According to the 1998 book “Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe”:

In 1993 there was an attempt officially to restore the Latin script; very few people advocated the Arabic script. Kryzi and Khinalug speakers, as well as most Tsakhurs, are bilingual and tend to assimilate with the Azeris. The same is true of the Tat speakers, and slightly less about the Talysh. At least there is no official recognition, teaching or publishing in these languages in any form. Lezghins in Azerbaijan are struggling very determinedly for their linguistic revival, but with little success. Generally there is a prevailing policy of forceful assimilation of all minorities, including the Talysh, Tat, Kurds and Lezgins. There is little or no resistance to assimilation from the Kryzi, Khinalug, Tsakhurs or Tat, and not much resistance from the Talysh. There are some desperate efforts of resistance from the Udin, stubborn resistance from the Kurds, and an extremely active struggle from the Lezgins, who want to separate Lezgin populated districts both from Dagestan and Azerbaijan in order to create an autonomous republic with Lezgin as the state language.

The information, however, is outdated, and from a period of violent break-up of the Soviet Union, when a total collapse of economy and war, were the cause of hardship. According to CNN analysis, "The fragmentation led to stupendous amounts of economic and cultural losses, not to mention millions of ethnic refugees. Previous calamities on a similar scope happened in Europe only as a result of the two world wars."

The Russian expert on the nationalities issue, Valery Tishkov, stated that Azerbaijan is one of the biggest assimilators of the former Soviet republics, the other two being Georgia and Uzbekistan .

However, this information should be treated cautiously, as the countries named, all part of the GUUAM bloc, were viewed as anti-Russian in that period. Notable omissions are Armenia, which is the most monoethnic republic of the former USSR with 99% of population being ethnically Armenian.

Armenians

Most of the Armenians in Azerbaijan currently live in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, there are still 30,000 Armenians residing in the rest of Azerbaijan, primarily in Baku. Armenians in Azerbaijan are at a high risk as long as Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unsettled .

Azerbaijan SSR

During Soviet rule, the question of Karabakh festered for Armenians. The Armenians of Karabakh made claims of economic neglect, charging that Azeri authorities with under-investment in the region in an attempt to keep it impoverished. In addition, Baku placed restrictions on cultural ties with Armenia. Tensions rose in the early 1960s, and in 1968 clashes erupted between Armenians and Azeris in Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh). The Armenians feared that the Armenian character of Karabakh would disappear as it had in Nakhichevan over the decades, where the Armenian population had disappeared and all of the Armenian monuments were systematically removed and reportedly destroyed by the Azerbaijani authorities. In 1979, Nagorno-Karabakh had a 74% Armenian majority but received no Armenian television broadcasts and had no Armenian institution of higher learning

According to Thomas De Wall:

By 1979, the Armenians of Nakhicvhevan had declined to a level of 1 percent of the population, or three thousand people. The Karabakh Armenians used the example of slow “de-Armenization” of Nakhichevan in the courrse of the twentieth century as an example what they feared would happen to them.

However, some other evidences suggest that the Armenians lived in better conditions in Nagorno-Karabakh than Azerbaijanis. According to Yamskov,

In Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, the social status of the Armenians in the enclave was higher than that of the Azeris inside and outside the territory.

The Soviet laws ensured that in Nagorno-Karabakh "party and state organs were staffed primarily by Armenians who not only ensured Armenian cultural autonomy with Armenian-language newspapers, schools, and arts but strengthened it"

1991 to present

See also: Nagorno-Karabakh War

War soon broke out over Nagorno Karabakh and ended in 1994 with the Armenian separatists gaining control over the territory. Turkic nationalism is the leading force in Baku and has undoubtedly contributed to the conflict with the Armenians given the historical enmity between Armenians and Turkey. All the major human rights monitors agreed that the status of Armenians, those married to or those who associate with Armenians, and those who are perceived to be sympathetic to Armenians, is extremely grave. There has also been numerous acts of vandalism against the Armenian Apostolic Church throughout Azerbaijan. Armenians within Azerbaijan at the time complained that they were subject to human rights violations, harassment, and terrorization. Armenians and part Armenians living in Azerbaijan were reported as being refused permission to leave the country. They have also reported that the Department of Visas and Registrations took them off of the list of residents.

A 1993 report from the American Embassy in Baku noted:

…those of mixed marriages cannot look to emigrate to Armenia since Azerbaijanis believe that they will be discriminated against just as Armenians are here, and because Yerevan Armenians [ethnic Armenians from Armenia] are openly hostile to Baku Armenians [ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan], and most Azerbaijani Armenians have no ties to Russia.

According to a 1993 Department of Justice report:

It is clear that Armenians are the target of violence from societal forces and that the Azerbaijani government is unable or in some instances unwilling to control the violence or acts of discrimination and harassment. Some sectors of the government, such as the Department of Visas and Registrations mentioned above, appear unwilling to enforce the governments stated policy on minorities. As long as the Armenian-Azeri conflict over the fate of Karabakh continues, and possibly long after a settlement is reached, Armenian inhabitants of Azerbaijan will have no gaurantees of physical safety.

From 1998 till present, Armenia has been accusing Azerbaijan of destroying the cemetery of Armenian khachkars in Julfa. The most recent allegations were based on the video of allegedly Azerbaijani soldiers, allegedly shot in Julfa by an Armenians accross the border in Iran. In 2006, Azerbaijan barred European Parliament members from investigating the claims, charging them with a "biased and hysterical approach" to the issue and stating that it would only accept a delegation if it visited Armenian-controlled territory as well . Azerbaijan has similarly accused Armenia of destruction of cultural monuments in Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan .

Kurds

There were some 41,000 Kurds residing in Azerbaijan during the Soviet era . Local Kurds had always been on good terms with the Azerbaijani majority, a Kurdish radio station, newspaper and numerous schools attempt to keep Kurdish culture alive, but fewer families bother to teach their mother tongue .

According to Thomas de Waal:

Smaller indigenous Caucasian nationalities, such as Kurds, also complained of assimilation. In the 1920s, Azerbaijan's Kurds had had their own region, known as Red Kurdistan, to the west of Nagorny Karabakh; in 1930, it was abolished and most Kurds were progressively recategorized as "Azerbaijani." A Kurdish leader estimates that there are currently as many as 200,000 Kurds in Azerbaijan, but official statistics record only about 12,000.

The geographical areas of concentration of Kurds (Muslim) in Azerbaijan were Kelbajar, Lachin, Qubadli and Zangilan districts, sandwiched between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. In the course of Nagorno-Karabakh War, these regions came under occupation by the Armenian forces . As a result, Kurds along with the entire Azerbaijani population of these regions were forcefully displaced to other parts of Azerbaijan .

Talysh

According to a 1926 census, there were 77,039 in Azerbaijan SSR. From 1959 to 1989, the Talysh were not included as a separate ethnic group in any census, but rather they were included as part of the Turkic-speaking Azerbaijani's, although the Talysh speak an Iranian language. In 1999, the Azerbaijani government claimed there were only 76,800 Talysh in Azerbaijan, but this is believed to be an under-representation given the problems with registering as a Talysh. Some claim that the population of the Talysh inhabiting the southern regions of Azerbaijan is 500,000.

According to the Talysh Cultural Center in Lenkoran, 60% of Masalli is Talysh, only two villages in Lenkoran are Turkic, Astara is entirely Talysh, and in Lerik only two villages are Turkic.

Obtaining accurate statistics is difficult, due to the unavailability of reliable sources, intermarriage, and the decline of the Talysh language. Although oppressed by poverty, unemployment, lack of basic infrastructures such as electricity, the Talysh have a high birth rate and thus their proportion of the Azerbaijani population will grow. These issues, combined with the fear of repression and associations of colluding with Armenia, many Talysh assert their ethnic identity or nationalism.

In Azerbaijan SSR

The Talysh identity was strongly suppressed during Soviet times. In the early Soviet period, there were Talysh medium schools, a newspaper called "Red Talysh", and several Talysh language books published, but by end of the 1930's these schools were closed and the Talysh identity was not acknowledged in official statistics, with the Talysh being classified as "Azerbaijani".

From 1991 to present

Historical repression of identity and the inability to practice their culture and language has led the Talysh to an internalized self repression. This makes it hard to gauge support for any type of Talysh movement. According to Hema Kotecha, many Talysh fear being associated with the separatist Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic, with Russia, or with Armenia if they acknowledged or attempted to talk about their beliefs in the public sphere. One instance of current repression was when a school in Lerik wanted to invite a poet from Lenkoran to have a party in his honor and for him to speak to Children; the headmaster was told that he would be dismessed if the event went ahead. The fear of the police is also another factor to this silence, although support for a secular democracy and shared Azerbaijani-Talysh feelings towards Nagorno-Karabakh contribute as well.

Lezgins

The UNHCR states that Lezgins make up 75% of the populations of the Qusar and Khachmaz regions and that Greater Baku is 15% Lezgin. Official Azerbaijani government statistics state that the Lezgin population is only 2% of the total population of the country, bringing the number to 178,00, however, this figure could be up to double. Arif Yunus suggests that the figure is closer to 250,000-260,000, while some Lezgin nationalists claim that they number more than 700,000. Qusar town is approximately 90 to 95% Lezgin according to the local NGO Helsinki Committee office.

According to the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland :

Although many feared that Lezgin demands for the creation of an independent "Lezgistan" would result in another secessionist war in Azerbaijan, these fears have thus far proved to be unwarranted. It currently appears less likely than ever that the Lezgins will resort to any sustained collective action to address their grievances, although isolated incidents do occur. In the past eight years, they have not engaged in any serious protests and only two incidents of violence; they have also shown a willingness to negotiate and compromise on their most intractable demands. The Lezgin nationalist movements do not receive wide support among the Lezgin people who are not well-organized at the grass-roots level

According to Thomas de Waal:

Although there are no discriminatory policies against them on the personal level, the Lezghins* campaign for national-cultural autonomy is vehemently rejected by the Azerbaijani authorities. Daghestani Lezghins fear that the continued existence of their ethnic kin in Azerbaijan as a distinct community is threatened by what they consider Turkic nationalistic policies of forceful assimilation. Inter-ethnic tensions between Lezghins and Azeris spilled over from Azerbaijan to Daghestan also. They started in 1992 when the Popular Front came to power in Azerbaijan, but reached a peak in mid-1994, the time of heavy losses on the Karabakh front. In May that year violent clashes occurred in Derbent (Daghestan), and in June in the Gussary region of Azerbaijan. Since then the situation has stabilised, although Azerbaijani authorities allege a link between Lezghin activists and Karabakh Armenians and a cloud of suspicion surrounds the Lezghin community in Azerbaijan.

According to Svante E. Cornell:

Where as officially the number of Lezgins registered as such in Azerbaijan is around 180,000 the Lezgins claim that the number of Lezgins registerd in Azerbaijan is much higher than this figure, some accounts showing over 700,000 Lezgins in Azerbaijan. These figures are denied by the Azerbaijani government, but in private many Azeris acknowledge the fact that the Lezgins – for that matter the Talysh or the Kurdish-population of Azerbaijan is far higher than the official figures...

For the Lezgins in Azerbaijan, the existence of ethnic kin in Dagestan is of high importance. Nariman Ramazanov, one of the Lezgin political leaders, has argued that whereas the Talysh, Tats, and Kurds of Azerbaijan lost much of their language and ethnic identity, the Lezgins have been able to preserve theirs by their contacts with Dagestan, where there was naturally no policy of Azeri assimilation. …. The Lezgin problem remains one of the most acute and unpredictable of the contemporary Caucasus. This said, the conditions for a peaceful resolution of the conflict are present. No past conflict nor heavy mutual prejudices make management of the conflict impossible; nor has ethnic mobilization taken place to a significant extent. Hence there are no actual obstacles to a de-escalation of the conflict at the popular level. At the political level, however, the militancy of Sadval and the strict position of the Azeri government give cause for worry, and may prevent the settlement of the conflict through a compromise such as a freetrading zone. The Lezgin problem needs to be monitored and followed in closer detail, and its continued volatility is proven by the tension surrounding a recent

Lezgin congress in Dagestan.

Jews

See also: Mountain Jews and Israel-Azerbaijan relations

Foreign Interference

Neighboring countries, Armenia, Iran, and, to a lesser extent, Russia were reported to support separatist sentiments in Azerbaijan.

Armenia

In May 2005, Armenia organized the "First International Conference on Talysh Studies". The event was hosted by the Yerevan State University's Iranian Studies Department and the Yerevan-based Center for Iranian Studies in Armenian resort town of Tsaghkadzor. According to Valdimir Socor :

Almost certainly, some political circles in Armenia were behind this initiative. The conference appeared designed at least in part to resurrect the issue of autonomy for the Talysh ethnic group in Azerbaijan.Such intentions draw inspiration from the would-be "Talysh-Mugan Republic," declared on June 21, 1993, in southeastern Azerbaijan by a group of ethnic Talysh officers under the leadership of Colonel Alikram Gumbatov. Their rebellion was correlated with a massive Armenian offensive on the Karabakh front and seizure of territories deep inside western Azerbaijan by Armenian forces. The Talysh rebels proclaimed the independence of a seven-district area in southeastern Azerbaijan, but did not elicit significant support among their own ethnic group.

In April 1996, Azerbaijan's National Security Ministry claimed that Armenian intelligence recruited and trained Armenian members of the Daghestan-based Lezgin separatist organization "Sadval" who subsequently perpetrated a bomb attack on the Baku metro in March 1994 that killed 14 people .

Iran

According to Hema Kotecha:

In the early years of independence, Iran took a paternalistic approach towards Azerbaijan, there were some ideas of integrating Azerbaijan to Iran and "Iran expected/pretended that Azerbaijan was a very unhappy place"... Stories about pressure put on Tehran by the US through sponsoring its minorities and dissenting groups increases its sense of insecurity and the pressure it puts on Baku not to support the US. Part of Iran’s leverage over Azerbaijan is religious influence over society and at moments of tension local observers say they perceive an increased involvement of "Iranian propaganda", Iran pulling on its strings of influence over people in the south.

Russia

In the northern regions of Azerbaijan, Russia was reported to have linkage with Lezgin separatist movement:

It is frequently stated by the media and many local observers that both Armenia and Russia have interests in maintaining Sadval:the organisation is labelled as a ‘game’ used by Russia, Azerbaijan and internal Dagestani politics...By one of the founders of a Lezgin Democratic Party it was noted that ‘Lezgins have been pro-Russian (like the Armenians) since the 18th century.’ He emphasised that there is no particular leader for the Lezgins who might head a movement and that only outside organisations and people can channel their interests through Lezgins; Sadval have no particular source of financial support other than through external interests.