MiG Alley

Map showing the general location of "MiG Alley."

"MiG Alley" is the name given by U.S. Air Force pilots (probably after the notorious Pigalle area of Paris) to the northwestern portion of North Korea, where the Yalu River empties into the Yellow Sea. During the Korean War, it was the site of numerous dogfights between U.S. fighter jets and those of the Communist forces, particularly the Soviet Union. The F-86 Sabre and the Soviet-built MiG-15 'Fagot' were the aircraft used throughout most of the conflict, with the area's nickname derived from the latter. Because it was the site of the first large-scale jet-vs-jet air battles, MiG Alley is considered the birthplace of jet fighter combat.

MiGs enter the scene

Single-seat MiG-15 version in the markings of the Polish Air Force

The North Koreans began their war against South Korea on June 25, 1950 with a small, obsolescent air force of propeller-driven Soviet aircraft of World War II vintage flown by under-trained and inexperienced pilots. Once the United States committed its air power to the war, this force was rapidly shot out of the skies.

For several months, U.S. F-80 Shooting Star and F-84 Thunderjet fighters, along with B-29 bombers and Navy and Marine aircraft, roamed the skies over North Korea virtually at will while the North Koreans and their Soviet and Communist Chinese backers argued behind the scenes over the best course of counter-action. By October, the Soviet Union had agreed to provide air regiments of state-of-the-art, Soviet-designed and built MiG-15 fighters, along with the trained crews to fly them. Simultaneously, the Kremlin agreed to supply the Chinese and North Koreans with their own MiG-15s, as well as training for their pilots.

Secrecy

For many years, the participation of Soviet aircrews in the Korean War was widely suspected by the United Nations forces, but consistently denied by the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, however, Soviet pilots who participated in the conflict have begun to reveal their role.

Soviet aircraft were adorned with North Korean or Chinese markings and pilots wore either North Korean uniforms or civilian clothes, to disguise their origins. For radio communication, they were given cards with common Korean words for various flying terms spelled out phonetically in Cyrillic characters. These subterfuges did not long survive the fury of air-to-air combat, however, and pilots were soon routinely communicating in Russian.

Soviet MiG-15 regiments were based on Chinese fields in Manchuria, where, according to existing U.S. rules of engagement, they could not be attacked by U.S. forces. Many Soviet regiments underwent preliminary training at Soviet bases in the neighboring Soviet Maritime Military District. Soviet air defense troops also began to arrive along the Yalu, setting up radar installations, ground control centers, searchlights and large numbers of anti-aircraft guns to deter any attacks on the Chinese airfields.

While U.S. pilots chafed at the restrictions imposed on attacking the MiG's Chinese airfields, it wasn't known until many years later that the MiG pilots themselves operated under tight restrictions. To preserve the fiction that Soviet pilots were not fighting in Korea, they were prohibited from flying over non-Communist-controlled territory or within 30 to 50 miles of the Allied front lines. (One Soviet pilot who was shot down in UN-controlled territory shot himself with his pistol rather than be taken captive. Another pilot who bailed out into the Yellow Sea was strafed to prevent him being captured.) Nor could they pursue U.S. aircraft over the U.S.-controlled Yellow Sea.

In spite of the restrictions, many U.S. pilots took advantage of a "hot pursuit" exception to flying over China to pursue MiGs across the Yalu River. Later, "hot pursuit" became active MiG hunting over Manchuria, with U.S. pilots maintaining a "code of silence" about the patrols. Flight leaders chose wingmen who would keep quiet, and many rolls of incriminating gun camera footage "mysteriously" disappeared.

Air combat

F-86 Sabre in flight.

The first USAF contact with MiG-15s occurred on November 8, 1950 with them attacking a flight of P-80 Shooting Star.. The inexperienced Soviet pilots initially showed little interest in pressing their attacks. Nevertheless, U.S. pilots quickly realized they were facing a formidable opponent, and the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, the only USAF unit equipped with the new, swept-wing F-86 Sabre, was rushed to Korea and based at Kimpo Airfield.

The 4th FIW downed the first MiG-15 on Dec. 17, 1950, with six more following five days later. Despite these early successes, however, the 50 Sabres of the 4th FIW were estimated to be facing as many as 400 MiGs. Worse, the performance of the MiG-15 was superior not only to that of the F-80 and the F-84, it even had a few advantages over the F-86, especially at higher altitudes.

Before the spring of 1951, the early MiG pilots had gained experience, but these pilots were students. Suddenly, however, the Soviets changed tactics and sent instructor pilots and veteran fliers. These were expert pilots, veterans of The Great Patriotic War. The air battles that would come to be associated with the name "MiG Alley" could now truly begin.

The mission of the Soviet forces was to defeat (or at least deter) large-scale daylight raids on North Korea by U.S. bombers. In this, the MiGs were largely successful. Even with heavier fighter escorts, B-29 losses mounted throughout the spring and summer of 1951, as the MiG pilots learned how to pick off the lumbering, slow-moving bombers. These efforts climaxed with the disastrous "Black Thursday" battle of October 23, 1951, in which an estimated 100 MiG-15s attacked B-29s and their escorts. Three B-29s were shot down, four crash-landed in South Korea and three more were judged to be beyond repair upon returning to base. After that, daylight bombing raids became a rarity, and even night raids could be deadly. On June 10, 1952, four B-29 crews of the 19th Bomb Group found themselves in Soviet searchlights over Kwaksan in the southern end of MiG Alley. Attacked by 12 MiGs, three bombers went down: one exploded in mid-air, one hit the ground in North Korea and one crash-landed at Kimpo Airfield in the South. MiG-15s also began systematic attacks on jet fighter-bombers, which were the backbone of the U.S. effort to interdict railway operations in North Korea.

Although outnumbered throughout the conflict, the F-86 Sabre pilots enjoyed advantages they learned to exploit to the fullest. Foremost among these advantages was a radar ranging gunsight on their six .50 caliber machine guns, which ensured that even short bursts of fire generally found their target. F-86 pilots were also equipped with G-suits, which prevented pilot blackout in high-speed turning maneuvers. Later variants of the F-86, particularly the "F" model, came very close to duplicating the MiG in speed and performance. Employing these advantages, and learning the MiG's weaknesses, enabled U.S. pilots to have more success over their opponents, at least according to the US sources.

MiG-15 shot down by a F-86 over MiG Alley.

The U.S. pilots however, had the greatest respect for their opponents and quickly dubbed them "honchos." (Japanese for "big shot.") Facing daunting odds day after day bred in U.S. pilots what became known as "flight-suit attitude," or a cocky self-confidence at being able to tackle any task. This outlook was illustrated by Capt. Joseph C. McConnell, the top U.S. ace of the war with 16 kills, when his wingman estimated the two of them were facing as many as 30 MiGs. "Yeah," McConnell replied. "And we've got 'em all to ourselves."

The standard U.S. fighter formation in MiG Alley was the "finger-four," so-called because it resembled the fingers of a right hand as seen from above. The standard four-ship flight was led by a flight leader, typically the most experienced of the four, in the number one, or "middle-finger," position. The leader was covered on his left by his wingman, typically a less-experienced pilot, in the number two, or "index-finger" position. In the number three, or "ring-finger" position, was the element leader, the second-most experienced pilot. In turn, he was covered on the right by his wingman, flying the number four, or "pinkie finger," position. The latter was usually the most junior man in the flight. Perfected by the Luftwaffe in World War II, the "finger-four" gave good mutual support, and by flying in a more spread-out manner, the formation was very maneuverable and provided wider visual coverage. The flight leader and the element leader were the primary "shooters," with the wingmen assigned to keep their eyes open for threats from behind or above.

Although dogfights continued until the armistice of July 27, 1953, the fighting in MiG Alley began to abate that spring, particularly after May. There were several likely reasons for this. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in March, the new Soviet leadership might have been signaling the new Eisenhower administration in Washington of a desire to find a way out of the seemingly endless war.

Legacy

The MiG Alley battles produced many U.S. fighter aces, such as Maj. James Jabara, the first U.S. jet-vs.-jet ace; Capt. Joseph C. McConnell, the top U.S. ace of the war, claiming 16 MiGs, including three on one day. (Hollywood immortalized him with The McConnell Story, starring Alan Ladd and June Allyson); Another was Frederick C. "Boots" Blesse, who claimed 9 MiG-15s in his F-86 Sabre and later wrote "No Guts, No Glory," a manual of air fighter combat that is still studied today.

George Andrew Davis, Jr. became one of the first members of the new Air Force to receive the Medal of Honor while leading a flight in MiG Alley in 1952.

According to other sources, however, the top two fighter aces over MiG Alley were actually MiG-15 Soviet pilots: Nikolay Sutyagin (claiming 21 aircraft) and Yevgeniy Pepelyaev (claiming 19).

Casualties and "kill" totals over MiG Alley remain highly controversial and possibly will always remain so. The Soviets claimed 1,106 United Nations planes of all types shot down by the VVS, including about 650 Sabres. (The USAF only admits to losing less than 200 aircraft in air combat.) The F-86 pilots, in turn, claimed 792 MiG-15s shot down, while B-29 gunners claimed a further 16. These numbers were later reduced to 379 MiGs. The Chinese PLAAF claimed only 85 kills.

Over thirty Sabre pilots were shot down behind enemy lines and their fate has never been definitively established. Surviving pilots, captured and later repatriated after the armistice, reported being interrogated by Koreans, Russians, and Chinese. For years after the Korean War ended in 1953, rumors persist of pilots held captive by the Soviets.

A number of computer video games based on the combat in MiG Alley have been produced.

See also

• List of Korean War air aces
• MiG Alley (game) - flight simulation computer game based on the air combat in MiG Alley

References

• Werrell, Kenneth P. (2005). Sabres over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-933-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Zaloga, Steven J. (1991). "The Russians in MiG Alley: The nationality of the "honcho" pilots is no longer a mystery. The Soviets now admit their part in the Korean War". Air Force Magazine. 74 (2). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |quotes= and |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)

External links

• "Korean War Aces" website.
• "The B-29 in MiG Alley," by Bud Farrell
• "In Korea, We Whipped the Russian Air Force," by Richard K. Kolb, VFW magazine, August 1999.

• The McConnell Story at IMDb
• The Hunters at IMDb