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Coordinates: 60°46′5″N 28°52′43″E / 60.76806°N 28.87861°E / 60.76806; 28.87861 (Battle of Tali-Ihantala)
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The German Foreign Minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop|Ribbentrop]] arrived on June 22 and demanded a guarantee that Finland would fight to the end as a precondition of continued German military support. President Ryti [[Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement|gave this guarantee]] as a personal undertaking.
The German Foreign Minister [[Joachim von Ribbentrop|Ribbentrop]] arrived on June 22 and demanded a guarantee that Finland would fight to the end as a precondition of continued German military support. President Ryti [[Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement|gave this guarantee]] as a personal undertaking.


On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms,<ref name="moisala-58">[[#Moisala|Moisala & Alanen (1988)]] p. 58-59, 66-67</ref><ref name="Lunde-259">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 259-260</ref>the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:<ref>[[#Moisala|Moisala & Alanen (1988)]] p. 66, 134</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Mannerheim |first1=G. |title=Muistelmat, II |language=Finnish |trans_title=Memoirs, II |year=1952 |publisher=Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava |location=Helsinki, Finland |page=450}}</ref> a demand for unconditional surrender<ref name="moisala-58"/><ref name="Lunde-302">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 302</ref>. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.<ref name="Lunde-270">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 270</ref> This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.<ref name=FAW/> The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.<ref>Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944</ref><ref>Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944</ref> Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country.<ref name=Maude>{{cite book|title=Aspects of the Governing of the Finns|last=Maude|first=George|year=2010|publisher=Peter Lang Publishing|location=New York|isbn=978-1-4539-0061-1|pages=149-50}}</ref> In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender.<ref>{{cite book|title=Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 |trans_title=Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Army Corps 1941 - 1944 |last=Vankka |first=Eero |year=1999 |isbn=952-91-0762-5}}</ref> However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.<ref name=Baryshnikov/>
On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms,<ref name="moisala-58">[[#Moisala|Moisala & Alanen (1988)]] p. 58-59, 66-67</ref><ref name="Lunde-259">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 259-260</ref>{{or|date=October 2011}} the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:<ref>[[#Moisala|Moisala & Alanen (1988)]] p. 66, 134</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Mannerheim |first1=G. |title=Muistelmat, II |language=Finnish |trans_title=Memoirs, II |year=1952 |publisher=Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava |location=Helsinki, Finland |page=450}}</ref>{{or|date=October 2011}} a demand for unconditional surrender<ref name="moisala-58"/><ref name="Lunde-302">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 302</ref>. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.<ref name="Lunde-270">[[#Lunde|Lunde (2011)]] p. 270</ref> This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.<ref name=FAW/> The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.<ref>Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944</ref><ref>Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944</ref> Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country.<ref name=Maude>{{cite book|title=Aspects of the Governing of the Finns|last=Maude|first=George|year=2010|publisher=Peter Lang Publishing|location=New York|isbn=978-1-4539-0061-1|pages=149-50}}</ref> In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender.<ref>{{cite book|title=Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944 |trans_title=Engineer Battalion 14: Engineer battaltion of IV Army Corps 1941 - 1944 |last=Vankka |first=Eero |year=1999 |isbn=952-91-0762-5}}</ref> However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.<ref name=Baryshnikov/>


On June 21 Stavka ordered the [[Leningrad Front]] to breach the defensive line and to advance to [[Lake Saimaa]].<ref name=Zolotarev/>
On June 21 Stavka ordered the [[Leningrad Front]] to breach the defensive line and to advance to [[Lake Saimaa]].<ref name=Zolotarev/>
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The cease-fire between the Soviet Union and Finland began at 07:00, September 4, 1944, although for the following 24 hours the Red Army failed to comply with it.<ref>[http://www.kevos4.com/Part%2012%20End%20of%20Hostilities.htm Part 12 End of Hostilities for the Continuation War<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref name="Jakobson" />
The cease-fire between the Soviet Union and Finland began at 07:00, September 4, 1944, although for the following 24 hours the Red Army failed to comply with it.<ref>[http://www.kevos4.com/Part%2012%20End%20of%20Hostilities.htm Part 12 End of Hostilities for the Continuation War<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref name="Jakobson" />


Russian historian Nikolai Baryshnikov argues that such views exaggerate the significance and misrepresent the outcome of the Finnish defensive battles of 1944, including the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Though conquering Finland was not one of the known goals of the Soviet offensive<ref name=Glantz/><ref name=Erickson/><ref name=Baryshnikov/> and there is no solid documentary evidence, like military orders, that the Soviet high command intended to advance to Helsinki and occupy the country<ref name=Baryshnikov2>[[#Baryshnikov2|Baryshnikov (2001)]]</ref> there exist strong evidence that Soviets intended to advance far beyond the borders of 1940.<ref name=Zolotarev/> According to [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky|Marshall Vasilevsky]], already on June 17 it was decided that after taking Viipuri and the Viipuri Bay islands, the offensive would stop at the line Elisenvaara-Imatra-Virojoki, Soviet forces would switch to defense, and the main forces of the Leningrad Front would be concentrated on fighting the German forces in Estonia<ref name=Vasilevsky/><ref name=Baryshnikov/> On June 21 a Stavka order was issued for the Leningrad Front to advance to the line mentioned by Vasilevsky, however it also instructed to then advance further to the line Kouvola-Kotka-Kymi River.<ref name=Zolotarev/> There were no orders to advance further to Helsinki.<ref name=Baryshnikov2/> It is also known that Stalin reminded Marshall Govorov that the goal was Berlin not Helsinki.<ref name=Baryshnikov2/> According to [[Sergei Shtemenko|General Shtemenko]] the goal was to create a threat to Helsinki and other major political and economic centers in Finland, not conquer the country.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> After transferring most of its available forces to the Karelian Isthmus and receiving significant aid from Germany, the Finns managed to slow down and stop the Soviet offensive on the Isthmus before it reached the Finnish border.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> This boosted the morale of the Finnish troops, who were previously constantly retreating.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> According to Baryshnikov, Finnish propaganda soon started talking about a victory, and after the war this claim of achieving a victory in stopping the Soviets from conquering Finland became an official theme in Finnish historiography<ref name=Baryshnikov/> however contrary to Baryshnikov's claim the view of the Finnish victory exists also amongst non-Finnish historians.<ref name="books.google.com">[http://books.google.com/books?id=p58vtOKyVy8C&pg=PA14&dq=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&as_brr=3&cd=2#v=onepage&q=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&f=false Finland at War 1939–45 – Google Books<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref name="Lunde-306"/><ref name="moisala-152"/>
Russian historian Nikolai Baryshnikov argues that such views exaggerate the significance and misrepresent the outcome of the Finnish defensive battles of 1944, including the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Though conquering Finland was not one of the known goals of the Soviet offensive<ref name=Glantz/><ref name=Erickson/><ref name=Baryshnikov/> and there is no solid documentary evidence, like military orders, that the Soviet high command intended to advance to Helsinki and occupy the country<ref name=Baryshnikov2>[[#Baryshnikov2|Baryshnikov (2001)]]</ref> there exist strong evidence that Soviets intended to advance far beyond the borders of 1940.<ref name=Zolotarev/>{{synth|date=October 2011}} According to [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky|Marshall Vasilevsky]], already on June 17 it was decided that after taking Viipuri and the Viipuri Bay islands, the offensive would stop at the line Elisenvaara-Imatra-Virojoki, Soviet forces would switch to defense, and the main forces of the Leningrad Front would be concentrated on fighting the German forces in Estonia<ref name=Vasilevsky/><ref name=Baryshnikov/> On June 21 a Stavka order was issued for the Leningrad Front to advance to the line mentioned by Vasilevsky, however it also instructed to then advance further to the line Kouvola-Kotka-Kymi River.<ref name=Zolotarev/> There were no orders to advance further to Helsinki.<ref name=Baryshnikov2/> It is also known that Stalin reminded Marshall Govorov that the goal was Berlin not Helsinki.<ref name=Baryshnikov2/> According to [[Sergei Shtemenko|General Shtemenko]] the goal was to create a threat to Helsinki and other major political and economic centers in Finland, not conquer the country.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> After transferring most of its available forces to the Karelian Isthmus and receiving significant aid from Germany, the Finns managed to slow down and stop the Soviet offensive on the Isthmus before it reached the Finnish border.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> This boosted the morale of the Finnish troops, who were previously constantly retreating.<ref name=Baryshnikov/> According to Baryshnikov, Finnish propaganda soon started talking about a victory, and after the war this claim of achieving a victory in stopping the Soviets from conquering Finland became an official theme in Finnish historiography<ref name=Baryshnikov/> however contrary to Baryshnikov's claim the view of the Finnish victory exists also amongst non-Finnish historians.<ref name="books.google.com">[http://books.google.com/books?id=p58vtOKyVy8C&pg=PA14&dq=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&as_brr=3&cd=2#v=onepage&q=%22Tali-Ihantala%22&f=false Finland at War 1939–45 – Google Books<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref name="Lunde-306"/><ref name="moisala-152"/>{{or|date=October 2011}}


==Related operations==
==Related operations==

Revision as of 23:10, 28 October 2011

Battle of Tali-Ihantala
Part of the Continuation War

Finnish soldiers marching next to a destroyed Soviet T-34 tank
DateJune 25 to July 9, 1944
Location
60°46′5″N 28°52′43″E / 60.76806°N 28.87861°E / 60.76806; 28.87861 (Battle of Tali-Ihantala)
Karelian Isthmus
Result Finnish defensive victory[1][2][3]
Belligerents
 Finland
 Germany		  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Karl Lennart Oesch
Kurt Kuhlmey		 Leonid Govorov
Dmitry Gusev
Aleksandr Cherepanov
Strength
50,000[4][5] 150,000[6][7][5]
Russian source: 48,000-60,000[8]
Casualties and losses
8,561 killed or wounded [9]
(1,100 killed
1,100 missing
6,300 wounded[5])		 18,000 to 22,000 killed or wounded;
600 tanks,
200 planes lost[10]
According to Finnish sources based on Soviet archives:
21st Army:
estimated 4,500–5,500 killed
13,500–14,500 wounded[11][12][verification needed]
23rd Army:
1458 killed, 288 missing, 6159 wounded[13]

The Battle of Tali-Ihantala (June 25 to July 9, 1944) was part of the Continuation War (1941–1944), which occurred during World War II. The battle was fought between Finnish forces—using war material provided by Germany—and Soviet forces. To date, it is the largest battle in the history of the Nordic countries.[14]

The battle was one of attrition - with the Finns suffering proportionally more casualties than the Soviet forces.[15] It marked a point in the Soviet offensive when the Finnish forces first prevented the Soviets from making any significant gains[15][16] however already earlier at Siiranmäki and Perkjärvi had Finns halted advancing Soviet forces.[17] Finnish forces achieved a defensive victory,[18][19][3] though Russian historian N. Baryshnikov criticizes this as an exaggeration.[16]

After the Soviets had failed to create any breakthroughs in Tali-Ihantala, Viipuri Bay, or Vuosalmi, the Soviet Leningrad Front started the previously planned transfer [20][21][16][22] of troops from the Karelian Isthmus to support Operation Bagration, where they were encountering particularly fierce resistance.[18] Though the Leningrad Front failed to advance into Finland as ordered by the Stavka[22][23][24][25][26] some historians state that the offensive did eventually force Finland from the war.[27][28][29]

Background

Map of the Karelian Isthmus. The River Vuoksi can be seen originating from near the city Imatra.
Parts of Karelia, as they are traditionally divided.
Main article: Continuation War

After the initial Finnish advance of 1941, the Continuation War was stabilized to trench warfare with very little activity on either side. When the Siege of Leningrad was lifted in January 1944, the Stavka received orders to plan an offensive against Finland to push it out of the war.

The Soviet attack on the Finnish front commenced on the Karelian Isthmus on June 9, 1944, (coordinated with the Allied Invasion of Normandy). Three armies were pitted there against the Finns, among them several experienced Guard formations.[5]

The attack soon breached the Finnish front line of defence in Valkeasaari on June 10 and the Finnish forces retreated to their secondary defence line, the VT-line (which ran between Vammelsuu and Taipale). The Soviet attack was supported by a massive artillery barrage, air bombardments and armoured forces.[5]

The VT-line was breached in Sahakylä and Kuuterselkä on June 14 and after a failed counterattack in Kuuterselkä by the Finnish armoured division the Finnish defence had to be pulled back to the VKT-line (Viipuri (sw: Viborg, ru: Vyborg) – Kuparsaari – Taipale).[5]

The abandonment of the VT-line was followed by a week of retreat and delaying battles. The Soviet offensive was crowned when the city of Viipuri was captured by the Soviets on June 20 after only a short battle. Despite the Red Army’s great success in smashing two Finnish defense lines and capturing a substantial piece of territory in just 10 days, it had failed to destroy the Finnish army which was able to concentrate the depleted forces on the VKT-line, as well as to have time to get reinforcements from the other main front north of Lake Ladoga.[5]

Mannerheim, the Finnish commander in chief, had asked for German help on June 12, and on June 16 the Flight detachment Kuhlmey (a composite ad hoc wing of about 70 dive bombers and ground attack fighters, with a fighter and an air transport component) arrived in Finland. A few days later the battalion-sized 303. Assault Gun Brigade and the 122nd Division Greif had also arrived but after that the Germans offered only supplies, among which Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons were the most important.[5]

The German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop arrived on June 22 and demanded a guarantee that Finland would fight to the end as a precondition of continued German military support. President Ryti gave this guarantee as a personal undertaking.

On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms,[30][31][original research?] the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:[32][33][original research?] a demand for unconditional surrender[30][34]. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.[35] This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.[15] The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.[36][37] Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country.[38] In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender.[39] However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.[16]

On June 21 Stavka ordered the Leningrad Front to breach the defensive line and to advance to Lake Saimaa.[20]

Order of battle

Finnish

HQ of the Commander of the Isthmus Forces (Lt. Gen. Karl Lennart Oesch)

German

Soviet

Soviet forces that took part in the battle belonged to the Soviet Leningrad Front under Marshall Leonid Govorov's command. In Tali-Ihantala region, the Soviet 21st Army (Gusev) attacked; the 30th Guards Rifle Corps, 97th, 108th, 109th, and 110th Rifle Corps took part in the battle. These five army corps had together the 45th, 63rd and 64th Guards Rifle Divisions and 46th, 72nd, 90th, 109th, 168th, 178th, 265th, 268th, 286th, 314th, 358th and 372nd Rifle Divisions. The 21st Army did not commit all of its forces simultaneously but instead kept some of the forces in reserve and committed them only after the initially committed formations had spent their offensive capability and required rest and refit. Also at the beginning of the battle some of the Soviet forces that later took part to the battle were deployed on nearby sections of the front like the 108th Rifle Corps with its three divisions being deployed to Viipuri and Viipuri Bay area. Soviet 23rd Army (Tserepanov) attacked on the front immediately east of the 21st Army towards Noskua. It deployed the Soviet 6th Corps which consisted of 13th, 177th and 382nd Rifle Divisions.

The terrain

The Battle of Tali-Ihantala was fought in a small area (100 km²) between the northern tip of the Viipuri Bay and the River Vuoksi around the villages of Tali and Ihantala, 8–14 km north-east from Viipuri.

The Soviet forces were concentrated on the area east of the city of Viipuri, from where the attack started, through the southern village of Tali, northwards to Ihantala (Petrovka). This was the only suitable exit terrain for armoured forces out of the Karelian Isthmus, 10 km wide, broken by small lakes and limited by Saimaa Canal on the west and the River Vuoksi on the east.

Tali: June 25 – June 30

Finnish 7,5 cm Pak 40 antitank gun in action
Finnish StuG III Ausf. G assault guns.
Finnish soldiers in a foxhole. One of the soldiers is holding a Panzerfaust
Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 303 on the move in city of Lappeenranta.
Battle Squadron Kuhlmey´s Stukas returning from mission in Karelian Isthmus in late June 1944.

The fighting in the area began on June 20.

June 20 – June 24

The first days were a defensive battle that the Finnish 18th Division (Finnish 6th and 48th regiment and 28 independent battalion) and 3rd brigade (4 battalions) and the 3rd battalion of the 13 Regiment (Swedish speaking) fought against the Soviet 97th and 109th army corps and 152nd tank brigade. The defenders were hit especially hard by artillery and air attacks, but managed to put up a strong defense that stalled the Soviet advance long enough for Finnish reinforcements to join the battle.[5]

June 25 – June 26

The action of June 25 started at 0630 with a one-hour heavy artillery bombardment and air attack, followed by a major Soviet offensive from Tali village at 0730. The goal of the attack was to reach Imatra-Lappeenranta-Suurpäälä before June 28. The 30th Soviet Guards Army corps had now also joined the battle.

The Soviet army tried a breakthrough along both sides of Lake Leitimojärvi. The attack on the eastern side of the lake was stopped after 3 kilometers by the Finnish 4th Division. On the west side the Soviet infantry of the 45th guards division and the 109th Army Corps got stuck in defensive positions around the hills of Konkkalanvuoret defended by the Finnish regiment JR48. However, Soviet tanks from the 27th Tank Regiment were able to force their way to the Portinhoikka crossroads.

The Soviets also attacked with the 178th Division over the Saarela strait which was defended by Finnish regiment JR6's 1st battalion, but the attack was thrown back here as well. Meanwhile, the Soviets' 97th army corps attacked the Finnish 3rd brigade’s positions but gained little ground. At this stage the situation was very critical for the Finns whose units were at risk of being cut off and surrounded. This would inevitably have led to defeat of the Finnish 4th army corps and the loss of the VKT line.

The Finns were able to organize a counterattack with the reserves of the 18th Division, parts of the 17th Division and some battle groups from the 4th Division. Later that afternoon the Finnish armored division joined the battle and managed to push the Soviet attackers on the west side of the Lake Leitimojärvi back to their starting point. The Soviet 27th Tank Regiment was annihilated except for six tanks that were captured by the Finns.

June 27 – June 30

More Finnish units joined the battle along with the German 303rd Sturmgeschütz brigade. The Finnish units had been spread out and mixed in the battle, which made the organization of a concentrated defence difficult. The Finnish units were therefore reorganized into two battle groups, BG Björkman and BG Puroma. The Soviets also reinforced their forces with the 108th Army Corps. At this stage the Soviet forces included at least one armored brigade, two armored breakthrough regiments and four assault gun regiments.

The Finns tried to regain the initiative by attacking the four Soviet divisions (46th Guard, 63rd Guard, 64th Guard, 268th Division and the 30 Guard Tank Brigade) – who had broken through east of Leitimojärvi – from three directions in order to make a "motti" of the Soviet divisions. The two battle groups, Björkman and Puroma, did manage to advance to within one kilometer of each other but failed to surround the Soviet divisions who had set themselves up into a hedgehog defense around Talinmylly.

The Finnish attack failed because of heavy Soviet resistance especially with massed tanks and artillery and because communication between several of the battalions broke down during the attack. Colonel Puroma said after the war that the one thing he regretted was the failure to make a motti out of Talinmylly. The attack gave the Finnish defenders 72 hours of respite at the same time as the fresh Finnish 6th and 11th divisions reached the battlefield. Several tank battles took place during this fighting.

On June 28, air activity was high on both side as Finnish bombers and German Stukas pounded Soviet formations. The Soviet Air Force also attacked from the air and hit the staff of the Finnish armored division hard with bombers from the 276th Soviet bomber division. On June 28 the Finnish commander Oesch gave the order that the Finnish units should withdraw back to the line of Vakkila-Ihantalajärvi-Kokkoselkä-Noskuanselkä (still within the VKT line), but they became caught up in a new Soviet offensive.

June 29 was the hardest and worst day for the Finns during the whole battle, and defeat was not far off. The Finnish forces finally managed to restore the line on June 29 after very bloody fighting. On June 30 the Finnish forces retreated from Tali. The heaviest fighting took place between July 1 and July 2 when the Finns lost some 800 men per day.[5]

Ihantala: July 1 – July 9

The ensuing Finnish concentration of artillery fire was the heaviest in the country's military history.[40] It was based on the famed fire correction method of Finnish Artillery General Vilho Petter Nenonen, which enabled easy fire correction and quick changes of targets.[5] At the critical Ihantala sector of the battle, the Finnish defenders managed to concentrate their fire to the extent of smashing the advancing Soviet spearhead.[40] The clever fire control system enabled as many as 21 batteries, totaling some 250 guns, to fire at the same target simultaneously in the battle; the fire controller did not need to be aware of the location of individual batteries to guide their fire, which made quick fire concentration and target switching possible. This concentration was considered a world record at the time.[5]

According to Bitva za Leningrad 1941–1944 ("The Battle of Leningrad") edited by Lieutenant General S.P. Platonov:[41]

"The repeated offensive attempts by the Soviet Forces failed ... to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and repuls[ing] all attacks of our troops ... During the offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command issued on June 21."

By this time the Finnish army had concentrated half its artillery in the area, along with the army's only armoured division, with StuG III assault guns as its primary weapon and German 303. Sturmgeschütz Brigade. The defenders now finally had the new German anti-tank weapons that were previously kept in storage.

On July 2 the Finns intercepted a radio message that the Soviet 63rd Division and 30th Armored Brigade were to launch an attack on July 3 at 04:00 hours. The following morning, two minutes before the supposed attack, 40 Finnish and 40 German bombers bombed the Soviet troops, and 250 guns fired a total of 4,000 artillery shells into the area of the Soviets. On the same day, beginning at 06:00, 200 Soviet planes and their infantry attacked the Finnish troops. By 19:00 the Finnish troops had restored their lines.[5]

On July 6 the Soviet forces had some success, despite the Finnish 6th Division having 18 artillery battalions and one heavy battery for their defence. However, the Soviets were thrown back the following day, and their counterattacks at 13:30 and 19:00 that day did not amount to anything. By July 7 the focus of the Soviet attacks was already moving to the area of Vuoksi, and the Soviets now began transferring their best troops to the Narva front in Estonia, to fight the Germans and the Estonians. From July 9, the Soviet troops no longer attempted a break-through. Nevertheless, some fighting continued.[5] Soviet forces were ordered to cease offensive operations and take up defensive positions on July 10 as Stavka redeployed forces to the Baltic fronts, where the Red Army was encountering "fierce German and Baltic resistance."[42]

Losses

Finnish sources estimate that the Soviet army lost about 300 tanks in the Tali-Ihantala,[5] mainly to air attacks and close defence weapons. 120–280 Soviet aircraft were shot down.[5]

The Finnish army reported that 8,561 men were wounded, missing and/or killed in action. According to Finnish historian Ohto Manninen, the Soviets reported their losses as about 18,000–22,000 killed or wounded, based on the daily and 10-day summary casualty reports of the Soviet 21st Army. The uncertainty about casualties rises from the fact that 25% of the forces of the 21st Army didn't participate in the battle.[12] In addition to the losses of the Soviet 21st Army the Soviet 6th Army Corps of the 23rd Army attacking east of 21st Army closer to Vuoksi waterway suffered 7905 casualties, of which 1458 were KIA and 288 MIA, without taking losses of its supporting formations into account.[13]

Impact

The Battle of Tali-Ihantala, along with other Finnish victories (Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944), Battle of Vuosalmi, Battle of Nietjärvi, and Battle of Ilomantsi) achieved during the period, finally convinced the Soviet leadership that conquering Finland was proving difficult, and not worth the cost;[19][43] the battle was possibly the single most important battle fought in the Continuation War, as it largely determined the final outcome of the war, allowing Finland to conclude the war with relatively favorable terms[44][19] and continue its existence as an autonomous and independent nation.[19][45] Finnish researchers state that Soviet sources - like POW interviews - prove that the Soviets intended on advancing all the way to Helsinki.[46] There also existed an order from Stavka to advance far beyond the borders of 1940.[20]

One of the reasons leading to the Soviet failure was that the Finns were able to intercept the Soviet radio messages and to forewarn and prompt the Finnish Army to put up a firmly resolved defense.[14] Also, the existence of the Finnish Salpa Defence Line was an important factor in the peace negotiations in the autumn of 1944.[47]

The cease-fire between the Soviet Union and Finland began at 07:00, September 4, 1944, although for the following 24 hours the Red Army failed to comply with it.[48][44]

Russian historian Nikolai Baryshnikov argues that such views exaggerate the significance and misrepresent the outcome of the Finnish defensive battles of 1944, including the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Though conquering Finland was not one of the known goals of the Soviet offensive[27][28][16] and there is no solid documentary evidence, like military orders, that the Soviet high command intended to advance to Helsinki and occupy the country[49] there exist strong evidence that Soviets intended to advance far beyond the borders of 1940.[20][improper synthesis?] According to Marshall Vasilevsky, already on June 17 it was decided that after taking Viipuri and the Viipuri Bay islands, the offensive would stop at the line Elisenvaara-Imatra-Virojoki, Soviet forces would switch to defense, and the main forces of the Leningrad Front would be concentrated on fighting the German forces in Estonia[21][16] On June 21 a Stavka order was issued for the Leningrad Front to advance to the line mentioned by Vasilevsky, however it also instructed to then advance further to the line Kouvola-Kotka-Kymi River.[20] There were no orders to advance further to Helsinki.[49] It is also known that Stalin reminded Marshall Govorov that the goal was Berlin not Helsinki.[49] According to General Shtemenko the goal was to create a threat to Helsinki and other major political and economic centers in Finland, not conquer the country.[16] After transferring most of its available forces to the Karelian Isthmus and receiving significant aid from Germany, the Finns managed to slow down and stop the Soviet offensive on the Isthmus before it reached the Finnish border.[16] This boosted the morale of the Finnish troops, who were previously constantly retreating.[16] According to Baryshnikov, Finnish propaganda soon started talking about a victory, and after the war this claim of achieving a victory in stopping the Soviets from conquering Finland became an official theme in Finnish historiography[16] however contrary to Baryshnikov's claim the view of the Finnish victory exists also amongst non-Finnish historians.[2][14][22][original research?]

See also: Battle of Tienhaara, Battle of Vyborg Bay (1944), and Battle of Vuosalmi

On June 22, the Soviet forces began a wide-scale push into Eastern Poland and Belorussia.

At the same time, the Soviet 59th Army attacked the islands in the Viipuri Bay from July 4 on, and after several days of fighting forced the vastly outnumbered Finnish forces out from most of the islands[50][16] while suffering heavy losses.[51][50] However, the Soviet attack aimed at crossing the Viipuri Bay was a failure as the Soviet troops were thrown back by the German 122nd Division of the V AK.[50][52]

The Soviet 23rd Army attempted to start the crossing of the River Vuoksi on July 4 at Vuosalmi, but due to the Finnish defense at Äyräpää ridge it was unable to start the crossing before July 9.[53][54] Even with the crossing completed, the Soviet forces consisting of elements from three Soviet divisions were not able to expand the beachhead against the defending Finnish 2nd Division, which was later reinforced.[54][5][53] The unsuccessful Soviet breakthrough attempts continued there until July 21.[53]

In addition to Tali-Ihantala, the Finnish front line held fast at Kivisilta and Tienhaara to the north of the Viipuri Bay.[55][56] There was further heavy fighting on the northeast side of Lake Ladoga, and in the Battle of Ilomantsi the Finns were able to encircle two Soviet divisions, though most of the troops were able to escape.[57][58]

On July 12, the Soviet troops received an order to stop their attempts to advance and to dig in. Soon, the Finnish scouts noticed trains with empty trucks advancing towards Viipuri to take troops away from the Finnish front. They were needed for the great push towards Berlin.[14]

The Finnish government chose to decline further negotiations in late June and did not ask for peace until the Soviet offensive had been stopped and instead used to Ryti-Ribbentropp agreement to strenghten their forces.[29] Only after the Soviet offensive had been stopped on all primary fronts, on July 28 President Ryti was ready to resign and requested with leading social-democrat Väinö Tanner that Mannerheim accept the candidacy for presidency, thus freeing Finland from the Ryti-Ribbentropp agreement, which had only been made as a personal pledge of President Ryti. Finland then could ask the Soviet Union for peace.[29][28]

See also

References

  1. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). p. 14.
  2. ^ a b 500 Days: The War in Eastern Europe ... – Google Books Cite error: The named reference "books.google.com" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  3. ^ a b Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: F-O – Google Books
  4. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). "Finnish forces total about 50,000 men of IV Corps (LtGen Taavetti Laatikainen), with 50 per cent of the nation's entire complement of artillery committed to the battle. The main Finnish assets committed at Tali-Ihantala are the 3rd, 4th, 6th & 18th Divs, the 'Lagus' Armd Div, and the 3rd 'Blue' brigade. The Finnish artillery perform magnificently, and their accurate fire is one of the main factors in the victory." p. 14.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Koskimaa, Matti, Veitsenterällä, 1993, ISBN 951-0-18811-5, WSOY
  6. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). "The main Soviet attacking force is the 21st Army, with a total of 150,000 men in 14 infantry divisions, with tank brigades, artillery, and other heavy support assets." p. 13.
  7. ^ Kantakoski, Pekka (1998). Punaiset panssarit – Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945 (Red tanks – the Red Army's armoured forces 1918–1945) (in Finnish). Hämeenlinna : Ilves-Paino. p. 512. ISBN 951-98057-0-2.
  8. ^ Shigin (2004), p. 270-271, 316
  9. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). p. 14.
  10. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). p. 14.
  11. ^ Archives of Soviet Ministry of Defence, daily casualty reports of 21. Army June 29 – July 10, 1944, 10-day casualty summaries of 21. Army, June–July 1944. Daily reports consists 3,198 KIA, 363 MIA and 13,125 WIA. With the information of 10-day summaries, the casualties of the first four days of the battle could be estimated, which gives total Soviet losses to about 22,000 from which 4,500–5,500 KIA/MIA. According to Soviet military medication statistics from the wounded, about 6% died to their wounds, and those would not be included in the numbers above.
  12. ^ a b Manninen, Ohto, Molotovin cocktail, Hitlerin sateenvarjo, 1994, ISBN 951-37-1495-0, Painatuskeskus
  13. ^ a b Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2008). Jatkosodan puolustustaisteluja 1942-44. Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy. p. 192. ISBN 978-951-593-070-5.
  14. ^ a b c d Lunde (2011) p. 306
  15. ^ a b c Jowett, P., Snodgrass, B. Finland at War 1939-45 Osprey Publishing. 2006.
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Baryshnikov (2006)
  17. ^ Lunde (2011) p.286-287
  18. ^ a b McAteer, S. 500 Days: The War in Eastern Europe, 1944-1945.Dorrance Publishing. 2009/
  19. ^ a b c d Lunde (2011) p. 379
  20. ^ a b c d e Zolotarev (1999), p. 97-98, 368
  21. ^ a b Vasilevsky, Aleksandr (1978). Дело моей жизни (in Russian). Moscow: Politizdat. p. 412. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
  22. ^ a b c Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 152-154
  23. ^ Lehmus K. Tuntematon Mannerheim. Hels., 1967, pp. 179–180
  24. ^ Wirtanen A. Salaiset keskustelut Lahti, 1967, p. 268
  25. ^ Wirtanen A. Poliitiset muistdmat Hels., 1972, p. 27
  26. ^ Seppälä H. Taistelu Leningradista ja Suomi, pp. 272–273
  27. ^ a b Glantz (1998), p. 201-203
  28. ^ a b c Erickson (1993), p. 329-330
  29. ^ a b c Lunde (2011) p. 303-304,309,314
  30. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 58-59, 66-67
  31. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 259-260
  32. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 66, 134
  33. ^ Mannerheim, G. (1952). Muistelmat, II (in Finnish). Helsinki, Finland: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava. p. 450. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
  34. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 302
  35. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 270
  36. ^ Dagens Nyheter, July 3, 1944
  37. ^ Svenska Dagbladet, July 3, 1944
  38. ^ Maude, George (2010). Aspects of the Governing of the Finns. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. pp. 149–50. ISBN 978-1-4539-0061-1.
  39. ^ Vankka, Eero (1999). Pion P 14: IV AK:n pioneeripataljoona 1941 - 1944. ISBN 952-91-0762-5. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
  40. ^ a b Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun historian laitos, Jatkosodan historia 1–6, 1994
  41. ^ Platonov, S.P. (editor) (1964). Битва за Ленинград ("The Battle of Leningrad"). Voenizdat Ministerstva oborony SSSR. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
  42. ^ Jowett & Snodgrass (2006). p. 15.
  43. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 154-155, 258-261
  44. ^ a b Jakobson, Max, Säkerhetspolitik och historia, 2007, ISBN 978-91-7224-061-2, Hjalmarson & Högbergs Bokförlag AB, Essay page 164-177 Avvärjningsegern, defensive victory
  45. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 260
  46. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 85, 152-154
  47. ^ http://www.battlevault.com/Events/Wolfkrieg-09/WK-09%20Player%20List_files/German/Rob_Prince_Hist.pdf
  48. ^ Part 12 End of Hostilities for the Continuation War
  49. ^ a b c Baryshnikov (2001)
  50. ^ a b c Lunde (2011) p. 307
  51. ^ Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2008). Jatkosodan puolustustaisteluja 1942-44. Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy. pp. 204–205. ISBN 978-951-593-070-5.
  52. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 143-147
  53. ^ a b c Lunde (2011) p. 308-309
  54. ^ a b Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 147-152
  55. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 289
  56. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 134
  57. ^ Lunde (2011) p. 299
  58. ^ Moisala & Alanen (1988) p. 127-129

Bibliography

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