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:::::::::give me a chance Bob, I am hoping between meetings at the UN and Manhatten using the iPad between meetings. I think it is a move per Brews above and a redirect to Enactivism. ----[[User:Snowded|<font color="#801818" face="Papyrus">'''Snowded'''</font>]] <small><sup>[[User talk:Snowded#top|<font color="#708090" face="Baskerville">TALK</font>]]</sup></small> 20:55, 25 April 2014 (UTC)
:::::::::give me a chance Bob, I am hoping between meetings at the UN and Manhatten using the iPad between meetings. I think it is a move per Brews above and a redirect to Enactivism. ----[[User:Snowded|<font color="#801818" face="Papyrus">'''Snowded'''</font>]] <small><sup>[[User talk:Snowded#top|<font color="#708090" face="Baskerville">TALK</font>]]</sup></small> 20:55, 25 April 2014 (UTC)
:::::::::Brews, would you mind copying a summary to the AfD page? —[[User talk:Machine Elf 1735|<span style="text-shadow:#00FADE 0.05em 0.05em 0.07em;white-space: nowrap;font-family: Fraktur, Mathematica6, Georgia, sans-serif">Machine Elf <sup style="font-size:75%;font-family: Georgia, sans-serif">1735</sup></span>]] 23:54, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

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Disclaimer

This article is a stub, and needs considerable expansion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:55, 30 March 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Scope and content

A useful article to create, but we need to make sure it does not digress into a coat rack for material that is in other articles - I have removed material that falls into that category. Also at the moment the sources used are a little restrictive and need expanding - I would have done something there this morning but I am away from home and my text books. We also need secondary sources to establish some of the claims in the lede.

Brews - can we please try and avoid a repetition of your normal strategy of immediately reverting changes, you know it will just be reverted in turn. Also there is an opportunity here to build a good article but that will not work if you are not prepared to compromise and insist on your material in its original form. ----Snowded TALK 09:23, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Snowded: Your visit here is such a surprise! An invitation to collaborate is great, and improvement in this article is desirable. How can that be accomplished? I'd suggest that it be attempted by a discussion of contributions based upon sources. In that spirit, you have not provided me with much to go on. But in the section below I'll attempt a beginning. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Social constructivism

The following subsection was deleted by Snowded, and I'd like to discuss it:

Social constructivism

Enaction applies to groups as well as individuals. Social constructivism is the study of an individual's learning that takes place because of their interactions in a group, and the group's experience with its environment. According to Gergen, the social constructionist orientation suggests:[1]

  1. What we take to be knowledge of the world is not a product [simply] of induction, or of the building and testing of hypotheses...How can theoretical categories be induced or derived from observation,...if the process of identifying observational attributes itself relies on one's possessing categories? ... Constructionism asks one to suspend belief that commonly accepted categories or understandings receive their warrant through observation.
  2. The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. From the constructionist position the process of understanding is not automatically driven by the forces of nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons in relationship....[We are invited] to consider the social origins of taken-for-granted assumptions about the mind – such as the bifurcation between reason and emotion, the existence of motives and memories, and the symbol system believed to underlie language.
  3. The degree to which a given form of understanding prevails or is sustained across time is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of the perspective in question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g., communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric)
  4. Descriptions and explanations of the world themselves constitute forms of social action. As such they are intertwined with the full range of other human activities.

An example is the idea of a paradigm as described by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.[2][3] For the scientist a paradigm refers to the sense of the way reality is structured and the means by which the scientist uncovers this reality and is able to manipulate it and predict effects and events. The dissatisfaction of scientists with an existing theory leads to a paradigm shift, and this dissatisfaction is a matter of criteria demanded of an acceptable theory. These criteria are not themselves scientifically established, but describe an 'ideal' theory as seen by the scientific community, criteria such as 'elegance', 'completeness', 'seminality', 'simplicity'.[4][5]

Thus, as the idea of enaction suggests within the context of social constructivism, the development of a paradigm involves the interaction of scientists with their environment and each other, the theoretical treatment of experimental results, and re-engagement in probing the environment on the basis of that theory, sometimes with very sophisticated apparatus. Examples of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, what enaction is about, are the Hadron collider or the Hubble telescope. These activities are accompanied by the evolution and application of theories subject to an aesthetic stemming from social interactions between scientists.[4]

References

  1. ^ Kenneth J Gergen (March 1985). "The social constructionist movement in modern psychology" (PDF). American Psychologist. 40 (3): 266 ff.
  2. ^ Stefano Guzzini (2000). "A reconstruction of constructionism in international relations" (PDF). European Journal of International Relations. 6 (2): 158. One of the main defenders of epistemological constructivism who is also well known in IR [international relations], Thomas Kuhn.
  3. ^ Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press. p. 275. ISBN 978-0691028323. Kuhn had already provided...the general basis for a conception of the social character of science.
  4. ^ a b Thomas Kuhn formally stated the need for the "norms for rational theory choice". One of his discussions is reprinted in Thomas S Kuhn. "Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice". In James Conant, John Haugeland, eds (ed.). The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 208 ff. ISBN 0226457990. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  5. ^ Mark Colyvan (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 78–79. ISBN 0195166612.


Snowded removed this section with the in-line editorial comment "essays on social constructivism are not appropriate to this article, especially OR".

Now, the reasons why Snowded thinks the topic of social constructivism is "not appropriate" and just what in this subsection constitutes a violation of WP:OR has not been identified. Perhaps some further guidance as to what exactly Snowded has in mind could be offered as a beginning point for discussion? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Non-reductive naturalism

Snowded has removed the subsection below on non-reductive naturalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:

Non-reductive naturalism

Reductionism in science is the argument that all events (ultimately) are connected to (possibly yet-to-be-established) primal events by the 'laws of nature' and, in particular, mental events are reducible to neuroscience and brain circuitry.[R 1] In contrast, non-reductive naturalism claims that "mental phenomena cannot be reduced to any particular material object or local process, as for instance neural processing."[R 2] One form of this thesis arises in cultural psychology where mind is viewed as a cultural phenomenon.[R 3]

The enactive approach is constructivist, not reductionist, that is, it is about "the active construction of knowledge through our interaction with the environment"..."Our brains do not indiscriminately and passively crunch up any structure that can be detected in a never ending stream of sensations...Cognition is a lot about discarding irrelevant information and going out to get relevant information...Open-loop approaches restricted to input-output mappings are unable to capture this circular causality and the emergent phenomena it can bring about."[R 2][R 4]

References

  1. ^ Eric R. Kandel (2007). In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind. WW Norton. p. 9. ISBN 0393329372. ...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...
  2. ^ a b Marieke Rohde (2010). "Introduction". Enaction, embodiment, evolutionary robotics: Simulation models for a post-cognitivist science of mind. Atlantis Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-9078677239. Available on line here
  3. ^ Carl Ratner (2011). Macro Cultural Psychology: A Political Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. p. 96. ISBN 0199706298. Culture produces the mind; brain circuitry does not. The mind–body problem of how the physical body/brain produces mental, subjective qualia, is the wrong way to frame the origin of consciousness.
  4. ^ SM Potter (2007). "What do we know about natural intelligence (NI) that can inform artificial intelligence (AI)?". 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence: Essays Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 176 ff. ISBN 3540772952. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)


I hope Snowded will provide some guidance as to his reasoning in removing this subsection. Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I did Brews, but as before if you don't like something you just ignore it. Its not relevant to this entry and aspects of it are OR. Otherwise see TonyClarke comments below. Assume the same response on the other section ----Snowded TALK 06:09, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: The matter is simple: here we have a proposed subsection and an invitation for source-based critique. We don't have to look over your previous protestations that you have already presented suitable discussion. The discussion about this subsection is about this subsection and it is located right here. We aren't looking for abstract commentary about my editing style. We are looking for specific remarks about the material of this subsection. There is nothing here from you whatsoever. Brews ohare (talk) 14:07, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Form of citations

Providing the rationale "in text citations makes article creation a lot easier to handle" Snowded has changed some footnotes to an 'in-text' version <ref>{{cite book |title= |author= |isbn= |url= |publisher= |page= |year=}}</ref>, replacing the less distracting use of the 'in-text' designation <ref name =author/> formatting of the original. I'd say this is an imposition of his personal distaste for the cleaner approach, and as he has not originated this article, I do not think it his prerogative to force his aesthetic upon it. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Accordingly, I have put the references into the original format. Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

In text citations make it easier for other editors as they don't have to do through multiple changes to prevent error messages. Your format is excellent for an article with stable text not undergoing major change. If you want participation and to reduce the temptation to simply do a mass revert you might want to think about changing ----Snowded TALK 05:56, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: There are several pros for the list-defined reference format used in this article. One is that the text in the edit window is clear and uninterrupted by extraneous footnote material that is distracting and can make the text hard to follow. Another advantage to having all the reference material in its own sub-section is that it is easy to find and change references details and to edit footnote commentary by editing only the reference sub-section, and one does not have to search the body text to find where the inserted <ref>...</ref> material is to be found. The only con of this approach is that in adding a reference one has either to open the entire article to gain simultaneous access to the reference subsection and the body text being edited, or to open sequentially the reference subsection to add the source material and the text where the footnote arises.
It is a personal preference, but in my experience it is the list-defined reference approach that works best, and resistance to its use is due primarily to unfamiliarity. Brews ohare (talk) 14:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Secondary sources

Snowded has suggested by additon of {{citation needed}} that secondary sources are needed to establish two points. The leading paragraph identifies these points as follows:

Enaction in the study of philosophy is related to the study of embodied cognition,[citation needed] the notion that mind is not coterminous with the brain or perhaps even an entire organism,1 but goes farther[citation needed] in its emphasis upon the interactions between a living organism and its surroundings.
1Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. ISBN 0262261235.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

The first issue is whether there is any relation between 'enaction' and 'embodied cognition'.

My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.

The second issue is whether 'enaction' places an emphasis upon interaction.

My reaction is that the second point is the very meaning of the term 'enaction'.

In both cases the cited general introduction of the book by Varela, Thompson & Rosch is about as good a secondary source as one is likely to find, being the introduction by three authors to their essays on various topics from a decidedly non-partisan stance that discusses these aspects at length. Accordingly, these templates appear gratuitous here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:40, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Chapter 8 of this source is titled "Enaction: Embodied cognition". It defines enaction at great length on pp. 173-174. The organism itself chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive. Perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment.

Perhaps, Snowded, you have some other sources in mind that would present a more 'objective' view of the subject?? Brews ohare (talk) 17:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

There are many issues here Brews, Embodiment is one thing, enaction and other and yes authors connect them. But in an article on enact ion we summarise those links but we don't create an extended essay on a related subject. You reference is a collection of essays that take a particular perspective it is not a general summary of the field. They use embodiment differently from other authors, some would link it more with scaffolding etc. We have the normal problem here of you finding some material and over relying on that material rather than looking at the field as a whole. If I get time between arriving home on Sunday and shipping out to the States I will check the Cambridge Companion's definition and one other secondary source on the "E"s that I think would be useful. ----Snowded TALK 06:19, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
It will be great to see some source-related commentary from you that goes beyond your claims that the presented sources have a parochial view of the matter, in your opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Agree with Snowded

Brews, you asked me to be involved with this page. I am sorry to have to say that it is now looking like a rerun of many conflicts that have a arisen between you and Snowded, and conflicts without resolution or improvement resulting.

I agree with Snowded on removing the two sections. The last paragraphs in each section are not properly supported with clear citations, and your citations are put in as evidence for your views. But in fact they give only individual comments on the subject, and there are many other views and approaches which should merit a mention. I also agree that both were not strictly relevant to the subject, and I can't understand some of your responses, e.g. ' My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.' What does that mean? It does not address the point being made. Perhaps, taking up the -citation needed- suggestion constructively : ), you should look at some general introductory works on the 'four e's', some of which spell out relationships between embodied cognition, enactive cognitions, extended etc…

Well done for initiating this page, and I wish you well with it. It could be a very useful contribution to this subject. I am happy to contribute to it if there are sensible productive discussions going on, but not at the present.

TonyClarke (talk) 01:55, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I'd appreciate your help. You could begin by framing what you see as a 'sensible productive discussion'. You have suggested the citations provided support the views presented. You suggest other views merit mention, and I encourage you to do that and source them appropriately. Brews ohare (talk) 02:17, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews, for the record the 'many conflicts' are as problematic for me as for you. But you just don't listen. On every article, without exception when other editors have got involved they have not agreed with you, but you persist in arguing your original position rather than listening. As I said I think this is a useful article to create, but you need to be prepared to listen and work with other editors rather than insisting on your original text all the time. ----Snowded TALK 06:24, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: I have objected to nothing said here. What I have done is object that nothing has been said. I await your reasoning about the deletions of the subsections above.
I also await Tony's introduction of the "many other views and approaches which should merit a mention". Brews ohare (talk) 12:25, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage ----Snowded TALK 05:46, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: There has been no source-supported commentary by you or by Tony so far. In fact, so far all we have are statements of personal reservation without specifics as to offending wording or content, never mind sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:01, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews they were pretty specific. Your conclusions for example, like the run-on sentence that includes the Hubble Space Telescope etc... You could probably find cites for that kind of thing but not from a philosophy department.—Machine Elf 1735 15:26, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
MachineElf: It is you that is specific, not Snowded. As for the example of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, obviously what enaction is about, well other examples could be found, if necessary. Whether these examples are apt or not, they do not justify reversion of that subsection. However, I do appreciate your effort to introduce some specificity into the otherwise empty commentary here so far. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Title and subject

One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort. ----Snowded TALK 06:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Bravo. Apparently Gregbard doesn't agree with you and has rated the importance of this article as low.
Perhaps, given your evaluation, you will actually consider contributing to this article?? One way to do that would be to explain your deletion of two subsections above, both well-sourced, both placing enaction in a broad context, and one based upon sources devoted in their entirety to 'enaction'.
The "anti-Cartesian" position is largely a misconception of the entire subject-object problem but it could be represented in the article as the opinion of some. Brews ohare (talk) 12:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
As it stands it is 'low' hence the suggestion below. If you bother to read any of my comments you will see suggestions, including this one as to the nature of content. If you can bother to respond to those with more open language then I might as this is a major area of interest and work for me. However if yu thing its a misconception of subject-object you really are starting in the wrong place. So please respond on the suggestion ----Snowded TALK 05:44, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Any source-supported content suggestion here, as elsewhere, is undetectable. Brews ohare (talk) 13:57, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Editing an encyclopaedia is not about stringing together partially understood quotations out of context however referenced Brews. hen you are prepared to engage on other than your own terms let the rest of us know ----Snowded TALK 22:03, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: Your invention of "stringing together partially understood quotations out of context" lacks credibility because you have given no indication of what makes you think any of the quotations provided are 'partially understood'. And your invention that I am not "prepared to engage on other than [my] own terms" is complete fabrication. It would seem to suggest that I have refused to accept some concrete proposals for changing the original proposal. That is a fabrication, as no proposals for different wording or sourcing have been suggested at all, never mind being rejected. In fact, nothing substantive has been said to support your deletion of any of the subsections, and no attempt has been made to change or discuss their content or their sources. Your attempt at smearing the record and your refusal to participate in content review or sourcing is, well, you fill in the blanks... Brews ohare (talk) 00:15, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
OK, so despite multiple rejections by multiple editors on multiple articles you are not prepared to change, Pity (two meanings) ----Snowded TALK 06:58, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Change what? The proposed subsections? Sure. Go ahead and suggest some specific changes in wording or some new material or some new sources. Without some concrete proposals for change, your remarks reduce to personal attacks violating WP:CIVIL. Brews ohare (talk) 14:07, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You behaviour Brews, try and engage with discussion rather than just telling people they are wrong and insisting on your manner of editing being the only valid one. And your referencing WP:Civil somewhat takes the biscuit----Snowded TALK 22:15, 5 April 2014 (UTC)![reply]
Snowded: I just don't know where you are coming from. I have 'insisted upon' absolutely nothing. My manner of editing may indeed be "the only valid one", just because nobody else has edited at all, except for yourself. You have simply deleted three subsections without any discussion of sources or content on the basis simply that you don't think they are satisfactory. That is not a valid manner of editing - it's just assertion of your own desires. You are living in some other universe than this talk page and this article. Brews ohare (talk) 00:40, 6 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Removal of another pertinent and reliably sourced subsection

Snowded has removed the subsection below on internalism & externalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:

Internalism and externalism

Proponents of enaction consider its emphasis upon interaction with the external environment to be in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the internal operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world, the rules and representations approach to cognition.[S 1] The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity. However, the role of the subject, the individuation, of this activity might be underestimated.[S 2][S 3]

The interactivity between the organism and the environment emphasized by extended cognition impinges on the deeper philosophical questions of the subject-object problem, that is the partition of experience between subject and object.[S 2] At one extreme, our interior mental processes are dictated by interaction with the external world, and at the other extreme, they are creations of our conscious and subconscious brain activity. "Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way. Internalism (or individualism) denies this, and it affirms that having those intentional mental states depends solely on our intrinsic properties."[S 3]

Sources

  1. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
  2. ^ a b Basil Smith. "Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. ^ a b Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)


Snowded removed this material with the in-line comment: restrict to material directly related to the top (holding action there may be more if we agree scope on talk ). On this Talk page he has added the remark: "You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage"

What is omitted from Snowded's words is any clarification of his reasons for removal of this subsection, or the other two that he has removed in earlier efforts. My invitations to supply reasons and sources so far has resulted only in Snowded's personal peremptory opinions and his avoidance of all source-related commentary, suggesting that he "has already done enough". Enough what? Tony has also been invited without result to provide some substance to flesh out what he feels is an incomplete presentation.

However, Snowded takes things further than Tony by removing the presentation of these subtopics entirely, and without rationale. Brews ohare (talk) 13:54, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Why wouldn't this be a WP:SUMMARY of the Internalism and externalism article?—Machine Elf 1735 15:42, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
As the second paragraph suggests, it is the pertinence of this topic to enaction that is the purpose of this section. Feel free to improve upon it. Brews ohare (talk) 17:05, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You are doing what you always do Brews, take one article and use it for extended essays on any subject that you find to be linked, You also confuse sourcing with relevance, they are not the same thing, ----Snowded TALK 06:56, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: Evidence, please? Not about your blanket assertions of my "doing what I always do", but evidence that the topic here is not pertinent, preferably by using sources, not your unsupported notions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:01, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Contribution to Citizendium

Finding no useful commentary here, and instead unsupported and peremptory reversion, I've decided to present this material on Citizendium where it can be found as Extended cognition. Brews ohare (talk) 15:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Agree with removal

Brews: I agree with Snowded's removal of internalism/ externalism. People wanting to know about enactivism(philosophy) could maybe benefit form a link to internalism/externalism, to which this is related, but writing about it here would lose the focus on this important area. The article loses its strength and relevance by this divergent development.

I also think, Brews that you do use sources to back up what you say, which verges on OR. Instead we should be talking about the sources, as balanced pictures of the subject, and specify as closely as possible what they say.

You also said I haven't tried to improve the article. I think I made my point earlier about why I don't intend to get involved in editing this article. I would have to engage in drastic reversions and cuts, and Snowded is already doing this. I don't have any knowledge or allegiance to either of you, but I really think you need to listen to what is being said and try to focus your writing, after surveying the relevant literature.

I wish you well in your future writing.

TonyClarke (talk) 23:13, 5 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Tony: I am confused why you think using sources to back up what is said constitutes OR. It sounds like the opposite to me: it is reporting what the sources say. I am not saying anything based upon my personal opinion; I'm just pointing out sources containing discussion that bears upon enaction. If you think they are a diversion from enaction, as you have mentioned here regarding internalism/externalism, then I guess the relevant policy is WP:Undue.
I think you don't want to engage here because you think the atmosphere is toxic. However, if you look closely you will see all that is going on is that I am trying to get Snowded to explain his actions, as you have tried to do for him. However, he will not do that, and he will not address sources.
I suggest that you try engaging and see whether interaction with me is as bad as Snowded would have you think. You will be surprised. Brews ohare (talk) 00:49, 6 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Enaction?

Is there any reliable source that uses the term "enaction" for the topic of this article? --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:58, 6 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Bob: Reference 2; Stewart et al. Might be what you want. Brews ohare (talk) 19:33, 6 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks. I see the book is, Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Looks fine. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:36, 6 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Scaffolding

Scaffolding is a topic name-dropped without explanation on several occasions by Snowded. To accommodate him, this subsection was contributed. However, Snowded has removed this subsection with the in-line comment: You are just inserting material without context. Lets agree what this article is about first shall we. The subsection is below:

Scaffolding

The term scaffolding in connection with mind refers to the dependence of more complicated functionality upon simpler functionality that serves as a 'scaffold' to build and develop the more complex activity. In developmental psychology one application of scaffolding is the idea that early life experiences significantly shape the adult’s understanding.[N 1] More broadly, the term has been introduced to describe a "broad class of physical, cognitive and social augmentations -- augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal which would otherwise be beyond us".[N 2]

In the context of enaction, scaffolding refers to cognition-enhancing tools that extend mental processes into the environment and modulate or even enable interaction with that environment in the processes of cognition. A simple example is the use of a cane by a blind man, "stick-augmented perception".[N 3] From this standpoint, "what individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a mind, but the ability to develop a mind," a "matrix of resources that serve as the actual physical causes of development."[N 4] The development of mind is seen as a dynamical process involving interaction with the environment.

According to Thelan (as quoted by Griffiths and Stotz):[N 5]

"behavior and cognition, and their changes during ontogeny [development] are not represented anywhere in the system beforehand either as dedicated structures, or symbols in the brain, or as codes in the genes. Rather, thought and behavior are "softly assembled" as dynamical patterns of activity that arise as a function of the intended task at hand and an individual's "intrinsic dynamics" [by which is meant] the preferred states of the system given its current architecture and previous history of activity."

Notes

  1. ^ Lawrence E Williams, Julie Y Huang, John A Baruch (2009). "The scaffolded mind: Higher mental processes are grounded in early experience of the physical world" (PDF). European Journal of Social Psychology. 39 (7): 1257–1267.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Andy Clark (1998). "Chapter 8: Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation". In Peter Carruthers, Jill Boucher (ed.). Language and thought: Interdisciplinary themes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 162–183. ISBN 978-0521637589.
  3. ^ Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind : Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press. p. 31. ISBN 978-0199715534.
  4. ^ PE Griffiths and K Stotz (2000). "How the mind grows: a developmental perspective on the biology of cognition" (PDF). Synthese. 122 (1–2): 29–51.
  5. ^ Esther Thelen (1995)). "Chapter 3: Time-scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition". In Robert F Port, Timothy van Gelder, eds (ed.). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. MIT Press. pp. 69–100. ISBN 0-262-16150-8. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) CS1 maint: year (link)


Snowded suggests: "Let's agree what this article is about first, shall we?" Snowded indicated a while back that he was about to participate with this article, but so far no such discussion has taken place, and it remains to be seen whether Snowded has a real intention. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 7 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

This deleted subsection is one of four sourced subsections (1, 2, 3 & 4) that Snowded has deleted from the article without any concrete discussion of content or sourcing. Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 7 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Title and range

OK lets try again. I will repeat my relier statement with some additions, hopefully we can get some engagement

Original comment

One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort.

Additional points

I think the value of an article is to summarise the cartesian/non-cartesian split but in other language. Basically we have the view of the brain as directing activity (with lots of consequences for free will etc) and against that the ideas of extended consciousness (which might be a better title than extended cognition). That has multiple sources and we need to start with a secondary source that summarises the positions, the current one is a bit partial and over focused on the environment.

Leslie Paul Thiele is a good starting point. He characterises Cartesian approaches as seeing cognitive psychology as being responsible for working out the abstract programs that the brain (as a computational device) runs with cognitive neuroscience studying how they are implemented. He contrasts that with post-cartesian approaches which include:

  • Embodied: extra-neural
  • Embedded: scaffolding
  • Enacted: co-evolve with reality
  • Extended: into the environment

He further expands on that (from memory there are some other "E"s and he also is good on the autonomic v novelty receptive receptive parts of the brain. Pattern recognition and partial scanning then also come in. My suggestion would be that Extended Consiousness is the better name and Thiele the starting point. He references the sources used by Brews. He is also a philosopher. ----Snowded TALK 07:13, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Glad to see some content proposals. The author Leslei Paul Thiele has written several books. You haven't mentioned just what you refer to. One of these is The Heart of Judgment, which has rather little to say about "Cartesian approaches". It seems oriented toward decision making, and doesn't mention the four points you have bulleted. A number of others are about sustainability issues, which seem wide of the subject. Could you be more specific?
In contrast with Thiele, Rowlands does discuss the issues you raise, as already cited in the original proposal for this article, so perhaps you have simply identified the wrong author? Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Thiele's Heart of Judgement makes the Cartesian point and the phrases above are summary quotes from that book. It was published in 2006 and while Rowlands book is later (2010) I think Thiele provides a better overview. The origin of the "4es" is not clear from either source and Thiele (from memory I have both books with extensive notes at home and read them the year they came out in each case) references a broader range of primary sources. I think we need to resolve what this article is about as enaction may merit its own article, or be better referenced in the existing non-philosophy ones with one on the whole "4es" being a new article. You jumped the gun there creating that new article and simply slotting in the OR material on Social Constructivism etc. So for the moment that is a stub article. I suggest we resolve the issue of title and scope here before proceeding.----Snowded TALK 10:23, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: To 'resolve what this article is about' is a laudable goal, but how is it to be accomplished? When I drafted this article originally I understood enaction to stress the interactive nature of knowledge acquisition. That view was based upon Rowlands' book and the collected essays in Enaction. With that in mind, a natural issue is: "What forms of interaction are involved in knowledge acquisition?" And, one might ask, which forms of knowledge acquisition do the proponents of 'enaction' exclude from consideration, and for what reason would any of them be excluded??
The huge number of articles overlapping enaction include those in the See also list, and many overlap enaction, and might actually contain enaction, but do not put as much emphasis upon the interactive aspect. A program to determine 'what this article is about' should differentiate this article from these others, preferably using sources.
I doubt that The Heart of Judgment will help in this regard. As you are of a contrary view, some page numbers would help locate where text supporting your summary description can be found. In the meantime, a search of the text using Amazon's 'look-inside' feature reveals nothing like your summary. For example, the only reference to 'Cartesian' is one sentence on p. 22. where it occurs only in a designatory role as: "a Cartesian understanding". The words "enaction" and "scaffolding" do not occur. The word "embodied" shows up as "embodied learning", discussed at length on p. 152 and that discussion has to do with the role of the subconscious mind, and is not explicitly connected by Thiele to the four E's. Brews ohare (talk) 14:11, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
What Thiele does profess, and some others who are more clearly in the 'enaction' school agree, is a role for emergence (See section "Grappling with Multi-dimensionality"). As Thiele states it (p. 279) "Reducing a system to the laws that govern interaction of its parts does not mean those laws can be employed to reconstruct the whole... 'More is different'; the whole is not simply the aggregate of its parts." The bearing upon the 4E's is unclear, probably it is the conjecture that one cannot divide the brain from the environment it interacts with and must deal with the whole (really a question of when is a system a closed system). Using this line of thought to avoid the dilemma of determinism and permit moral responsibility is mysticism. Immersing this article in that morass is to be avoided. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You will find that Amazon searches of books is not substitute for reading them and the related literature Brews. You correctly point out that emergence is a key concept and the free will issue is fundamentally changed by the ideas of the Es and the autonomic/novelty receptive issues of decision making all of which are relevant. We can't just grab material here and its beyond the scope of this article's subject which is very precise. I am variously on the east and west coast of the US for the next two weeks. When I get home I will get both books (and a few others) and take them with me so I can respond on sourcing. What matters for the moment is to agree the range of what will be on this article, what might go onto another article and/or if this should be renamed (per your original idea to delete it). My feeling is that this article is too specific and best handled at the longer standing and non-philosophy one. We should then look at an article on distributed cognitition or post-cartesian concepts and agree the content of that. I am not up for simply collating strings of quotes.----Snowded TALK 16:01, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Amazon searches is not a substitute for reading, but it does serve to identify whether certain words are employed, and as noted, the words you have used to describe Thiele are not his. I look forward to your providing of details when you "respond on sourcing".
I am happy to see you recognize the narrowness of the topic title "enaction (philosophy)" because philosophy is the least of all the topics involved, others being psychology, neuroscience, and all the 'See also' topics. Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Which is why the value of this article is questioned, it may be better as a paragraph in the main article. Then a new article for the wider subject matter. You have not responded on that. ----Snowded TALK 17:10, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: I've agreed with you that a different article would be less of a straight jacket. I'd like your idea of an outline of topics. I don't think your list of the E′s is sufficient to build upon. Brews ohare (talk) 17:17, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

New section

I added a summary of a 2012 article which I think covers the areas and points to the importance of enaction. It is also easier to read than many Philosophy articles. I hope it sets the scene to retain and build upon this article, which we all think is important. We need some more entries now, e.g. on 'Criticisms' of the topic (and it certainly has had some opposition!), and some other viewpoints on it. Hopefully we can make it beyond the stub status. Peace!

TonyClarke (talk) 12:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

If we are keeping this to Enaction I think that summary is useful with a few amendments. Thanks for that. To expand intro the wider ISS of consciousness would require something different of which that would be a part (see above). I'm neutral on which route us taken. Brews seemed to want to expand the scope so I tried to respond to that desire with a structure that reflects secondary sourcing ----Snowded TALK 14:01, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Great, a way forward maybe. I agree that we can include contextual stuff, but perhaps when a secondary topic becomes important enough it needs its own page (or might have already), and we can branch off that way. But the article is called Enaction(Philosophy) and I think we should make that the main subject. (Not sure what you mean by the 'ISS of consciousness'?)TonyClarke (talk) 14:35, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Tony: I reformatted two of your footnotes. The section seems to suggest that Stapleton and Ward originated the four E's, but that is not the case. For some historical background, see Rowlands' introduction Expanding the Mind. Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I did some minor rewording to avoid any assertion of priority to this paper for the E's . Brews ohare (talk) 16:43, 8 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I did some further rewording, adopting the authors' own description of their work that includes more Es. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
As Stapleton and Ward have indicated, the 'classical sandwich' is a term coined by Susan Hurley, and I've added a footnote to her work. Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Title of section

The value of the title is that it makes no claim for the field, but reports a view. Hence I have reverted to Tony's original title as that is OK, we cannot say that this article defines the field. I have also restored neutral language. The original of the sandwich looked like OR or a key word search, that needs to reflect what is said in the article (which I do not have to hand). If they reference Hurley OK put that change back, if they do not reference Hurley for that term it should not be used----Snowded TALK 17:18, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I have made it perfectly clear in my remarks above that Hurley is referenced by the authors. You can also read their paper and see that for yourself, as I did. There is no non-neutrality of language, and you have not bothered to support your silly accusations. If you can read this article on line, you can use the links to the sources. Do some work, don't make waves out of laziness. Brews ohare (talk) 17:42, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
The subsection title The E′s of enactive cognition is not a 'view'. It is a context for the subject of Enaction as pointed out in the Intro of this article and sourced to Rowlands. One doesn't have to subscribe to some contentious controversial view to admit to these ideas as being the subject of conversation. Brews ohare (talk) 18:05, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

The E′s of enactive cognition

Snowded has taken exception to this subsection added by TonyClarke following my addition of footnotes identifying references within this section and a change in wording to reflect Stapleton's and Ward's description of their own paper. These changes are duly noted on the Talk page in the above thread. Snowded's in-line editorial comment is A account not THE account so we can't use their title. You are also making the text definitive rather than reporting one view. TAKE IT TALK

Now this subsection clearly states that it is a presentation of the article of Stapleton and Ward, so there is no confusion about its being "definitive text". I also note that Snowded made no objection to this subsection before I made these changes, changes that are at most minor clarifications and links to sources. So I don't know what the fuss is about.

Maybe Snowded can explain??

I have taken exception to your renaming of the subsection, not to the section for the reasons stated. I left some changes, but ones that implied that the view of these authors represented the field as a whole I changed back to the original text. ----Snowded TALK 18:41, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
→ Snowded: A very inaccurate description of your activities.
1. You removed the authors' own words that describe the intended purpose of their article:
"elaborates and partially defends the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended"
in favor of the incomplete statement
"present the view that enactive cognition implies embodiment, embeddedness, and the centrality of affect in cognition"
which drops several of the E′s.
2. You removed the authors' own citation to Hurley as the philosopher who coined the term 'classical sandwich'.
3. You removed the explanation of the word 'affective' which readers will find obscure, and the reference to Dickinson.
4. You changed TonyClarke's words 'enactive cognition' to 'extended cognition' in some instances, but not in others. Part 2 of Stapleton and Ward uses enactive to refer to cognition that arises out of "adaptive interaction with the environment", Part 5 uses extended to refer to a cognitive state "extending beyond the skin and skull". In the sentence where you changed 'enactive' to 'extended' you not only overrode TonyClarke's words, but changed them to the wrong meaning.
5. You reverted the change I made to remove an incorrect identification of 'dualism' with the 'classical sandwich', even thought these two concepts are not equivalent.
I conclude quite simply that your actions, Snowded, actively impede improvement of WP, and have nothing to do with any useful activity on your part. Brews ohare (talk) 21:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]


The E′s of enactive cognition

In a recent article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.[F 1] They elaborate and partially defend the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended, named for convenience the E′s. The term 'affective' refers to unpurposed but motivating reactions to the environment, such as physiological responses (for example, nausea) and the emotions.[F 2] Enactive cognition is possible through skillful interaction with the environment. Therefore the article intends partially to defend each of these E′s but also to point out the centrality of enactive cognition: if this is seen as a valid interpretation of our cognition, then the other aspects (the E′s, and affect) follow also.

The authors propose an 'ecumenical' enactivism combining affordances (James J. Gibson), sensorimotor expectations (Alva Noë) and mutual enactive structuring (Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992))[F 3]. This enactivism avoids what Hurley calls the ′Classical Sandwich′,[F 4] whereby internal cognitive workings intervene between perceptual input and actions output. There is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features.

They agree (p9) with Varela Rosch and Thompson, that rules and regularities come about through our interaction with perceptible environment. The world and our cognition are co-constituted, the world informs us what we can see and do, and our perception demarcates that which is in our world.

The enactivist position they outline 'holds that cognition essentially depends upon the activity, both actual and potential, of the cogniser.' They trace the origins of this view to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. Their claim is that we embody interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through the our bodily limitations and opportunities to enact that world. Further they emphasize the essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall their view is that our enactive cognition implies that we are embedded and embodied in an environment which we enact, and into which we are to a degree extended.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.
  2. ^ Anthony Dickinson (2008). "Chapter 10: Why a rat is not a beast machine". In Lawrence Weiskrantz, Martin Davies, eds (ed.). Frontiers of consciousness: The Chichele lectures. Oxford University Press. p. 275. ISBN 978-0199233151. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  3. ^ Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. ISBN 0262261235.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ Susan Hurley (2001). "Perception and action: An alternative view". Synthese. 129: 3–40. Perception and action are not just separate from one another, but also separate from the higher processes of cognition. The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling. Hurley does not support the 'sandwich' view of cognition.


TonyClarke stated the selection of this article was based upon its clarity in stating its position, not that it was definitive. Perhaps Snowded could offer some reasons why including some footnotes has changed the character of this subsection?? Perhaps he can explain why the title: The E′s of enactive cognition, is tendentious, especially as the E′s occur in multiple references (Rowlands being one of them, and Snowded's bulleted list and reference to the E′s in talk page discussion being a recognition of the matter)?? The E′s were chosen by Stapleton and Ward simply because their audience would immediately understand what the E′s are. The subsection's wording makes its nature perfectly clear as a presentation of the views of Stapleton and Ward, IMO. Brews ohare (talk) 17:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I have taken exception to your renaming of the subsection, not to the section for the reasons stated. I left some changes, but ones that implied that the view of these authors represented the field as a whole I changed back to the original text. And please don't clutter up the talk page by replicating material from the article which a diff would handle ----Snowded TALK 18:41, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I included the text you object to along with the footnotes to make clear what the subject is. You haven't supported your activities, which amount simply to a misguided reaction to misinterpreted material. Brews ohare (talk) 19:22, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I know Brews, anyone who disagrees with you is misguided or misinterprets you, it must be really difficult ----Snowded TALK 22:58, 9 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: Please fix this itemized list of your mess. Brews ohare (talk) 05:25, 10 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Your messy use of unnecessary quotes (a diff would have done) and formatting created the problem Brews. Lets see if anyone else engages before any effort is put in. Oh and remember to sign in, I assume the IP met in Reno is you----Snowded TALK 03:29, 10 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

An enactive view of perception

This new section does not make clear what is philosophy and what is psychology. Is it the perspective here that we cannot tell? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 14 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Philosophy?

Well, it focuses on the work of a professor of philosophy; its written in an article that has philosophy in its title; how much more indication do you want that it is philosophical?? Please amend as you see fit to improve it. Not sure that I fully understand your comments Brews, or what you want to change. TonyClarke (talk) 20:09, 14 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Philosophy and psychology are coming together in this domain anyway so I am not sure we can split. My one concern is that we need somethng which is more of an overview, at the moment we have limited sources. But its a start ----Snowded TALK 20:23, 14 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Tony, there may be gray areas. However, I'd say questions that are to be settled by lab experiments designed to verify theories of perception are psychology. More abstract questions that are perhaps questions about connections between ideas and connections with the larger questions of epistemology are philosophy. Naturally a philosopher on occasion will mention the prevailing scientific view of the 'facts' as they are presently understood. Bu that is not the philosopher's purpose.
So, I'd suggest that how an animal achieves a 3-D perception of an object is a lab project, not philosophy. However, it is philosophy to suggest that the process involved in gaining a 3-D understanding is an instance of enaction, enaction being the larger epistemological view (entirely beyond all hope of empirical test) that all knowledge involves the interactive aspects seen in this simple example, and that interaction is the sine qua non of acquiring knowledge.
If, in fact, the psychological understanding of 3-D perception is hazy, then the philosopher hasn't got a bona fide example of enaction here, but only an example that, when interpreted in an unverified speculative manner, supports the view of enaction.
How do the sources see it? Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
A question that I cannot shake about 3-D perception is the way certain cameras can take a picture using two lenses, and then use this information to focus the image at whatever depth the photographer chooses. It would seem this process allows 3-D perception of an object, but is it an example of enaction? The passive recording of the subject by the camera is not an instance of enaction, but perhaps the photographer's use of the images is? Perhaps the camera designer's idea of multiple lenses is? Brews ohare (talk) 15:26, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Need to sort out subject

If this article is about enaction, then it is the third of the "E"s that the Rowlands quote identifies at the start. If that is to be the subject matter then we need to radically alter the lede to reflect the final paragraph of the first section Tony inserted. That would also imply articles for each of the other "E"s and also some summary on the post-Descartian approach. So Clark criticises eneaction, but exemplifies embedded and so on. The issue remains how much material exists to justify different approaches. At the moment a coatrack is a distinct possibility with identical material on different articles. My personal preference is to get the master article on post-Descartian approaches done and then sort out the individual ones, but I am more than open to other alternatives. The point is we need an agreed plan. ----Snowded TALK 09:03, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Instead of adding to this WP:POVFORK, you should consider whether there's anything you want to move/add to either Enaction or Enactivism.—Machine Elf 1735 09:16, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I think it should go there hence the deletion proposal. But I don't see that going through at the moment. So I have made changes to focus it on the subject ----Snowded TALK 09:20, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Reversions by Snowded

I don't find Snowded's drastic changes to this article have all been improvements. Much of the language is awkwardly constructed and unsourced, sometimes unintelligible. I have tried to make English out of the introduction, but find it unsatisfactory. Useful contributions (like Stapleton and Ward discussion) by Tony have been removed without Talk page discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

The material from Tony more or less provided the definition so I moved it to the lede with minor alterations. It did mean getting rid of discursive material. Your various derogatory comments are to be expected, but tedious nevertheless ----Snowded TALK 16:29, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Some things in the intro that need fixing

The present introductory paragraph reads as follows:

Enaction as a theory argues that cognition depends on the physical activity of the cognsier; there is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features. The origins of this view are traced to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through our opportunities to enact with that world. The theory sees an essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall the view is that we are embedded and embodied in an environment that we enact, and in which we are to a degree embedded and extended. It is one of a series of non-Cartesian theories of the mind which in various ways hold that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, and the environment[1]
[1] Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.

I'd like to discuss a few points about it.

  • cognseir - probably cognizer
  • "The origins of this view are traced to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit."
→ The origins of the view that "there is no separation between action and perception" is not traceable to Kant. In fact, Kant epitomizes a view contrary to enaction, namely the view that mind is pre-programmed with categories with which it interprets the world, space and time among them, and uses these categories to organize perceptions. In contrast, the view of enaction is that categories are not pre-programmed but arrived upon and invented during interaction with the world.
→ In any event, this line of thought does not belong in the introduction but in a subsection on historical beginnings.
  • "The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through our opportunities to enact with that world."
→ The embedding of the observer is not a result of 'opportunities to enact'. The embedding refers to sensorimotor capacities at the motor-learning level, and possibly cultural tools (books, art, science) at a higher level. Opportunity does not embed us, the nature of our embedding dictates our opportunities, the ways available to interact.
  • "since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes."
→ a non-sequitur, IMO. In any event it is not 'evaluation' that is intrinsic in the enactive view, but the selection of how we act and the blow-back, the 'interaction', that is intrinsic to our cognition. Enaction is explicitly opposed to the idea of the world 'out there', evaluated by the world 'in here'.
  • "It is one of a series of non-Cartesian theories of the mind which in various ways hold that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, and the environment"
→ the description of enaction as one among many 'non-Cartesian theories' seems a bit unhelpful as it defines enaction in terms of what it isn't, and uses very technical jargon unfamiliar to many readers to describe what enaction isn't. It seems a bit of a waste of time to bone up on 'Cartesian theory' just so we know where not to look for enaction. The subsequent explanation of what enaction is, namely one of a series of theories blah-blah-blah is a repetition of what already has been said, but introduces the notion that enaction is about 'consciousness', which it is not. It is about cognition.

There is a lack of sourcing here also, which is not made up for by more careful sourcing in the body of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 19:05, 15 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I wonder why you think other editors are incapable of reading the introduction, repeating it here just clutters up the talk page. The text there came from Tony's reference. Most of your points you make seem to challenge that reference with your own opinion. The substantial point related to non-cartesian, that could be referenced to Reynolds if you have concern and a dab link would be easy. ----Snowded TALK 05:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Too much original research and synthesis in hose changes Brews and your edit summary is misleading, the objections are only your. When I get a chance this evening I will make some changes to remove the OR. Ill try and preserve what I can but you are again writing a personal view and misusing some of those sources----Snowded TALK 15:39, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: Your comments are invention. I've rewritten the introduction and included some sources to make clear that "my own opinions" have nothing to do with it. However, the sources show pretty clearly that this article should be moved to Enactive cognition because a good deal of the discussion of it in the literature is about ways to verify its concepts by experimental observation and simulation, which is not the domain of philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 15:44, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
The real irony Brews is that you are using Cartesian language, string together partially understood sources. I'm happy to look at moving/deleting but you need to engage in the discussions about what a new article should be. You also need to be more consistent on the delet Koon discussion on this article. The one thing I can promise you is that you will not be allowed to simply write this material yourself.----Snowded TALK 15:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded: Glad for help in presenting sources more clearly, if that is your goal. Bellicose comments on what you will 'allow' seem egoistic. Comment about Kooning discussion unintelligible. Brews ohare (talk) 17:37, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I am not being bellicose Brews, that you interpret it that way is disappointing. Your rent changes show zero evidence of paying attention to what I and several other editors have been saying to you. I was sorely tempted to simply revert but I will spend time this evening working through this 'delet Koon' was iPad fingers should have read 'deletion'. You are being inconsistent ----Snowded TALK 17:56, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I am glad your assertions as to what you will personally 'allow' were entirely misinterpreted as being bellicose. I still have no idea where 'Koon' arises? Maybe you mean Kant? If so, I have suggested that a background subsection be written where various philosophical schools can be related to enaction, including Kant and Descartes. In such a subsection some prologue can be included to bring the uniformed reader up to speed about these authors. The introduction of undefined technical jargon in the Intro is disconcerting to the non-cognoscenti. Brews ohare (talk) 18:40, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
In case you meant the article deletion discussion, I updated my view on that page. Brews ohare (talk) 18:55, 16 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I Added a picture

And I really think the intro is too long now, although we don't want to lose the important points in the work of Stapleton and Ward. Guidance says it should be concise, and 1-4 paragraphs. At the moment it is neither. I will try to deal with that, by brief mention in the intro then fuller text back in the main article. While taking account of others' views, of course. TonyClarke (talk) 03:02, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I was sorely tempted too revert to the summary by Stapleton and Ward but I have done my best to make the lede into an acceptable length using his material as much as possible. If it simply gets reinserted I think I will revert the version you 'liked' via a tag ----Snowded TALK 11:33, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Proposed subsection

A subsection explaining the E′s might be useful here to put enaction in context. Here is a possible approach, somewhat along what Tony proposed and Snowded removed:

The E′s of cognition

As mentioned above, enaction is sometimes taken as one of the E′s describing cognition.1, 2. The E′s refer to Enactive, Embodied, Embedded, and Extended. This section outlines briefly what these terms mean, as described by Rowlands,1 and by Stapleton and Ward.2

Enactive

This aspect is the subject of this article. Broadly speaking 'enactive' means that cognition depends upon the activity of the cognitive agent, but beyond that, it opposes what is sometimes called a 'computationalist' or 'representationalist' picture of this interaction in which the agent receives information from the environment, represents it internally and processes it, and then arrives by 'computation' or 'deduction' at a course of action. Instead, the enactive view of the interaction is that the agent already is 'attuned' to its environment, which tuning filters both the input from the environment and the probing of the environment. One aspect of this interaction is the anticipation of the agent as to what might be the result of a particular probing action, and the design of that probing action to test that expectation.

Embedded

The cognitive agent is not engaged in a simple information exchange with the environment, a sort of detached input-output between largely autonomous systems, but is to some degree inseparable from aspects of its environment to which it is closely coupled. This coupling may limit or channel or structure the interactions available within the agent-environment interaction.

Embodied

The cognitive agent interacts with the environment through 'apparatus' peculiar to the form of the agent, for example the senses. Various aspects of the agent's embodiment influence this interaction, for example, the eye processes visible light to present a modified signal to the brain, and the spinal cord encodes certain instructions that produce a muscular response to some forms of stimulation.

Extended

The cognitive agent is not limited in its interaction to its embodied capacities, but can invent and enlist the aid of external 'tools' that extend its presence into the environment.

Affected

Not a descriptor beginning with the letter 'E', but indicating that there are some motivating factors pushing the cognitive agent to engage in the cognitive process, to adopt an evaluative stance. Our 'affective state' decides what the agent actually will undertake.

[1] Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
[2] Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.

Comments

  • That needs another article of which this is a development as proposed, its coat racking and diversionary. You need to engage in the discussion about a new article and agree a name. That would be evidence of a willingness to engage. I personally think we would be better with one article on the Es including this material until it expands to the point where it splits. ----Snowded TALK 11:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
→ Snowded: I suggested the article title be widened to more easily incorporate non-philosophical topics such as psychology and robotics. I also have presented three or four extensive sourced presentations of material suitable for this renamed article. You simply hold your nose, and say nothing about content. So, I guess I have demonstrated a "willingness to engage'. Your response has been to repeatedly refer to the chimera of some distant future discussion in which you will play an active role. Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Snowded's reversion of intro

In a string of 7 edits, Snowded removed most of this Introduction:



Enaction as a theory argues that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment;[S 1] action and perception are directly connected, and "only a creature with certain features – for example, eyes, hands, legs, and skills – can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities".[S 2] The claim is that we interact with an environment we selectively create through our capacities to enact with that world.[S 3] Perception, however, is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features: for example, "your brain is tuned to certain potentialities".[S 3] This 'tuning' is not a sensorimotor limitation upon what the agent can perceive, but a 'guess' about what the sensed particularities 'mean'; "there belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant' – not yet perceived, but only anticipated."[S 4]
The term enaction was introduced by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch,[S 5] and further developed by Thompson and others,[S 6] to place emphasis upon the idea that experience of the world is a result of mutual interaction between the sensorimotor capacities of the organism and its environment.[S 2] "Sense-making is an inherently active idea. Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world.[S 7]
In a 2012 article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.[S 8] They place enaction as one part of a wider context for cognition as being enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended.[S 1][S 8] For convenience, these aspects are sometimes named the E′s, and are parts of several theories of mind which, in various ways, hold that cognition is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artifacts, their environment, and their interactions. According to Rowlands, for the theory of enaction to succeed, it must establish a "parity [between internal and external processes] with respect to certain abstract, general features of cognition that will be identified by the mark of the cognitive."[S 9]
The theory sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.[S 10]
The initial emphasis of enaction upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",[S 7][S 11] but has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.[S 7] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with ts environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."[S 12]
Sources
  1. ^ a b Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
  2. ^ a b Robert A Wilson, Lucia Foglia (July 25, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied Cognition: §2.2 Enactive cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  3. ^ a b Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 70 ff. ISBN 0262014556. Rowlands attributes this idea to D M MacKay (1967). "Ways of looking at perception". In W Watthen-Dunn (ed.). Models for the perception of speech and visual form (Proceedings of a symposium). MIT Press. pp. 25 ff.
  4. ^ Cited by Rowlands: Edmund Husserl (1999). "§19 Actuality and potentiality of intentional life". (Reprint of 1950 Martinus Nijhoff ed.). Kluwer Academic. p. 44. ISBN 978-9024700684. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help) or see Edmund Husserl (1999). Donn Welton (ed.). The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology. Indiana University Press. p. 108. ISBN 978-0253212733.
  5. ^ Francisco J Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch (1992). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press. p. 9. ISBN 978-0262261234. We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  6. ^ Evan Thompson (2010). "Chapter 1: The enactive approach". Mind in life:Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind (PDF). Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674057517.
  7. ^ a b c Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 33 ff. ISBN 978-0262526012. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  8. ^ a b Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.
  9. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 90. ISBN 0262014556.
  10. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. p. 79. ISBN 0262014556.
  11. ^ Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio (1994). "Doing without representing" (PDF). Synthese. 101: 401–434.
  12. ^ Marieke Rohde (2010). "§3.1 The scientist as observing subject". Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press. pp. 30 ff. ISBN 978-9078677239.


Snowded provided one-line edit summaries for his actions:

That looks very much like OR and its not for the lede anyway, possible main body but not in that form
Not of direct relevance
You need a third party not a primary source to make that statement

and so on. In sum, a series of non-specific vague assertions based upon his own ideas and without any sourced support. His talk-page reference to his actions is:

I have done my best to make the lede into an acceptable length using his material as much as possible. If it simply gets reinserted I think I will revert the version you 'liked' via a tag.

TonyClarke suggested this introduction was too long.

I propose a discussion as to what material in this reverted introduction might be retained in the lede, and how the remainder might be incorporated in the body of the article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Comments

  • To begin this discussion, below is a list of the omitted points that should appear somewhere in the article.
1. The 'tuning' idea, as expressed by Rowlands citing Husserl
2. The background of the 'enaction' terminology begun by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (the reference everyone uses for this attribution) and further elaborated upon in the second paragraph.
3. A discussion of the Stapleton-Ward "E′s are good" paper, the third paragraph.
4. A clear presentation of the role of motivation or affect, as in the fourth paragraph
5. The view of the critics that the sensorimotor aspects are 'cognitively marginal', in particular Andy Clark and DiPaolo as described in the last paragraph.
6. The extension of enactivism to high-level thought processes as outlined by Rohde, including the activities of science. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 17 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • Why, oh why, oh why do you feel the need to reproduce material that any editor can find with a single click? As I have said elsewhere its deeply patronising to other editors and wastes space on the talk page. It can also intimidate other editors from getting involved when they look at the amount of material they have to engage with.
On the substantive issue, a lot of what you propose above (where relevant to the subject) is better treated on the Enaction article, reproducing it here is a content fork at best. Per comments below, better to see if the philosophy section of the Enaction article can sustain enough material in its own right to justify an article before further work is done here. ----Snowded TALK 10:58, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Tony has expressed interest in pursuing the philosophy aspects, and you also keep mentioning them although you haven't been forthcoming. On the other hand, Enactivism has plenty to deal with that is not philosophy. Brews ohare (talk) 12:34, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
So pursue it in the section on Enactivism. At the moment you are just replicating material ----Snowded TALK 12:48, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I'm unable to understand your recommendation. However, to this point there has been no replication of material in Enactivism, just a transfer of text proposed for Enaction (philosophy) but reverted by you. This material was proposed here before Enactivism was identified as the more general article, but it fits into Enactivism better. Brews ohare (talk) 14:05, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Philosophy topics

As this article is about philosophy, several points could be raised. An incomplete list follows:

1. Husserl: "there belongs to every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of perception to the sides 'also meant' – not yet perceived, but only anticipated." cited by Rowlands; discussed by Thompson as noted by Keith Pearson.

2. Descarte: Maligned as a matter of course by Enactavists as somehow the exemplar of the division of mind from body.

3. Kant: Also maligned as somehow following Descarte's lead, but actually more complicated than that.

4. Alva Noë: Review found here

5. Hutto & Myin: Review found here

Brews ohare (talk) 01:10, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

But Brews, aren't those the sources you're co-suggesting at Talk:Enactivism?—Machine Elf 1735 01:36, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Enaction (philosophy) is where philosophy is to be handled in depth; the other article only mentions philosophy and leaves the heavy lifting here. Brews ohare (talk) 04:45, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Why would the other article only mention philosophy and leave the "heavy lifting" here? Let's imagine some "future" version of a main Enactivism article that has so much philosophy coverage that you'll want to hive it off here... Can you explain why you wouldn't want this to be a redirect until that actually takes place?—Machine Elf 1735 06:53, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
There is enough material for two articles if anyone is allowed to present it. Brews ohare (talk) 12:32, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
So you want to segregate all the philosophical material into a different article or just some portion of it?—Machine Elf 1735 15:28, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

This discussion of 'what might be' is just too hypothetical given the unwillingness of all concerned to do anything but yatter. Brews ohare (talk) 17:32, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

As things stand right now, the philosophical aspects reviewed by Stapleton & Ward and by Rowlands have been deleted by Snowded, and what is left is 90% psychology of perception, which is mostly scientific guesswork, not philosophy, and doesn't belong here. Brews ohare (talk) 17:54, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

If you're done with the hypothetical yatter and the merge is complete then why not redirect at this time?—Machine Elf 1735 17:57, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
How about re-instating the Stapleton-Warde material and Rowlands references to Husserl? Brews ohare (talk) 18:01, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Where at Brews? Enactivism? Enaction? Extended cognition? This is a WP:POVFORK, not an article. Please incorporate any material into the appropriate article.—Machine Elf 1735 18:41, 19 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Subject

The subject of this article is ENACTION it is not about the whole range of Es and other material that relate to post-Cartesian approaches. If we want to make it a more general article then lets agree to do that and change the name. I'm more that open to that as I think such an article is needed. However to date I don't see much engagement in discussing what that article would be called (I made suggestions). Pending such an agreement and move; to insert material that is not about ENACTION not on, hence my reversion. We are not here to write extended essays around a subject, but to create entries in an encyclopaedia.

FURTHER, Brews proposal to make that extension (above section) was rejected by another editor so to proceed without agreement is not being bold it is being disruptive ----Snowded TALK 00:29, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

So far as I can see, the only rejection is from you. You have said a few times that you'd like an article on the Es, but so far I do not have a road map from you, and every attempt to do that ends up in the ditch. Do you want it in Enaction? Do you think the Es are pure philosophy, or a fuzzy mixture with psychology? Let's get your ideas out here in the open. Brews ohare (talk) 01:02, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Machine Elf's comment is clear Brews, as is your latest rejection at the OR notice board. You either don't understand or you choose to ignore what are pretty direct comments. You chose not to participate when I raised the question of a new article so don't be surprised if your requests for me to repeat them for your benefit fall on deaf ears. Otherwise as I have tried to explain before, the boundaries between Philosophy and the cognitive sciences (I would avoid simply saying psychology) are very blurred at the moment, in fact there is considerable overlap including several people working in both fields. ----Snowded TALK 01:08, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
No substantive guidance as to where you want to go here. Brews ohare (talk) 05:13, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded I totally support your suggestion for a name change that would solve the WP:POVFORK problem by changing the topic to an overview of the Es of cognition: Enactive, Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Envatted, etc., but the only names I can think of would be something like Es (cognition)? Anything better? Does anyone know if it's a play on the German word for Id (or X)?—Machine Elf 1735 08:52, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Well it might help to work out the subjects first. I am in North America (ironically working on the implications of some of this stuff in safety, scaling development, engagement and the like. But that means I am away from my books until the end of the month. Brews seems to think that everyone here is retired and has infinite time available and that searching on line versions of books is sufficient, something I find appalling to be honest. I've started a list below, how about adding with minimal commentary? I've listed any where I know there are philosophers working on the subject. I suggest people add to the list then comment ----Snowded TALK 13:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You don't have a name for a new topic in mind yet? Can we please focus more tightly on the immediacy of that need because of the active AfD?—Machine Elf 1735 17:00, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Well if pushed then I think its post-cartesian approaches to cognition and consciousness but that is a bit wordy. Choosing either cognition or consciousness would mean taking a particular slang. Post-cartesian theories of cognition might work however.----Snowded TALK 00:26, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews, how about Post-cartesian theories of cognition?—Machine Elf 1735 01:20, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Well, one has to start somewhere. Rowlands would suggest Non-Cartesian theories of cognition emphasizing logical distinctions rather than an era in time. Here are some quotes:

(p. 2) "I am going to refer to cognitive science in its traditional form as Cartesian cognitive science." and earlier: "Cognitive science, in its traditional form, is based upon the idea that mental processes - specifically cognitive processes - are abstract 'programs' realized in the hardware' of the brain (an analogy with computers guided much of the early work on cognitive science). The principal tasks of cognitive science are, accordingly, to identify the programs (cognitive psychology) and work out how these programs are implemented in the brain (cognitive neuroscience)."
This seems to suggest the issue is an aspect of science, rather than philosophy.
(p. 3) "What unites these differing faces of Cartesian cognitive science is an unquestioned - indeed seemingly banal - assumption: whatever else is true of meant processes,...they are processes that occur inside the head of the thinking organism. It is this unquestioned assumption that makes Cognitive science Cartesian."
(p. 7) "The primary role of philosophy is not to provide new empirical evidence for non-Cartesian cognitive science, but to place this science on a solid conceptual footing...
(p. 8) The new way of thinking about the mind is sometimes characterized as the claim that the mind, or even the self, is outside the head. Now that, at least on one way of thinking...would be a truly crazy claim. Happily, no version of non-Cartesian cognitive science commits us to this."
This remark immediately rules out my own idea of what is the case as crazy, and so persuades me that Rowlands and I are not at all on the same page.

It seems that the philosophical subject is putting 'cognitive science' on the right footing, but without regard to empirical evidence. I find this framing of the matter indigestible, and a strong dose of "philosophers can help set up scientific theories better than the people trying to do the science", which I find to be pure hutzpah. My own view is that the philosophical subject transcends science altogether and relegates science to a small corner of the Universe where it works very well, but is inherently limited to questions that do not include many important philosophical questions. So I object to a title that sounds like science for a philosophy article. What do you think? Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Brews, are you suggesting Non-Cartesian theories of cognition?—Machine Elf 1735 16:23, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
How about Philosophies of cognition?? It is a recognized subject. Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Already covered by Philosophy of Mind.—Machine Elf 1735 16:54, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Great! Maybe all that is needed is some addition or revision of that article and we can get back to business writing here? Can we fit the Es into Philosophy of mind? Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Here is an attempt to do this. Brews ohare (talk) 17:33, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Snowded will not accept any attempt to put the Es in Philosophy of mind. We'll see his next step in the grand design one day, I guess. Brews ohare (talk) 03:20, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Already has done Brews. It is a featured article after all, so it would be better to get consensus first on a more elaborate contribution.—Machine Elf 1735 04:30, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I see Snowded relented and included one sentence about the Es under the sub-subtopic of cognitive science. So much for philosophy, eh? I guess that extremely minor mention means that we still need an article with a more useful discussion of the E′s. Brews ohare (talk) 05:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
You were dumping material again Brews. The briefest reading of the article and the tinniest bit of respect for the subject would have told you that the most that was justified was a sentence. It is a high level summary article, not an elaboration. Now try and engage, although your recent abuse of another editor Masem here does not bode well. This is going to end up at ANI again if you don't show some evidence of learning ----Snowded TALK 10:49, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Potential list of subjects needing summarised a new article

  • Exaptation & co-evolution of the brain (encompasses embodiment)
  • Embedded (Clark on Scaffolding)
  • Enacted (per above but one of the more controversial)
  • Extended into the environment
  • Continued evolution of the brain in a social setting post birth
  • Epigenetics, cultural/social responses impact on biology
  • Complex adaptive systems (Juarrero on the philosophical problem of intention)
  • Freeman's stuff on how brains make up their minds (A philosopher, doctor and neuroscientists)
  • Cognitive archeology, tools can determine or trigger development of abstract capability
  • In aesthetics the role of art in enabling languages based on abstraction (links to Heidegger)
  • The Churchlands in many manifestations
  • Any number of people on free will
  • The rehabilitation of Deluze's ideas on affordance by De Landa (impacts on identity)
  • Fractality and scaling issues in social and cognitive processes (may be too new)

comments

  • We have a developing fusion at the moment of Philosophy of the Mind, Cognitive neuroscience, the biological end of anthropology and to a lesser extent psychology. So this not going to be easy so its important to agree a broad approach before people rush off and write articles making work for others. Maybe a new project? ----Snowded TALK 13:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • You left out cultural psychology and neurophilosophy. This listing could become something useful if (i) it were more closely related to existing articles, (ii) linked actual sources (iii) indicated a beginning point.
Considering the moribund state of the philosophy participation on WP, and our present inability to decide upon citing a seminal reference without extended, unpleasant exchanges, how is this massive rewrite of WP to occur? Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
As I understand you, these points are to be incorporated in one massive review or overview article, which necessarily will link to dozens of other articles for the main development. At a minimum that means shelving the deletion discussion of Enaction (philosophy) and directing attention to this new project.
As I also understand you, you are unavailable to participate in this exercise because you want to be next to your library before starting. In the meantime (a month or two I gather), you will occupy yourself with reverting all efforts to compose this new overview with one-line edit summaries that are of no use at all in modifying content.
So is it your opinion we should all find something else to do until you signal that you are back at home with time to spare and your library? Brews ohare (talk) 15:41, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
A suggestion for beginning could be to identify existing WP articles that are to be overviewed in the master article, and then an overview of their content be prepared. Gaps and lack of currency could be filled in later as they become apparent. Brews ohare (talk) 15:39, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Another suggestion is to use this outline as a starting point. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 20 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews, if I ever suspected that you really find it difficult to work with other editors then the above comments would confirm the suspicion. I've studied the subject enough to produce the above list without text books and it only takes a little good will to produce an simple outline of an article or articles and then look at existing material to match it. I know enough to engage in that without access to my library. I'm reverting material from you which is original research or coatracks, that will carry on regardless of when I have access to my books. Now try, just try to work with other editors; you know it makes sense. If you want to be helpful then identify all the related wikipedia articles Great idea, do it.----Snowded TALK 00:22, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
We don't yet have a title for this overview article. It includes free will, the E′s, mental development, epigenetics, adaptive systems, cognitive archeology, art and language, and so on. It is a bunch of beads, but without a string to thread them on. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Post-cartesian theories of the Mind might work and is supported by sources. ----Snowded TALK 10:19, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
As already pointed out, post Cartesian suggests a time period, while non Cartesian (Rowlands' term) represents a difference in subject. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Apologies I missed that being distracted by your discourse on science and philosophy. I'm open to 'non' although I think the sense of time could be valuable ----Snowded TALK 14:16, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Fractality? exaptation? All of this is wildly off beam, and I suspect whipped up by editors who don't have a philosophical background. My position is that enaction is an important philosophical concept, arising from a range of interdisciplinary studies (started by Varela Rosch and Thomson), and this article needs much work to inform our readers accurately. But the tenor of this article's talk page sadly means that it is likely that my remarks will be ignored, so I will leave it there and go on editing the page as I think others should focus on also. TonyClarke (talk) 22:38, 21 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

It is an important subject, but it is one of a family of concepts. Fractality I agree with you, on exaptation it is one of the new ones, but if you look at exaptation of the cerebellum to enable grammar you will find it is now being considered. I made it clear in producing that list that some were new and the idea was to get a sense of the range. I have a degree in Philosophy by the way and work with several authors in this field (all of which is verifiable). The solution to issues on the talk page atmosphere is to contribute constructively, which probably means avoiding speculation as to the knowledge of other editors :-) ----Snowded TALK 01:42, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Tony, go for it. Snowded has a grand vision of his own, but it will prove too big a mouthful. In the meantime, "petit a petit, l'oiseau fiat son nit." , or maybe "a grand journey begins with a single step." Brews ohare (talk) 03:26, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
And the most important step is to pay attention to what you are being told at the OR notice board and try and work with other editors. ----Snowded TALK 03:42, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

De-emphasis on sensorimotor activity

In this edit Snowded removed the following:

The initial emphasis of enaction upon sensorimotor skills has been criticized as "cognitively marginal",[Rf 1][Rf 2][Rf 3] but has been extended to apply to higher level cognitive activities, such as social interactions.[Rf 1] "In the enactive view,... knowledge is constructed: it is constructed by an agent through its sensorimotor interactions with ts environment, co-constructed between and within living species through their meaningful interaction with each other. In its most abstract form, knowledge is co-constructed between human individuals in socio-linguistic interactions...Science is a particular form of social knowledge construction...[that] allows us to perceive and predict events beyond our immediate cognitive grasp...and also to construct further, even more powerful scientific knowledge."[Rf 4]
References
  1. ^ a b Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. p. 43. ISBN 978-0262526012. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio (1994). "Doing without representing" (PDF). Synthese. 101: 401–434.
  3. ^ Andy Clark (March 2006). "Vision as Dance? Three Challenges for Sensorimotor Contingency Theory" (PDF). Psyche. 12 (1).
  4. ^ Marieke Rohde (2010). "§3.1 The scientist as observing subject". Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press. pp. 30 ff. ISBN 978-9078677239.

Showded made no Talk page analysis of this action, but did supply the one-line edit summary That looks very much like OR and its not for the lede anyway, possible main body but not in that form. That comment suggests some form of this material belongs in the body of the article, but not in the lede.

It is certainly the case that the position described has notable adherents and should be mentioned. Maybe a subsection with this material is order? Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I think my problem is that you are putting together three authors to make a point and we really need a source which does that integration and which establishes the significance for the subject overall. ----Snowded TALK 14:50, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I think my problem is your armchair criticism with no participation. Brews ohare (talk) 15:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
For the 'cognitively marginal' description, see Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, and Hanne De Jaegher; page 34: " Our enactive-like ideas could well account for complex skills such as mastering sensorimotor contingencies in visual perception (O’Regan and Noë 2001), or becoming an expert car driver (Dreyfus 2002), but — important though these skills are — they remain cognitively marginal (Clark and Toribio 1994) and fall short of explaining performances such as preparing for a mathematics final or designing a house." Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews, I am not participating in the way you want me to, but your approach to editing is not getting support so I will live with that. Your quote really validates my point, even the authors are speculating so it fails a significance test without a secondary source. You are stringing together sources and that as you well know breaks the OR rules. Yes you disagree with them, but resolution of your policy issues is not for the talk pages of an article.----Snowded TALK 16:35, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I am 'stringing together sources' that agree the sensorimotor aspects of cognition are a minor part of cognition, and the enactive approach has to go further if it is to be a player in cognitive science. Call these sources speculative if you like. Their assessment is not debatable, only how to address the issue.
And no thanks for the paternalistic comments. No substitute for a substantive contribution to fix the morass you have created here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
If you want to resort to personal attacks feel free Brews. The simple fact remains is that you are not getting support for your views on how wikipedia should be edited. If repeating a lesson you will not learn is paternalistic then so be it. Yes the enactive approach has to go further, when it does, and only then, do we report it here. In the meantime a lot of us will carry on working with the ideas of enaction and embodiment in the real world and that is exciting, some of it is or will be published but it still will not belong here until after it gets secondary citation. That is what an encyclopaedia is about----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC) ----Snowded TALK 17:06, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
What on Earth does any of this have to do with anything? Brews ohare (talk) 17:10, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
And the fact that you ask that question illustrates the problem. I am never sure if you just don't get it, or if you choose not to. Whatever too many editors have wasted too much time explaining it to you ----Snowded TALK 17:17, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

POV fork, notability, etc.

MachineElf, Not sure what's going on so I'll express my understanding of the situation, ask some questions, and see what you think.

  • I looked at WP:POVFORK and this article doesn't seem to fit the term pov fork because this doesn't seem to be the case where contributors disagreed about the content of another article and this one was then created. For example, Brews ohare didn't even work on the article Enactivism before he created this article. It may not have been right to create this article, but the term POV fork doesn't seem to fit the situation.
  • The philosophy subject Enaction seems notable as indicated by the number of references. I think the issue you have with this article is something else. In that regard, could you describe your understanding of the relationship between the articles Enaction, Enactivism, Enaction (philosophy)? --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:07, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • One problem is that it is difficult to separate the philosophical aspects of enaction from all the other aspects. Before this article was created everything Varela based was in one place and the danger here is that we end up replicating material and/or creating a coatrack. I think we would be better to create a good article at Enaction with a solid philosophy section, then a wider article under Philosophy of Mind, which in turn references Enactivism. Maybe in a few months time it would justify its own article but its not clear at the moment. We need a disambiguation with Enaction or another merge. Calling this article Enaction (Philosophy) rather than Enactivism (Philosophy) has just added to the confusion. ----Snowded TALK 19:14, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
What's the difference between the topic of the article Enactivism and the topic of the article Enaction? (Please note I'm not asking about this article Enaction (philosophy).) --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:52, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
One is really focused on Varela which is the starting point for a lot of of the subsequent thinking. Good case for a merge however ----Snowded TALK 23:46, 22 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
To answer your question, no I'm not saying anything about CFORKS, just POV forks.
Regarding the two articles Enaction (not Enaction (philosophy)) and Enactivism that you mentioned, are they about the same topic? --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:12, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Bob: It appears that the articles enaction and enactivism have some commonality. The Enaction article appears to take a stance coming from interface design, while Enactivism seems to originate in psychological ideas about perception like the sense of depth. One of these articles has a subsection on 'enaction in the theory of mind' . It seems they use different sources. I don't think they should be merged, because they seem to be traveling in different directions. As for the myriad of WP articles overlapping in this area (See the category listings in the various articles) we have a real cacophony here.
The split-off of the philosophical aspects of enactivism into enaction (philosophy) was a miss-step of mine due to being unaware of enactivism. However, enactivism is the bigger subject, and philosophy is probably the least interesting part of it. Given the complete apathy of the philosophy group and the wonderful collaborative atmosphere between those few who take any interest, it would be a good thing to leave enaction (philosophy) in place where it can atrophy in decadent squalor, and possibly let a more productive set of editors work on enactivism  :-). Brews ohare (talk) 01:47, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
So just to get this right (i) you set up the article as a 'miss-step', (ii) have realised this you PRODed it (iii) when it was set up for deletion (the right approach not a PROD) you opposed the deletion and finally (iv) you feel the focus should move elsewhere but you are not supporting deletion? ----Snowded TALK 02:21, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
It does look like some serious organizing is needed. I think a way to start is to clarify what the other two articles Enaction and Enactivism are about. Especially, to clarify what the difference between them is. Personally, I would find it difficult to work on an article if I didn't know what the topic of the article was and whether my contributions were better suited for another article. So that's why I would want the topic of the article clarified as much as possible. --Bob K31416 (talk) 02:53, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Agree, best would be to merge all three using existing content, then see what we need to change? happy to review or take a punt at it over the weekend. A little wiped out with travel and client work for the rest of this week----Snowded TALK 02:57, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
No, I think the clarification indicated in my last message is needed before considering any major changes like that. --Bob K31416 (talk) 05:04, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you Brews, I appreciate your candor.—Machine Elf 1735 04:20, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Enaction/Enactivism comparison

Below is a flyer at characterizing various articles. They are numbered for easy discussion and amplification.

1. The article Enaction was originated by Sankazim in 2006 who was interested in the ENACTIVE program of the NoE. This gives this article a very particular orientation toward computer interfaces. My guess is that this article should be made to focus even more narrowly upon this subject area, and the pretense of a wider undertaking be removed, making Enactivism the wider article.

2. The article Enactivism is in flux, but presently aims to include all aspects of enactivism. This article appears to be the most general topic choice, and could include a subsection on the E′s embodied, enactive, extended, embedded. These could refer to main articles on these subtopics as these articles develop, but only Embodied cognition has a significant presence right now. The Stanford Encyclopedia has no entry for Enactivism, but the article on embodied cognition has a subsection on enactive cognition. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article on Synesthesia by Allen-Hermanson that mentions enactivism. This site seems to be down at the moment. Here is the PhilPapers link to enactivism.

3. The articles Embodied cognition and Extended cognition could be supplemented with Enactive cognition, but it is probable that the last two could be included in Enactivism because they don't contain sufficient material to go beyond stubs.

4. The article Enaction (philosophy) intends to cover the philosophical aspects of Enactivism. It is doubtful at this time that this article will get off the ground, but Tony wants to work on it.

I'm sure that other editors can add to this beginning. Hope it helps begin to untangle this mess. Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for your thoughtful work. I read it and the three articles Enaction, Enactivism, and Enaction (philosophy).
Re your item 1, I agree that the article is oriented towards computer interfaces.
Re items 2–4, I think we should focus only on the three articles I mentioned above. My impression is that there are three basic topics mixed in the present form of those three articles.
  • In the article Enaction is enaction (psychology), enaction (computer interface), and enaction (philosophy).
  • In the article Enactivism is enaction (philosophy) and enaction (psychology).
  • In the article Enaction (philosophy) is enaction (philosophy) and enaction (psychology).
I think that the three existing articles should be replaced with articles on respectively the three basic topics I mentioned above. The new articles and their respective limited topics would be the following.
--Bob K31416 (talk) 21:07, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I'm in broad agreement as far an 'enaction' goes, however I am not sure you can separate psychology from philosophy ----Snowded TALK 21:31, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
I thought that the psychology article would be restricted to info obtained from psychology sources, such as psychology journals, books that say they are about psychology, etc. Similarly for philosophy. A psychology source probably wouldn't mention philosophy, whereas a philosophy source may mention psychology and that could be included in the philosophy article if needed, in the same limited way as the source mentions it. This is in line with the first paragraph of WP:NOR that advises use of "published sources that are directly related to the topic of the article", in one case psychology and in the other case philosophy. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:38, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
At best I think they can be separated into separate sections of a single article but there's no call for parenthetical disambiguation because the philosophers and psychologists are (more or less) talking about the same topic. I think that "Enaction (psychology+philosophy)" is the WP:PRIMARY topic for "Enaction" and I think an argument can be made that "Enaction (computing)" is not only much more easily separated but that the WP:COMMONNAME should really be going to psycho+philo (as opposed to computing). So, one way to resolve the AfD would be the following sequence:
1) rename the article currently named "Enaction" to "Enactive interface" something parenthetical like "Enaction (computing)"
2) rename "Enactivism" to "Enaction" over that redirect and finally
3) redirect this article there as well.—Machine Elf 1735 22:22, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Re your item 1, I thought the common name for the computer subject was enactive interfaces, which seems to be suggested by the article. For example, try doing an edit-find for enactive interface at the article Enaction and see what you get. --Bob K31416 (talk) 22:52, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Enactive interface would be totally fine and I've included it above.—Machine Elf 1735 23:22, 23 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Bob: Enactivism now had some additional subsections on educational theories and cultural psychology. Would that suggest some changes in your description of the desirable articles? Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I don't think so.
  • If it's about cultural psychology, then going by the term it seems like it would go in the psychology article, if anywhere.
  • I think the sources for the Education section are about education rather than enactivism. Their connection with enactivism is that they use the concept to discuss education, rather than contribute to the subject of enactivism. So the education section may be out of place in Enactivism and in either of the proposed psychology and philosophy articles.
--Bob K31416 (talk) 17:23, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Bob, isn't that a bit like saying ontology is part of 'philosophy' so we don't need an article on ontology? Enactivism is an approach with many applications, and a subsection on each of these is OK. It can hardly be argued that these subsections as they are now are exhaustive treatments. For example, the subsection Enactivism#Cultural aspects is only a few lines, while the literature on this subject is vast, and (presumably one day) there will be a more comprehensive discussion in cultural psychology or maybe an article of its own. The section Enactivism#Educational aspects largely has an article of its own: Situated cognition and in keeping with that bigger treatment, also is only a few lines.
So, Bob, I agree with you that these subsections deal with enactivism as applied to the bigger topics, but don't see why that means they should be dropped from an article on enactivism in all its aspects. Brews ohare (talk) 17:48, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps I was unclear when mentioning "the psychology article" when I meant the proposed Enaction (psychology) article not the Psychology article? Would that change any of your comments? --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:42, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
BTW, the same applies to Enactivism#Psychological aspects and Enactivism#Philosophical aspects, so by removing these subsections, only the introduction would remain in Enactivism, it seems to me? Brews ohare (talk) 18:05, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
The philosophy and psychology material in Enactivism wouldn't be removed or dropped from Wikipdedia but put respectively in the article Enaction (philosophy) and the proposed article Enaction (psychology). --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:18, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
That does look like your proposal, which would remove this article, and replace 'enactivism' with 'enaction' and would have (I guess) Enaction (psychology) which would include Enaction (psychology)#Cultural psychology and maybe Enaction (psychology)#Educational psychology to which we might add Enaction (cognitive science) with subsections Enaction (cognitive science)#Embedded cognition, Enaction (cognitive science)#Extended cognition, Enaction (cognitive science)#Embodied cognition, Enaction (cognitive science)#Affect. That approach could be criticized as appearing to elevate 'enaction' to the prime force engendering 'embedding' extending' and 'embodying'. We'd also have Enaction (philosophy), which would be the discussion of 'non-Cartesian theories of mind' that Tony is working on.
How does that sound? I don't know why 'enaction' is preferred to 'enactivism'. Brews ohare (talk) 18:33, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
We do not chop topics up into separate articles dog-eared for different sources/editors.—Machine Elf 1735 18:43, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
This article Enaction (philosophy) wouldn't be replaced. The article Enactivism would be replaced with Enaction (psychology), which might include Enaction (psychology)#Cultural psychology as you suggested. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:35, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

MachineElf: It sounds as though you are dissing the process for arriving at page topics, as well as the particular proposal. Your own proposal appears to be:
Enaction - disambiguation page
Enactive interface - computer and machine interfaces
Enaction (philosophy) - redirect to Enactivism#Philosophical aspects
Enactivism - more or less as is with some additions perhaps?
That seems workable, and I suppose the present form of Enactivism would be acceptable, more or less, as an article of much wider scope than the philosophical aspects. I am not sure where you put the E′s. Brews ohare (talk) 19:14, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
It may turn out that Enactivism#Philosophical aspects becomes too big when it includes a full blown discussion of 'non-Cartesian theories of mind', and we need Enactivism (philosophy) in the near future to include that topic adequately. Brews ohare (talk) 19:25, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

MachineElf: Renaming Enaction to Enactive interfaces seems like it fits the subject matter there. However, some of its content will have to be moved. The term "enactivism" has deep roots and redirecting Enactivism and moving its content to a new Enaction doesn't seem necessary. What about going the other way around and redirecting the newly empty article Enaction to Enactivism? What are the pros and cons here? Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

The resulting "Enaction" redirect to "Enactive interface" could instead be changed into a dab page and "Enaction (philosophy)" could redirect to "Enactivism".—Machine Elf 1735 18:27, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Re "However, some of its content will have to be moved." — That was one of the ideas, i.e. that the proposed Enactive interfaces article would not be about enaction philosophy or enaction psychology. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:55, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Understood. Brews ohare (talk) 21:14, 24 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Two proposals

Just to summarize, let me put down the article contents as I understand them for MachineElf's proposal:

Enaction. - a disambiguation page
Enactive interfaces. - the material on machine and computer interfaces taken from the existing article Enaction
Enaction (philosophy). - made a redirect to Enactivism#Philosophical aspects, where its material on philosophy will be transferred
Enactivism - a possibly enlarged version of the present article with its present subsections, and to include all aspects of enactivism, including, but not limited to its philosophical aspects
...

Now let me look at Bob's proposal:

Enactive interfaces. - same as other proposal
Enaction (Psychology)
Enaction (Psychology)#Cultural aspects - enactivism and Cultural psychology
Enaction (Psychology)#Educational aspects - things like Situated cognition
...
Enaction (Philosophy). - strictly philosophy; the philosophical parts of the present article, but the psychology removed
Enaction (Philosophy)#Non-Cartesian aspects
Enaction (Philosophy)#Universal Darwinism
...

So question one is: Are these the proposals? Of course, additional subsections could be added.

Question two is: How do they compare?

Two proposals — Comments

  • In looking at them, I prefer MacineElf's proposal for this reason: it allows philosophy and cognitive science in the same article, which will avoid problems separating these two and repetition of similar material that seems likely to occur with Bob's proposal. Brews ohare (talk) 04:30, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • I don't think it was two proposals per se, it was several editors discussing how best to do this. I think the last suggestion from MachineElf is the better one for similar reasons to Brews but with a slight caution as to scope creep ----Snowded TALK 11:03, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • Actually, I hadn't proposed any specific subsections for the two articles Enaction (psychology) and Enaction (philosophy). Essentially the guiding principle for what would go into each article is whether the material was from a psychology oriented source or a philosophy oriented source. From the comments so far it looks like what I suggested isn't going to be accepted, so I will leave it at that. --Bob K31416 (talk) 11:53, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Perhaps my problem is that I thought the definition of the concept of enaction in psychology is different from the definition of the concept of enaction in philosophy. Maybe you could give your thoughts on what those two definitions are? Or are they the same? --Bob K31416 (talk) 12:16, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Its both different and the same, then you add in Thhe cognitive science aspects which heavily overlay on philosophy. So per your comments of some time ago this is a trans disciplinary issue with differentiator aspects and common themes and concepts/implications----Snowded TALK 13:31, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
The philosophical and the scientific are in principle quite separable. The first is not open to empirical test, and the second is based upon it. Although scientists change hats occasionally, they usually notice that is what they are doing. Philosophers aren't so careful.
An example here is a psychological theory of perception, which is based upon a testable theory of how certain classes of objects are seen as having a three-dimensional character (maybe leading to haptic technology). That can be compared to a philosophical position (maybe Husserl) that presumes the observer brings pre-experential mental and tactile equipment to their interactions with the world that to some degree (to be analyzed ad nauseum) limits their exploration of the world to one that satisfies their limitations. The last view is such a wide generalization as to be beyond the capacity for empirical verification, although instances where this happens may be verifiable. The generalization has application to our entire experience, while a limitation to the verifiable prevents psychology from such extrapolation. Brews ohare (talk) 14:36, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
In short, enaction in psychology is testable, enaction in philosophy is an extrapolation from the testable that cannot be, even in principle, verified. Brews ohare (talk) 14:57, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the answers from both of you. From Snowded I get that it is hard to say what the definition(s) is(are). From Brews ohare I get that whatever the definitions are, the one from psychology is testable whereas the one from philosophy is an extrapolation of testable concepts that isn't itself testable. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:24, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Well, Bob, some say "enactivism" has become a term so broad that it has no meaning anymore. As for philosophy, one of its quandaries is how "knowing" is to be distinguished from "testability". Enaction is one proposed answer, that "knowing" can't be separated from "doing", "know what" requires "know how". Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
The separation of science from philosophy is a philosophical position Brews. Those of us from a realist and nauralising perspective would disagree and you will find many authors very comfortable working in both words. The statement that action is testable in one and not testable in others makes an ontological assumptions that many would challenge. While e discussion is interesting we are agreed on one article so not sure where this is going? 17:45, 25 April 2014‎ Snowded (talk | contribs)‎
Snowded, Re your comment, "... we are agreed on one article so not sure where this is going? " — If that's the case then implement it. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:28, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
A change we all seem agreed to is moving Enaction to Enactive interfaces. How about starting there? Brews ohare (talk) 20:02, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
give me a chance Bob, I am hoping between meetings at the UN and Manhatten using the iPad between meetings. I think it is a move per Brews above and a redirect to Enactivism. ----Snowded TALK 20:55, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Brews, would you mind copying a summary to the AfD page? —Machine Elf 1735 23:54, 25 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]