Helmuth von Moltke the Younger: Difference between revisions
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[[Image:von moltke the younger.jpg|thumb|Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke]] |
[[Image:von moltke the younger.jpg|thumb|Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke]] |
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'''Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke''' ([[1848]] |
'''Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke''' ([[May 25]] [[1848]]–[[June 18]] [[1916]]), also known as '''Moltke the Younger''', was a nephew of the "[[Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke|Great Moltke]]" and served as the [[German General Staff|Chief of the German General Staff]] from [[1906]] to [[1914]]. |
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==Biography== |
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He was born in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and named for his uncle, [[Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke]], future [[Generalfeldmarschall|Field Marshal]] and hero of the Wars of Unification. During the [[Franco-Prussian War]] he served with the 7th Grenadier Regiment, and was cited for bravery. He attended the War Academy between [[1875]] and [[1878]] and joined the General Staff in [[1880]]. In [[1882]] he became personal adjutant to his uncle, then Chief of the General Staff. In [[1891]], on the death of his uncle, Moltke became aide-de-camp to [[William II of Germany|Wilhelm II]], thus becoming part of the Emperor's inner circle. In the late 1890's he commanded first a brigade and then a division, finally being promoted to Lieutenant General in [[1902]]. <!--Mombauer, 47-49--> |
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In [[1904]] he was promoted to Quartermaster-General; in effect, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Indeed, in [[1906]], he became chief on the latter's retirement. His appointment was controversial then and remains so today. The other likely candidates for the position were [[Hans Hartwig von Beseler]], [[Karl von Bülow]], and [[Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz]].<!--Mombauer, 68--> Critics charge that Moltke gained the position on the strength of his name and his friendship with the Kaiser. Certainly Moltke was far closer to the Kaiser than the other candidates. Historians argue, however, that Beseler was too close to Schlieffen to have succeeded him, while Bülow and Goltz were too independent for Wilhelm to have accepted them. Indeed, Moltke's friendship with the Kaiser permitted him latitude with his majesty that others could not have enjoyed. It should be noted that Goltz, at least, saw nothing wrong with Moltke's performance as Chief. <!--Ibid, 71--> |
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As Chief of the General Staff Moltke was responsible for the development and execution of the strategic plans of the German Army. There is considerable debate over the nature of his plans. Critics from the so-called "Schlieffen School" argue that Moltke took his predecessor's plan (the "[[Schlieffen Plan]]"), modified it without understanding it, and failed to execute it properly during the [[First World War]], thus dooming German efforts. The Schlieffen Plan (based on the ''Denkschrift'' of [[1905]]) envisaged a one-front war against [[France]] and [[Great Britain|England]]. The entire German Army would take the offensive in the West, with the hammer blow being delivered by the right wing, which would attack through [[Belgium]] and [[the Netherlands]], both of which then and in [[1914]] were neutral. Moltke's planning was based on a two-front war against [[France]] and [[Russia]], and predicated upon the army in the West (still vastly stronger than the army in the East), gaining a quick decision against the French so that troops could be shifted to meet the Russian threat. It has recently been argued by [[Terence Zuber]] that Schlieffen's memorandum of [[1905]] was never a war plan, or even representative of his thinking, and that in actuality Schlieffen planned something similar to what Moltke executed in [[1914]]. In addition, Moltke opted to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands, thus maintaining her usefulness as a port in the event of a British blockade. The debate goes on. |
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During the Marne Campaign of 1914, Moltke's health broke down and he was succeeded by [[Erich von Falkenhayn]]. It is a matter of debate whether the failure of said campaign can be placed at Moltke's feet. A number of historians, notably Zuber and S.L.A. Marshall, contend that the failure of [[Alexander von Kluck]]'s First Army to keep position with Bülow's Second Army, thus creating a gap near [[Paris]] that was exploited by the French, is a more direct cause than any planning foibles on Moltke's part. The Schlieffen School disagrees, and argues that Moltke lost control of the invading armies during the month of August and thus was unable to react when the [[Battle of the Marne]] developed in September. |
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Moltke's health deteriorated and he died in Berlin on [[June 18]], [[1916]], a broken man. |
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==References== |
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*Annika Mombauer. ''Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War''. Cambridge University Press, 2001. |
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*Terence Zuber. ''Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871-1914''. Oxford University Press, 2002. |
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{{PeerNavbox | Title=[[German General Staff|Chief of the General Staff]] | Prev=[[Alfred Graf von Schlieffen|Count Schlieffen]] | Next=[[Erich von Falkenhayn]]}} |
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[[Category:1848 births|Moltke, Helmuth, Johann Ludwig von]] |
[[Category:1848 births|Moltke, Helmuth, Johann Ludwig von]] |
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Revision as of 02:35, 27 October 2004
Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke (May 25 1848–June 18 1916), also known as Moltke the Younger, was a nephew of the "Great Moltke" and served as the Chief of the German General Staff from 1906 to 1914.
Biography
He was born in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and named for his uncle, Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, future Field Marshal and hero of the Wars of Unification. During the Franco-Prussian War he served with the 7th Grenadier Regiment, and was cited for bravery. He attended the War Academy between 1875 and 1878 and joined the General Staff in 1880. In 1882 he became personal adjutant to his uncle, then Chief of the General Staff. In 1891, on the death of his uncle, Moltke became aide-de-camp to Wilhelm II, thus becoming part of the Emperor's inner circle. In the late 1890's he commanded first a brigade and then a division, finally being promoted to Lieutenant General in 1902.
In 1904 he was promoted to Quartermaster-General; in effect, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Indeed, in 1906, he became chief on the latter's retirement. His appointment was controversial then and remains so today. The other likely candidates for the position were Hans Hartwig von Beseler, Karl von Bülow, and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Critics charge that Moltke gained the position on the strength of his name and his friendship with the Kaiser. Certainly Moltke was far closer to the Kaiser than the other candidates. Historians argue, however, that Beseler was too close to Schlieffen to have succeeded him, while Bülow and Goltz were too independent for Wilhelm to have accepted them. Indeed, Moltke's friendship with the Kaiser permitted him latitude with his majesty that others could not have enjoyed. It should be noted that Goltz, at least, saw nothing wrong with Moltke's performance as Chief.
As Chief of the General Staff Moltke was responsible for the development and execution of the strategic plans of the German Army. There is considerable debate over the nature of his plans. Critics from the so-called "Schlieffen School" argue that Moltke took his predecessor's plan (the "Schlieffen Plan"), modified it without understanding it, and failed to execute it properly during the First World War, thus dooming German efforts. The Schlieffen Plan (based on the Denkschrift of 1905) envisaged a one-front war against France and England. The entire German Army would take the offensive in the West, with the hammer blow being delivered by the right wing, which would attack through Belgium and the Netherlands, both of which then and in 1914 were neutral. Moltke's planning was based on a two-front war against France and Russia, and predicated upon the army in the West (still vastly stronger than the army in the East), gaining a quick decision against the French so that troops could be shifted to meet the Russian threat. It has recently been argued by Terence Zuber that Schlieffen's memorandum of 1905 was never a war plan, or even representative of his thinking, and that in actuality Schlieffen planned something similar to what Moltke executed in 1914. In addition, Moltke opted to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands, thus maintaining her usefulness as a port in the event of a British blockade. The debate goes on.
During the Marne Campaign of 1914, Moltke's health broke down and he was succeeded by Erich von Falkenhayn. It is a matter of debate whether the failure of said campaign can be placed at Moltke's feet. A number of historians, notably Zuber and S.L.A. Marshall, contend that the failure of Alexander von Kluck's First Army to keep position with Bülow's Second Army, thus creating a gap near Paris that was exploited by the French, is a more direct cause than any planning foibles on Moltke's part. The Schlieffen School disagrees, and argues that Moltke lost control of the invading armies during the month of August and thus was unable to react when the Battle of the Marne developed in September.
Moltke's health deteriorated and he died in Berlin on June 18, 1916, a broken man.
References
- Annika Mombauer. Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Terence Zuber. Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871-1914. Oxford University Press, 2002.