Historical nihilism

Historical nihilism (历史虚无主义) is a term used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to refer to research or discussions that contradict its official version of history. The CCP opposes interpretations and viewpoints of history that are critical to the communist party, the Chinese government, the People's Liberation Army, national leaders, socialism, or related topics. In China, historical nihilism has been described as criticism of the entirety of an entity, such as the communist party, national heroes, leaders, socialism and CCP history, by citing only certain events about the entity without consideration of the whole. Qu Qingshan, the head of CCP history research in the CPC Central Committee, defined the essence of historical nihilism as "political thoughts with strong political tendencies and intentions" and encourages Chinese historians to "take a more active approach toward historical nihilism by stating facts in a clearer way with a louder voice." Viewpoints deemed to be historical nihilism are subject to official censorship and legal repercussions. In a January 2013 speech, President Xi Jinping accused “hostile forces” of using historical nihilism to weaken the party’s rule by smearing its history. In early 2021, Xi increased efforts to promote a “correct outlook on history” ahead of the 100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, including opening a telephone hotline and website for citizens to report instances of historical nihilism.

Origin

Although 'incorrect' interpretations of history would have been censored and punished during the period of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), neither leader made a clear attempt to engage against 'historical nihilism' as it is specifically understood today. According to Chinese historian Zhang Lifan, the main push to fight against 'historical nihilism', according to its specific modern meaning, undertaken by the communist party has its origin in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square Protests and coinciding events within the communist countries of Eastern Europe. In December of that year, Jiang Zemin the new CCP general secretary and leader of China, made a speech in which he said the liberation of the Bourgeoisie had led to the spread of 'national nihilism' and 'historical nihilism', which had entered party thinking and brought about confusion.

Content

Media and education in China is not allowed to represent history in a manner that is forbidden by government censors. In 2018, the Law on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs banned the slander of “heroes and martyrs”. In May 2021, the internet regulator confirmed it had deleted over 2 million posts containing 'harmful' discussions of history. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established a specialized unit to propagate an official version of history.

Topics on things like the Great Chinese Famine, the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square Protests are often scrubbed or at least depicted in such a way as to avoid blame on the party. Chinese students in public schools, for example, may be taught that the Great Famine was caused by bad weather conditions without mention of human factors related to contemporary government policy at the time. Modern Chinese history is generally presented to praise the achievements of the Communist party and its role in creating a prosperous 'new China'.

Xi Jinping in January 2013, at the time when he was taking over power as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and paramount leader in China, made a speech in which he said 'The history of the post-reform period cannot be used to contradict the history of the pre-reform period, and the history of the pre-reform period cannot be used to contradict the history of the post-reform period'. Although China's reforms since the 1980s caused it to radically change and abandon many of the Marxist policies that had existed under Mao Zedong, the official state-sanctioned version of history under Xi Jinping teaches an interpretation of continuity, praising both the contributions made by the communist party of Mao's generation and the communist party of the post-reform period. This is in contrast to interpretations in the period prior to Xi Jinping whereby some of Mao's policies could receive heavy criticism and the official stance of the party was a rejection of the Cultural Revolution, which had been referred to as the 'Ten Year Calamity' (十年浩劫).

Some critical events preceding the history of the Communist Party of China also may have interpretations that can be labeled as 'historical nihilism'. For example, in 1994 Li Zehou, a Chinese scholar, criticized Sun Yat-Sen and the Xinhai revolution of 1911, which marked the overthrow of the old Imperial system in China. His view was that the revolution was rooted in radicalism and had created a disaster, while it would have been better to slowly reform and modernize the system. This viewpoint was condemned as 'historical nihilism', because it was in contradiction to official communist interpretations.