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Chinese foreign policy derives from the [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]].<ref>Xinhua News “Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence” (2004) China View/Xinhua News, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm available here] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121102202803/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm |date=2012-11-02 }}; [[Wen Jiabao]], Premier of the People’s Republic of China “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development” (Speech at Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 2004, 28 June 2004), [http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/t140777.htm available here]; Zhou Enlai ''Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan'' or ''周恩来外交文选'' or ''Selected works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy'', at 63.</ref> These principles enshrine [[non-intervention]] as a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. Non-interference principles are also found in China's foreign policy manifestos.<ref>"China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace" (2003) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm available here].</ref> This is problematic because non-intervention rejects the common-assertion of R2P, that state sovereignty cannot justify non-action in the face of genocide or mass atrocity.<ref>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ''The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS'' (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001).</ref> Force is permitted in the last resort.<ref>''2005 World Summit Outcome'' GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [139].</ref>
Chinese foreign policy derives from the [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]].<ref>Xinhua News “Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence” (2004) China View/Xinhua News, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm available here] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121102202803/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm |date=2012-11-02 }}; [[Wen Jiabao]], Premier of the People’s Republic of China “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development” (Speech at Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 2004, 28 June 2004), [http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/t140777.htm available here]; Zhou Enlai ''Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan'' or ''周恩来外交文选'' or ''Selected works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy'', at 63.</ref> These principles enshrine [[non-intervention]] as a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. Non-interference principles are also found in China's foreign policy manifestos.<ref>"China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace" (2003) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm available here].</ref> This is problematic because non-intervention rejects the common-assertion of R2P, that state sovereignty cannot justify non-action in the face of genocide or mass atrocity.<ref>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ''The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS'' (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001).</ref> Force is permitted in the last resort.<ref>''2005 World Summit Outcome'' GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [139].</ref>


The concept of forcible intervention is "alien" to Asian nations<ref>Akiko Fukushima and William Tow "Human Security and Global Governance" in William Tow (ed) ''Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?'' (2009, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 170 {{ISBN|9780521758826}}</ref> especially following two horrific wars.<ref>The [[Korean war]] and the [[Vietnam war]].</ref> Chinese reticence to forcible intervention can be traced back to its historical experiences during the [[First Opium War|First]] and [[Second Opium War]]s of the nineteenth century, semi-colonization and the Cold War alongside the continued motivations of the Chinese government to maintain dominance over the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (they also claim Taiwan despite the PRC never having any sovereign claim over the country).<ref>Shuisheng Zhao "Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" (2005) 29 ''The Washington Quarterly'' 131.</ref>
The concept of forcible intervention is "alien" to Asian nations<ref>Akiko Fukushima and William Tow "Human Security and Global Governance" in William Tow (ed) ''Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?'' (2009, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 170 {{ISBN|9780521758826}}</ref> especially following two horrific wars.<ref>The [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]].</ref> Chinese reticence to forcible intervention can be traced back to its historical experiences during the [[First Opium War|First]] and [[Second Opium War]]s of the nineteenth century, semi-colonization and the Cold War alongside the continued motivations of the Chinese government to maintain dominance over the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (they also claim Taiwan despite the PRC never having any sovereign claim over the country).<ref>Shuisheng Zhao "Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" (2005) 29 ''The Washington Quarterly'' 131.</ref>


China have also advocated the principles of [[state sovereignty]] and non-intervention to obstruct [[Hegemony|US-hegemonic]] expansion.<ref>: Zhang Li “A Few Issues Concerning International Intervention” (paper presented at the International Intervention and State Sovereignty Conference, Beijing, 14–15 January 2002); Lu Gang “Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty” (paper presented at the Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty workshop, Shanghai, 8 January 2002); Guo Xuetang “Presentation for Conference on ‘Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty,’” Shanghai, 8 January 2002.</ref> China is skeptical of a Western system of human rights being imposed globally, and were quick to accuse the US of threatening a "rising China" following the [[U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade|accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy]] in Belgrade during the [[1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia|NATO bombing of Kosovo]].<ref>Zhang Yunling "China: Whither the World Order after Kosovo?" in Albert Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds) ''Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship'' (2000, UNU Press, Tokyo) at 121.</ref>
China have also advocated the principles of [[state sovereignty]] and non-intervention to obstruct [[Hegemony|US-hegemonic]] expansion.<ref>: Zhang Li “A Few Issues Concerning International Intervention” (paper presented at the International Intervention and State Sovereignty Conference, Beijing, 14–15 January 2002); Lu Gang “Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty” (paper presented at the Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty workshop, Shanghai, 8 January 2002); Guo Xuetang “Presentation for Conference on ‘Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty,’” Shanghai, 8 January 2002.</ref> China is skeptical of a Western system of human rights being imposed globally, and were quick to accuse the US of threatening a "rising China" following the [[U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade|accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy]] in Belgrade during the [[1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia|NATO bombing of Kosovo]].<ref>Zhang Yunling "China: Whither the World Order after Kosovo?" in Albert Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds) ''Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship'' (2000, UNU Press, Tokyo) at 121.</ref>

Revision as of 08:54, 21 June 2024

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a widely endorsed and developing norm aimed at preventing humanitarian atrocities.[1] China has been surprisingly[2] receptive towards the development of R2P since its inception in 2001,[3] despite China's traditional tendency to obstruct engagement in humanitarian crises.[4] As veto-wielding Security Council member, important regional power,[5] and major economic power, with interests in states experiencing, or vulnerable to, humanitarian crisis,[6] including Nigeria,[7] Zimbabwe,[8] Angola and Sudan,[9] the support of China for R2P is vital.

Overview

China has been identified as a prima facie vulnerable country of concern, whose people are at significant risk of becoming victims of atrocity.[10] China remains poorly regarded for its handling of internal dissent, especially the brutal crackdowns in Tibet, Xinjiang and the Tiananmen Square massacre.[11]

History

Mass atrocity is not foreign to China. Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalists killed some 10 million people from 1927 to 1949 in group-targeted violence,[12] while Mao Zedong's communists killed a further 7 million from 1934 onwards, not including the tens of millions who died following the famine of the Great Leap Forward or the violence of the Cultural Revolution,[13] or the 300,000 Chinese slaughtered by Japanese during the Rape of Nanking.[14] More recently, China experienced great brutality when thousands were massacred in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.[15]

Chinese foreign policy

State sovereignty and non-intervention

Chinese foreign policy derives from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.[16] These principles enshrine non-intervention as a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. Non-interference principles are also found in China's foreign policy manifestos.[17] This is problematic because non-intervention rejects the common-assertion of R2P, that state sovereignty cannot justify non-action in the face of genocide or mass atrocity.[18] Force is permitted in the last resort.[19]

The concept of forcible intervention is "alien" to Asian nations[20] especially following two horrific wars.[21] Chinese reticence to forcible intervention can be traced back to its historical experiences during the First and Second Opium Wars of the nineteenth century, semi-colonization and the Cold War alongside the continued motivations of the Chinese government to maintain dominance over the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang (they also claim Taiwan despite the PRC never having any sovereign claim over the country).[22]

China have also advocated the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention to obstruct US-hegemonic expansion.[23] China is skeptical of a Western system of human rights being imposed globally, and were quick to accuse the US of threatening a "rising China" following the accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO bombing of Kosovo.[24]

China believes that a state's economic development and historical background should be factors considered when looking at the humanitarian situation in that state.[25] Jiang Zemin felt that human rights should be promoted in light of cultural diversities.[26] However, this clashes statements made by Ban Ki-moon, that R2P must be integrated into all cultures "without hesitation or condition," to reflect its universality.[27] In light of this, China initially dismissed the notion of R2P as a "total fallacy".[28]

A new sovereignty

A new understanding of state sovereignty arose in the 1990s, incorporating the element of "responsibility."[29] This meant that no longer could state sovereignty be invoked to shelter states, guilty of committing massive humanitarian atrocities, from international condemnation.[30]

In light of this progression, there have been indications that Chinese foreign policy has progressed to incorporate the belief that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in the most extreme circumstances[31] Possible examples of this include:[32]

  • A government practicing blatant racism;
  • State failure;
  • Large-scale domestic violence; or
  • The killing of civilians en masse.

China submit that this will always be conditional on Security Council approval,[33] and be treated on a case-by-case basis.[34] This prevents the creation of customary international law[35] and allows China to block any action. China exercised its right to veto in respect of the Burmese[36] and Zimbabwean conflicts.[37] Nevertheless, it has been the rhetoric of Chinese diplomats to reinforce national, regional and global efforts to ensure peace, and on more than one occasion to emphasize "the moral obligation" the world has to secure peace in Africa.[38] China has a contributing role in R2Ps operationalisation.[39]

Socialisation

China has successfully integrated into the global economy,[40] becoming a significant focal point of trade, investment and production.[41] While Chinese society is still largely non-transparent,[42] Chinese leaders are becoming more and more susceptible to international criticism following its increasing level of integration.[43] No country in the world is immune from peer pressure.[44] Recently China was the subject of international criticism, for its concern for its own economic interests in Sudan, rather than for the humanitarian atrocities occurring there.[45] Here, for the first time, China felt the need to respond to this naming and shaming.[46]

Peacekeeping

Throughout the 1990s China was a key party to UN peacekeeping missions deployed to intrastate conflicts, take for example China's role in East Timor.[47] This and other missions were authorized with the use of force to protect civilian populations along with being intimately involved in the internal affairs of the host-state.[48] China strengthened this commitment after 2000, and as of August 2008 contributed more military and police personnel than any other permanent Security Council member.[49]

While China can be seen as taking a more flexible approach to intervention and the acceptable use of force,[50] it does continue to hamper Security Council efforts from time to time,[51] perhaps to ensure a norm of customary international law does not develop,[52] however more likely because the missions in question deviate from the China's traditional peacekeeping principles of nonviolence and impartiality.[53]

Nevertheless, in cases where China has blocked or watered-down Security Council resolutions, it has taken strides to ensure political solutions. For example:

  • Despite resisting a Security Council resolution, China played a “vital and constructive role” in brokering the Darfur peace plan in 2006;[54]
  • Despite voting against a resolution regarding the deteriorating situation in Burma in October 2007, China played a pivotal role in securing and organizing the UN special envoy visit to Yangon.[55]
  • While objecting to the imposition of sanctions on Sudan, Chinese diplomats warned the Sudanese government of the international communities dwindling patience over the crisis in Darfur, and the brewing impetus to impose sanctions on them.[56]

These illustrations have been recognised as pragmatic support for the core concepts underpinning R2P.[57]

Responsibility to Protect

2005

China was a party to the 2005 endorsement of R2P,[58] and reaffirmed its support for the doctrine in the same year.[59] A momentous headway was made in the Security Council in 2006. In November 2005, Kofi Annan petitioned the Security Council to strengthen its R2P commitments, with regard to civilians in armed conflict.[60] Following initial reluctance[61] to specifically include R2P in a resolution, China eventually agreed to incorporate the same phrasing used in 2005 and voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 1674.[62]

2006-

However, Chinese support since 2005 has been “cautious.”[63] China was sure to limit its support of Resolution 1674 to the four specific crimes specified in the Outcome Document of 2005[64] and was skeptical of other states loosely interpreting it and abusing the concept by applying it to circumstances that were not intended.[65] This skepticism peaked in 2007, when the Chinese augured that the Security Council must avoid forcible intervention,[66] and because of differing interpretations the General Assembly must garner a broad consensus on the concept to prevent its misapplication by the Security Council.[67]

However, during this period China consistently endorsed the World Summit phrasing and the primary responsibility each state has to protect their populations, and referred to Resolution 1673 as the “legal framework” within which the Security Council may work to protection of civilians in armed conflict.[68] China has continually emphasized the key roles of conflict prevention and capacity building in R2Ps development to argue that the best form of protection is prevention.[69] This mirrors the work of the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General who stresses that the primary focus of R2Ps implementation is preventing atrocities in the first instance.[70] China argue that, failing this, any protective measures taken following the outbreak of conflict are virtually ineffectual. It is much better to provide civilians with “safe and predictable living environments,”[71] hence their augmented peacekeeping role.[72] China argue that bodies such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, The Human Rights Council, the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank all have to play their part, alongside regional organizations and non-governmental organizations.[73] China's emphasis on enhancing the roles of various international bodies aligns with the efforts to actualise R2P.[74]

Crisis response

China has responded to R2P in “pendulum-like movements,”[75] evidenced in its strong criticism of NATO for its 1999 bombing of Kosovo compared to its explicit support for forcible intervention in East Timor very shortly after.[76] China has also provided a strong regional dimension to its implementation of R2P, see for example the cases of Darfur and Myanmar.[77]

Darfur

China thwarted proposed Security Council resolutions aimed at ending the atrocities that had already claimed nearly 300,000 civilian lives in Darfur.[78] There were two resolutions involved:

Resolution 1672

This sought to impose travel and financial sanctions on four alleged war criminals, impeding the peace process. Here, China objected on the ground that sanctions only work to victimize civilians and due to their coinciding with the Abuja peace talks; sanctions could forego any potential positive outcome of those talks.[79] Moreover, they disliked the procedure that led to this resolution, which included premature suspension of discussion and a complete lack of supplementary detail clarifying the evidence which had led the Security Council to the proposed sanctions.[80] China never stood opposed to international involvement, rather it felt it necessary to hold the perpetrators to account and supported the “pivotal” role the African Union had in securing peace in the region.[81]

Resolution 1706

This sought to place peacekeepers in the region and was the first reference to R2P in Resolution in relation to a specific conflict. China abstained on voting on the basis that Sudan had not consented, and that such measures should be postponed until Annan's recommendation, of holding high-level discussions, was played out.[82] China believed this could derail progress at implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.[83] Nonetheless, China regarded the deployment of UN peacekeepers as a “good idea and realistic option,” so long as Sudanese consent could be obtained and in such event the deployment must take place in a timely manner.[84] China, in its position, purposely mirrored the stance of the African Union, to ensure a lasting and peaceful result for the African region.[85]

Myanmar/Burma

China blocked humanitarian action in Burma despite worsening conditions and refugee flows. It did so on the basis that the situation was neither a threat to international peace[86] nor within the specific ambit of R2P. Thus, according to China it remained the within the internal affairs of Myanmar.[87] China not only felt Security Council action would hinder the work being completed by other United Nations bodies, but that the “grave challenges” it faced, such as refugee flows, child labour, HIV/AIDS, human rights abuses and drugs did not warrant Security Council intervention.[88]

China was criticized[89] for this unsympathetic statement on the grounds that R2P involves crisis-prevention, that they had overlooked the seriousness of the refugee flows,[90] and that its position directly countered specific resolutions allowing the council to consider situations where civilians are being targeted and humanitarian aid is denied.[91] China once again felt that it was down to the Regional body, ASEAN, to play a “leading role”[92] in addressing the Myanmar issue.[93] ASEAN, much like China, prefer unobtrusive engagement, void of forcible intervention.[94]

References

  1. ^ Major endorsements of R2P at the international level (grouped by actor):
    • International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001);
    • United Nations Secretaries General: Kofi Annan, A more secure world: our shared responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change UN GOAR, 59th sess, A/59/565 (2004); Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security, and human rights for all: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GOAR, 59th sess, A/59/2005 (2005); Ban Ki-moon Secretary General Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: international Cooperation for a Changed World’ UN Dept. of Public Information SG/SM/11701 (2008); Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General UN GOAR, 63rd sess, A/63/677 (2009);
    • United Nations General Assembly: 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138]-[139];
    • United Nations Security Council: SC Res 1674, S/Res/1674 (2006) particularly at [4]; SC Res 1706, S/Res/1706 (2006); SC Res 1973, S/Res/1973 (2011) in particular at [4] and [8];
    • United Nations Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, Edward Luck “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect” (2008) The Stanley Foundation Available Here.
  2. ^ Gareth Evans details his surprise at the 2004 Secretary-General High Panel Stage, see Gareth Evans The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.) at 45;
    • This was regarded as particularly surprising given China's staunch opposition during the entire ICISS process, see Alex Bellamy "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit (2006) 20 Ethics and International Affairs 143 at 151.
  3. ^ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001)
  4. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 208-209
  5. ^ In both the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three processes, see Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect (2011, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Singapore) at 8.
  6. ^ Stephanie Hanson “China, Africa and Oil” (2008) Council on Foreign Relations, available here.
  7. ^ Peter Goodman “Cnooc Buys Oil Interest In Nigeria” The Washington Post (United States of America, 10 July 2006) available here.
  8. ^ BBC News “China raises stakes in Zimbabwe” (2004) BBC News, available here.
  9. ^ Rochelle Mutton “Mugabe sells bankrupt Zimbabwe's assets to China” The Age (Australia, 30 July 2005), available here.
  10. ^ Gareth Evans The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.) at 76.
  11. ^ Gareth Evans The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.) at 63.
  12. ^ Hugo Slim Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (2008, Columbia University Press, New York) at 44.
  13. ^ Hugo Slim Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (2008, Columbia University Press, New York) at 44.
  14. ^ Hugo Slim Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (2008, Columbia University Press, New York) at 51-52.
  15. ^ Amnesty International Preliminary Findings on Killings of Unarmed Civilians, Arbitrary Arrests and Summary Executions since 3 June 1989 (30 August 1989).
  16. ^ Xinhua News “Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence” (2004) China View/Xinhua News, available here Archived 2012-11-02 at the Wayback Machine; Wen Jiabao, Premier of the People’s Republic of China “Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development” (Speech at Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 2004, 28 June 2004), available here; Zhou Enlai Zhou Enlai Waijiao wenxuan or 周恩来外交文选 or Selected works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy, at 63.
  17. ^ "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace" (2003) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, available here.
  18. ^ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001).
  19. ^ 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [139].
  20. ^ Akiko Fukushima and William Tow "Human Security and Global Governance" in William Tow (ed) Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? (2009, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 170 ISBN 9780521758826
  21. ^ The Korean War and the Vietnam War.
  22. ^ Shuisheng Zhao "Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" (2005) 29 The Washington Quarterly 131.
  23. ^ : Zhang Li “A Few Issues Concerning International Intervention” (paper presented at the International Intervention and State Sovereignty Conference, Beijing, 14–15 January 2002); Lu Gang “Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty” (paper presented at the Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty workshop, Shanghai, 8 January 2002); Guo Xuetang “Presentation for Conference on ‘Preventative Diplomacy and State Sovereignty,’” Shanghai, 8 January 2002.
  24. ^ Zhang Yunling "China: Whither the World Order after Kosovo?" in Albert Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds) Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship (2000, UNU Press, Tokyo) at 121.
  25. ^ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo de renquan zhuangkuang or 中国的人全状况 or China’s Human Rights Situation (1991, Information Office of the State Council, Beijing) at 67-70.
  26. ^ Jiang Zemin “Together to Build a China-U.S. Special Relationship Oriented Towards the New Century” (Speech, New York, 8 September 2000), available here.
  27. ^ Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General UN GOAR, 63rd sess, A/63/677 (2009) at [20].
  28. ^ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility To Protect, Part III: Background at 392
  29. ^ Francis Deng ‘Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian Action’ in John Harbeson & Donald Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges (1995, Westview Press, Boulder) at 295; Francis Deng et al Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (1996, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.) and also adopted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS (International Development Research Centre Ottawa, 2001).
  30. ^ Kofi Annan “Two Concepts of Sovereignty” The Economist (London, 18 September 1999) at 48; Kofi Annan Millennium Report and Annual Report on the Work of the Organization UN GOAR, 55th sess, supp. No.1, A/55/1 (2000) at [37]; Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng ‘Exodus within Borders: The Uprooted Who Never Leave Home’ (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs, at 12.
  31. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 212-213;Allen Carlson “Protecting Sovereignty, Accepting Intervention: The Dilemma of Chinese Foreign Relations in the 1990s” (2002) 18 National Committee on United States-China Relations: China Policy Series at 24.
  32. ^ Jia Qingguo ‘China’ in Watanabe Koji (ed) Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolving Asian Debate (2003, Japan Centre for International Exchange, Tokyo) at 25.
  33. ^ Jia Qingguo ‘China’ in Watanabe Koji (ed) Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolving Asian Debate (2003, Japan Centre for International Exchange, Tokyo) at 25.
  34. ^ Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Khong Human Security and the UN: A Critical History (2006, Bloomington, Indiana) at 169; also see in respect of Libya: Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations "Statement by H. E. Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict" (10 Ma 2011), available here.
  35. ^ Hugh Thirlway ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed, 2010, Oxford University Press, New York) at 108-109.
  36. ^ Security Council Peace and Security in Myanmar Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5619 (2007)
  37. ^ Security Council Peace and security in Africa Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5933 (2008)
  38. ^ Quote from Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister for the People’s Republic of China, UN SCOR, Peace and Security in Africa United Nations Security Council Verbatim Record S/PV.5749 (25 September 2007) at 13; Also see Wang Yi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China, Peace and Security in Africa United Nations Security Council Verbatim Record S/PV.2868 (16 April 2008) at 11.
  39. ^ Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg “China and Darfur: ‘Signs of Transition’” (2007) International Crisis Group, available here Archived 2011-09-02 at the Wayback Machine.
  40. ^ Yong Deng China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of Intel Relations (2008, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
  41. ^ Wei Liang “China: Globalization and the Emergence of a New Status Quo Power?” (2007) 31 Asian Perspective 125.
  42. ^ Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect (2011, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Singapore) at 12
  43. ^ Allen Carlson “More than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen” in Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross (eds) New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (2006, Stanford University Press, Stanford) at 234.
  44. ^ Gareth Evans The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2008, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.) at 63.
  45. ^ Jonathan Holslag “Commerce and Prudence: Revising China’s Evolving Africa Policy (2008) 8 International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 325.
  46. ^ China Daily “Wen Defends China’s Role in Darfur” China Daily (20 February 2008), available here;Sudan Tribune “China issues a warning to Sudan over Darfur crisis” Sudan Tribune (30 January 2008), available here.
  47. ^ Paul Evans "Human Security in Extremis: East Asian Reactions to the Responsibility to Protect" in Sorpong Peou (ed) Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action (2009, Routledge, London) at 79-93
  48. ^ Bates Gill and James Reilly ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing’ (2000) 42 Survival 41 at 48-50, available here; Yin He China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations (2007, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden) at 41-42, available here; Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect (2011, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Singapore) at 9; Bates Gill Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (2007, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.) see Chapter 4.
  49. ^ United Nations Peacekeeping ‘Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel’ (August 2008), available here.
  50. ^ Stefan Staehle “China’s Participation” (MA, Thesis, The Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 2006) at 45; Allen Carlson ‘Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention’ (2004) 77 Pacific Affairs 9 at 19-25.
  51. ^ M Taylor Fravel ‘China’s Attitude to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’ (1996) 36 Asian Survey 1102 at 1109-1115 (deals with in particular: Cambodia at 1109-1110, The former Yugoslavia at 1110-1112, Somalia at 1112-1114 and Haiti at 1113-1115)
  52. ^ Hugh Thirlway ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Malcolm Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed, 2010, Oxford University Press, New York) at 108-109.
  53. ^ M Taylor Fravel ‘China’s Attitude to UN Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’ (1996) 36 Asian Survey 1102 at 1109.
  54. ^ The peace plan: BBC News “Annan outlines Darfur peace plans” BBC News (2006), available here; Chinese support recorded by Andrew Natsios, The US special envoy to Sudan in ‘Statement of Andrew S. Natsios, The President’s Special Envoy to Sudan’ House Committee on Foreign Affairs (8 February 2007), available here.
  55. ^ Security Council Report “Update Report: Myanmar” (4 October 2007) at 3, available here.
  56. ^ Sudan Tribune “China issues a warning to Sudan over Darfur crisis” Sudan Tribune (30 January 2008), available here.
  57. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 215.
  58. ^ 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138]-[139].
  59. ^ “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (7 June 2005) at point 3(1), available here.
  60. ^ Kofi Annan Report of the Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict S/2005/740 (2006).
  61. ^ Security Council Report “Update Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” (8 March 2006) at 1, available here.
  62. ^ United Nations Security Council Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict SC Res 1674, S/RES/1674 (2006); Rosemary Foot “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its Evolution: Beijing's Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas” (2011) St Antony’s International Review.
  63. ^ Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Ambassador in the Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5577 (2006) at 8.
  64. ^ Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Ambassador in the Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5476 (2006) at 10; Liu Zhenmin "Statement by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly on the QUestion of 'Responsibility to Protect'" The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (24 July 2009), available here; 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138]-[139].
  65. ^ Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Ambassador in the Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5577 (2006) at 8.
  66. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5781 (2007) at 9.
  67. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5703 (2007) at 17; Liu Zhenmin "Statement by H.E. Ambassador LIU Zhenmin at the Open Debate of the Security Council on 'Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts'" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (20 November 2007), available here; Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5898 (2008) at 9.
  68. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5898 (2008) at 8.
  69. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 217-218
  70. ^ Special Advisor see: United Nations Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, Edward Luck “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect” (2008) The Stanley Foundation, available here.
  71. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5577 (2006) at 8.
  72. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5781 (2007) at 9.
  73. ^ Security Council Security Council Open Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5898 (2008) at 9.
  74. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 218-219.
  75. ^ Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect (2011, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Singapore) at 11.
  76. ^ Security Council Resolution 1264 S/RES/1264 (1999); Security Council Resolution 1272 S/RES/1272 (1999).
  77. ^ Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect (2011, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Singapore) at 2.
  78. ^ CNN News “U.N.: 100,000 more dead in Darfur than reported” CNN News (22 April 2008), available here Archived 2012-10-10 at the Wayback Machine.
  79. ^ Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya Resolution 1672 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5423 (2006) at 3.
  80. ^ Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya Resolution 1672 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5423 (2006) at 3.
  81. ^ Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya Resolution 1672 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5423 (2006) at 3.
  82. ^ Security Council Resolution 1706 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5519 (2006) at 5.
  83. ^ Security Council Resolution 1706 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5519 (2006) at 5.
  84. ^ Security Council Resolution 1706 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5519 (2006) at 5.
  85. ^ Yang Jiechi, Chinese Foreign Minister Peace and Security in Africa United Nations Security Council Verbatim Record S/PV.5749 (2007) at 13; this support for the African region can also be seen in Zhang Yishan Resolution 1679 United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5749 (2007) at 13.
  86. ^ Security Council Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5619 (2007) at 3.
  87. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 223.
  88. ^ Wang Guangya Draft Resolution on Myanmar United Nations Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5619 (2007) at 3.
  89. ^ Sarah Teitt ‘Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 208 at 223.
  90. ^ Charlie McDonald-Gibson “Worries Over Myanmar Refugee Flood At Crammed Border Camp” Relief Web (2007), available here.
  91. ^ Including Security Council Resolutions:
    • Protection of Civilians S/RES/1265 (1999)
    • Protection of Civilians S/RES/1296 (2000)
  92. ^ Security Council Security Council Verbatim Records S/PV.5619 (2007) at 3.
  93. ^ Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (press conference, 11 January 2007).
  94. ^ Shaun Narine “State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific” (2004) 17 Pacific Review 423 at 437-438.

Further reading

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