Denial-of-service attack: Difference between revisions
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====Incidents==== |
====Incidents==== |
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The first major attack involving DNS servers as reflectors occurred in January 2001. The attack was |
The first major attack involving DNS servers as reflectors occurred in January 2001. The attack was Register.com.<ref>[http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos/register.com-unisog.txt January 2001 thread on the UNISOG mailing list]</ref> This attack, which forged requests for the MX records of AOL.com (to amplify the attack) lasted about a week before it could be traced back to all attacking hosts and shut off. It used a list of tens of thousands of DNS year old (at the time of the attack.) |
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In July 2002, the Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge was issued.<ref>[http://www.honeynet.org/reverse Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge]</ref> The binary that was analyzed turned out to be yet another DDoS agent, which implemented several DNS related attacks, including an optimized form of a reflection attack. |
In July 2002, the Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge was issued.<ref>[http://www.honeynet.org/reverse Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge]</ref> The binary that was analyzed turned out to be yet another DDoS agent, which implemented several DNS related attacks, including an optimized form of a reflection attack. |
Revision as of 23:06, 10 July 2007
A denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the means to, motives for and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally comprises the concerted, malevolent efforts of a person or persons to prevent an Internet site or service from functioning efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely.
Perpetrators of DoS attacks typically — but not exclusively — target sites or services hosted on high-profile web servers; a pair of DNS Backbone DDoS Attacks, on October 22, 2002 and February 6, 2007, targeted DNS root servers, in an apparent attempt to disable the Internet itself.
One common method of attack involves saturating the target (victim) machine with external communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable. In general terms, DoS attacks are implemented by:
- forcing the targeted computer(s) to reset, or consume its resources such that it can no longer provide its intended service; and/or,
- obstructing the communication media between the intended users and the victim so that they can no longer communicate adequately.
Denial-of-service attacks are considered violations of the IAB's Internet proper use policy. They also commonly constitute violations of the laws of individual nations.
Manifestations
The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team defines symptoms of DoS attacks to include:
- unusually slow network performance (opening files or accessing web sites)
- unavailability of a particular web site
- inability to access any web site
- dramatic increase in the number of spam emails received [1]
Not all service outages, even those that result from malicious activity, are necessarily denial-of-service attacks. Other methods of attack may include a denial of service as one component of a larger offensive.
DoS attacks can also lead to problems in the network 'branches' around the actual computer being attacked. For example, the bandwidth of a router between the Internet and a LAN may be consumed by a DoS, compromising not only the intended computer, but also the entire network.
If the DoS is conducted on a sufficiently large scale, entire geographical swathes of Internet connectivity can also be compromised by incorrectly configured or flimsy network infrastructure equipment without the attacker's knowledge or intent.
Methods of attack
A "denial-of-service" attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. Examples include:
- flooding a network, thereby preventing legitimate network traffic;
- disrupting a server by sending more requests than it can possibly handle, thereby preventing access to a service;
- preventing a particular individual from accessing a service;
- disrupting service to a specific system or person.
Attacks can be directed at any network device, including attacks on routing devices and Web, electronic mail, or Domain Name System servers.
A DoS attack can be perpetrated in a number of ways. There are three basic types of attack:
- consumption of computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, or CPU time;
- disruption of configuration information, such as routing information;
- disruption of physical network components.
A DoS attack may include execution of malware intended to:
- max out the CPU's usage, preventing any work from occurring;
- trigger errors in the microcode of the machine;
- trigger errors in the sequencing of instructions, so as to force the computer into an unstable state or lock-up;
- exploits errors in the operating system to cause resource starvation and/or thrashing, i.e. to use up all available facilities so no real work can be accomplished;
- crash the operating system itself.
SYN floods
A SYN flood sends a flood of TCP/SYN packets, often with a spoofed sender address. Each of these packets are handled like a connection request, causing the server to spawn a half-open connection, by sending back a TCP/SYN-ACK packet, and waiting for a TCP/ACK packet in response from the sender address. However, because the sender address is forged, the response never comes. These half-open connections consume resources on the server and limit the number of connections the server is able to make, reducing the server's ability to respond to legitimate requests until after the attack ends.
When a computer wants to make a TCP/IP connection (the most common internet connection) to another computer, usually a server, an exchange of TCP/SYN and TCP/ACK packets of information occur. The computer requesting the connection, usually the client's or user's computer, sends a TCP/SYN packet which asks the server if it can connect. If the server will allow connections, it sends a TCP/SYN-ACK packet back to the client to say "Yes, you may connect." and reserves a space for the connection, waiting for the client to respond with a TCP/ACK packet detailing the specifics of its connection.
In a SYN flood the address of the client is often forged so that when the server sends the go-ahead back to the client, the message is never received because the client either doesn't exist or wasn't expecting the packet and subsequently ignores it. This leaves the server with a dead connection, reserved for a client that will never respond. Usually this is done to one server many times in order to reserve all the connections for unresolved clients, which keeps legitimate clients from making connections.
The classic "bad" example is that of a party. Only 50 people can be invited to a party, and invitations are available on a first-come first-serve basis. Fifty letters are sent to request invitations, but the letters all have false return addresses. The invitations are mailed to the return addresses of the request letters. Unfortunately, all of the return addresses provided were fake, so nobody, or at least nobody of interest, receives the invitations. Now, when someone actually wants to come to the party (view the website), there are no invitations left because all the invitations (connections) have been reserved for 50 supposed people who will never actually show up.
The classic SYN flood was most notably introduced in 1993 by members of the IRC community as a method of removing combatants from IRC channels or networks. The first UNIX programs to utilize these programs were synflood.c by osek (circa 1993) and nuke.c Satanic Mechanic (circa 1992/1993)
LAND attack
A LAND attack involves sending a spoofed TCP/SYN packet (connection initiation) with the target host's IP address with an open port as both source and destination. The attack causes the targeted machine to reply to itself continuously and eventually crash.
ICMP floods
A smurf attack is one particular variant of a flooding DoS attack on the public Internet. It relies on mis-configured network devices that allow packets to be sent to all computer hosts on a particular network via the broadcast address of the network, rather than a specific machine. The network then serves as a smurf amplifier. In such an attack, the perpetrators will send large numbers of IP packets with the source address faked to appear to be the address of the victim. To combat Denial of Service attacks on the Internet, services like the Smurf Amplifier Registry have given network service providers the ability to identify misconfigured networks and to take appropriate action such as filtering.
Ping flood is based on sending the victim an overwhelming number of ping packets, usually using the "ping -f" command. It is very simple to launch, the primary requirement being access to greater bandwidth than the victim.
UDP floods
UDP floods include "Fraggle attacks". In a fraggle attack an attacker sends a large amount of UDP echo traffic to IP broadcast addresses, all of it having a fake source address. It is a simple rewrite of the smurf attack code.
Teardrop attack
The Teardrop attack involves sending IP fragments with overlapping oversized payloads to the target machine. A bug in the TCP/IP fragmentation re-assembly code caused the fragments to be improperly handled, crashing the operating system as a result of this.[2] Windows 3.1x, Windows 95 and Windows NT operating systems, as well as versions of Linux prior to 2.0.32 and 2.1.63 are vulnerable to this attack.
Peer-to-peer attacks
Attackers have found a way to exploit a number of bugs in peer-to-peer servers to initiate DDoS attacks. The most aggressive of these peer-to-peer-DDoS attacks exploits DC++. Peer-to-peer attacks are different from regular botnet based attacks. With peer-to-peer there is no botnet and the attacker doesn’t have to communicate with the clients it subverts. Instead, the attacker acts as a ‘puppet master,’ instructing clients of large peer-to-peer file sharing hubs to disconnect from their peer-to-peer network and to connect to the victim’s website instead. As a result, several thousand computers may aggressively try to connect to a target website. While a typical web server can handle a few hundred connections/sec before performance begins to degrade, most web servers fail almost instantly under five or six thousand connections/sec. With a moderately big peer-to-peer attack a site could potentially be hit with up to 750,000 connections in a short order. The targeted web server will be plugged up and confused by the incoming connections. While peer-to-peer attacks are easy to identify with signatures, the large number of IP addresses that need to be blocked (often over 250,000 during the course of a big attack) means that this type of attack can overwhelm mitigation defenses. Even if a mitigation device can keep blocking IP addresses, there are other problems to consider. For instance, there is a brief moment where the connection is opened on the server side before the signature itself comes through. Only once the connection is opened to the server can the identifying signature be sent and detected, and the connection torn down. Even tearing down connections rapidly takes server resources and can harm the server [3].
Application level floods
On IRC, IRC floods are a common electronic warfare weapon.
Various DoS-causing exploits such as buffer overflow can cause server-running software to get confused and fill the disk space or consume all available memory or CPU time.
Other kinds of DoS rely primarily on brute force, flooding the target with an overwhelming flux of packets, oversaturating its connection bandwidth or depleting the target's system resources. Bandwidth-saturating floods rely on the attacker having higher bandwidth available than the victim; a common way of achieving this today is via Distributed Denial of Service, employing a botnet. Other floods may use specific packet types or connection requests to saturate finite resources by, for example, occupying the maximum number of open connections or filling the victim's disk space with logs.
A "banana attack" is another particular type of DoS. It involves redirecting outgoing messages from the client back onto the client, preventing outside access, as well as flooding the client with the sent packets.
An attacker with access to a victim's computer may slow it until it is unusable or crash it by using a fork bomb.
A 'Pulsing zombie' is a term referring to a special denial-of-service attack. A network is subjected to hostile pinging by different attacker computers over an extended amount of time. This results in a degraded quality of service and increased workload for the network's resources. This type of attack is more difficult to detect than traditional denial-of-service attacks due to their surreptitious nature.
Nukes
Nukes are malformed or specially crafted packets.
WinNuke is a type of nuke, exploiting the vulnerability in the NetBIOS handler in Windows 95. A string of out-of-band data is sent to TCP port 139 of the victim machine, causing it to lock up and display a Blue Screen of Death.
Distributed attack
A distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) occurs when multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system, usually one or more web servers. These systems are compromised by attackers using a variety of methods.
Malware can carry DDoS attack mechanisms; one of the more well known examples of this was MyDoom. Its DoS mechanism was triggered on a specific date and time. This type of DDoS involved hardcoding the target IP address prior to release of the malware and no further interaction was necessary to launch the attack.
A system may also be compromised with a trojan, allowing the attacker to download a zombie agent (or the trojan may contain one). Attackers can also break into systems using automated tools that exploit flaws in programs that listen for connections from remote hosts. This scenario primarily concerns systems acting as servers on the web.
Stacheldraht is a classic example of a DDoS tool. It utilizes a layered structure where the attacker uses a client program to connect to handlers, which are compromised systems that issue commands to the zombie agents, which in turn facilitate the DDoS attack. Agents are compromised via the handlers by the attacker, using automated routines to exploit vulnerabilities in programs that accept remote connections running on the targeted remote hosts. Each handler can control up to a thousand agents.[4]
These collections of compromised systems are known as botnets. DDoS tools like stacheldraht still use classic DoS attack methods centered around IP spoofing and amplification like smurf attacks and fraggle attacks (these are also known as bandwidth consumption attacks). SYN floods (also known as resource starvation attacks) may also be used. Newer tools can use DNS servers for DoS purposes. (see next section)
Unlike MyDoom's DDoS mechanism, botnets can be turned against any IP address. Script kiddies use them to deny the availability of well known websites to legitimate users.[5] More sophisticated attackers use DDoS tools for the purposes of extortion — even against their business rivals.[6]
It is important to note the difference between a DDoS and DoS attack. If an attacker mounts a smurf attack from a single host it would be classified as a DoS attack. In fact, any attack against availability would be classed as a Denial of Service attack (e.g. using High-energy radio-frequency weapons to render computer equipment inoperable, would be a DoS attack, albeit an exotic one.)[7]. On the other hand, if an attacker uses a thousand zombie systems to simultaneously launch smurf attacks against a remote host, this would be classified as a DDoS attack.
The major advantages to an attacker of using a distributed denial-of-service attack are that multiple machines can generate more attack traffic than one machine, multiple attack machines are harder to turn off than one attack machine, and that the behavior of each attack machine can be stealthier, making it harder to track down and shut down. These attacker advantages cause challenges for defense mechanisms. For example, merely purchasing more incoming bandwidth than the current volume of the attack might not help, because the attacker might be able to simply add more attack machines.
Reflected attack
A distributed reflected denial of service attack (DRDoS) involves sending forged requests of some type to a very large number of computers that will reply to the requests. Using Internet protocol spoofing, the source address is set to that of the targeted victim, which means all the replies will go to (and flood) the target.
ICMP Echo Request attacks (described above) can be considered one form of reflected attack, as the flooding host(s) send Echo Requests to the broadcast addresses of mis-configured networks, thereby enticing many hosts to send Echo Reply packets to the victim. Some early DDoS programs implemented a distributed form of this attack.
Many services can be exploited to act as reflectors, some harder to block than others.[8] DNS amplification attacks involve a new mechanism that increased the amplification effect, using a much larger list of DNS servers than seen earlier.[9]
Unintentional attack
This describes a situation where a website ends up denied, not due to a deliberate attack by a single individual or group of individuals, but simply due to a sudden enormous spike in popularity. This can happen when an extremely popular website posts a prominent link to a second, less well-prepared site, for example, as part of a news story. The result is that a significant proportion of the primary site's regular users — potentially hundreds of thousands of people — click that link in the space of a few hours, having the same effect on the target website as a DDoS attack.
News sites and link sites — sites whose primary function is to provide links to interesting content elsewhere on the Internet — are most likely to cause this phenomenon. The canonical example is the Slashdot effect. Sites such as Digg, Fark, Something Awful and the webcomic Penny Arcade have their own corresponding "effects", known as "the Digg effect", "farking", "goonrushing" and "wanging"; respectively.
Routers have also been known to create unintentional DoS attacks, as both D-Link and Netgear routers have created NTP vandalism by flooding NTP servers without respecting the restrictions of client types or geographical limitations.
Similar unintentional attacks can also occur via other media, e.g. when a URL is mentioned on television. If a server is being indexed by Google or another search engine during peak periods of activity, or does not have a lot of available bandwidth while being indexed, it can also experience the effects of a DoS attack.
Incidents
The first major attack involving DNS servers as reflectors occurred in January 2001. The attack was Register.com.[10] This attack, which forged requests for the MX records of AOL.com (to amplify the attack) lasted about a week before it could be traced back to all attacking hosts and shut off. It used a list of tens of thousands of DNS year old (at the time of the attack.)
In July 2002, the Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge was issued.[11] The binary that was analyzed turned out to be yet another DDoS agent, which implemented several DNS related attacks, including an optimized form of a reflection attack.
On two occasions to date, attackers have performed DNS Backbone DDoS Attacks on the DNS root servers. Since these machines are intended to provide service to all Internet users, these two denial of service attacks might be classified as attempts to take down the entire Internet, though it is unclear what the attackers' true motivations were. The first occurred in October 2002, and disrupted service at 9 of the 13 root servers. The second occurred in February 2007, and caused disruptions at two of the root servers.
Prevention and response
Surviving attacks
The investigative process should begin immediately after the DoS attack begins. There will be multiple phone calls, call backs, emails, pages and faxes between the victim organization, one's provider and others involved. It is a time consuming process, so the process should begin immediately. It has taken some very large networks with plenty of resources several hours to halt a DDoS.
The easiest way to survive an attack is to have planned for the attack. Having a separate emergency block of IP addresses for critical servers with a separate route can be invaluable. A separate route (perhaps a DSL) is not that extravagant, and it can be used for load balancing or sharing under normal circumstances and switched to emergency mode in the event of an attack.
Filtering is often ineffective, as the route to the filter will normally be swamped so only a trickle of traffic will survive. However, by using an extremely resilient stateful packet filter that will inexpensively[12] drop any unwanted packets, surviving a DDoS attack becomes much easier. When such a high performance packet filtering server is attached to an ultra high bandwidth connection (preferably an Internet backbone), communication with the outside world will be unimpaired so long as not all of the available bandwidth is saturated, and performance behind the packet filter will remain normal as long as the packet filter drops all DDoS packets.[13] It should be noted however, that in this case the victim of the DDoS attack still would need to pay for the excessive bandwidth. The price of service unavailability thus needs to be weighed against the price of truly exorbitant bandwidth/traffic.
SYN Cookies
SYN cookies modify the TCP protocol handling of the server by delaying allocation of resources until the client address has been verified. This seems to be the most powerful defense against SyN attacks. There are Solaris and Linux implementations. The Linux implementation can be turned on during runtime of the Linux kernel.
Firewalls
Firewalls have simple rules such as to allow or deny protocols, ports or IP addresses. Some DoS attacks are too complex for today's firewalls, e.g. if there is an attack on port 80 (web service), firewalls cannot prevent that attack because they cannot distinguish good traffic from DoS attack traffic. Additionally, firewalls are too deep in the network hierarchy. Your router may be affected even before the firewall gets the traffic. Nonetheless, firewalls can effectively prevent users from launching simple flooding type attacks from machines behind the firewall.
Modern stateful firewalls like Check Point FW1 NGX & Cisco PIX have a built-in capability to differentiate good traffic from DoS attack traffic. This capability is known as a "Defender", as it confirms TCP connections are valid before proxying TCP packets to service networks (including border routers). A similar ability is present in OpenBSD's pF, which is available for other BSDs as well. In that context, it is called "synproxy".
Switches
Most switches have some rate-limiting and ACL capability. Some switches provide automatic and or system-wide rate limiting, traffic shaping, delayed binding (TCP splicing), deep packet inspection and Bogon filtering (bogus IP filtering) to detect and remediate denial of service attacks through automatic rate filtering and WAN Link failover and balancing.
These schemes will work as long as the DoS attacks are something that can be prevented using them. For example SYN flood can be prevented using delayed binding or TCP splicing. Similarly content based DoS can be prevented using deep packet inspection. Attacks originating from dark addresses or going to dark addresses can be prevented using Bogon filtering. Automatic rate filtering can work as long as you have set rate-thresholds correctly and granularly. Wan-link failover will work as long as both links have DoS/DDoS prevention mechanism.
Routers
Similar to switches, routers have some rate-limiting and ACL capability. They, too, are manually set. Most routers can be easily overwhelmed under DoS attack. If you add rules to take flow statistics out of the router during the DoS attacks, they further slow down and complicate the matter. Cisco IOS has features that prevents flooding, i.e. example settings [14].
Application front end hardware
Application front end hardware is intelligent hardware placed on the network before traffic reaches the servers. It can be used on networks in conjunction with routers and switches. Application front end hardware analyzes data packets as they enter the system, and then identifies them as priority, regular, or dangerous. There are more than 25 bandwidth management vendors. Hardware acceleration is key to bandwidth management. Look for granularity of bandwidth management, hardware acceleration, and automation while selecting an appliance.
IPS based prevention
Intrusion-prevention systems are effective if the attacks have signatures associated with them. However, the trend among the attacks is to have legitimate content but bad intent. IPSs which work on content recognition cannot block behavior based DoS attacks.
An ASIC based IPS can detect and block denial of service attacks because they have the processing power and the granularity to analyze the attacks and act like a circuit breaker in an automated way.
A rate-based IPS (RBIPS) must analyze traffic granularly and continuously monitor the traffic pattern and determine if there is traffic anomaly. It must let the legitimate traffic flow while blocking the DoS attack traffic.
Notes and references
- ^ Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks (US CERT)
- ^ "Advisory CA-1997-28 IP Denial-of-Service Attacks" (CERT)
- ^ Sop, Paul (2007). "P2P Distributed Denial of Service Attack Alert".
- ^ The "stacheldraht" distributed denial of service attack tool
- ^ Intrusion Detection FAQ: Distributed Denial of Service Attack Tools: trinoo and wintrinoo
- ^ US credit card firm fights DDoS attack
- ^ Zap! ... and your PC's dead
- ^ Paxson, Vern (2001), An Analysis of Using Reflectors for Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
- ^ Vaughn, Randal and Evron, Gadi (2006), DNS Amplification Attacks
- ^ January 2001 thread on the UNISOG mailing list
- ^ Honeynet Project Reverse Challenge
- ^ ie. without consuming much processing power
- ^ OpenBSD's pf is a packet filter some providers use for exactly this purpose. [1]
- ^ "Some IoS tips for Internet Service (Providers) or points" (Mehmet Suzen)
External links
- Denial of service magazine article
- RFC 4732 Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations
- Intentando detener un DDoS (en español)
- W3C The World Wide Web Security FAQ
- cert.org CERT's Guide to DoS attacks.
- washington.edu Dave Dittrich's DDoS page.
- surasoft.com - DDoS case study, concepts, and protection.
- tik.ee.ethz.ch DDoSVax Research Project at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich.
- prolexic.com - Prolexic Whitepaper on DDoS mitigation
- honeypots.net Papers and presentations on DDoS mitigation techniques.
- DoS attack resources
- newssocket.com An article regarding a DDoS for hire incident.
- grc.com General information regarding DoS attacks.
- isotf.org General information regarding DNS reflector and amplification DDoS attacks.
- linuxsecurity.com An article on preventing DDoS attacks.
- intruguarddevices.com News articles on DDoS attacks.
- whatis.com – Denial of Service
- Denial of Service (Carnegie Mellon) CC Denial of Service Attacks
- Understanding Denial of Service Attack. US-CERT
- Cisco IOS commands to prevent flooding.
- A proposal for defeating SYN attacks by a protocol change
- (Queens University Belfast) Denial of Service Study
- DDoSInfo.com Blog About The Latest DDoS Incidents