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==On Journalism==
==On Journalism==
Since the mid-1980s, Deweyan ideas have experienced revival as they are a major source of inspiration for the public journalism movement. His definition of "public," as described in ''The Public and Its Problems'', has profound implications for the significance of journalism in society. As suggested by the title of the book, Dewey's concern was of the transactional relationship between publics and problems. Also implicit in its name, public journalism seeks to orient communication away from elite, corporate hegemony toward a civic public sphere. "The 'public' of public journalists is Dewey's public."<ref>Heikkilä, H. and Kunelius, R. 2002. Public Journalism and Its Problems: A Theoretical Perspective, http://www.imdp.org/artman/publish/article_30.shtml</ref> <br /> It has been argued that Dewey's public is strongly identical with that of the Internet, and that Dewey's interactive notion of the community foreshadowed the rise of the global telecommunications society. <ref>Slabbert, N.J., Nov-Dec., 2006. John Dewey: Philosopher of Community. Urban Land, journal of the Urban Land Institute, Washington DC.</ref> <br />
Since the mid-1980s, Deweyan ideas have experienced revival as they are a major source of inspiration for the public journalism movement. His definition of "public," as described in ''The Public and Its Problems'', has profound implications for the significance of journalism in society. As suggested by the title of the book, Dewey's concern was of the transactional relationship between publics and problems. Also implicit in its name, public journalism seeks to orient communication away from elite, corporate hegemony toward a civic public sphere. "The 'public' of public journalists is Dewey's public."<ref>Heikkilä, H. and Kunelius, R. 2002. Public Journalism and Its Problems: A Theoretical Perspective, http://www.imdp.org/artman/publish/article_30.shtml</ref> <br />


Dewey gives a concrete definition to the formation of a public. Publics are spontaneous groups of citizens who share the indirect effects of a particular action. Anyone affected by the indirect consequences of a specific action will automatically share a common interest in controlling those consequences, i.e., solving a common problem.<ref>Dewey, J. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. Henry Holt & Co., New York. pp 126.</ref> <br /> Since every action generates [[unintended consequence]]s, publics continuously emerge, overlap, and disintegrate.
Dewey gives a concrete definition to the formation of a public. Publics are spontaneous groups of citizens who share the indirect effects of a particular action. Anyone affected by the indirect consequences of a specific action will automatically share a common interest in controlling those consequences, i.e., solving a common problem.<ref>Dewey, J. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. Henry Holt & Co., New York. pp 126.</ref> <br /> Since every action generates [[unintended consequence]]s, publics continuously emerge, overlap, and disintegrate.

Revision as of 00:01, 27 April 2008

John Dewey
Era20th-century philosophy
RegionWestern Philosophy
SchoolPragmatism
Main interests
Philosophy of education, Epistemology, Journalism, Ethics
Notable ideas
Educational progressivism

John Dewey (October 20, 1859June 1, 1952) was an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer, whose thoughts and ideas have been greatly influential in the United States and around the world. He, along with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, is recognized as one of the founders of the philosophical school of Pragmatism. He is also known as the father of functional psychology; he was a leading representative of the progressive movement in U.S. schooling during the first half of the 20th century.[1]

Life and Works

Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont of modest family origins [2]. Like his older brother, Davis Rich Dewey, he attended the University of Vermont, from which he graduated (Phi Beta Kappa) in 1879. After three years as a high school teacher in Oil City, Pennsylvania, Dewey decided that he was unsuited for employment in primary or secondary education. Borrowing two thousand dollars from his aunt[citation needed], he was able to enter graduate school in philosophy. His unpublished and now lost dissertation was titled "The Psychology of Kant" and he made a special study of Hegel's Absolute idealism. After receiving his Ph.D. from the School of Arts & Sciences at Johns Hopkins University in 1884, he took a faculty position at the University of Michigan with the help of George Sylvester Morris. In 1894 Dewey joined the newly founded University of Chicago where he shaped his belief in an empirically based theory of knowledge aligning his ideals with the newly emerging Pragmatic school of thought. His time at the University of Chicago resulted in four essays collectively entitled Thought and its Subject-Matter which was published with collected works from his colleagues at Chicago under the collective title Studies in Logical Theory (1903). During this time Dewey also founded the University of Chicago Laboratory Schools where he was able to actualize his pedagogical beliefs which provided material for his first major work on education, The School and Society (1899). Disagreements with the administration ultimately led to his resignation from the University at which point he left for the East Coast. From 1904 until his death he was professor of philosophy at both Columbia University and Teachers College, Columbia University. [3] He was a long-time member of the American Federation of Teachers.

Along with the historian Charles Beard, economists Thorstein Veblen and James Harvey Robinson, Dewey is one of the founders of The New School for Social Research. Dewey's most significant writings were "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (1896), a critique of a standard psychological concept and the basis of all his further work; Human Nature and Conduct (1922), a study of the role of habit in human behavior; The Public and its Problems (1927), a defense of democracy written in response to Walter Lippmann's The Phantom Public (1925); Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey's most "metaphysical" statement; Art as Experience (1934), Dewey's major work on aesthetics; A Common Faith (1934), a humanistic study of religion, which was originally delivered as the Dwight H. Terry Lectureship at Yale; Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), an examination of Dewey's unusual conception of logic; and Freedom and Culture (1939), a political work examining the roots of fascism. While each of these works focuses on one particular philosophical theme, Dewey wove all of his major themes into everything he wrote.

Overview: Pragmatism and Instrumentalism

Dewey is one of the three central figures in American pragmatism, along with Charles Sanders Peirce, who coined the term, and William James, who popularized it—though Dewey did not identify himself as a pragmatist, per se, but instead referred to his philosophy as "instrumentalism." Dewey worked from strongly Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian influences, unlike James, whose lineage was primarily British, drawing particularly on empiricist and utilitarian thought. Dewey was also not nearly so pluralist or relativist as James. He held that value was a function not of whim nor purely of social construction, but a quality situated in events ("nature itself is wistful and pathetic, turbulent and passionate" (Experience and Nature)).

He also held, unlike James, that experimentation (social, cultural, technological, philosophical) could be used as a relatively hard-and-fast arbiter of truth. For example, James felt that for many people who lacked "over-belief" in religious concepts, human life was shallow and rather uninteresting, and that while no one religious belief could be demonstrated as the correct one, we are all responsible for taking the leap of faith and making a gamble on one or another theism, atheism, monism, etc. Dewey, in contrast, while honoring the important role that religious institutions and practices played in human life, rejected belief in any static ideal, such as a theistic God. Dewey felt that only science could reliably further human good, specifically denying that religion or metaphysics could form a valid foundation for morality and social values [4].

Of the idea of God, Dewey said, "it denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions."[5]

As with the reemergence of progressive philosophy of education, Dewey's contributions to philosophy as such (he was, after all, much more a professional philosopher than a thinker on education) have also reemerged with the reassessment of pragmatism, beginning in the late 1970s, by thinkers like Richard Rorty, Richard J. Bernstein and Hans Jonas.

Because of his process-oriented and sociologically conscious view of the world and knowledge, he is sometimes seen as a useful alternative to both modern and postmodern ways of thinking. Dewey's non-foundational approach pre-dates postmodernism by more than half a century. Recent exponents (like Rorty) have not always remained faithful to Dewey's original vision, though this itself is completely in keeping both with Dewey's own usage of other thinkers and with his own philosophy— for Dewey, past doctrines always require reconstruction in order to remain useful for the present time.

Dewey's philosophy has gone by many names other than "pragmatism". He has been called an instrumentalist, an experimentalist, an empiricist, a functionalist, and a naturalist. The term "transactional" may better describe his views, a term emphasized by Dewey in his later years to describe his theories of knowledge and experience.

Epistemology

The terminology problem in the fields of epistemology and logic is partially due, according to Dewey and Bentley,[6] to inefficient and imprecise use of words and concepts that reflect three historic levels of organization and presentation.[7] In the order of chronological appearance, these are :

  • Self-Action: Prescientific concepts regarded humans, animals, and things as possessing powers of their own which initiated or caused their actions.
  • Interaction: as described by Newton, where things, living and inorganic, are balanced against thing in a system of interaction, for example, the third law of motion that action and reaction are equal and opposite.
  • Transaction: where modern systems of descriptions and naming are employed to deal with multiple aspects and phases of action without any attribution to ultimate, final, or independent entities, essences, or realities.

A series of characterizations of Transactions indicate the wide range of considerations involved.[8]

  • Transaction is inquiry in which existing descriptions of events are accepted only as tentative and preliminary. New descriptions of the aspects and phases of events based on inquiry may be made at any time.
  • Transaction is inquiry characterized by primary observation that may range across all subject matters that present themselves, and may proceed with freedom to re-determine and re-name the objects comprised in the system.
  • Transaction is Fact such that no one of the constituents can be adequately specified as apart from the specification of all the other constituents of the full subject matter.
  • Transaction develops and widens the phases of knowledge, and broadens the system within the limits of observation and report.
  • Transaction regards the extension in time to be comparable to the extension in space, so that “thing” is in action, and “action” is observable in things.
  • Transaction assumes no pre-knowledge of either organism or environment alone as adequate, but requires their primary acceptance in a common system.
  • Transaction is the procedure which observes men talking and writing, using language and other representational activities to present their perceptions and manipulations. This permits a full treatment, descriptive and functional, of the whole process inclusive of all its contents, and with the newer techniques of inquiry required.
  • Transactional Observation insists on the right to freely proceed to investigate any subject matter in whatever way seems appropriate, under reasonable hypothesis.

Illustration of differences between self-action, interaction, and transaction, as well as the different facets of transactional inquiry are provided by statements of positions that Dewey and Bentley definitely did not hold and which never should be read into their work.[9]

  1. They do not use any basic differentiation of subject vs. object; of soul vs. body; of mind vs. matter; or self vs. nonself.
  2. They do not support the introduction of any ultimate knower from a different or superior realm to account for what is known.
  3. Similarly, they do not tolerate "entities" or "realities" of any kind intruding as if from behind or beyond the knowing-known events, with power to interfere.
  4. They exclude the introduction of "faculties" or other "operators" of an organism’s behaviors, and require for all investigations the direct observation and contemporaneous report of findings and results.
  5. Especially, they recognize no names that are offered as expressions of “inner” thoughts, nor of names that reflect compulsions by outer objects.
  6. They reject imaginary words and terms said to lie between the organism and its environmental objects, and require the direct location and source for all observations relevant to the investigation.
  7. They tolerate no meanings offered as "ultimate" truth or "absolute" knowledge.
  8. Since they are concerned with what is inquired into, and the process of knowings, they have no interest in any underpinning. Any statement that is or can be made about a knower, self, mind, or subject, or about a known thing, an object, or a cosmos must be made on the basis of, and in the language applicable to the specific investigation.

In summary, all of human knowledge consists of actions and products of acts in which men and women participate with other human beings, with animals and plants, as well as objects of all types, in any environment. Men and women have, are, and will present their acts of knowing and known in language. Generic man, and specific men and women are known to be vulnerable to error. Consequently, all knowledge (knowing and known) whether commonsensical or scientific; past, present, or future; is subject to further inquiry, examination, review, and revision.

Logic and Method

Dewey sees paradox in contemporary logical theory. Proximate subject matter garners general agreement and advance, while the ultimate subject matter of logic generates unremitting controversy. In other words, he challenges confident logicians to answer the question of the truth of logical operators. Do they function merely as abstractions (e.g., pure mathematics) or do they connect in some essential way with their objects, and therefore alter or bring them to light? (The Problem of Logical Subject Matter, in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry {1938}.)

Logical positivism also figured in Dewey's thought. About the movement he wrote that it "eschews the use of 'propositions' and 'terms', substituting 'sentences' and 'words'." (General Theory of Propositions, in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.) He welcomes this changing of referents “in as far as it fixes attention upon the symbolic structure and content of propositions.” However, he registers a small complaint against the use of “sentences” and “words” in that without careful interpretation the act or process of transposition “narrows unduly the scope of symbols and language, since it is not customary to treat gestures and diagrams (maps, blueprints, etc.) as words or sentences.” In other words, sentences and words, considered in isolation, do not disclose intent, which may be inferred or “adjudged only by means of context.” (Ibid.)

Yet Dewey was not entirely opposed to modern logical trends. Concerning traditional logic, he states: “Aristotelian logic, which still passes current nominally, is a logic based upon the idea that qualitative objects are existential in the fullest sense. To retain logical principles based on this conception along with the acceptance of theories of existence and knowledge based on an opposite conception is not, to say the least, conductive to clearness – a consideration that has a good deal to do with existing dualism between traditional and the newer relational logics.” (Qualitative Thought {1930}.)

Louis Menand argues somewhat convincingly in The Metaphysical Club that Jane Addams was critical to Dewey's emphasis on commensurability and reconciliation, as opposed to the traditional thesis/anti-thesis component of the dialectic. Considering how otherwise uneventful Dewey's life was, it is worth quoting the passage in full. (The context is a discussion of the Pullman strike of 1894.):

...Dewey was baffled. He asked Addams whether there weren't antagonisms between certain institutions--for example, capital and labor, or the church and democracy--which it made sense to take seriously. She said there never were: "The antagonism of institutions was always unreal; it was simply due to the injection of the personal attitude & reaction; & then instead of adding to the recognition of meaning, it delayed & distorted it." It was, Dewey confessed to Alice, "the most magnificent exhibition of intellectual & moral faith I ever saw. She converted me internally, but not really, I fear.... [W]hen you think that Miss Addams does not think this as a philosophy, but believes it in all her senses & muscles--Great God."

By morning he had changed his mind. Addams, he decided, was right. "I can see that I have always been interpreting [he wrote "Hegelian," but crossed it out] dialectic wrong end up," he wrote to Alice, "--the unity as the reconciliation of opposites, instead of the opposites as the unity in its growth, and thus translated the physical tension into a moral thing." He saw, in other words, that the resistance the world puts up to our actions and desires is not the same as a genuine opposition of interests. "I don't know as I give the reality of this at all," he concluded, "--it seems so natural & commonplace now, but I never had anything take hold of me so." [10]

Aesthetics

Art as Experience (1934) is Dewey's major writing on aesthetics. It is, according to his place in the Pragmatist tradition that emphasizes community, a study of the individual art object as embedded in (and inextricable from) the experiences of a local culture. Such an approach is, of course, open to postcolonial, postmodern and deconstructive critique, but has been found useful in a number of disciplines, including the new media. See his Experience and Nature for an extended discussion of 'Experience' in Dewey's philosophy.

On Education

Dewey's philosophical anthropology, unlike Egan, Vico, Ernst Cassirer, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Nietzsche, does not account for the origin of thought of the modern mind in the aesthetic, more precisely the myth, but instead in the original occupations and industries of ancient people, and eventually in the history of science.[11] A criticism of this approach is that it does not account for the origin of cultural institutions,which can be accounted for by the aesthetic. Language and its development, in Dewey's philosophical anthropology, have not a central role but are instead a consequence of the cognitive capacity.[11]

As can be seen in his Democracy and Education (1916) Dewey sought to at once synthesize, criticize, and expand upon the democratic (or proto-democratic) educational philosophies of Rousseau and Plato.[citation needed] He saw Rousseau's philosophy as overemphasizing the individual and Plato's philosophy as overemphasizing the society in which the individual lived. For Dewey, this distinction was by and large a false one; like Vygotsky, he viewed the mind and its formation as a communal process. Thus the individual is only a meaningful concept when regarded as an inextricable part of his or her society, and the society has no meaning apart from its realization in the lives of its individual members. However, as evidenced in his later Experience and Nature (1925) Dewey recognizes the importance of the subjective experience of individual people in introducing revolutionary new ideas.

For Dewey, it was vitally important that education should not be the teaching of mere dead fact, but that the skills and knowledge which students learned be integrated fully into their lives as persons, citizens and human beings. This practical element—learning by doing—sprang from his subscription to the philosophical school of Pragmatism.

Dewey's ideas were never broadly and deeply integrated into the practices of American public schools, though some of his values and terms were widespread. Progressive education (both as espoused by Dewey, and in the more popular and inept forms of which Dewey was critical) was essentially scrapped during the Cold War, when the dominant concern in education was creating and sustaining a scientific and technological elite for military purposes.[citation needed] In the post-Cold War period, however, progressive education had reemerged in many school reform and education theory circles as a thriving field of inquiry learning and inquiry-based science. Dewey is often cited as creating the foundations for outcomes-based education and Standards-based education reform, and standards such as the NCTM mathematics standards, all of which emphasize critical thinking over memorization of facts. On the other hand, in How We Think (1910), Dewey criticized focusing on the outcome of learning at the expense of the process, describing a strict emphasis on standards as an undesirable extreme. For Dewey, the focus should not be on the skills learned, but on whether they are learned in a mechanical manner or one based on good thinking, as only the latter will improve thinking, which is the goal of education.

John Dewey's USA Stamp

The central concept of John Dewey's view of education was that greater emphasis should be placed on the broadening of intellect and development of problem solving and critical thinking skills, rather than simply on the memorization of lessons. This is because Dewey saw that the public school's relation to society was much like a repair organ to the organism of society.Dewey, J (1897) “My Pedagogic Creed’ in The School Journal, Vol 14, No 3, pp 77-80. [citation needed]

One of Dewey's main theories was the incorporation of the student's past experiences into the classroom (Experience and Education 1938). This was a job of both the educator and the caretaker. The quality of experiences is key in the development of Dewey's progressivism. Without beneficial experiences growing off prior ones, education would not be able to use these experiences to reflect on the past, work through the present and prepare for the future (Experience and Education 1938).

While Dewey's educational theories have enjoyed a broad popularity [citation needed] during his lifetime and after, they have a troubled history of implementation due to the fact that there were no teachers qualified to incorporate these ideas. (Experience and Education 1938). Dewey's writings can be difficult to read, and his tendency to reuse commonplace words and phrases to express extremely complex reinterpretations of them makes him susceptible to misunderstanding. So while he held the role of a leading public intellectual, he was often misinterpreted, even by fellow academics. Many enthusiastically embraced what they mistook for Dewey's philosophy, but which in fact bore little or a distorted resemblance to it.

Dewey tried, on occasion, to correct such misguided enthusiasm, but with little success[citation needed]. Simultaneously, other progressive educational theories, often influenced by Dewey but not directly derived from him, were also becoming popular, such as Educational perennialism which is teacher-centered as opposed to student-centered. The term 'progressive education' grew to encompass numerous contradictory theories and practices, as documented by historians like Herbert Kliebard.

It is often claimed that progressive education "failed", though whether this view is justified depends on one's definitions of "progressive" and "failure". Several versions of progressive education succeeded in transforming the educational landscape: the utter ubiquity of guidance counseling, to name but one example, springs from the progressive period. Radical variations of educational progressivism were troubled and short-lived, a fact that supports some understandings of the notion of failure. But they were perhaps too rare and ill-funded to constitute a thorough test.

Many of Dewey's ideas directly influenced the founding of Bennington College in Vermont, where Dewey served on the Board of Trustees. One of the Bennington houses bears Dewey's name. Dewey, J (1897)

Dewey also profoundly affected Ken and Susan Webb in founding Farm and Wilderness Camps in Plymouth, Vermont. [12]

Schools based on the Deweyean model

On Journalism

Since the mid-1980s, Deweyan ideas have experienced revival as they are a major source of inspiration for the public journalism movement. His definition of "public," as described in The Public and Its Problems, has profound implications for the significance of journalism in society. As suggested by the title of the book, Dewey's concern was of the transactional relationship between publics and problems. Also implicit in its name, public journalism seeks to orient communication away from elite, corporate hegemony toward a civic public sphere. "The 'public' of public journalists is Dewey's public."[13]

Dewey gives a concrete definition to the formation of a public. Publics are spontaneous groups of citizens who share the indirect effects of a particular action. Anyone affected by the indirect consequences of a specific action will automatically share a common interest in controlling those consequences, i.e., solving a common problem.[14]
Since every action generates unintended consequences, publics continuously emerge, overlap, and disintegrate.

But in the era of mass media, Dewey exposes two conundra:

  1. The modern dispersal of information is so rapid and universal as to grossly amplify the extent of the indirect consequences. Modern publics increasingly form in response to mass-mediated information about very distant, impersonal actions, as opposed to familiar community-based issues. How can such vast, loosely-bonded publics agree to make a coherent response to the very problems that define them?
  2. For Dewey, public knowledge, a prerequisite for democracy, can only come from direct participation in action. But the mass-mediated public is too large and scattered to coordinate a mass-response. Since such a public is unable to interact and identify problems as local phenomena, they instead react as a mass to second-hand news. Can a mass-mediated public engage in social progress?

These are the central themes of public journalism. It is no coincidence that public journalism's resistance to the mass-mediation of information borrows heavily from The Public and Its Problems, as that was likewise written in response to the views of Walter Lippmann (see below). Indeed, Walter Lippmann played a central role in both the corporatization of journalism and the mass-mediation of the government as a very prominent journalist and as an advisor to the President of the United States. Dewey saw his views as incompatible with democratic ideals.

In The Public and Its Problems, John Dewey presents a rebuttal to Walter Lippmann’s treatise on the role of journalism in democracy. Lippmann’s model was a basic transmission model in which journalists took information given them by experts and elites, repackaged that information in simple terms, and transmitted the information to the public, whose role was to react emotionally to the news. In his model, Lippmann supposed that the public was incapable of thought or action, and that all thought and action should be left to the experts and elites.

Dewey refutes this model by assuming that politics is the work and duty of each individual in the course of his daily routine. The knowledge needed to be involved in politics, in this model, was to be generated by the interaction of citizens, elites, experts, through the mediation and facilitation of journalism. In this model, not just the government is held accountable, but the citizens, experts, other actors as well.

Dewey also revisioned journalism to fit this model by taking the focus from actions or happenings and changing the structure to focus on choices, consequences, and conditions, in order to foster conversation and improve the generation of knowledge in the community. Journalism would not just produce a static product that told of what had already happened, but the news would be in a constant state of evolution as the community added value by generating knowledge. The audience would disappear, to be replaced by citizens and collaborators who would essentially be users, doing more with the news than simply reading it.

Dewey’s journalism was revolutionary because it changed the structure from choosing a winner of a given situation to posing alternatives and exploring consequences. His effort to change journalism, involve citizens, stimulation, was all under the auspices of creating the Great Community he wrote of in The Public and Its Problems: “Till the Great Society is converted in to a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community” (Dewey, pg. 144).

Dewey believed that communication creates a great community, and citizens who actively participate in public life contribute to that community. "The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy (The Public and its Problems, p. 149)." This Great Community can only occur with "free and full intercommunication (p. 211)." Communication can be understood as journalism - the traditional forum in which people communicate.

Through participating in public life, people find each other and create the Public. When the public interacts with officials and government, then an effective State is formed. Dewey believed people should experiment with their actions. Therefore, since action, knowledge and inquiry were always changing, the State must always be redefined. In this way, the public and officials constantly work to create and define the state.

The Center for Dewey Studies is the focal point for the study of Dewey's life and work, and is located at the campus of Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

Major works

Also see

  • The Essential Dewey: Volumes 1 and 2. Edited by Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander. (1998). Indiana University Press.
  • The Philosophy of John Dewey. Edited by John J. McDermott. (1981). University of Chicago Press.

Dewey's Complete Writings is available in 3 multi-volume sets (37 volumes in all) from Southern Illinois University Press:

  • The Early Works: 1892-1898 (5 volumes)
  • The Middle Works: 1899-1924 (15 volumes)
  • The Later Works: 1925-1953 (17 volumes)

The Correspondence of John Dewey is available on CD-ROM in 3 volumes.

Works about Dewey

  • Alexander, Thomas. John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature (1987)[10]. SUNY Press.
  • Boisvert, Raymond. John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time. (1997)[11]. SUNY Press.
  • Campbell, James. Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence. (1995) Open Court Publishing Company.
  • Caspary, William R. Dewey on Democracy. (2000). Cornell University Press.
  • Hickman, Larry A. John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology. (1992) Indiana University Press.
  • Lee, Harper To Kill a Mockingbird. Jem confuses the Dewey Education system with the decimal system.
  • Martin, Jay. The Education of John Dewey. (2003)[12]. Columbia University Press.
  • Pring, Richard (2007). John Dewey: Continuum Library of Educational Thought. Continuum. ISBN 0-8264-8403-4.
  • Rockefeller, Stephen. John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism. (1994)[13]. Columbia University Press
  • Roth, Robert J. John Dewey and Self-Realization. (1962). Prentice Hall.
  • Ryan, Alan. John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism. (1995)[14]. W.W. Norton.
  • Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, (ed.). Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey (2001)[15]. Penn State University Press.
  • Shook, John. Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality. (2000)[16][. The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy
  • Sleeper, R.W. The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy. Introduction by Tom Burke. (2001) [17].University of Illinois Press.
  • Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. (1991)[18]. Cornell University Press.
  • White, Morton. The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism. (1943). Columbia University Press.

References

  1. ^ Violas, Paul C.; Tozer, Steven; Senese, Guy B. School and Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages. p. 121. ISBN 0-07-298556-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Gutek, Gerald L. Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education: A Biographical Introduction. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc. p. 338. ISBN 0-13-113809-X.
  3. ^ New York Times edition of January 19, 1953, page 27
  4. ^ "Dewey felt that science alone contributed to 'human good,' which he defined exclusively in naturalistic terms. He rejected religion and metaphysics as valid supports for moral and social values, and felt that success of the scientific method presupposed the destruction of old knowledge before the new could be created. ... (Dewey, 1929, pp. 95, 145) "William Adrian (2005), [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15363750590925929 TRUTH, FREEDOM AND (DIS)ORDER IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY], Christian Higher Education', 4:2, 145-154
  5. ^ A Common Faith, p. 42 (LW 9:29).
  6. ^ John Dewey, Arthur Bentley, (1949). Knowing and the Known. Beacon Press, Boston.
  7. ^ ibid. p107-109
  8. ^ ibid. p121-139
  9. ^ ibid. p119-121
  10. ^ Louis Menand. The Metaphysical Club p. 313
  11. ^ a b Theodora Polito, Educational Theory as Theory of Culture: A Vichian perspective on the educational theories of John Dewey and Kieran Egan Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2005
  12. ^ Welcome | Farm and Wilderness
  13. ^ Heikkilä, H. and Kunelius, R. 2002. Public Journalism and Its Problems: A Theoretical Perspective, http://www.imdp.org/artman/publish/article_30.shtml
  14. ^ Dewey, J. 1927. The Public and Its Problems. Henry Holt & Co., New York. pp 126.

See also