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* [[List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515]]
* [[List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515]]
* [[List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court]]
* [[List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court]]



==External links==
==External links==

*[http://unitedstatesreports.org/1995/06/12/adarand-constructors-inc-v-pena-515-u-s-200-1995/ Summary, Full

Text and PDF of this case from UnitedStatesReports.org ]
*{{caselaw source
*{{caselaw source
|case=''Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña'', 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
|case=''Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña'', 515 U.S. 200 (1995)

Revision as of 06:17, 24 September 2011

Adarand Constructors v. Peña
Argued January 17, 1995
Decided June 12, 1995
Full case nameAdarand Constructors, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation, et al.
Citations515 U.S. 200 (more)
115 S. Ct. 2097; 132 L. Ed. 2d 158; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4037; 63 U.S.L.W. 4523; 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1828; 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P43,556; 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 357; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4381; 95 Daily Journal DAR 7503; 40 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) P76,756
Case history
PriorOn writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
SubsequentOn remand, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997); vacated, sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F. 3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999); rev'd, 528 U.S. 216 (2000); aff'd in part, 228 F. 3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001); cert. dismissed, sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001)
Holding
All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under a standard of "strict scrutiny," the highest level of Supreme Court review (such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests).
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
MajorityO'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
ConcurrenceScalia
ConcurrenceThomas
DissentStevens, joined by Ginsburg
DissentSouter, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer
DissentGinsburg, joined by Breyer
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that racial classifications, imposed by the federal government, must be analyzed under a standard of "strict scrutiny," the most stringent level of review which requires that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which effectively overturned Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), in which the Court had created a two tiered system for analyzing racial classifications. Adarand held the federal government to the same standards as the state and local governments through a process of "reverse incorporation," in which the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was held to bind the federal government to the same standards as state and local governments are bound under the 14th Amendment.

Background

Many contracts that are let by agencies of the United States federal government contain financial incentives for the prime contractor to employ subcontractors that are owned or controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” The US Small Business Administration certifies certain businesses as disadvantaged. This usually means that the business is owned by racial or ethnic minority groups or by women. In this particular case the contract stated that “...the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...”

The facts

In 1989 the US Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded a highway construction contract in Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company. Mountain Gravel solicited bids for a subcontract for guardrails along the highway. The lowest bid was submitted by Adarand Constructors, with a higher bid being submitted by Gonzales Construction. However, Gonzales Construction had been certified by the Small Business Administration as a disadvantaged business, and thus Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales, due to financial incentives in the Mountain Gravel’s contract for employing disadvantaged businesses. Adarand filed suit in federal court against DOT, arguing that the subcontracting incentive clause, or bonus, that caused Adarand to lose a subcontract was unconstitutional. The federal district court and circuit court ruled in favor of DOT and against Adarand, which then appealed to the US Supreme Court. The case was docketed as Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation, et al., because Federico Peña was the US Secretary of Transportation at that time. Mountain States Legal Foundation represented Adarand Constructors.

The question to be decided

Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment as well as the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment?

Aftermath

On September 5, 2005, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report finding that, ten years after the Adarand decision, federal agencies still largely fail to comply with the rule in Adarand. Specifically, the Commission found that the Departments of Defense, Transportation, United States Department of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, State, and the Small Business Administration, do not seriously consider race-neutral alternatives before implementing race-conscious federal procurement programs. The Commission found that such consideration is required by the strict scrutiny standard under Adarand and Court decisions. Commissioner Michael Yaki dissented from the Commission's report, arguing that the Commission was taking a "radical step backwards" from the "race-progressive policies" of the past.

See also


Text and PDF of this case from UnitedStatesReports.org ]