Twenty-One Demands

For other emanings, see 21 Demands and 21_demands_of_MKS.

Japanese Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, under whose administration the Twenty-One Demands were drafted.

The Twenty-One Demands (対華二十一ヵ条要求, Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū) (Chinese: 二十一條) were a set of demands made by the Empire of Japan under Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu sent to the nominal government of the Republic of China on January 18, 1915, resulting in two treaties with Japan on May 25, 1915.

Background

Main article: Japanese expansionism

Japan had gained a large sphere of interest in northern China and Manchuria through its victories in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and had thus joined the ranks of the European imperialist powers in their scramble to establish political and economic domination over China. With the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in the Xinhai Revolution, and the establishment of the new Republic of China under General Yuan Shikai, Japan saw an opportunity to expand its position in China.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen repeatedly declared that the Twenty One Demands were a put-up job, invited and even drafted by Yuan Shikai himself; the price Yuan was willing to pay Japan for recognizing him as Emperor.

Although China later joined on the side of the Allies in World War I, the Japanese demanded the German spheres of influence in China, and also wanted special economic rights for the Japanese nationals living in parts of China

Initial negotiations

"Twenty-One Demands"

Japan, under Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki, drafted the initial list of Twenty-One Demands, which were reviewed by the genrō and Emperor Taishō, and approved by the Diet. This list was presented to Yuan Shikai on January 18, 1915, with warnings of dire consequences if China were to reject.

The Twenty One Demands were grouped into five groups:

• Group 1 confirmed Japan's recent acquisitions in Shandong Province, and expanded Japan's sphere of influence over the railways, coasts and major cities of the province.

• Group 2 pertained to Japan's South Manchuria Railway Zone, extending the leasehold over the territory into the twenty-first century, and expanding Japan's sphere of influence in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, to include rights of settlement and extraterritoriality, appointment of financial and administrative officials to the government and priority for Japanese investments in those areas.

• Group 3 gave Japan control of the Hanyeping mining and metallurgical complex, already deep in debt to Japan.

• Group 4 barred China from giving any further coastal or island concessions to foreign powers except for Japan.

• Group 5 contained a miscellaneous set of demands, ranging from Japanese advisors appointed to the Chinese central government and to administer the Chinese police force (which would severely intrude on Chinese sovereignty) to allowing Japanese Buddhist preachers to conduct missionary activities in China.

Knowing the negative reaction "Group 5" would cause, Japan initially tried to keep its contents secret. The Chinese government attempted to stall for as long as possible and leaked the full contents of the Twenty-One Demands to the European powers in the hope that a perceived threat to their own political/economic spheres of interest would help contain Japan.

Japanese ultimatum

After China rejected Japan's revised proposal on April 26, the genrō intervened and deleted ‘Group 5’ from the document, as these had proved to be the most objectionable to the Chinese government. A reduced set of "Thirteen Demands" was transmitted on May 7 in the form of an ultimatum, with a two-day deadline for response. Yuan Shikai, competing with other local warlords to become the ruler of all China, was not in a position to risk war with Japan, and accepted appeasement, a tactic followed by his successors. The final form of the treaty was signed by both parties on May 25, 1915.

Katō Takaaki publicly admitted that the ultimatum was invited by Yuan to save face with the Chinese people in conceding to the Demands. American Minister Paul Reinsch reported to the State Department that the Chinese were surprised at the leniency of the ultimatum, as it demanded much less than they had already committed themselves to concede.

Consequences

The results of the revised final (Thirteen Demands) version of the Twenty-One Demands were far more negative for Japan than positive. Without "Group 5", the new treaty gave Japan little that it did not already have in China.

On the other hand, the United States expressed strongly negative reactions to Japan's rejection of the Open Door Policy. In the Bryan Note issued by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on March 13, 1915, the U.S., while affirming Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, expressed concern over further encroachments to Chinese sovereignty.

Japan's closest ally at that time, Great Britain also expressed concern over what was perceived as Japan's overbearing, bullying approach to diplomacy, and the British Foreign Office in particular was unhappy with Japanese attempts to establish what would effectively be a Japanese protectorate over all of China.

Afterwards, United States and Japan looked for a compromise point. As a result, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was concluded in 1917. It was approved by Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

In China, the overall political impact of Japan's actions was highly negative, creating a considerable amount of public ill-will towards Japan, resulting in the May Fourth Movement, and a significant upsurge in nationalism.

Japan continued to push for outright control over Shandong Province and they won European diplomatic recognition for their claim at the Treaty of Versailles (despite the refusal of the Chinese delegation to sign the treaty). This in turn provoked ill-will from the United States government as well as widespread hostility within China. A large-scale boycott against Japanese goods was just one effect.

See also

• Second Sino-Japanese War
• History of the Republic of China
• Warlord era

References

• Spence, Jonathan D. "The New Republic." In "The Search for Modern China". pg 281. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999
• Hsu, Immanual C. Y. "The Rise of Modern China". pages 494 and 502. Oxford University Press, 1983
• http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/21demands.htm

External links

• Full text of the Twenty-One Demands