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The Israeli lobby uses paid foreign agents. See AIPAC espionage scandal
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==Contrast with Israeli lobby==
==Contrast with Israeli lobby==
There are a number of differences between the Arab lobby and the Israeli lobby according to Mitchell Bard. In general the Arab lobby "suffers from a very negative image and Israel enjoys a very positive image."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/> In terms of activities "the Arab lobby almost always lobbies negatively; i.e., against pro-Israel legislation rather than for pro-Arab legislation."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/> Also, the Arab lobby, unlike the Israeli lobby, makes use of paid foreign agents: "Pro-Arab U.S. government officials can look forward to lucrative positions as lobbyists, spokesmen, and consultants for the Arab cause."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>
There are a number of differences between the Arab lobby and the Israeli lobby according to Mitchell Bard. In general the Arab lobby "suffers from a very negative image and Israel enjoys a very positive image."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/> In terms of activities "the Arab lobby almost always lobbies negatively; i.e., against pro-Israel legislation rather than for pro-Arab legislation."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>


Public opinion polls also show both greater suspicions of the Arab lobby ("polls indicate the public sees the Arab lobby as more of a threat than the Israeli lobby"<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>) and less overall effectiveness ("Israel varied between 32 and 64 percent, averaging 46 percent, while sympathy for the Arabs has oscillated between 1 and 30 percent and averaged only 12 percent."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>).
Public opinion polls also show both greater suspicions of the Arab lobby ("polls indicate the public sees the Arab lobby as more of a threat than the Israeli lobby"<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>) and less overall effectiveness ("Israel varied between 32 and 64 percent, averaging 46 percent, while sympathy for the Arabs has oscillated between 1 and 30 percent and averaged only 12 percent."<ref name=JVLMitchellBard/>).

Revision as of 04:45, 12 September 2006

The Arab lobby in the United States describes a collection of formal and informal groups that lobby the public and governement of the United States on behalf of Arab interests.

Origins

The lobby, according to Isaiah L. Kenen (the founder of what became AIPAC, an Israeli lobby) [1], has its roots in the "petro-diplomatic complex" that comprises the "oil industry, missionaries, and diplomats".

According to Mitchell Bard, "from the beginning, the Arab lobby has faced not only a disadvantage in electoral politics but also in organization. There are several politically oriented groups, but many of these are one man operations with little financial or popular support."[1]

Formal Arab lobby

In 1951, King Saud of Saudi Arabia asked U.S. diplomats to finance a pro-Arab lobby to counter the leading formal Israel lobbying organization in the US, the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), the forerunner of the modern American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) [1]. The result was the formation of the National Association of Arab-Americans (since merged into the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee).

The 1973 Arab oil embargo established the Arab lobby as the "official, active, and visible spokesman for the Arab cause in the wake of the oil embargo" according to Mitchell Bard[1].

The most representative groups are the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), the Middle East Research and Information Project; the Middle East Affairs Council, Americans for Near East Refugee Aid, the Arab American Institute and the American Palestine Committee. [1]

Oil industry alliance

Bard writes that in the American oil companies "Exxon, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), Mobil, and Texaco" comprised a group known as the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and as a result "sought to manipulate public opinion and foreign policy on the Middle East." Bard relates that "the campaign began after the 1967 War when ARAMCO established a fund to help present the Arab side of the conflict." The influence of these oil companies was very visible during the 1973 oil crisis during which Mobil "published an advertisement/editorial in the New York Times", Standard Oil of California's chairman "sent out a letter to the company's 40,000 employees and 262,000 stockholders asking them to pressure Washington to support 'the aspirations of the Arab people'" and the "chairman of Texaco called for a reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy."[1]

In 1973 the Saudi Arabian government acquired a 25% share of ARAMCO, increased this to 60% by 1974 and finally acquired full control of Aramco by 1980. In November 1988, the company changed its name from Arabian American Oil Company to Saudi Arabian Oil Company (or Saudi Aramco).

Protestant Christian alliance

Bard claims that the Arab lobby often finds support from the Protestant Christian community and in particular the National Council of Churches. He writes that the National Council of Churches "has taken consistently anti-Israel stands, and its 1980 policy statement on the Middle East called for the creation of a PLO state. Besides passing anti-Israel resolutions, the NCC puts on seminars, radio shows, and conferences. From 1972 to 1977, it published the ARAMCO financed SWASIA (Southwest Asia) newsletter. When SWASIA ceased publication, the NCC established an Islamic desk to 'enable American Christians to understand Arab Christian and Muslim attitudes.' The relationship between the NCC and other Arab lobby organizations is primarily informal, with NCC leaders serving on many of their boards."[1]

Saudi lobby

Saudi Arabia maintains an ongoing lobbying operation in the United States as part of its diplomatic mission. The head of the Saudi lobby for two decades was Prince Bandar bin Sultan, ambassador to the United States from 1983 to 2005. His influence peaked during the first Bush administration and declined during the Bill Clinton and the George W. Bush administrations, according to the Economist. Prince Bandar was replaced by Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud in 2005, who keeps a lower profile. ("The late King Faisal used to be known in our part of the world as the great sphinx because he said very little on any subject. And in this case, I’m going to be the little sphinx.")[1]

Contrast with Israeli lobby

There are a number of differences between the Arab lobby and the Israeli lobby according to Mitchell Bard. In general the Arab lobby "suffers from a very negative image and Israel enjoys a very positive image."[1] In terms of activities "the Arab lobby almost always lobbies negatively; i.e., against pro-Israel legislation rather than for pro-Arab legislation."[1]

Public opinion polls also show both greater suspicions of the Arab lobby ("polls indicate the public sees the Arab lobby as more of a threat than the Israeli lobby"[1]) and less overall effectiveness ("Israel varied between 32 and 64 percent, averaging 46 percent, while sympathy for the Arabs has oscillated between 1 and 30 percent and averaged only 12 percent."[1]).

Harry Truman famously said to Paul Porter, an appointed ambassador to the Arab-Israeli peace talks in Geneva in 1948:

"I won't tell you what to do or how to vote, but I will only say this. In all of my political experience, I don't ever recall the Arab vote swinging a close election." [1]

Noted Lobbyists

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "The Israeli and Arab Lobbies", Mitchell Bard, Jewish Virtual Library, published 2006, accessed August 26 2006.