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Soufan's argument was also supported by the CIA Inspector General's 2004 Report into the program.<ref>{{cite web|title=Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torture_archive/20040507.pdf|work=Special Review|publisher=CIA|accessdate=10 May 2013|date=7 May 2004}}</ref> After investigating claims about the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques, the report stated that while the regular interrogation approach achieved many successes "measuring the effectiveness of the EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not without some concern."
Soufan's argument was also supported by the CIA Inspector General's 2004 Report into the program.<ref>{{cite web|title=Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torture_archive/20040507.pdf|work=Special Review|publisher=CIA|accessdate=10 May 2013|date=7 May 2004}}</ref> After investigating claims about the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques, the report stated that while the regular interrogation approach achieved many successes "measuring the effectiveness of the EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not without some concern."


The Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility report,<ref>{{cite book|title=Office of Professional Responsibility Report|publisher=US Department of Justice|url=http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf|accessdate=10 May 2013|date=29 July 2009}}</ref> published July 29, 2009, states that "the CIA Effectiveness Memo provided inaccurate information about Abu Zubaydah's interrogation." The CIA memo stated that "Zubaydah's reporting led to the arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003." However, the OPR report states, "In fact Padilla was arrested in May 2002, not 2003," and so "the information 'leading to the arrest of Padilla' could not have been obtained through the authorized use of EITs."
The Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility report,<ref>{{cite book|title=Office of Professional Responsibility Report |publisher=US Department of Justice |url=http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf |accessdate=10 May 2013 |date=29 July 2009 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728023830/http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf |archivedate=July 28, 2011 }}</ref> published July 29, 2009, states that "the CIA Effectiveness Memo provided inaccurate information about Abu Zubaydah's interrogation." The CIA memo stated that "Zubaydah's reporting led to the arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003." However, the OPR report states, "In fact Padilla was arrested in May 2002, not 2003," and so "the information 'leading to the arrest of Padilla' could not have been obtained through the authorized use of EITs."


===Bloomberg op-ed criticizing Jose Rodriguez===
===Bloomberg op-ed criticizing Jose Rodriguez===
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<ref name=MissedOpportunities>{{cite news |title=Q. & A. : Missed Opportunities |url=http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710on_onlineonly01?currentPage=all |newspaper=[[The New Yorker]] |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080407064359/http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710on_onlineonly01?currentPage=all |archivedate=April 7, 2008 |deadurl=no |date=July 10, 2006 |accessdate=August 29, 2011}}</ref>
<ref name=MissedOpportunities>{{cite news |title=Q. & A. : Missed Opportunities |url=http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710on_onlineonly01?currentPage=all |newspaper=[[The New Yorker]] |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20080407064359/http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/10/060710on_onlineonly01?currentPage=all |archivedate=April 7, 2008 |deadurl=no |date=July 10, 2006 |accessdate=August 29, 2011}}</ref>


<ref name=soufangroup>{{cite web |url=http://www.soufangroup.com/team/ |title=The Team |publisher=The Soufan Group |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110213024138/http://www.soufangroup.com:80/team |archivedate=February 13, 2011 |deadurl=no |accessdate=}}</ref>
<ref name=soufangroup>{{cite web|url=http://www.soufangroup.com/team/ |title=The Team |publisher=The Soufan Group |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110213024138/http://www.soufangroup.com/team |archivedate=February 13, 2011 |deadurl=no |accessdate= }}</ref>


<ref name=TheDarkSide>{{cite book |title=[[The Dark Side (book)|The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals]] |last=Mayer |first=Jane |authorlink=Jane Mayer |year=2008 |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page=191}}</ref>
<ref name=TheDarkSide>{{cite book |title=[[The Dark Side (book)|The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals]] |last=Mayer |first=Jane |authorlink=Jane Mayer |year=2008 |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page=191}}</ref>


<ref name=Soufan>{{cite news |title=What Torture Never Told Us |first=Ali H. |last=Soufan |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111016200734/http://www.nytimes.com:80/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.html |archivedate=October 16, 2011 |deadurl=no |date=September 5, 2009 |accessdate=August 29, 2011}}</ref>
<ref name=Soufan>{{cite news|title=What Torture Never Told Us |first=Ali H. |last=Soufan |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111016200734/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.html |archivedate=October 16, 2011 |deadurl=no |date=September 5, 2009 |accessdate=August 29, 2011 }}</ref>


<ref name=TheLoomingTower>{{cite book |title=[[The Looming Tower|The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11]] |last=Wright |first=Lawrence |authorlink=Lawrence Wright |year=2006 |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page=364}}</ref>
<ref name=TheLoomingTower>{{cite book |title=[[The Looming Tower|The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11]] |last=Wright |first=Lawrence |authorlink=Lawrence Wright |year=2006 |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page=364}}</ref>

Revision as of 17:31, 1 July 2017

Ali H. Soufan
FBI lead investigator Soufan in Afghanistan (2001)
Born (1971-07-08) July 8, 1971 (age 53)[1]
NationalityLebanese-American
Alma materMansfield University of Pennsylvania (B.A., International Studies and Political Science)
Villanova University (M.A., International Relations)
Known forFBI agent
Websitesoufangroup.com

Ali H. Soufan (born July 8, 1971) is a Lebanese-American former FBI agent who was involved in a number of high-profile anti-terrorism cases both in the United States and around the world. A New Yorker article in 2006 described Soufan as coming closer than anyone to preventing the September 11 attacks, even implying that he would have succeeded had the CIA been willing to share information with him.[2] He resigned from the FBI in 2005 after publicly chastising the CIA for not sharing intelligence with him, which could have prevented the attacks. In 2011, he published a memoir, which includes some historical background on al-Qaeda: The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda.[3] In 2017, he published Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State. He is the CEO of The Soufan Group.[4]

Early years

Soufan was born in Lebanon. He is an ardent admirer of the poet Khalil Gibran.[5] He graduated from Mansfield University of Pennsylvania (1995), receiving his B.A in Political Science.

FBI career

Soufan was called to Jordan in 1999 to investigate the Jordan Millennium Bombing plot, and discovered a box of documents delivered by Jordanian intelligence officials prior to the investigation, sitting on the floor of the CIA station, which contained maps showing the bomb sites. His find "embarrassed the CIA", according to a 2006 New Yorker profile of him.[2]

In 2000, he was made the lead investigator of the USS Cole bombing.[2] When given a transcript of the interrogations of Fahd al-Quso, he noticed a reference to a one-legged Afghan named "Khallad", whom he remembered as a source identified years earlier as Walid bin 'Attash; this helped the FBI to track down Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.[2] Following the September 11th attacks, Soufan was one of eight FBI agents who spoke Arabic, and the only one in New York City.[6] Colleagues reported that he would sit on the floor with suspects, offer them tea and argue over religion and politics in fluent Arabic, while drawing out information.[5]

While in Yemen investigating the September 11th attacks, Soufan received intelligence that the CIA had been withholding for months. According to The New Yorker, "Soufan received the fourth photograph of the Malaysia meeting—the picture of Khallad, the mastermind of the Cole operation. The two plots, Soufan instantly realized, were linked, and if the CIA had not withheld information from him he likely would have drawn the connection months before September 11th."[2]

He was tasked with the "intensive interrogation" of Abu Jandal over the course of five days in Yemen, during which time Jandal gave up the names of a number of members of al-Qaeda.[7]

It was his questioning of Mohammed al Qahtani that led to the terrorism charges against Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri in Chicago, whom al Qahtani had mentioned as being a relative.[5]

In 2005, Soufan approached a Florida doctor, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, pretending to be an Islamist militant, and asked him whether he would provide medical treatment to wounded Al-Qaeda fighters in the Iraq War.[8] When Sabir agreed to provide medical treatment, he was arrested and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for supporting terrorism.[9]

Soufan has been described as having had a close working relationship with FBI counter-terrorist agent John P. O'Neill.[10]

Role in Guantanamo military commissions

Soufan obtained a confession from Salim Hamdan, accused of being a driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. Soufan testified before his military tribunal that Hamdan was a hardened terrorist, with advance knowledge of the September 11th attacks.[11][12]

He also obtained a confession from Ali al-Bahlul, an al Qaeda propagandist and Bin Laden media secretary accused of making a video celebrating the Cole attacks, and testified at his military tribunal as well.[13]

Post-FBI career

Ali Soufan resigned from the FBI in 2005 and founded the Soufan Group. [14] In addition he is frequently called upon to serve as an expert commentator.

Senate testimony

On May 14, 2009, Soufan testified in front the Senate Judiciary Committee for its hearing on torture.[15] The hearing followed Obama's declassification of what is known as the "torture memos."[16]

Most notably, he claimed in his testimony that his interrogation of Abu Zubaydah had resulted in actionable intelligence, such as the identity of convicted terrorist José Padilla; and that thereafter, when waterboarding was performed on Abu Zubaydah, the flow of intelligence stopped. Soufan's statement contradicts the one made in the "torture memos," which were intent on making a legal case in favor of—and justification for—the use of waterboarding and other so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques" (EITs).

Soufan re-stated his claims in an April 22, 2009, op-ed for The New York Times op-ed entitled "My Tortured Decision",[17] which was published shortly after the memos were released, and similarly two months later.[18]

According to one of President George W. Bush's speechwriters Marc Thiessen, writing in the National Review in October 2009, both Soufan's testimony and his April 2009 New York Times op-ed are contradicted by CIA documents that state that Abu Zubaydah revealed the actionable intelligence only during the CIA's interrogation, which included rougher treatment than what the FBI had used.[19] But in turn, Thiessen's argument is contradicted by the 2008 Department of Justice's Inspector General Report,[20] which quotes FBI sources stating that "Zubaydah was responding to the FBI's rapport-based approach before the CIA assumed control over the interrogation, but became uncooperative after being subjected to the CIA's techniques."

Soufan's argument was also supported by the CIA Inspector General's 2004 Report into the program.[21] After investigating claims about the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques, the report stated that while the regular interrogation approach achieved many successes "measuring the effectiveness of the EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not without some concern."

The Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility report,[22] published July 29, 2009, states that "the CIA Effectiveness Memo provided inaccurate information about Abu Zubaydah's interrogation." The CIA memo stated that "Zubaydah's reporting led to the arrest of Padilla on his arrival in Chicago in May 2003." However, the OPR report states, "In fact Padilla was arrested in May 2002, not 2003," and so "the information 'leading to the arrest of Padilla' could not have been obtained through the authorized use of EITs."

Bloomberg op-ed criticizing Jose Rodriguez

On May 8, 2012, Bloomberg News published an op-ed by Ali Soufan, criticizing a book recently published by former CIA official Jose Rodriguez.[14] Rodriguez's duties included supervising the CIA's enhanced interrogation program.

Soufan strongly disputed Rodriguez's claims that the CIA's enhanced interrogation program was effective at securing reliable, useful information.[14]

Soufan questioned whether the marked differences in Rodriguez's description of Al Nashiri's role in the USS Cole bombing from that of the prosecution would undermine the case against al Nashiri.[14] Rodriguez disputed that al Nashiri was the bombing's mastermind; Rodriguez disputed that al Nashiri was intelligent enough to be a "mastermind".

Works

  • The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda. W. W. Norton & Company. 2011. ISBN 978-0-393-07942-5.
  • Anatomy of Terror: From the Death of Bin Laden to the Rise of the Islamic State. W. W. Norton & Company. 2017. ISBN 978-0-393-24117-4.

References

  1. ^ U.S. Public Records Index, Volume 1; 1991: Ali H. Soufan: b. July 8, 1971. Residence: Mansfield, Penn.
  2. ^ a b c d e Wright, Lawrence (July 10, 2006). "A Reporter at Large: The Agent". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on July 17, 2008. Retrieved August 29, 2011. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  3. ^ "An Interrogator Writes 'The Inside Story Of 9/11'". NPR - Fresh Air. September 13, 2011. Retrieved September 13, 2011.
  4. ^ "The Team". The Soufan Group. Archived from the original on February 13, 2011. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ a b c Mayer, Jane (2008). The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals. p. 191.
  6. ^ "Q. & A. : Missed Opportunities". The New Yorker. July 10, 2006. Archived from the original on April 7, 2008. Retrieved August 29, 2011. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ Wright, Lawrence (2006). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. p. 364.
  8. ^ Neumeister, Larry (May 21, 2007). "Doctor Convicted of Providing Support to Terrorists". The Sun. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  9. ^ "U.S. v. Sabir". Leagle. October 15, 2007. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  10. ^ Edmonds, Sibel (September 10, 2011). "The Boiling Frogs Presents Ray Nowosielski & John Duffy". Sibel Edmonds' Boiling Frogs. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  11. ^ "Guantanamo war crimes judge penalizes U.S. prosecutors in Hamdan case". Canadian Press. July 29, 2008. Archived from the original on July 29, 2008. Retrieved July 29, 2008. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  12. ^ "'Bin Laden's driver knew hijackers aiming for attack'". Gulf News. July 23, 2008. Archived from the original on July 25, 2008. Retrieved July 14, 2008. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ "Guantanamo Yemeni claims Al Qaeda's 'best video'". Daily Times. October 21, 2008. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  14. ^ a b c d Ali Soufan (May 8, 2012). "Will a CIA Veteran's Book Save a Terrorist?". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on May 10, 2012. Retrieved 2012-05-10. The defense of Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri -- the mastermind in the bombing of the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in 2000 -- has received a boost from a surprising source: Jose Rodriguez, a former high-ranking CIA official. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  15. ^ "Testimony of Ali Soufan". United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. May 13, 2009. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  16. ^ United States Department of Justice: Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda Archived May 7, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
  17. ^ Soufan, Ali (April 22, 2009). "My Tortured Decision". The New York Times. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  18. ^ Soufan, Ali H. (September 5, 2009). "What Torture Never Told Us". The New York Times. Archived from the original on October 16, 2011. Retrieved August 29, 2011. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  19. ^ Thiessen, Marc (October 31, 2009). "New Documents Show the CIA, Not the FBI, Got Zubadayh to 'Cough Up' Jose Padilla". National Review Online. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  20. ^ "A Review of the FBI's Involvement and Observations of Detainee Interrogation in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq" (PDF). U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  21. ^ "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities" (PDF). Special Review. CIA. May 7, 2004. Retrieved May 10, 2013.
  22. ^ Office of Professional Responsibility Report (PDF). US Department of Justice. July 29, 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on July 28, 2011. Retrieved May 10, 2013. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)