Talk:Falsifiability

Typo / incorrect meaning

The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain no falsifiable statements;

The last part doesn't make sense. I believe this is correct instead:

The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain non-falsifiable statements;

Because the criterion excludes a "whole theory" if it contains any non-falsifiable statements.

Currently it says that a "whole" theory is excluded only if it doesn't contain any falsifiable statements. This is not correct; if a theory contains both falsifiable and non-falsifiable statements, it will be excluded.

NOTE: Whoever wrote this is mistaken. A theory is falsifiable if, and only if, it entails at least one falsifiable statement. It's irrelevant if it also entails unfalsifiable statements, e.g. all theories entail all tautologies, and tautologies exemplify unfalsifiable statements.

Lakatos Vs Popper

I am aware that we cannot make our own thesis in a Wikipedia article. Nevertheless, knowing what notable philosophers have written (as primary source) is important and can guide us in finding proper secondary sources that presented a view point on these writings. With this perspective in mind, here is a quote from Lakatos, which seems to misinterpret the very definition of falsifiability given by Popper.

"A theory is 'scientific' if one is prepared to specify in advance a crucial experiment (or observation) which can falsify it, and it is pseudoscientific if one refuses to specify such a 'potential falsifier'. But if so, we do not demarcate scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones, but rather scientific method from non-scientific method.

...

"Is, then, Popper's falsifiability criterion the solution to the problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience? No. For Popper's criterion ignores the remarkable tenacity of scientific theories. Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely because facts contradict it."

— Imre Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes (1978), pp.3-4

We will see that this quote from Lakatos is very close to what Popper wrote about the scientific method. Popper has obviously written a lot of things to motivate the definition of falsifiability, things that were not his definition of falsifiability: we must distinguish between the motivation for a definition and the definition itself. It's the first time that I hear the thesis that Popper's falsifiability does not apply to a theory (or a statement), but to the overall scientific method. We don't even say that in our article. Here is a few quotes from Popper that show how Popper viewed his definition of falsifiability in the larger context of a scientific method. In this first quote, Popper stresses, as he has done in many occasions, that falsification is not possible and he even admits that it creates an issue regarding the applicability of a falsification criteria.

"It might be said that even if the asymmetry [between universal and existential statements] is admitted, it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified. For it is always possible to find some way of evading falsification, for example by introducing ad hoc an auxiliary hypothesis, or by changing ad hoc a definition. It is even possible without logical inconsistency to adopt the position of simply refusing to acknowledge any falsifying experience whatsoever. Admittedly, scientists do not usually proceed in this way, but logically such procedure is possible; and this fact, it might be claimed, makes the logical value of my proposed criterion of demarcation dubious, to say the least."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), pp.19-20

Popper continues by responding to his imaginary critic that we might conceive (in principle) of a scientific method that would work, if only scientists would apply it.

"I must admit the justice of this criticism; but I need not therefore withdraw my proposal to adopt falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation. For I am going to propose (in sections 20 f.) that the empirical method shall be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of evading falsification which, as my imaginary critic rightly insists, are logically possible. According to my proposal, what characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), p.20

To my knowledge, Popper was not very successful in describing what is the historical scientific method. The fact that his proposed scientific method has not been applied and would perhaps never be applied does not imply that his definition of falsifiability has no merit. In any case, it is important not to assume that this quote from Popper his a definition of falsifiability. It is only Popper's view on what the scientific method should be, ideally. He is only trying to motivate his definition of falsifiability, which comes later in the book and perhaps appears in simpler terms before. After about 45 pages of analysis, here is the definition of falsifiability given by Popper.

"A theory is to be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’). We can put this more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty."

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), p.65

Here is one of many other quotes from Popper which explains that we should not confuse his technical notion of falsifiability as a proposed criteria of demarcation and a less technical notion of falsifiability, which only mean that it can be proven false. Popper stresses that falsifiability in this latter sense is impossible.

"We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:

"1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept — falsifiable in principle, one might say — rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them).
"2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").
"I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)"

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), pp=82-85

To my knowledge, critics of Popper's falsifiability fall in three categories. Those who critic the consistency of the definition itself, those who critic the usefulness of the definition within any scientific method, those who critic the specific scientific methods advanced by Popper to motivate the definition. Lakatos, in the above quote, did not critic the definition itself, but only a specific view avanced by Popper on the scientific method. Indeed, Popper failed at few occasions to apply his falsifiability criteria within a method to choose between scientific theories (see Popper 1979, pp. 58–59 for what Popper said about this), but we should not confuse the process of choosing between different scientific theories and the process of demarcating between scientific theories and other forms of knowledge. The falsifiability criteria works well for the latter. Nevertheless, it's a complex situation, because it's natural to view that Popper's definition failed, if we cannot find a way to apply it to pick a theory among many. On the other hand, as explained in Talk:Falsifiability#Refocusing on falsifiability and using more of Lakatos, even Lakatos reused the definition of falsifiability in his more holistic approach.

Reference

Popper, Karl (1979). Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-875024-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

The term 'Metaphysical Research Program' is not used properly.

I noticed that the term 'metaphysical research program' is not used properly. Here is what Popper wrote about it.

"In science, problem situations are the result, as a rule, of three factors. One is the discovery of an inconsistency within the ruling theory. A second is the discovery of an inconsistency between theory and experiment – the experimental falsification of the theory. The third, and perhaps the most important one, is the relation between the theory and what may be called the 'metaphysical research programme'.

By raising the problems of explanation which the theory is designed to solve, the metaphysical research programme makes it possible to judge the success of the theory as an explanation. On the other hand, the critical discussion of the theory and its results may lead to a change in the research programme (usually an unconscious change, as the programme is often held unconsciously, and taken for granted), or to its replacement by another programme. These programmes are only occasionally discussed as such: more often, they are implicit in the theories and in the attitudes and judgements of the scientists.

I call these research programmes 'metaphysical' also because they result from general views of the structure of the world and, at the same time, from general views of the problem situation in physical cosmology. I call them 'research programmes' because they incorporate, together with a view of what the most pressing problems are, a general idea of what a satisfactory solution of these problems would look like."

— Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, p.161

In the article, we say that every thing metaphysical is part of this. This is not true. In fact, it should be obvious from the usual definition of 'program'. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:08, 22 June 2018 (UTC)

Case of DNS records

Would it be an improvement to the article to have an example of the level of integrity of DNS records? I have a case that could demonstrate a subset of falsifiability (false-flag spam lists and unique changes to the DNS of hydro.net from 1996 to 2016). 126etc126.209.32.199 (talk) 13:31, 15 August 2018 (UTC)

My impression would be that this would best belong in a DNS related article. However, even then, to avoid original research, a source should have made that constatation which could then be cited and summarized there. Thanks, —PaleoNeonate – 21:22, 15 August 2018 (UTC)

Regarding the added "... or observation": clarifying the empirical status of basic statements

User:James343e added "or observation" after "basic statement" in the definition of the falsifiability criterion, see https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Falsifiability&diff=prev&oldid=850864548. I am not surprised. One difficulty in understanding Popper's falsifiability criterion is that it is a purely logical criterion, in the following sense that it is only stated in terms of statements and their relation, not in terms of perceptions or observations, and yet it must have an empirical character. Regarding this issue, Popper wrote:

Perceptual experiences have often been regarded as providing a kind of justification for basic statements. It was held that these statements are ‘based upon’ these experiences; that their truth becomes ‘manifest by inspection’ through these experiences; or that it is made ‘evident’ by these experiences, etc. All these expressions exhibit the perfectly sound tendency to emphasize the close connection between basic statements and our perceptual experiences. Yet it was also rightly felt that statements can be logically justified only by statements. Thus the connection between the perceptions and the statements remained obscure, and was described by correspondingly obscure expressions which elucidated nothing, but slurred over the difficulties or, at best, adumbrated them through metaphors.

Noting that basic statements are singular existential statements with an empirical character, we can see that Popper recognizes that his approach faces the same dilemma:

If falsifiability is to be at all applicable as a criterion of demarcation, then singular statements must be available which can serve as premises in falsifying inferences. Our criterion therefore appears only to shift the problem—to lead us back from the question of the empirical character of theories to the question of the empirical character of singular statements.

However, Popper was very pragmatic in his approach and noted that, in practice, it was a false problem:

Yet even so, something has been gained. For in the practice of scientific research, demarcation is sometimes of immediate urgency in connection with theoretical systems, whereas in connection with singular statements, doubt as to their empirical character rarely arises. It is true that errors of observation occur and that they give rise to false singular statements, but the scientist scarcely ever has occasion to describe a singular statement as non-empirical or metaphysical.

Therefore, Popper shifted his attention to a more serious problem, the problem of induction and expressed a solution on the basis of his purely logical demarcation criterion. His solution is simply that we only try to deduce from the falsifiable theory (and initial conditions) a statement that is contradicted by a basic statement, that is, we only try to falsify a theory, we never prove it.

He was also very much aware that his logical demarcation criterion for theories had to be complemented by a proper scientific methodology to create, reject, modify these theories, but he was very clear that this other part could hardly be made rigorous:

The requirement of falsifiability which was a little vague to start with has now been split into two parts. The first, the methodological postulate (cf. section 20), can hardly be made quite precise. The second, the logical criterion, is quite definite as soon as it is clear which statements are to be called ‘basic’ (cf. section 28).

This quote is a rare occasion where Popper mentions a methodological part to the requirement of falsifiability, but note that he does not say "a methodological part to the falsifiability criterion". He would not, because a "criterion" presumes some rigor, which the methodological part cannot have. More importantly, no confusion is possible given the context, because the methodological part is a requirement on the method, not on the theory itself: whenever we speak of a criterion for theories or statements, then we speak of the logical demarcation criterion given in terms of statements, basic statements, etc., not observations, etc. It could not have been otherwise.

Therefore, the addition of "or observations" is not helping to clarify the concept. Yet, it is clear that we need to clarify early the empirical status of basic statements, which was the basic intention behind the extra "or observation". We have to think about the best way to do that.--Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:07, 21 August 2018 (UTC)

So, one might ask why does Popper refer to observation in the following quote (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability#cite_note-observation-1):

Einstein's principle of proportionality of inert and (passively) heavy mass. This equivalence principle conflicts with many potential falsifiers: events whose observation is logically possible. Yet despite all attempts (the experiments by Eötvös, more recently refined by Rickle) to realize such a falsification experimentally, the experiments have so far corroborated the principle of equivalence.
— Popper 1983 p. XX

The answer is that Popper wants to explain that falsifiability is different from falsification. To do that, Popper gives an example of a theory that is falsifiable even when its falsification has failed and seems to be doomed to always fail. In these attempts at falsification, a basic statement, which Popper also calls a potential falsifier, must be interpreted as an observation. So, this quote, when placed in its context, is perfectly consistent with the understanding that falsifiability, unlike falsification, is a purely logical affair. In fact, in the same page where this quote is found, Popper explains:

But when is a statement falsifiable? It is of great importance to current discussion to notice that falsifiability in the sense of my demarcation criterion is a purely logical affair. It has to do only with the logical structure of statements and of classes of statements. And it has nothing to do with the question whether or not certain possible experimental results would be accepted as falsifications.
— Popper 1983 p. XX

--Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:00, 21 August 2018 (UTC)

And rejected logical inconsistency as a criterion for falsification

The contributions by Dominic Mayers are certainly great and I am really thankful to her giant effort to improve the page. Nonetheless, I deleted a sentence because it is not clear for the general reader what does it mean. Dominic Mayers initially wrote:

"Popper clearly distinguished between falsifiability and falsification,[6] and rejected logical inconsistency as a criteria for falsification, because he considered consistency a prerequisite so necessary that it had to be a part of falsifiability, the (logical) demarcation criterion itself, not of a subsequent falsification."

What does "rejected logical inconsistecy as a criterion for falsification" means? The Wikipedia page where "logical inconsistency" redirects says that a consistent theory is one which does not contain contradiction. And the Wikipedia page for "contradiction" says that "In classical logic, a contradiction consists of a logical incompatibility between two or more propositions. It occurs when the propositions, taken together, yield two conclusions which form the logical, usually opposite inversions of each other. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's law of noncontradiction states that One cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time."

Does it mean that Popper didn't consider contradictory (or incompatible) observations to be a criterion for falsification? Because that is not correct. The experiments of Pasteour falsified the spontaneous generation theory precisely because they represented a contradictory observation against spontaneous generation. The hypothesis that chimpanzees are herbivores (widely held in the 1950s) was falsified by Jane Goodall contradictory observations of wild chimpanzees hunting and eating monkeys.

Which page of which book does Popper say "I reject logical inconsistecy as a criteria for falsification"? That claim needs a source where Popper explicity says so.

I revised the page 72 of his Logic of Scientific discovery: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/popper-logic-scientific-discovery.pdf

Popper doesn't say that "I reject logical consistency as a criterion for falsification" in any moment. He says that any system must be consistent since:

    the importance of the requirement of consistency will be appreciated if one realizes that a self-contradictory system is uninformative. It 
    is so because any conclusion we please can be derived from it. Thus no statement is singled out, either as incompatible or as derivable, 
    since all are derivable."

Thus, only unfalsifiable systems are inconsistent. Falsifiable systems are consistent according to Popper. Then Popper argues that

   A consistent system, on the other hand, divides the set of all possible statements into two: those which it contradicts and those with
   which it is compatible. (Among the latter are the conclusions which can be derived from it.)".

The problem is that Popper is defining consistency in a diferent manner than Wikipedia. According to Popper, a consitent system allows both contradictory and compatible statements.

But according to Wikipedia consistency is the property of a theory which does not contain contradiction: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consistency

And Wikipedia defines contradiction as the property of having two propositions which express the opposite: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction

But according to Popper, a consistent system must allow both contradictory and compatible statements. On the other hand, according to Wikipedia, a consistent system cannot allow any contradiction or contradictory statement.

Since the Wikipedia definition of consistency differs from that of Popper, I think it is better to avoid putting the sentence "Popper rejected logical consistency as a criterion for falsifiability" and the whole paragraph that includes it. If such a paragraph were included, then it would be necessary to clarify in the lead section of the article what does Popper mean by logical inconsistency and consistency. Otherwise, such a messy paragraph should be excluded. (James343e (talk) 16:55, 28 August 2018‎ (UTC)

Thank you for the comment. I am sure that this paragraph could be improved. I did not write it alone, by the way. The decision to mention explicitly in the lead of the article that logical consistency is so important to Popper that it should precede falsification is not mine. I agree with this decision, but it is not mine. I like it, because it brings out that falsification is specifically about a contradiction against observations and thus goes beyond the purely formal or logical structure where the theory lies.

How do you propose that we convey the point that in Popper's definition falsifiable theories must be logically consistent? I see from your comment that you understand this point. We cannot change Popper's definition. If other philosophers have other definitions, we should mention them, but we must faithfully present Popper's definition. So, how should we convey this point.

Again, it was not my decision to explicitly mention this point. Originally, I only brought it as a footnote but someone felt it should be directly in the text.

Perhaps it could help to understand that it is natural that a logical system or language allows contradictory statements. The fact that in Popper's definition a consistent theory must exist together with statements that contradict it is not special at all. It certainly does not mean that Popper has a different notion of consistency. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:46, 28 August 2018 (UTC)

And let me answer your questions: What does "rejected logical inconsistecy as a criterion for falsification" means? ... Does it mean that Popper didn't consider contradictory (or incompatible) observations to be a criterion for falsification? The answer is that there is an implicit "internal" before "logical inconsistency". When we say that a theory is inconsistent, we usually mean "internally inconsistent". For every statement, there is always another statement that contradicts it, because we can simply add a "Not" before. We know that not every statement is inconsistent, of course. So, clearly, inconsistent usually refers to an internal inconsistency. A theory corresponds to a set of statements that can be derived from it. We can equate the theory with this set of statements. The theory is consistent, if they do not contradict each other. The existence of contradictory statements (not internal to the theory) is not interesting, because these contradictory statements always exist. However, Popper's definition is that among these contradictory statements, we must have basic statements. We see how important is the concept of basic statements. They must be existential singular statements that can be interpreted as observations. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:17, 29 August 2018 (UTC)

"All swans are white" can be proven false and is, hence, a falsifiable statement,

This statement below the picture is directly in contradiction with the definition. Popper insisted very much that falsifiable does not mean that it can be proven false. See the second note after the first sentence. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:17, 28 August 2018 (UTC)

Here is the second note after the first sentence in the article.

"We must distinguish two meanings of the expressions falsifiable and falsifiability:
"1) Falsifiable as a logical-technical term, in the sense of the demarcation criterion of falsifiability. This purely logical concept — falsifiable in principle, one might say — rests on a logical relation between the theory in question and the class of basic statements (or the potential falsifiers described by them).
"2) Falsifiable in the sense that the theory in question can definitively or conclusively or demonstrably be falsified ("demonstrably falsifiable").

"I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is never falsifiable in this second sense. (For this reason I have used the expression falsifiable as a rule only in the first, technical sense. In the second sense, I have as a rule spoken not of falsifiability but rather of falsification and of its problems)"

--Dominic Mayers (talk) 08:45, 29 August 2018 (UTC)

If you are saying the illustration should be deleted because it's misleading, unclear, counterproductive, and confusing, I strongly agree. I think the most powerful miscommunication part of that is the image itself. An actual black swan is not needed, only a realistic imagined possibility of a (hypothetical) black swan is needed. Or in Popper's words; "a purely logical affair."

From the black swan's vague, unclear caption: ""All swans are white" can be proven false and is, hence, a falsifiable statement," —Corrected: "All swans are white" can logically (or realistically hypothetically) be proven false and is, hence, a falsifiable statement." —However, as you point out, that's in contradiction with the rest of the caption. —Corrected: since possible evidence of black swans is reasonably possible, proves it to be falsifiable and such evidence can be provided....

I like this definition: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/falsifiable

Dominic Mayers, above, quotes:

"But when is a statement falsifiable? It is of great importance to current discussion to notice that falsifiability in the sense of my demarcation criterion is a purely logical affair. It has to do only with the logical structure of statements and of classes of statements. And it has nothing to do with the question whether or not certain possible experimental results would be accepted as falsifications.  — Popper 1983 p. XX"

However, the image itself is deceptive since it implies that real black swans are a part of falsifiability. They are not. The real black swan confuses logically falsifiable with falsified. That image is counterproductive.

Example; a lay valid argument: "Unlike Creationism, which cannot be falsified, evolution theory is scientific because it can be falsified a zillion ways, for example; a modern screwdriver, dog, or flowering plants found in the belly of a T Rex dinosaur found in undisturbed rock would falsify the current theory of evolution." —No real swan or dog needed. The illustration, even without the caption implies the opposite. I strongly suggest deleting the confusing image. A better illustration might even be a cartoon of a purely hypothetical falsification. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:C5FF:F292:7567:1FB5 (talk) 17:33, 28 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

Just to add that, if we do not take "if" to mean "if and only if" and if we accept to be informal, it is correct to say if we can provide an actual observation that contradicts the theory then the theory is falsifiable. It does informally imply falsifiability, as much as something as informal as "actual observation" can imply anything, but it's certainly not the definition, because the definition does not deal with what is actually possible in real life, whatever that means. It only deals with statements, which are the only things that can be dealt rigorously. The fact is that all reasonable books that I know about falsifiability give the definition in terms of statements. Here is a case that I find interesting. Chalmers in the 1982 edition of his book "What is this thing called Science", did not make a clear distinction between facts as actual observations and facts as basic statements, but the latter was assumed. In the 1999 edition, he wrote two pages and a half to insist on the distinction and to say that in science, we write theories and the facts (corroborating or falsifying it) in terms of statements. In a way, I feel that we are being picky here, because anyone with basic common sense should think that there is no other way that we can proceed in science. This being said, I have no opinion about the picture. I was talking about the text below it. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:16, 28 October 2018 (UTC)

Also, we should not confuse "to exist in real life" and "to be alive". There is a formulation of evolution theory that is falsifiable, but we do not need that a modern screwdriver in the belly of a T Rex fossile is in principle possible in the real life of a paleontologist, whatever that means. It is sufficient that this observation, irrespective of the complexity of real life issues, can be consigned as a basic statement. Of course, the issue of rigor as simply been moved to the definition of the set of basic statements. Sure, but that is the whole point: we want to separate what can be stated rigorously from what depend on conventions. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:39, 28 October 2018 (UTC)

Wow! I wouldn't disagree but we certainly don't want that level of formality in the lede section! What bugs me in the Lede is this; the second sentence:

"For example, the claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable since it is contradicted by this basic statement: "In 1697, during the Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh expedition, there were black swans on the shore of the Swan River in Australia", which in this case is a true observation."     I don't think so.

Implied in statement; (Reworded): For example, the claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable since it is contradicted by this basic statement: it is false. Obviously anything false or falsified is falsifiable.

Or (reworded): For example, the claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable since it is contradicted by this basic true observation/fact: "Not all swans are white". Again obviously anything false or falsified is falsifiable, but again, that's not why it's falsifiable. That would imply that before the black swans were found, "all swans are white" was not falsifiable. But that's untrue, the statement was falsifiable independent of (our knowledge of) darker swans. It seems we are confusing falsifiable with falsified. The same argument applies to the illustration/caption.

Here's an analogy: Something bent is obviously bendable, but being bent is not why it's bendable as the article implies. The nail was bendable before it was bent. The article confuses bendable with bent. The claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable regardless of the existence of black swans and regardless of our knowledge of any black swans. I believe it is now, and was long ago falsifiable —because the possible discovery of colored swans (falsification) is/was reasonable. Likewise, there is no conceivable way to falsify the claim: "Ghosts exist." Therefore the claim is unscientific. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:C5FF:F292:7567:1FB5 (talk) 04:48, 29 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

Academic Paralysis here, & Communication

Academic Paralysis is when academics, perhaps used to peer-reviewed journals, are more concerned with not being wrong than they are with good writing —and most importantly; with the effective Communication of ideas. The result is muddled, over-lawyerly speech, typically with too many clauses and sub-clauses etc, and often; with inappropriate jargon or stilted language. There are other style flaws, such as the seeming aversion to examples even when effective Communication is begging for some. Everybody on this page including Popper himself seem to be victim of this. For example, all the attempts to cleanly define "falsifiable." But only Popper has an excuse for this, since he was not writing for Wikipedia. Wikipedia stresses that it does NOT NOT NOT want to emulate a peer reviewed journals! Instead it values the effective Communication of ideas to average non-specialists. Not customizing one's writing to the targeted audience is ALWAYS crappy writing.

For example, compare this clean definition: —falsifiable, adjective, designating or of a statement, theory, etc. that is so formulated as to permit empirical testing and, therefore, can be shown to be false. Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Copyright © 2010 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/falsifiable

...a good place to start. In our context we might replace "formulated" with "structured," and "empirical," with "logical." Whatever. Add a few simple sentences to clarify; done. Or: adjective: capable of being tested (falsified) by experiment or observation.

But for added complexity other key words have multiple definitions, I choose def3: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/empirical 3: capable of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment —empirical laws—     That's nothing compared to "love." Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:C5FF:F292:7567:1FB5 (talk) 01:39, 29 October 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

There is no paralysis here. One or even two definitions in dictionaries should have little weight in comparison to many articles on falsifiability and many books on Popper epistemology, which simply give the same definition as Popper. The subject is falsifiability, which was defined by Popper. He is the primary source. We must present it, not something else, in the light of secondary sources. If another notable philosopher had defined falsifiability in a different way, we could raise the question how much weight we must give to it, but only Popper has defined falsifiability. So, the question is not even raised.

BTW, the "definition" in Collins has simply confused a statement that Popper wrote to motivate the definition with the definition itself. Yes, it's true that falsifiability of a theory was defined by Popper in such a way that the theory can be empirically tested and, therefore, can be shown false. Yes, the definition implies this property, but this is not the definition. As far as the Merriam definition is concerned, it's about the adjective empirical, which is a general concept that has been defined in different ways by different philosophers. We should not confuse it with the technical term "falsifiability" introduced by Popper. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:59, 29 October 2018 (UTC)

However, I do sympathize with your concern. It's difficult to define falsifiability in one sentence, even one paragraph. The important philosophical issue of the empirical basis is raised by the definition. This issue is implicit in the concept of basic statement, which is hard to define but fundamental in the definition. If we define falsifiability in a way that avoid this issue, then we have defined something else. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:10, 29 October 2018 (UTC)

Difficult? Yes, for me nothing is more difficult than attempting to communicate more than small-talk, which is typically little more than expressive grunting. I see gibberish in the lede section, I've explained why. If the technical jargon contradicts plain English, (sounds-alike jargon, SPIT!) then perhaps the jargon itself needs to be defined before using it? Personally, for me nothing is more challenging than attempting effective communication. Do you know as much about that topic, those skills, as you do about Popper? I ask because very little of what you write is getting thru to me. Since I suspect you know about Popper, then the problem must be communication. The problem might be on my end. But I have seen you make very little effort to that end; all I see are jargon-laden appeals to authority and dogma, not plain English attempts to explain or teach. If one thinks effective communication requires less than one's full effort and much time, one is destructively ignorant of the topic. I've tried to reword my arguments several ways to try and communicate with you, and you? Respectfully; it seems like you don't even understand my questions/challenges, you brush them aside, so one must wonder what you do understand.

"....should have little weight in comparison to many articles on falsifiability and many books on Popper epistemology..." That aint worth shit here. All that matters here is what the reader gathers from the article. If the reader doesn't get it, or worse; gets it wrong, the article and the writers fail. Encyclopedias by definition condense info which means almost by definition the writer will be conveying a partial truth or distortion. (We have no godlike writers.) Therefore the writer's task is to decide which "untruth" to tell. I'm pretty sure we don't want a portrayal that seems false on it's face, seems self-contradictory or illogical. If the writer holds the many books on Popper etc as holy, as not subject to that "partial truth or distortion," perhaps he is paralyzed. (While I hold Popper and Kuhn's genus along side Eisenstein's, not so Popper's writing communication skills.)

For me Popper's and Kuhn's worldviews have been highly useful when truth seeking. If we can pass that on to others I will be content. I want something rugged and useful. Tools. The poli-econ motivated anti-science, anti-truth, anti-intellectualism movements are growing exponentially.

Inappropriate jargon has long been a part of my job and is a pet peeve. Over the years it has been my observation that the worst articles are often technical articles because respected experts tend to falsely assume 1)writing/explaining/teaching requires little effort or 2)of course they own the writing skills, time, and talents, —or because they no longer have the ability (or desire) to communicate complex ideas with Joe Sixpack on Joe's terms. Laugh! but sometimes I also see what seems like precocious 13-year-olds attempting to impress self, peers, or others. Laugh!!, even: cram for a final; write a Wikipedia article!

I think the Lede may be a bit out of specs, you may want to review this: MOS:LEAD Wikipedia:Manual of Style/Lead section. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3044:A2C3:2683:987B (talk) 14:59, 2 November 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

I agree that the lead section needs improvement. My mistake and perhaps also the mistake of those who wish a simpler version, I feel, is to think that we must "fully" define falsifiability in the lead. Let me explain what I mean by "fully" using some examples. The statement "We say that a theory is falsifiable if it can be proven wrong in an experiment" is a complete definition. It is a complete definition, because as soon as we know what is meant by "proven wrong in an experiment", and usually we have a good idea of what it means, the notion of falsifiability is fully determined. It is a complete definition, but it is wrong. When you think about it, it makes no sense, because if it can be proven wrong, then it has to be wrong. Because of that, some people will add "in principle", but it does not help much, because "in principle" or "possibly" is unclear, not defined. I had no idea how to turn "in principle" into a rigorous concept. I had no idea what this supposedly easy to understand definition meant. In any case, it's not the definition. It simply is not. On the other hand, the following statement

Falsifiability is a property, a sort of potentiality used to characterize any theory that possibly may clash with a particular state of affairs. According to its more simple formulation, it tells us that, when such a clash takes place, the theory in question becomes falsified.

— Carlos E. Garcia, Popper's Theory of Science. An apologia.

is not a full definition. It is the way used by the author to gently introduce the full definition, which he says, will come later. Most notable authors on the subject use this kind of gentle approach, even Popper himself does so. Here is the first statement used by Popper to "define" falsifiability in Logic of Scientific Discovery:

... not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. ... In other words: ... I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.”

— Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery.

Garcia's statement and Popper's statement are not full definitions. In Garcia's statement, we don't know what is the mentioned property. Even if we know what is meant by "a property", we still don't know what is the property in the definition. The actual definition depends on our choice for this property. In Popper's statement, we don't know what is the required logical form. The actual definition depends on the required logical form. The actual full definitions that are given later by Garcia and Popper in their respective book are identical and are both given in terms of basic statements. Note that despite the "possible" and "possibly" used in these statements, we have that, if the theory is possibly contradicted by an experiment, it must be incorrect. So, the same problem is there - these statements are unclear, but here, at the least, there is no claim that a full definition is given. We understand that it will become clear when we will have the full definition and, indeed, the correct full definition makes it clear and makes us realize that it is a deep concept.

My mistake was to feel that, in a lead, we must give the full definition because, as pointed out in MOS:LEAD : The lead should stand on its own as a concise overview of the article's topic. It should identify the topic, establish context, explain why the topic is notable, and summarize the most important points, including any prominent controversies. But, given your comment, I realize that a full definition might not be a good idea.

However, what was totally unacceptable and worst than the current version, was to provide an incorrect full definition in the lead. Why do you think I started to edit that article? It was because the definition made no sense to me. It was perhaps considered simple and natural by some people, but if you looked at it carefully, you could see the contradictions. In that sense, I feel that what I wrote was a necessary improvement. I agree that providing a gentle, incomplete, but correct definition would even be better. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:56, 2 November 2018 (UTC)

In fact, I am looking again at MOS:LEAD and it is clear that the previous lead before my edits did not respect at all these guidelines. It was only an incorrect supposedly natural definition together with one or two statements saying it demarcated scientific theories. It did not at all identify the topic, establish context, explain why the topic is notable, and summarize the most important points, including any prominent controversies.. I admit that the current version is not much better, but at the least it does not give a definition that is non sense. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:12, 2 November 2018 (UTC)

Again you frustrate my attempts at communication by brushing aside all my attempts, every single paragraph with no comment and restarting your little-changed, unaffected (by me) monologues, MONOlogues, refusing a dialog. First, I agree we need a complete definition in the lede, but what we don't need are all the lawyerly "subclauses" (crap). Typically a definition is given in first few lines or the first paragraph if possible. To "fully" define falsifiability, we DO NOT attempt Popper's lousy, inappropriate writing style, (or worse; attempt to paraphrase a quot,) we attempt to cleanly explain the concept, a rather simple, like-duh one. The concept is in the public domain, he is unneeded. Second you are using foggy, vague, confusing nearly meaningless language. Is it possible you are using terms-of-art or jargon or are aping previously defined Popper-speak without recognizing it? In any case, those words are crap, too vague, unusable, I have no idea what the Hell you are talking about. IOW, stop repeating yourself (others?) and start doing some actual explaining. You might even consider talking to me about what I've written...you may or may not agree, in full or partially I have no fucking idea. And why the hell are you posting incomplete partial (garbage) popper quotes at me? I have no desire to hear your self-musings.

Crap example:

The statement "We say that a theory is falsifiable if it can be proven wrong in an experiment" is a complete definition. Whether it is the correct definition is irrelevant here. The point is that as soon as we know what is meant by "proven wrong in an experiment", and usually we have a good idea of what it means, the notion of falsifiability is fully determined.

That is so sloppy, how dare you call that anything close to a definition. Sloppy thinking, vague sloppy words...sounds more like a teenager thinking aloud. Here's the biggest fix: change "if it can be proven wrong" to "if it could be proven wrong." That changes the physical into the logical, or feasible, as Popper intended. You keep making that error over and over, as I've attempted to explain again and again. To not a fuckin word from you.

Other problems with quotes is "empirical," which as I noted to your silence, has several definitions (as in vague crap). Since you refuse to actually communicate, I'll not put more effort into repeating myself, I guess I'm getting smarter.

So, 1)are you or are you not claiming "all swans are white" was not falsifiable before black swans were discovered? 2)Do you think you have answered that question, if so, where? 3)Why am I talking into a well?

"Why do you think I started to edit that article?" I am not referring to what was written before I got here since I have no knowledge of it. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3044:A2C3:2683:987B (talk) 23:23, 2 November 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

You wrote First, I agree we need a complete definition in the lede, but I was expressing that the exact opposite would be better. So, I don't think you communicate very well. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:42, 2 November 2018 (UTC)

And to answer your question, the empirical status of a theory, in accordance with the popperian criterion, is never affected by the outcome of an experiment. So, if "All swans are white" is falsifiable, it is falsifiable before and after any experiment. BTW, it is falsifiable, because the ultimate background theory, the logic, allows basic statements such as "Today, this swan on this river is black", which contradicts the theory. The logic background theory is there before we can even write the theory "All swans are white". --Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:20, 3 November 2018 (UTC)

Yup. 1)So what is this confusing, vague if not misleading sentence doing in the Lede paragraph?

"For example, the claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable since it is contradicted by this basic statement: "In 1697, during the Dutch explorer Willem de Vlamingh expedition, there were black swans on the shore of the Swan River in Australia", which in this case is a true observation."

"since" means because. Only about 443 people have tried to point this recurring error out to you.

Corrected: For example, the claim "all swans are white" is falsifiable since real colored swans are a reasonable possibility.

2)What is this pretentious, confusing lawyered-up verbiage doing in Wikipedia as the lede sentence?

"A statement, hypothesis, or theory has falsifiability (or is falsifiable) if it is contradicted by a basic statement, which, in an eventual successful or failed falsification, must respectively correspond to a true or hypothetical observation.[1][2]..."

Why not clean and simple paragraph, like this?

Falsifiability or refutability of a statement, hypothesis, or theory is the inherent possibility that it can be proven false. A statement is called falsifiable if it is possible to conceive of an observation or an argument which negates the statement in question. In this sense, falsify is synonymous with nullify, meaning to invalidate or "show to be false".

Or something like this:

A statement, hypothesis, or theory has falsifiability or refutability if there is the possibility of showing it to be false. It is falsifiable if it is possible to conceive an empirical observation or a logical argument which could refute it.

It's really a very simple concept. No confusing grandiloquence or logorrhea (shitty writing) needed!

As I recall Popper didn't include "logical argument" etc, but it was added later to meet the needs of astronomy & astrophysics, nonNewtonian etc where thought is often outside the realm of empirical observation. The topic is falsification, not Popperism. CHEERS!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3044:A2C3:2683:987B (talk) 21:38, 3 November 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford

Your simple notion of falsifiability is not verifiable in secondary sources such as Chalmers, Boyer and Garcia to mention only a few. The concept of falsifiability is not the simple idea that the theory can be possibly false or proven false. It's not that. It has nothing to do with what could possibly happen in some future. It has only to do with its relationship with the observations that are possible in principle (that is, if we ignore the theory). In a way, if we insist to give a criteria in terms of hypothetical observations, it has more to do with the hypothetical observations that were considered possible in the past, that is, before the theory. Popper wrote something that is enlightening on this respect: "Not for nothing do we call the laws of nature ‘laws’: the more they prohibit the more they say." Here, we see the idea that the value of a theory is that it clashes with observations that would otherwise be possible. Such a theory could be totally impossible to prove false and it would still be falsifiable. --Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:51, 3 November 2018 (UTC)

You claim without support: "The concept of falsifiability is not the simple idea that the theory can be possibly false or proven false. It's not that." Bullshit, that's the basic idea, particularly from science's (as opposed to philosophy's) POV, —if you think it needs further tweaking and feathering out, the lede section is not the place to attempt that. In this context, convention says philosophy takes the far, far back seat to the working tools of science.

Dude, do you have any idea how bad your communication skills are? I hate to attempt mindreading, but it looks like you think communication is all about the transmittor —you. Have you ever tried to parse your own words?...like your above paragraph? For example, 3/4 of it, —after the word "future,"— it's all logical puff; agreement, unsupported opinion, and non sequitur. Bloviation. But improving. Bashford's First Rule of Writing: Nobody cares about your words as much as you do. (Mom's only faking it.) It's like you are so excited with your ideas, with yourself, you just can't be bothered with what your fingers are doing, with what those words could mean to somebody else, with actually communicating.

What's all the jumping around for anyway? We are largely in agreement. My examples didn't mention the future. By the way, they are not "my" examples, they were long in use, largely unmolested before you started muddling around here last April, in fact one of them still shows up in the Bing search cache, nice, smooth, and comprehensible. What makes you the expert in writing Wiki Lead sections and effective communication? So yer saying "Trust me, while I can't even speak plain English, I'm not crazy, everybody else was! This is MY article now, MINE MINE MINE!!!" lol.

I guess you missed it the first time: Academic Paralysis is when academics and wannabees are more concerned with not being wrong than they are with good writing —and most importantly; with the effective Communication of ideas. The result is muddled, over-lawyerly speech, typically with too many clauses and sub-clauses etc, and often; with inappropriate jargon or stilted language. Some people are so self-absorbed they try that in the Lede. Cheesh. Cheers!
--2602:306:CFCE:1EE0:3044:A2C3:2683:987B (talk) 04:06, 4 November 2018 (UTC)Doug Bashford