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== Conspiracy theories and cognitive infiltration ==
== Conspiracy theories and cognitive infiltration ==
In 2009, two legal scholars, [[Cass Sunstein]] and [[Adrian Vermeule]], published an article in the ''[[The Journal of Political Philosophy|Journal of Political Philosophy]]'' called, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” (A longer version appeared online in 2008 under the title “Conspiracy Theories.”<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sunstein|first=Cass R.|last2=Vermeule|first2=Adrian|date=2008-01-15|title=Conspiracy Theories|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1084585|language=en|location=Rochester, NY}}</ref>) In this article Sunstein and Vermeule argue that, because conspiracy theorists tend to dismiss information that comes from authoritative sources, in order to respond to dangerous and demonstrably false conspiracy theories, the government should seek to infiltrate groups that propound conspiracy theories, and seek to cure their “crippled epistemologies” from the inside. They write: <blockquote>“[W]e suggest a distinctive tactic for breaking up the hard core of extremists who supply conspiracy theories: cognitive infiltration of extremist groups, whereby government agents or their allies (acting either virtually or in real space, and either openly or anonymously) will undermine the crippled epistemology of believers by planting doubts about the theories and stylized facts that circulate within such groups, thereby introducing beneficial cognitive diversity.” <ref>Sunstein, Cass, and Adrian Vermeule (2009). “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” ''Journal of Political Philosophy'' 17.2, p. 219.  </ref></blockquote>Several philosophers have responded to Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal and arguments. Kurtis Hagen questions whether the government can impartially determine what is and is not “demonstrably false,” arguing that Sunstein and Vermeule had provided scant justification for confidence.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” ''The International Journal of Applied Philosophy''24.2 (Fall 2010), pp. 155-158.</ref> He also argues that while Sunstein and Vermeule praise the virtues of an “open society,” their proposed “cognitive infiltrations” would tend to push society away from this ideal.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” ''The International Journal of Applied Philosophy''24.2 (Fall 2010), p. 160.</ref> Hagen elsewhere argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal relies on various types of misleading information, and their account of the spread of conspiracy theories—the “causes”—is implausible.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis (2011). “Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts,” ''Journal for Peace and Justice Studies'' 21.2 (Fall), p. 3.</ref> David Coady argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposed cure is both unlikely to work and “inconsistent with the values of liberal democracy,” <ref name=":5">Coady, David (2018). “Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule on Conspiracy Theories.” ''Argumenta'' issue 6, p. 291. https://www.argumenta.org/article/cass-sunstein-adrian-vermeule-conspiracy-theories-special-issue/</ref> and that their position hinges on an equivocation between conspiracy theories in general and false, harmful ones.<ref name=":5" /> Charles Pigden suggests a similar equivocation. He addresses Sunstein and Vermeule’s essay at some length in an article titled, “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” He acknowledges that a subset of conspiracy theories—those that are false, harmful, and unjustified—could use some sort of political cure. But he argues that Sunstein and Vermeule seem to conflate this subset of conspiracy theories with any “''conspiracy theory about the dark doings of recent Western governments or government agencies''.''”'' <ref>Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 123. In ''A Companion to Applied Philosophy'', edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9. </ref> Regarding such conspiracy theories, Pigden argues, “it ''is'' intellectually vicious to be a consistent conspiracy skeptic. … [T]he virtuous policy is to proportion belief to the evidence.” <ref>Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 131. In ''A Companion to Applied Philosophy'', edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9. </ref>
In 2009, two legal scholars, [[Cass Sunstein]] and [[Adrian Vermeule]], published an article in the ''[[The Journal of Political Philosophy|Journal of Political Philosophy]]'' called, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” (A longer version appeared online in 2008 under the title “Conspiracy Theories.”<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sunstein|first=Cass R.|last2=Vermeule|first2=Adrian|date=2008-01-15|title=Conspiracy Theories|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1084585|language=en|location=Rochester, NY}}</ref>) In this article Sunstein and Vermeule argue that, because conspiracy theorists tend to dismiss information that comes from authoritative sources, in order to respond to dangerous and demonstrably false conspiracy theories, the government should seek to infiltrate groups that propound conspiracy theories, and seek to cure their “crippled epistemologies” from the inside. They write: <blockquote>“[W]e suggest a distinctive tactic for breaking up the hard core of extremists who supply conspiracy theories: cognitive infiltration of extremist groups, whereby government agents or their allies (acting either virtually or in real space, and either openly or anonymously) will undermine the crippled epistemology of believers by planting doubts about the theories and stylized facts that circulate within such groups, thereby introducing beneficial cognitive diversity.” <ref>Sunstein, Cass, and Adrian Vermeule (2009). “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” ''Journal of Political Philosophy'' 17.2, p. 219.  </ref></blockquote>Several philosophers have responded to Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal and arguments. Kurtis Hagen questions whether the government can impartially determine what is and is not “demonstrably false,” arguing that Sunstein and Vermeule had provided scant justification for confidence.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” ''The International Journal of Applied Philosophy'' 24.2 (Fall ), pp. 155-158.</ref> He also argues that while Sunstein and Vermeule praise the virtues of an “open society,” their proposed “cognitive infiltrations” would tend to push society away from this ideal.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” ''The International Journal of Applied Philosophy'' 24.2 (Fall), p. 160.</ref> Hagen elsewhere argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal relies on various types of misleading information, and their account of the spread of conspiracy theories—the “causes”—is implausible.<ref>Hagen, Kurtis (2011). “Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts,” ''Journal for Peace and Justice Studies'' 21.2 (Fall), p. 3.</ref> David Coady argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposed cure is both unlikely to work and “inconsistent with the values of liberal democracy,” <ref name=":5">Coady, David (2018). “Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule on Conspiracy Theories.” ''Argumenta'' issue 6, p. 291. https://www.argumenta.org/article/cass-sunstein-adrian-vermeule-conspiracy-theories-special-issue/</ref> and that their position hinges on an equivocation between conspiracy theories in general and false, harmful ones.<ref name=":5" /> Charles Pigden suggests a similar equivocation. He addresses Sunstein and Vermeule’s essay at some length in an article titled, “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” He acknowledges that a subset of conspiracy theories—those that are false, harmful, and unjustified—could use some sort of political cure. But he argues that Sunstein and Vermeule seem to conflate this subset of conspiracy theories with any “''conspiracy theory about the dark doings of recent Western governments or government agencies''.''”'' <ref>Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 123. In ''A Companion to Applied Philosophy'', edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9. </ref> Regarding such conspiracy theories, Pigden argues, “it ''is'' intellectually vicious to be a consistent conspiracy skeptic. … [T]he virtuous policy is to proportion belief to the evidence.” <ref>Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 131. In ''A Companion to Applied Philosophy'', edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9. </ref>


Sunstein revised and republished his essay (now as sole author) in ''Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas''. There he states that his proposed cognitive infiltrations were meant only to apply to ''foreign'' conspiracy theorists.<ref>Sunstein, Cass (2014). ''Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas''. New York: Simon and Schuster. (pp. x, xii, xvi, 29).</ref>
Sunstein revised and republished his essay (now as sole author) in ''Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas''. There he states that his proposed cognitive infiltrations were meant only to apply to ''foreign'' conspiracy theorists.<ref>Sunstein, Cass (2014). ''Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas''. New York: Simon and Schuster. (pp. x, xii, xvi, 29).</ref>

Revision as of 14:23, 10 November 2019

Conspiracy theories have been studied within the academic discipline of philosophy. The proper way to define the term conspiracy theory have been debated in academic journals and books devoted to epistemology, the study of the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief.

Definitions of conspiracy theory

Philosophers M Dentith and Brian Keeley have argued that defining conspiracy theories as being prima facie unlikely may result in prematurely dismissing theories that posit conspiracies.[1] Consequently, those taking this position tend to favor non-pejorative definitions, as do Dentith and Keeley as well as Charles Pigden, David Coady and Lee Basham.[2] Dentith, Keeley, and Basham favor minimalist definitions, defining "conspiracy theories" as theories involving conspiracies as a significant cause.[2] This has been criticized by Coady as capturing too many false positives, including, for example, the official account of 9/11.[3] Coady has suggested that a characteristic feature of conspiracy theories is their opposition to some official account,[3][4] though he argues that this does not imply that the alternative theory must be unwarranted.[5] Daniel Cohnitz argues against this, pointing out that conspiracy theories should still be regarded as such even when they become the official narrative of a party in power.[6] Charles Pigden suggests that the phrase is used to refer to accusations of morally suspect behavior on the part of Western governments; in his view, the phrase is an illegitimate attempt to discredit such accusations.[7]

The term "conspiracy theory" typically implies oppressive or sinister intent.[8] The following philosophers have argued that such language overstates the case:[9][10][11]

  • Steve Clark (who argues that a dismissive attitude to conspiracy theories is generally justifiable) points out that Elvis Presley conspiring to fake his own death would not have been an example of nefarious intent, and that popularizers of that conspiracy theory have portrayed Elvis sympathetically.[12]
  • Cohnitz argues that in most versions of the Paul Is Dead conspiracy theory, the surviving Beatles and their co-conspirators had the non-malevolent motivation of trying to save the world from collective grief, and that some believers in chemtrails say they might be spreading chemicals for a beneficial purpose. Consequently, for Cohnitz, sinister intent should not be taken as a necessary component of the definition.[6]
  • Pigden characterizes conspiracy theories as positing "morally suspect" enterprises.[13]

Susan Feldman has pointed out that beliefs designated as conspiracy theories may purport to explain, not events that have occurred or facts that are widely known, but "hidden facts".[14]

Coady suggests that the phrase "conspiracy theory" should not be used, while Dentith and Keeley maintain that it should continue to be used and to be discussed.[15]

The conspiracy theory of society

The debate in analytic philosophy regarding conspiracy theories began in the mid-1990s when Charles Pigden challenged Karl Popper's position.[16] Popper, an influential philosopher of science, described what he called the "conspiracy theory of society", according to which history is a product of conspiracy, intended by some individuals or groups. Popper argues that this view must be wrong because not everything is intended.[17][18] Although Popper's critique has been and continues to be influential,[19] Pigden has maintained that Popper's argument does not apply to most conspiracy theories, which do not posit complete control of events.[20][21] Pigden also points out that when a conspiracy fails in some way, a theory about the conspiracy is still a conspiracy theory and may still play an explanatory role.[22]

Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate

Published contributions to the philosophical debate about conspiracy theories prior to 2006 are collected in David Coady's Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate (Ashgate 2006), which also includes several new essays by the same authors. Contributors include David Coady, Charles Pigden, Brian L. Keeley, Lee Basham, and Steve Clarke. The relevant pages from Karl Popper regarding the "conspiracy theory of society" are also included. The debate is focused primarily on epistemic issues such as "when if ever it is rational to believe conspiracy theories" (Coady 2006, p. ix). The book begins with Popper's idea of the "conspiracy theory of society" and Charles Pigden's response.

Brian Keeley's 1999 essay, "Of Conspiracy Theories", which originally appeared in The Journal of Philosophy, prompted a new phase in the debate. Keeley focused on a subset of conspiracy theories that he called "unwarranted conspiracy theories" (UCTs). According to David Coady, Keeley argued that several generalizations about conspiracy theories "suggest a prima facie case against belief in them" (Coady 2006, p. 6). Lee Basham takes a more sympathetic view, suggesting we should adopt an attitude of "studied agnosticism" (Coady 2006, p. 7). Steve Clarke argues that because conspiracy theories overestimate dispositional explanations an attitude of prima facie skepticism towards them is warranted. David Coady, however, suggests that there is another error that should be considered, "the error of being excessively unwilling to believe conspiracy theories". He argues that this error is more widespread and insidious (Coady 2006, p. 9).

In 2007, a special issue of Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology contained several more essays that continued the debate. Therein, Neil Levy, in "Radically Socialized Knowledge", argues that conspiracy theories, conceived of as conflicting with officially endorsed accounts, "should be treated with prima facie scepticism" because they conflict with the views of the relevant epistemic authorities.[23][24] David Coady, in "Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?" responds to Levy, arguing that "conspiracy theorists need not be particularly sceptical of epistemic authorities as such".[23] Coady also argues that Levy’s position trades on an ambiguity between "institutional authority" and "epistemic authority". [25] Coady takes the position that the pejorative use of the phrase "conspiracy theory" ought to be discontinued.[23] Pete Mandik "characterizes conspiracy theorists as people who fail to recognise that sometimes shit just happens".[26][24] Charles Pigden, on the other hand, frames the issue in terms of the "ethics of belief". He argues that the conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories—that they "should neither be believed nor investigated"—is dangerously mistaken on any of a variety of interpretations of the phrase "conspiracy theory".[26]

Generalists and particularists

The philosophical debate regarding the epistemic status of conspiracy theories has been characterized as between "generalists" and "particularists".[27] In 2010, Joel Buenting and Jason Taylor coined these terms, which they describe as follows:

"According to the generalist view, the rationality of conspiracy theories can be assessed without considering particular conspiracy theories. On this view, conspiratorial thinking qua conspiracy thinking is itself irrational. The particularist view about conspiratorial thinking denies that the rationality of conspiracy theories can be assessed without considering particular conspiracy theories".[28][29]

In addition to Buenting and Taylor themselves, particularists are said to include Charles Pigden, David Coady, and Lee Basham,[30] as well as M Dentith, and Kurtis Hagen.[31] Buenting and Taylor categorize Brian Keeley, Steve Clarke, and Pete Mandik as generalists. Hagen suggests Neil Levy also qualifies as a generalist but questions whether Keeley truly does.[32][33]

Conspiracy theories and cognitive infiltration

In 2009, two legal scholars, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, published an article in the Journal of Political Philosophy called, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” (A longer version appeared online in 2008 under the title “Conspiracy Theories.”[34]) In this article Sunstein and Vermeule argue that, because conspiracy theorists tend to dismiss information that comes from authoritative sources, in order to respond to dangerous and demonstrably false conspiracy theories, the government should seek to infiltrate groups that propound conspiracy theories, and seek to cure their “crippled epistemologies” from the inside. They write:

“[W]e suggest a distinctive tactic for breaking up the hard core of extremists who supply conspiracy theories: cognitive infiltration of extremist groups, whereby government agents or their allies (acting either virtually or in real space, and either openly or anonymously) will undermine the crippled epistemology of believers by planting doubts about the theories and stylized facts that circulate within such groups, thereby introducing beneficial cognitive diversity.” [35]

Several philosophers have responded to Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal and arguments. Kurtis Hagen questions whether the government can impartially determine what is and is not “demonstrably false,” arguing that Sunstein and Vermeule had provided scant justification for confidence.[36] He also argues that while Sunstein and Vermeule praise the virtues of an “open society,” their proposed “cognitive infiltrations” would tend to push society away from this ideal.[37] Hagen elsewhere argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal relies on various types of misleading information, and their account of the spread of conspiracy theories—the “causes”—is implausible.[38] David Coady argues that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposed cure is both unlikely to work and “inconsistent with the values of liberal democracy,” [39] and that their position hinges on an equivocation between conspiracy theories in general and false, harmful ones.[39] Charles Pigden suggests a similar equivocation. He addresses Sunstein and Vermeule’s essay at some length in an article titled, “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” He acknowledges that a subset of conspiracy theories—those that are false, harmful, and unjustified—could use some sort of political cure. But he argues that Sunstein and Vermeule seem to conflate this subset of conspiracy theories with any “conspiracy theory about the dark doings of recent Western governments or government agencies.” [40] Regarding such conspiracy theories, Pigden argues, “it is intellectually vicious to be a consistent conspiracy skeptic. … [T]he virtuous policy is to proportion belief to the evidence.” [41]

Sunstein revised and republished his essay (now as sole author) in Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas. There he states that his proposed cognitive infiltrations were meant only to apply to foreign conspiracy theorists.[42]

See also

Further reading

  • 2007. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2. (Special Issue: Conspiracy Theories)
  • 2018. Argumenta 3.2 (issue #6) (Special Issue: The Ethics and the Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories) Open access.
  • Coady, David, ed. (2006). Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 0754652505.
  • Dentith, Matthew R. X. (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1137363169.
  • Dentith, Matthew R. X. (2018). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. ISBN 1786608308.

External links

References

  1. ^ Dentith, M R.X. and Brian L. Keeley (2019). "The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview", p. 291, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge (284-294).
  2. ^ a b Dentith, M R. X. (2019). "Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence". Synthese 196, p. 2244; doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1532-7.
  3. ^ a b Coady, David. (2003). "Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories". International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17.2, pp. 200-201.
  4. ^ Coady, David. (2006). "An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories", pp. 2-3. In Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, edited by David Coady. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate: 1-11.
  5. ^ Coady, David. (2003). "Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories". International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17.2, pp. 208-209.
  6. ^ a b Cohnitz, Daniel. "Critical Citizens or Paranoid Nutcases? On the Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories". Retrieved November 3, 2019.
  7. ^ Pigden, Charles. (2006). "Complots of Mischief", pp. 164-165. In David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
  8. ^ "conspiracy theory". Oxford English Dictionary (Online ed.). Oxford University Press. (Subscription or participating institution membership required.) "the theory that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of a conspiracy between interested parties; spec. a belief that some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible for an unexplained event"
  9. ^ Coady, David (2006). "An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories", p. 1. In Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, edited by David Coady. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate: 1-11.
  10. ^ Keeley, Brian L. (2007). "God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory", Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, p. 141.
  11. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). "Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?" Social Epistemology 32.1, pp. 30-32.
  12. ^ Clarke, Steve (2002). "Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 32 (2): 131–150. doi:10.1177/004931032002001.
  13. ^ Pigden, Charles (2006). "Complots of Mischief", p. 157. In David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.
  14. ^ Feldman, Susan (2011). "Counterfact Conspiracy Theories". International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 25 (1): 15–24. doi:10.5840/ijap20112512.
  15. ^ Dentith, M R.X. and Brian L. Keeley (2019). "The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview", p. 29w, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge (284-294).
  16. ^ Butter, Michael; Knight, Peter (2019), "The History of Conspiracy Theory Research", Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, p. 39, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0002, ISBN 978-0-19-084407-3
  17. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 15–16.
  18. ^ Popper, Karl (1972). Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. Routledge Kegan Paul. pp. 123–125.
  19. ^ Coady, David (2006). Conspiracy theories : the philosophical debate. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. p. 5. ISBN 0-7546-5250-5. OCLC 60697068.
  20. ^ Dentith, Matthew (2014). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 16–17.
  21. ^ Pigden, Charles (1995). "Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 25 (1): 3–34. doi:10.1177/004839319502500101.
  22. ^ Coady, David (2006). The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. p. 5.
  23. ^ a b c Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4 (2): 132.
  24. ^ a b Dentith, M R. X. (2018). "When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation", p. 4. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  25. ^ Coady, David. (2018). "Anti-Rumor Campaigns and Conspiracy-Baiting as Propaganda", pp. 174-175. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  26. ^ a b Coady, David (2007). "Introduction: Conspiracy Theories". Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. 4.2: 133.
  27. ^ Dentith, M R.X. and Brian L. Keeley (2019). "The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview", p. 286, in David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge,
  28. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). "Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists", p. pp. 128-129. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  29. ^ Buenting, Joel; Taylor, Jason (2010). "Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data". Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 40 (4): 568–569.
  30. ^ Dentith, M R. X. (2018). "When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation", p. 13. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  31. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). "Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists", p. 128. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  32. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2018). "Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists", p. 139 n8. In Dentith (ed). Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
  33. ^ Keeley, Brian (2019), "The Credulity of Conspiracy Theorists", p. 424. In Joseph Uscinski (ed), Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190844073
  34. ^ Sunstein, Cass R.; Vermeule, Adrian (2008-01-15). "Conspiracy Theories". Rochester, NY. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  35. ^ Sunstein, Cass, and Adrian Vermeule (2009). “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” Journal of Political Philosophy 17.2, p. 219.  
  36. ^ Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24.2 (Fall ), pp. 155-158.
  37. ^ Hagen, Kurtis. (2010). “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24.2 (Fall), p. 160.
  38. ^ Hagen, Kurtis (2011). “Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts,” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21.2 (Fall), p. 3.
  39. ^ a b Coady, David (2018). “Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule on Conspiracy Theories.” Argumenta issue 6, p. 291. https://www.argumenta.org/article/cass-sunstein-adrian-vermeule-conspiracy-theories-special-issue/
  40. ^ Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 123. In A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9.
  41. ^ Pigden, Charles (2017). “Are Conspiracy Theorists Epistemically Vicious?” p. 131. In A Companion to Applied Philosophy, edited by Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, 120–132. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118869109.ch9.
  42. ^ Sunstein, Cass (2014). Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas. New York: Simon and Schuster. (pp. x, xii, xvi, 29).
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