Battle of Arras (1917)

Battle of Arras
Part of the Western Front of World War I
The Town Square, Arras, France. February, 1919.
Date 9 April to 16 May, 1917 Location France Result No final breakthrough achieved but major British & Dominion development of tactics leading, in 1918, to victory.
Belligerents
British Empire • United Kingdom • Canada • Australia	German Empire
Commanders and leaders
Douglas Haig Edmund Allenby Hubert Gough Henry Horne	Erich Ludendorff Ludwig von Falkenhausen Georg von der Marwitz
Strength
27 Divisions in the assault	7 Divisions in the line 27 Divisions in reserve
Casualties and losses
Approx. 160,000†	Between 120-160,000†
† Discussed in detail in Casualties, below

The Battle of Arras was an offensive during World War I by forces of the British Empire between 9 April and 16 May, 1917. British, Canadian, and Australian troops attacked German trenches near the French city of Arras. It was planned in conjunction with the French High Command, who were planning a massive attack (the Nivelle Offensive) about eighty kilometres to the south, with the aim of ending the war in forty-eight hours. At Arras, the British Empire's immediate objectives were more modest: (i) to draw German troops away from the ground chosen for the French attack and (ii) to take the German-held high ground that dominated the plain of Douai. They were successful in both these aims.

The first phase of Arras resulted in important strategic gains for the Allied forces right along the front. The most dramatic of these were the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps; the taking of the ridges at Monchy and Croisailles; and advances made by British troops east of Arras. There then followed a brief hiatus, during which British and Dominion forces re-organised their lines of communication and the German re-organised and reinforced their defences.

The second phase, sometimes referred to as the attrition phase, started in mid-April. It was largely impelled by the need to continue applying pressure on the Germans as the Nivelle Offensive had failed to live up to expectations. It was characterised by small, localised actions, to consolidate the gains of the first phase and protect the flanks of the newly created salient. Although mostly successful, the later assaults resulted in high casualties for very little territorial gain.

When the battle officially ended on 16 May, British Empire troops had made significant advances, but had been unable to achieve a major breakthrough at any point. New tactics had been battle-tested, particularly in the first phase, and had demonstrated that set-piece assaults against heavily fortified positions could be successful. This sector then reverted to the stalemate that characterised most of the war on the Western Front.

Background

Although the French and British had intended an assault for the spring of 1917, two developments put the plan in jeopardy. Firstly, in February, Russia declined to commit to a joint offensive, meaning that the planned two-front offensive would be reduced to a French-only assault along the River Aisne. Secondly, the German Army began to retreat and consolidate positions along the Hindenburg line, thus disrupting the tactical assumptions underlying the plans for the French offensive. In fact, until French troops advanced to compensate, there were no German troops at all in the planned assault sector. Given these factors, there was initially disagreement about whether or not the offensive should go forward. Political turmoil in France meant that the existing government desperately needed a victory to avoid major civil unrest at home, but the British were wary of proceding in view of the rapidly changing tactical situation. However, in a meeting with David Lloyd George, French commanding general Nivelle was able to convince the British Prime Minister that, with a diversionary assault by the British, which would draw German troops away from the assault sector, the French offensive could succeed. It was agreed that the French assault on the Aisne would go forward in mid-April, and that the British would make a diversionary attack in the Arras sector approximately one week prior.

The opposing armies

Three Allied armies were already concentrated in the Arras sector. They were deployed, roughly north to south, as follows: the First Army under Horne, Third Army under Allenby, Fifth Army under Gough. The overall British commander was Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. The battle plan was devised by General Allenby. Although Haig paid tribute to Allenby for the plan's "great initial success" , Allenby's "subordinates objected to the way he handled the ... attritional stage" and he was moved sideways to Palestine (where he redeemed his reputation as a first-class general).

Facing them were two German armies: the Sixth Army under 73-year-old General von Falkenhausen and the Second Army under General von der Marwitz (who was recovering from an illness he had contracted on the Eastern Front). The armies had been organised into three groups - Gruppe Souchez, Gruppe Vimy, and Gruppe Arras - deployed in that order north to south. However, only seven German Divisions were in the line; their remaining divisions were in reserve, to reinforce or counter-attack as required.

General von Falkenhausen reported directly to General Erich Ludendorff, operational chief of the German High Command ( the Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL). Ludendorff's staff contained several highly innovative and extremely capable officers , notably Major Georg Wetzell, Colonel Max Bauer, and Captain Hermann Geyer. Since December 1916, Ludendorff's staff had been developing counter-tactics to the new Allied Powers tactics used at the Somme and Verdun. Although these battles had been extremely costly for the Allied Powers, they had also seriously weakened the German army. Instructions to put the German counter-tactics (the Elastic Defence) in place had been issued in early 1917. Failure by Falkenhausen to implement these instructions would prove disastrous.

Preliminary phase

The British plan was well developed, drawing on the lessons of the Somme and Verdun of the previous year. Rather than attacking on an extended front, the full weight of artillery would be concentrated on a relatively narrow front of twenty-four miles. The barrage was planned for about a week right along the line, with a much longer and heavier barrage at Vimy to take care of more elaborate defences. During the assault, the troops would advance in waves, with units leapfrogging each other to allow time to consolidate and regroup. But before this, a great deal of preparation was required, much of it innovative in nature.

The war underground

Since October 1916, the Royal Engineers had been working underground. The Arras region was chalk and easily excavated. Under Arras itself is a vast network (called the boves) of caverns, underground quarries, galleries and sewage tunnels, dating from the Middle Ages. The engineers devised a plan to add newly-constructed tunnels to this network so troops could get up to the battlefield underground, in secrecy and in safety. The scale of this undertaking was enormous: in one sector, alone, four Tunnel Companies (of 500 men each) worked around the clock in 18-hour shifts for two months. Eventually, they constructed ten kilometres of tunnels, graded as subways (foot traffic only); tramways (with rails for pulling hand-drawn) and railways (light railway lines), with electric lighting provided by its own small powerhouse. The bulk of the work was done by New Zealanders and Bantams from the mining towns of Northern England.

As an additional refinement, some of the tunnels stopped short of the German line, with the last few metres ready to blow open by explosives on Zero-Day. In addition to this, conventional mines were laid under the front lines, ready to be blown immediately before the assault. In the meantime, German sappers were actively conducting their own underground operations, seeking out Allied tunnels to assault and counter-mine them. It must have been quite lively.

Battle in the air

Dominance of the air over Arras was essential for artillery spotting and for aerial photography of trench systems, both of which were coordinated by the 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers. The arrival of the Red Baron, Manfred von Richtofen, and his Flying Circus led to April 1917 being known as Bloody April. The average flying life of a Royal Flying Corps pilot in Arras in April was 18 hours. Between 4 April-8 April, the Royal Flying Corps lost 75 aircraft in combat, with the loss of 105 aircrew. During same period, 56 aircraft were crashed by inexperienced RFC pilots.

Creeping barrage

To keep enemy action to a minimum during the assault, a "creeping barrage" was planned. Here, gunners lay a mixture of high explosive and shrapnel shells down about one hundred metres in advance of the assaulting troops as they cross no mans land. This had been tried before at the battles of Neuve Chapelle and the Somme. A creeping barrage presents two technical difficulties. The first is synchronising the movement of the troops to the passage of the barrage: this was overcome by rehearsal and strict scheduling. The second was the barrage falling short as the barrels of heavy guns degrade swiftly but at differing rates during fire: the remedy was calculate the rate of degradation of each gun and calibrate it accordingly. While there was a risk of friendly fire, on the day, the creeping barrage kept the Germans in their trenches, allowing Allied soldiers to advance without fear of machine gun fire. Additionally, new instaneous fuses had been developed for high explosive shells so that they detonated on impact, vaporising barbed wire. Poison gas shells were used for the final 30-minutes of the barrage.

Counter-battery fire

The principal danger to assaulting troops came from enemy artillery fire as they crossed the open. This had accounted for over half the casualties at the first day of the Somme. A further complication was the location of German artillery, tucked away behind the ridges. In response, specialist artillery units were created specifically to attack German artillery. Their targets were provided by 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers who collated data obtained from "flash spotting" and "sound ranging". (Flash spotting involved observers operating in balloons and aircraft recording the location of telltale flashes made by guns whilst firing. Sound ranging used a matrix of microphones to triangulate the location of a gun from the sound it made during firing.) On Zero-Day, (9 April), over 80% of German heavy guns in the sector were neutralised (that is, "unable to bring effective fire to bear, the crews being disabled or driven off") by counter-battery fire.

First phase

Map of the British attack.

The preliminary bombardment of Vimy Ridge started on 20 March; and the bombardment of the rest of the sector on 4 April. Limited to a front of only 24 miles, the bombardment used almost 2.7 million shells, over a million more than had been used on the Somme. For the last ten hours of bombardment, gas shells were used.

Zero-Hour had originally been planned for the morning of 8 April (Easter Sunday), but it was pushed back 24 hours at the request of the French, despite relatively good weather in the assault sector. By the morning of 9 April, it was snowing heavily; troop movement was hindered by large drifts and visibility on the battlefield was incredibly poor. Nonetheless, the offensive began at 05:30.

First Battle of the Scarpe

The major British assault of the first day was directly east of Arras, with the 12th Division attacking Observation Ridge, north of the Arras—Cambrai road. After reaching this objective, they were to push on towards Feuchy, as well as the second and third lines of German trenches. At the same time, elements of 3rd Division began an assault south of the road, with primary objectives of Devil's Wood, Tilloy lés Mofflains, and the Bois des Boeufs. The ultimate objective of these assaults was the Monchyriegel, a trench running between Wancourt and Feuchy, and an important component of the German defences. Most of the objectives, including Feuchy village, had been gained by the evening of 10 April. However, the Germans were still in control of large sections of trench in between Wancourt and Feuchy, particularly in the area of the heavily fortified village of Neuville-Vitasse. The following day, troops from the 56th Division were able to force the Germans out of the village, although the Monchyriegel was not fully in British hands until a few days later. The British were able to consolidate these gains and push forward towards Monchy le Preux, although they suffered heavy casualties in fighting near the village.

One reason for the success of the offensive in this sector was the failure of German commander von Falkenhausen to employ Ludendorff's new innovation, the Elastic Defence. In theory, the enemy was allowed to make initial gains, thus stretching their lines of communication. Reserves held close to the battlefield would be committed once the initial advance had bogged down, before enemy reinforcements could be brought up. The defenders would thus be able to counterattack and regain any lost territory. In this sector, however, von Falkenhausen kept his reserve troops too far from the front, and they were unable to arrive in time for a useful counterattack on either 10 or 11 April. When it became apparent that a major factor in the British success was command failures within his own army, Ludendorff removed several staff officers, including General von Falkenhausen.

Battle of Vimy Ridge

Further information: Battle of Vimy Ridge

Canadian machine gun squad at Vimy Ridge

At roughly the same time, in perhaps the most carefully crafted portion of the entire offensive, the Canadian Corps launched an assault on Vimy Ridge. Advancing behind a creeping barrage, and making heavy use of machine guns – eighty to each brigade, including one Lewis gun in each platoon – the corps was able to advance through about 4,000 yards of German defences, and captured the crest of the ridge at about 13:00. Many military historians have attributed the success of this attack to careful planning by Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie and constant training, as well as the assignment of specific objectives to each platoon. Rather than a general attempt to capture the ridge, each unit had individual objectives to achieve, and had rehearsed them extensively. This allowed small units to continue to advance even if officers were killed or communication broke down, thus bypassing two major problems of combat on the Western Front.

First Battle of Bullecourt

South of Arras, the plan called for two divisions, the British 62nd Division and Australian 4th Division to attack either side of the village of Bullecourt and push the Germans out of their fortified positions and into the reserve trenches. The attack was initially scheduled for the morning of 10 May, but the tanks intended for the assault did not arrive due to the weather, and it was delayed by 24 hours. Unfortunately, the order to delay did not reach all units in time, and two battalions of the West Yorkshire Regiment attacked, and were driven back with significant losses. Despite protests from the Australian commanders, the attack was resumed on the morning of 11 April; mechanical failures meant that only 11 tanks were able to advance in support, and the limited artilery barrage left much of the barbed wire in front of the German trenches uncut. Additionally, the abortive attack of the previous day alerted German troops in the area to the impending assault, and they were better prepared than they had been in the Canadian sector. Misleading reports about the extent of the gains made by the Australians deprived them of necessary artillery support and, although elements of the 4th Division briefly occupied sections of German trenches, they were ultimately forced to retreat with heavy losses. In this sector, the German commanders correctly employed the Elastic Defence, and were able to counterattack effectively.

German reaction

On 12 April, the military critic of the Vossische Zeitung , a Berlin daily newspaper, wrote: "We have to count on reverses like that near Arras. Such events are a kind of tactical reverse,. If this tactical reverse is not followed by strategical effects ie breaking through on the part of the aggressor, then the whole battle is nothing but a weakening of the attacked party in men and materiel." The same day, the Frankfurter Zeitung (a Frankfurt daily) commented "if the British succeed in breaking through it will render conditions worse for them as it will result in freedom of operations which is Germany's own special art of war".

Second phase

"The great value of our recent advance here lies in the fact that we have everywhere driven the enemy from high ground and robbed him of observation. [H]aving secured these high seats [Vimy, Monchy and Croisailles] and enthroned ourselves, it is not necessarily easy to continue the rapid advance. An attack down the forward slope of high ground, exposed to the fire of lesser slopes beyond, is often extremely difficult and now on the general front …there must intervene a laborious period, with which we were familiar at the Somme, of systemic hammering and storming of individual positions, no one of which can be attacked until some covering one has been captured". The Times

Although the First Phase had seen significant Allied Powers gains right along the battlefield, it failed to provide the opportunity to break through into open country at any point. Meanwhile, General Ludendorff had become increasingly frustrated at Falkenhausen's inability to contain the Allied assault. Ludendorff sent reinforcements to the Arras sector and instructed Third Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg, to assume operational control of the line. ("Von Lossberg was later [to become] legendary as the fireman of the Western Front, always sent by OHL to the area of crisis".)

The Second Phase saw the Allied Powers continuing to press the attack east of Arras. This was partly to consolidate the gains made in the first days of the offensive; partly to keep the initiative; and partly because - in concert with the imminent French attack at Aisne - they still held out hope of breaking through.) When, from 16 April onwards, it became apparent that the Nivelle Offensive was not going as planned, the pressure on Field-Marshal Haig mounted even more to keep the Germans occupied in the Arras sector.

Second Battle of the Scarpe

On 23 April, the British launched an assault east from Wancourt towards Vis en Artois. Elements of the 30th and 50th Divisions made initial gains, and were in fact able to secure the village of Guémappe, but could advance no farther east and suffered heavy losses. Farther north, German forces counterattacked in an attempt to recapture Monchy le Preux, but troops from the Royal Newfoundland Regiment were able to hold the village until reinforcements from 29th Division arrived. British commanders determined not to push forward in the face of stiff resistance, and the attack was called off the following day, 24 April.

Battle of Arleux

Although the Canadian Corps had been able to capture Vimy Ridge, the difficulty encountered in making advances to the south left the position vulnerable. On 28 April, British and Canadian troops launched an attack towards Arleux in order to secure the south-eastern flank of the Canadian position. Arleux was captured by Canadian troops with relative ease, but the British troops advancing on Gavrelle met stiffer resistance. The village was secured by early evening, when a German counterattack forced a brief retreat. Elements of 63rd Division were brought up as reinforcements and the village was held, although subsequent attacks on 29 April failed to net any more advances. Despite achieving the limited objective of securing the Canadian position on Vimy Ridge, casualties were high, and the ultimate result was disappointing.

Second Battle of Bullecourt

The Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt, seen from the air.

After the initial assault failed to penetrate the German lines around Bullecourt, British commanders made preparations for another attempt. British artillery began an intense bombardment of the village, which was virtually destroyed by 20 April. Although this attack was initially planned for 20 April, it was pushed back a number of times, and finally set for the early morning of 3 May. At 03:45, elements of the 2nd Division attacked east of Bullecourt village, intending to pierce the Hindenburg Line and capture Hendecourt, while British troops from 62nd Division attempted to capture Bullecourt itself. German resistance was fierce, and when the offensive was called off on 17 May, very few of the initial objectives had been met. The Australians were in possession of much of the German trench between Bullecourt and Riencourt, but had been unable to capture Hendecourt. To the west, British troops were ultimately able to push the Germans out of Bullecourt, but, in doing so, incurred considerable losses, and also failed to advance north-east to Hendecourt.

Third Battle of the Scarpe

After securing the area around Arleux at the end of April, the British determined to launch another attack east from Monchy to try and breakthrough the Boiry Riegel and reach the Wotanstellung, a major German defensive fortification. This was scheduled to coincide with the Australian attack at Bullecourt, in order to present the Germans with a two pronged assault. British commanders hoped that success in this venture would force the Germans to retreat further to the east. With this objective in mind, the British launched another attack near the Scarpe on 3 May. However, neither prong was able to make any significant advances, and the attack was called off the following day after incurring heavy casualties. Although this attack was a failure, the British learned important lessons about the relationship between tanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later apply in the Battle of Cambrai (1917).

Aftermath

File:Battle of Arras 1917.jpg

An article commemorating the battle; from a South African newspaper.

By the standards of the Western front, the gains of the first two days were nothing short of spectacular. A great deal of ground was gained for relatively few casualties, and a number of strategically significant points were captured, notably Vimy Ridge. Twenty-five Victoria Crosses were subsequently awarded (see list).

Additionally, the offensive succeeded in drawing German troops away from the French offensive in the Aisne sector. In many respects, the battle might be deemed a victory for the British and their allies, but one or two counterpoints should be noted. Firstly, after the initial gains and light casualties of the initial assault, the offensive ground to a halt and casualty rates soared. By the end of the offensive, the British had suffered more than 150,000 casualties and gained little ground since the first day. Furthermore, despite the number of German troops transferred to the Arras sector, the French Nivelle Offensive to the southeast did not bring the war to an end as promised. And, finally, despite significant early gains, the British were unable to effect a breakthrough, and the situation reverted to stalemate. Although historians generally consider the battle a British victory, in the wider context of the front, it had very little impact on the strategic or tactical situation.

Casualties

The most quoted Allied casualty figures are those in the returns made by Lt-Gen Sir George Fowke, Haig's adjutant-general. His figures collate the daily casualty tallies kept by each unit under Haig's command. Third Army casualties were 87,226; First Army 46,826 (including 11,004 Canadians at Vimy Ridge); and Fifth Army 24,608; totalling 158,660. German losses by contrast are more difficult to determine. Gruppe Vimy and Gruppe Souchez suffered 79,418 casualties but the figures for Gruppe Arras are incomplete. Additionally, German records excluded those "lightly wounded". Captain Cyril Falls (the British official battle historian) estimated that 30% needed to be added to German returns for comparison with the British". Falls makes "a general estimate" that German casualties were "probably fairly equal". Nicholls puts them at 120,000.; and Keegan at 130,000.

References

• Falls, Cyril; Military Operations in France and Belgium 1917 London: MacMillan, 1940
• Keegan, John; The First World War New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999
  
• Keegan, John; The First World War London: Pimlico, 1999
  
• Liddell Hart, Basil; The Real War, 1914-1918. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1930
  
• Lupfer, Timothy T; The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War 1981 Combat Studies Institute, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
• Nicholls, Jonathon; Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battle of Arras 1917. Pen & Sword, 1990
  
• Oldham, Peter; The Hindenburg Line. London: Leo Cooper, 1997
  
• Sheffield, G; Forgotten Victory: The First World War - Myths and Realities (Review, 2002)
  
• Sheffield, G & Bourne, J; Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, UK: 2005, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson
  
• Stokesbury, James L; A short history of World War I. New York: Perennial, 1981
  
• Strachan, Hew; The First World War. New York: Viking, 2003
  

External links

• Online history of the Worcestershire Regiment. General history of a regiment involved in the battle, accessed 4-24-2007.
  
• The Battle of Arras at 1914-1918.net. Online history of the battle, accessed 4-4-2007.
  
• The Battle of Arras at the War Chronicle. Another online history of the battle, accessed 4-16-2007.