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Battle of the Gebora

Coordinates: 38°52′44″N 6°58′01″W / 38.879°N 6.967°W / 38.879; -6.967
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38°52′44″N 6°58′01″W / 38.879°N 6.967°W / 38.879; -6.967

Battle of the Gebora
Part of the Peninsular War

View of Badajoz, across the Guadiana river from the foothills of the San Cristóbal heights.
Date19 February, 1811
Location
Badajoz, Spain
Result French victory
Belligerents

Spain

Portugal		 France French Empire
Commanders and leaders
Gabriel Mendizabal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult,
Édouard Mortier
Strength

12,000,

17 guns[1]

7,000,

12 guns[1]
Casualties and losses
1,000 dead or wounded,
4,000 captured		 400

The Battle of the Gebora (19 February 1811) was a minor battle between Spanish and French armies near Badajoz, Spain, during the Peninsular War. An outnumbered French force routed and practically destroyed the Spanish Army of Extremadura.

In a bid to ease the plight of Marshal Masséna in front of the Lines of Torres Vedras, Marshal Soult led part of the French Army of Andalusia into Extremadura and laid siege to the fortress town of Badajoz. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Viscount of Wellington, and the Spanish Captain-General, Pedro Caro de La Romana, sent a large Spanish army to raise the siege; La Romana, however, died before the army could depart, and command fell to General Gabriel Mendizabal. Supported by a small force of Portuguese cavalry, the Spaniards marched to relieve the town, and camped on the nearby heights of San Cristóbal in early February 1811.

When Mendizabal ignored Wellington's instructions and failed to entrench his army, Soult took advantage of the vulnerable Spanish position and, on the night of 18 February, sent a small force to attack the Spaniards. The next morning, the French assault, led by Marshal Édouard Mortier, took barely an hour to defeat the Spanish army; having caused 1,000 casualties and taken 4,000 prisoners at a cost of only 400 French losses, Soult was free to resume his investment of Badajoz. The important fortress fell into French hands on 11 March, and would remain so until the following year.

Background

Despite his victory over elements of Marshal André Masséna's Army of Portugal at the Battle of Bussaco in September 1810, Sir Arthur Wellesley, Viscount of Wellington, was forced to retreat behind the extensive Lines of Torres Vedras by Masséna's manoeuvres. By 10 October 1810, only the British light division and some cavalry patrols remained outside the defensive Lines.[2] Masséna's Army of Portugal concentrated around Sobral, seemingly preparing to attack the Lines. After a fierce skirmish on 14 October, the French dug themselves in rather than launch a full-scale assault. They remained entrenched for a month before withdrawing to a position between Santarém and Rio Maior.[3]

Nicolas Soult

Napoleon had previously sent dispatches to Marshal Soult, commander of the Army of Andalusia, urging him to send assistance to Masséna.[4] The Emperor's orders were based on outdated intelligence and called for only a small force; by the time Soult received them the situation had changed considerably.[5] An attack against Lisbon was unlikely to succeed with the forces proposed—there were 30,000 Allied troops and six major fortresses between the French army and the Portuguese capital—but Soult had received orders nonetheless and felt obliged to do something.[4] He therefore gathered an army of 20,000 men, mainly from V Corps, and launched an expedition into Extremadura with the aim of capturing the fortress at Badajoz and drawing some of the Allied forces away from the Lines of Torres Vedras.[6]

Soult split his army into two equal columns and advanced into Extremadura, via the two main passes from Andalusia into the Guadiana valley, with the intention of rejoining at Almendralejo.[7] One of the columns, commanded by General Marie-Charles Latour-Maubourg, met little resistance on its march; on 3 January 1811, the column was confronted by 2,500 Spanish and Portuguese cavalry near Usagre, but that force was only a screen covering the retreat beyond the Guadiana of a Spanish infantry division commanded by General Gabriel Mendizabal. Latour-Maubourg was therefore able to take position near Almendralejo and await the arrival of the second French column.[8]

That column, commanded by Soult and including General Honoré Gazan's V Corps division, was escorting the French siege-train and therefore had to take a longer, more practicable, route into Extremadura.[8] Because of bad weather and the desertion of the Spanish drivers, the artillery train became separated from the escorting infantry, and when the column was threatened by 5,000 Spanish troops under General Francisco Ballesteros, Soult ordered Marshal Mortier to see off the Spaniards. Ballesteros retreated from the French without serious harm, but since he was still in a position to threaten the rear of the French column, Soult left Gazan's infantry to head off the Spanish force and protect the delayed siege-train, and continued on to Almendralejo with his cavalry.[9] As a result, Soult finally joined Latour-Maubourg on 6 January with only a fraction of his original column and no heavy artillery.[8]

Prelude to battle

Lieutenant-General Caro y Sureda, 3rd marqués de La Romana

Soult could not besiege so strong a fortress as Badajoz with his reduced force and therefore changed his plans. Sending his light cavalry, under General Briche, to take Mérida and leaving four squadrons of dragoons at Albuera to watch the garrison at Badajoz, he marched with the remainder of his army to invest Olivenza.[10] Wellington had previously advised General Pedro Caro de La Romana, commander of the Spanish Army of Extremadura, to either destroy the fortification at Olivenza, or to repair its defences and fully garrison it; La Romana had instructed Mendizabal to slight the fortress, but Mendizabal ignored this order and instead reinforced the garrison with four infantry battalions.[11] Soult, arriving on 11 January, was therefore confronted with a strongly garrisoned but untenable fortress. The heavy French artillery finally began to arrive on 19 January, and by 22 January a poorly repaired breach in the fortress's walls had been reopened. The garrison surrendered on 23 January, with over 4,000 Spanish troops from the Army of Extremadura taken captive.[12]

Soult was now in a difficult position; he had to release two battalions to escort the prisoners taken at Olivenza back to French-held Seville, leaving him only 5,500 infantry and a large (4,000-strong) contingent of cavalry with which to continue his campaign. Although his siege-train had started to arrive, the continued absence of Gazan's infantry division left him with a weakened army; despite this, though, he determined to lay siege to Badajoz in a bid to tempt Wellington into reducing the Allied force facing Masséna at the Lines of Torres Vedras by sending a contingent to relieve the Spanish fortress.[13] On 26 January he marched for Badajoz, sending Latour-Maubourg with six cavalry battalions across the Guadiana to blockade the fortress's northern approach,[14] and by 27 January the first siege of Badajoz had begun.[4] Gazan's division eventually re-joined Soult's army on 3 February, strengthening the besieging force by 6,000 men.[15]

Meanwhile, Mendizabal had sent two battalions into Badajoz to increase its garrison, and retreated to the Portuguese border.[16] Weakened by the loss of the garrison at Olivenza and Ballesteros's continued absence, he sent to La Romana for reinforcements; on 14 January, 1,800 men under Carlos de España were sent from Abrantes. Additionally, about 6,000 troops were sent forward from the Lines of Torres Vedras on 19 January, arriving at Elvas on 29 January. When these forces joined with Mendizabal's remaining 3,000 men, a Spanish cavalry division and a brigade of Portuguese horse, the Allies had an army almost 15,000 strong, under the command of La Romana, with which to hold Soult in check.[17] Before leaving Lisbon, La Romana had agreed a plan for the campaign with Wellington—the army was to entrench on the heights of San Cristóbal with its right flank protected by the fort of San Cristóbal, the front covered by the Gebora and Guadiana rivers, the left guarded by the fortress at Campo Maior and Elvas protecting the rear.[18] La Romana, however, died of an aneurysm on 23 January, and command of the army fell to Mendizabal.[19]

Although aware of the agreed plan, upon arriving on the north bank of the Guadiana on 5 February,[20] Mendizabal chose to ignore the instructions; instead, he threw the bulk of his infantry into Badajoz, leaving only a small contingent of foot and his cavalry below San Cristóbal.[21] On 7 February, Mendizabal launched a strong sally against the besieging French lines. The Portuguese cavalry, supported by a small group of infantrymen, feinted towards the French left wing while a strong force of 5,000 men attacked the right. The Spaniards under de España drove through the first French parallel to engage one of General Girard's brigades and were only driven back when Mortier sent several battalions to Girard's aid. De España pulled back to Badajoz, having lost 650 men and causing 400 French casualties.[22]

On 9 February, Mendizabal pulled most of his men out of Badajoz, leaving behind a 7,000-strong garrison. The field army's 9,000 infantry settled on the heights of San Cristóbal, while the 3,000 horse encamped behind them, on the plains of the Caya. Again, the Spanish commander ignored Wellington's plan, and failed to dig entrenchments on the heights; nor did he send out a cavalry screen to protect his front and monitor the French movements.[23] Soult, however, largely ignored the Spanish army for the next few days, concentrating instead on building up his siege lines and battering Badajoz.[24] Heavy rains also caused both the Guadiana and Gebora rivers to burst their banks and they were impassable, so between 11–18 February the French were only able to shell the southern end of the Spanish line, pushing the Spaniards further away from Badajoz and the protection of the San Cristóbal fort.[25]

Battle

Map of the battle.

By the afternoon of 18 February the rains had abated and the water levels in the Guadiana and Gebora rivers had fallen; the Gebora was once more fordable.[25] In the evening of that day, Soult sent nine infantry battalions, three cavalry squadrons and two artillery batteries, under Mortier's command, across a flying bridge over the Guadiana to the north bank. Joined by six cavalry regiments under Latour-Maubourg, the French now had 4,500 infantrymen, 2,500 horse and 12 cannon ready to attack the Spanish lines at dawn on 19 February.[26] Thanks to heavy fog, the first Mendizabal knew of the approaching French was when his picket, a mile to his front, was driven back by Mortier's infantry fording the Gebora.[27] At the same time, Latour-Maubourg had sent the 2nd Hussars to the north to turn the Spanish left flank; that cavalry had been able to climb the heights undetected and fell upon one of Carlos de España's unsuspecting regiments.[28]

Mortier showed his tactical abilities when deploying his small force: he sent all his cavalry to the north to attack the Spanish left, while three battalions were sent south between the fort at San Cristóbal and the Spanish right wing and his remaining six infantry battalions assaulted the Spanish front.[29] As the fog rose, the French light cavalry, under Brigadier General André Briche, gained the heights and fell upon the Spanish left flank while Latour-Maubourg took three dragoon regiments to attack the combined Spanish and Portuguese cavalry on the plains of the Caya.[30] Despite outnumbering the French, the Allied horse ignored their orders and immediately fled towards Elvas and Campo Maior; they escaped unscathed, since Latour-Maubourg chose to leave them alone and instead launched his cavalry against the Spanish infantry line.[31]

Édouard Mortier, duc de Trévise

The fight at the Spanish right flank was not, at first, so clear-cut. Since the fog had lifted, the Spaniards could see just how weak the opposing force was and formed up with little sign of falling.[31] The musketry duel between the two sides had scarcely begun, however, when the French cavalry appeared; the light horse approached along the top of the heights, while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons came up from the rear. Mendizabal formed his troops into two huge divisional squares, supported by his artillery,[32] and initially the French cavalry were unable to break through.[20] Mendizabal's two massive squares, however, were an easy target for the French infantry and artillery—as one Spanish infantryman recounts, "their artillery played upon it in a most horrible fashion until it became first an oval and then an unformed mass that the cavalry were able to penetrate and take prisoner."[20] Briche's light cavalry thus broke through the two Spanish squares without much difficulty, and the battle was effectively over. Some of the Spanish regiments dispersed, many surrendered, and some clubbed together to fight their way to Badajoz or the Portuguese border.[33]

Consequences

The battle was a serious setback for the Anglo–Spanish–Portuguese allies; Wellington had earlier warned the Spanish generals that the Army of Extremadura was "the last body of troops which their country possesses",[34] and later wrote that "[t]he defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest misfortune, which was not previously expected, that has yet occurred to us."[35] The army had been practically destroyed—2,500 infantry escaped into Badajoz, and a slightly smaller number to Portugal, but about 1,000 Spaniards had been killed or wounded, 4,000 taken prisoner, and 17 cannon lost.[36] The French, for their part, suffered slight casualties. Soult initially gave his losses as 30 killed and 140 wounded, but those figures were eventually revised to around 400 casualties, mainly from the cavalry.[36]

Soult was now free to continue his investment of Badajoz; although the town's garrison was now some 8,000 strong thanks to the influx from Mendizabal's destroyed army, it eventually fell to the French on 11 March.[37] Wellington sent a large Anglo–Portuguese corps, commanded by Sir William Beresford, to retake the important fortress town,[38] and by 20 April, the second siege of Badajoz had begun.[39] A French attempt to lift this siege resulted, on 16 May, in the bloody Battle of Albuera;[40] Beresford's strong Allied corps barely managed to hold off an outnumbered French army, again commanded by Soult, but the siege remained in place.[41] When the French Army of Portugal, now under the command of Marshal Auguste Marmont, and the Army of the South converged, however, Wellington was forced to pull his 44,000-man besieging army back to Elvas; on 20 June, the combined French force of over 60,000 men had lifted the siege.[42] Badajoz would remain in French hands until the following year, when the Allies finally retook it following the Battle of Badajoz.[43]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Gates 1986, p. 248.
  2. ^ Weller 1962, pp. 141–142.
  3. ^ Weller 1962, pp. 145–146.
  4. ^ a b c Gates 1986, p. 245.
  5. ^ Oman 1911, pp. 28–29.
  6. ^ Glover 1974, p. 142.
  7. ^ Oman 1911, pp. 31–32.
  8. ^ a b c Oman 1911, p. 32.
  9. ^ Oman (1911, p. 33) and Napier (1831, p. 91).
  10. ^ Oman 1911, p. 35.
  11. ^ Napier (1831, p. 92) and Oman (1911, p. 35).
  12. ^ Oman 1911, pp. 36–37.
  13. ^ Oman 1911, pp. 37–38.
  14. ^ Oman 1911, p. 38.
  15. ^ Oman 1911, p. 41.
  16. ^ Oman 1911, p. 40.
  17. ^ Napier (1831, p. 92) and Oman (1911, pp. 43–44).
  18. ^ Napier (1810, p. 93) and Oman (1911, p. 47), from Wellington's dispatches.
  19. ^ Oman (1911, pp. 44–46), Esdaile (2002, p. 337 footnote) and Gates (1986, p. 248).
  20. ^ a b c Esdaile 2002, p. 337.
  21. ^ Napier (1831, p. 94) and Oman (1911, p. 47).
  22. ^ Oman (1911, p. 48) and Napier (1831, p. 96).
  23. ^ Oman 1911, p. 49.
  24. ^ Oman 1911, p. 50.
  25. ^ a b Napier (1831, p. 97) and Oman (1911, pp. 50–51).
  26. ^ Gates (1986, p. 248), Oman (1911, p. 51) and Napier (1831, p. 97).
  27. ^ Oman 1911, p. 51.
  28. ^ Napier (1831, pp. 97–98) and Oman (1911, pp. 51–52).
  29. ^ Oman (1911, p. 52) and Napier (1831, p. 98).
  30. ^ Oman 1911, pp. 52–53.
  31. ^ a b Oman 1911, p. 53.
  32. ^ Gates (1986, p. 248) and Oman (1911, p. 53).
  33. ^ Oman 1911, p. 54.
  34. ^ Oman (1911, p. 47) and Wellington to La Romana (Wellington 1838, p. 163).
  35. ^ Wellington to Henry Wellesley (Wellington 1838, p. 286).
  36. ^ a b Gates (1986, p. 248) and Oman (1911, pp. 54–55).
  37. ^ Oman 1911, p. 55 and pp. 57–61.
  38. ^ Gates 1986, pp. 252–253.
  39. ^ Gates 1986, p. 254.
  40. ^ Esdaile 2002, pp. 342–343.
  41. ^ Esdaile 2002, p. 348.
  42. ^ Weller 1962, pp. 187–189.
  43. ^ Weller 1962, pp. 198–205.

References

  • Esdaile, Charles (2002), The Peninsular War, Penguin Books (published 2003), ISBN 0-140-27370-0{{citation}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link);
  • Gates, David (1986), The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War, Pimlico (published 2002), ISBN 0-7126-9730-6{{citation}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link);
  • Glover, Michael (1974), The Peninsular War 1807–1814: A Concise Military History, Penguin Classic Military History (published 2001), ISBN 0-141-39041-7{{citation}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link);
  • Weller, Jac (1962), Wellington in the Peninsula, Nicholas Vane{{citation}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link);
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