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Design 1047 battlecruiser

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A line drawing of Nevesbu's Project 1047; the final design of the battlecruisers would have been quite close to what is pictured.
Class overview
NameDesign 1047
Operators Koninklijke Marine (intended)
Planned3
Completed0
General characteristics
TypeBattlecruiser
Displacement28,482 t (31,396 short tons)[1]
Lengthlist error: <br /> list (help)
236 m (774 ft) p.p.[1]
241.2 m (791 ft) overall[1]
Beamlist error: <br /> list (help)
29.4 m (96 ft) (outside armor)[1]
30.85 m (101.2 ft) (upper deck)[1]
Draft7.8 m (26 ft) (trial)[1]
PropulsionNot finalized; 4-shaft geared turbines and 8 boilers were certain, but shp would have been either 160,000 or 180,000; the latter would have allowed a top speed of around 34 knots[2][3]
Armamentlist error: <br /> list (help)
9 × 283 mm (11.1 in) guns (3×3)[5][A 2][A 3]
12 × 120 mm (4.7 in)/45 caliber guns (6×2)[3]
14 × 40 mm Bofors (7x2)[3]
8 × 20 mm Oerlikon (8×1)[3]
Armorlist error: <br /> list (help)
Main side belt: 225 mm (9 in) inclined at 72° (external)[1]
Upper side belt: 40 mm (1.6 in) (vertical)
Longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkhead: 40 mm (1.6 in)
Upper deck: 20 mm (0.79 in)[1][A 1]
Main armored deck: 100 mm (4 in) on 15 mm (0.59 in)[4][A 1]
Lower deck: 30 mm (1 in)[4]
Boiler uptakes: 225 mm (8.9 in) gratings (main deck) and 75 mm (3.0 in) (lower deck)[4]
Underwater protection: Bulge below main side belt (depth 1.5 m (4.9 ft))[A 1]
Conning tower: 150 mm (5.9 in)[1]
Steering compartment: 150 mm (5.9 in)[1]
Steering compartment main deck: 125 mm (4.9 in)[1]
Armored bulkhead: 40 mm (1.6 in)[1]
Barbettes for main turrets: 250 mm (10 in) above upper deck; 200 mm (7.9 in) between main and upper decks; 40 mm (1.6 in) director tower communication[1]
Barbettes for secondary armament: 75 mm (3.0 in) above upper deck; 60 mm (2.4 in) director towers[1]
Notesall of the above characteristics are from a drawing dated 19 April 1940, with the exception of the armament; those are from a drawing done on 16 February 1940.

Design 1047, also known as Project 1047 or Project 323,[6] was a series of plans for a class of Dutch battlecruiser drawn up before the Second World War. The battlecruisers were intended to counter the perceived threat posed by Imperial Japanese aggression in the Dutch East Indies. Dutch intelligence believed that the Imperial Japanese Navy would deploy its most powerful ships against their counterparts of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy, meaning that the largest ships available for an advance into the East Indies would be heavy and light cruisers. As such, the 1047s would need to be capable of fighting their way though any cruiser and destroyer escort screen to deal a severe blow to an assembled invasion force, and would act as a fleet in being capable of delaying, altering, or ending plans for an invasion of the East Indies.

After a recommendation from high-ranking Dutch naval officers that the Koninklijke Marine be bolstered so any attacker would have to "use such a large part of his military potential that there would be an unacceptable weakening of his capabilities in other theaters", the Minister of Defence ordered the Navy to prepare designs for a two or three-member class of battlecruisers. A preliminary plan by Dutch designers was completed in July 1939, but as they had not previously designed a modern capital ship the design was missing many of the post-First World War advances in warship technology; in particular, the armor protection was totally outmoded. The only information available came from public literature and editions of Jane's Fighting Ships so the Dutch turned to Germany, which agreed to release plans and drawings based upon their Scharnhorst class in return for a guarantee that all needed equipment would be ordered from German firms. With this assistance a final design was completed by February 1940, but a visit to Italy prompted a rethink of the internal subdivision within the ships to incorporate a rough Pugliese system. This led to a set of drawings dated 19 April 1940, which are the last known design produced prior to Germany's invasion and occupation of the Netherlands.

Due to the chaotic situation in Europe during the Second World War, information on the 1047 design is fragmentary.[7] Copies of notes and other items are missing from official records,[A 4] and there is no way of discerning if the Dutch records seized by the Germans soon after their invasion were ever returned.[7]

Background

The lone Dutch seagoing armored ship in the East Indies, Soerabaja, seen in her earlier guise as De Zeven Provinciën at an unknown date

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 marked a period of increasing belligerence from the Japanese Empire, and as the decade progressed the Dutch grew concerned about the security of their East Indies colonies.[3][8] The islands, which included Java, Sumatra, Borneo and part of New Guinea, were enormously important both politically and strategically to the Dutch, who had lived and traded there for more than three centuries. Over 500,000 settlers had moved from the Netherlands to this "second homeland",[9] and the East Indies possessed abundant valuable resources, the most important of which were the rubber plantations and oil fields;[10][11] the islands were the fourth-largest exporters of oil in the world, behind the United States, Iran, and Romania.[11][A 5]

The Koninklijke Marine had only one seagoing armored ship stationed in the East Indies, the coastal-defence ship Soerabaja (ex-De Zeven Provinciën). As this ship was considered to be "of little remaining combat value", three light cruisers (Java, Sumatra and De Ruyter), a few destroyers, and a large submarine fleet were charged with the main naval defense of the islands.[12]

The Dutch believed that if war broke out, Japan's capital ships would be preoccupied with the battleships of the United States Navy and the British Royal Navy; the defences of the East Indies would need to cope only with Japan's cruisers. However, these were more powerful than their Dutch equivalents and Japan would also have the advantage of numbers. It was estimated that, should no new vessels be ordered, by 1944 the five light cruisers of the Koninklijke Marine (two of the Java class, which were laid down prior to the First World War, De Ruyter, and two of the Tromp class, which were under construction) could be facing 18 heavy and 27 light Japanese cruisers.[8][13][A 6]

Java moored at Den Helder in 1925, soon after her commissioning

These factors forced the Koninklijke Marine to bolster this force, and so the construction of three "super cruisers" capable of overpowering cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy was contemplated. The Washington Naval Treaty and London Naval Treaty limited their signatory nations to new cruisers of not more than 10,000-ton displacement and 8-inch (20 cm) guns, but as a relatively minor naval power the Netherlands had not been party to the treaties and were not bound by their restrictions.[14][15] According to Dutch naval intelligence, the Japanese cruisers did not participate in exercises with the main fleet of battleships and fleet carriers, instead operating with seaplane carriers, so it was assumed that the battlecruisers would not have to face overwhelming carrier-based air strikes. Moreover, the presence of these powerful ships—whose larger guns could easily out-range any escorting cruisers or destroyers—would give the Dutch a fleet in being in the East Indies, potentially delaying or ending plans for an invasion for fear of the assault being disrupted or the invasion fleet destroyed.[14]

Design

In 1938, a number of high-ranking naval officers within the Koninklijke Marine gathered to discuss possible improvements to the navy. They concluded that the Dutch should have a navy strong enough to force an enemy to "use such a large part of his military potential that there would be an unacceptable weakening of his capabilities in other theaters". At this, and a note from the Chief of Naval Staff, the Minister of Defence J.C.C. van Dijk ordered the navy on 18 February 1939 to begin planning and estimating costs for two or possibly three battlecruisers.[16]

Requirements for the new battlecruiser design were laid down by the navy a day before the order from van Dijk was made; they included the ability to steam for 12 hours at 32 knots, an endurance of 4,500 nautical miles at 20 knots, a maximum of fifteen minutes for the ship to go from 20 to 30 knots, protection for the engine room that would allow the ship to take hits in that area without being slowed, a draft not to exceed 9 meters, and capacity for six weeks' worth of supplies. Desired armament was three 28 cm guns in three triple turrets for the main armament, with each gun capable of firing independently, a dual-purpose secondary armament of 12 cm guns in four twin mounts, and an anti-aircraft battery of seven 40 mm guns with centralized fire control. Aircraft were to be two fighters and two reconnaissance aircraft. Specific values were given for each aspect of the design's armor, which featured substantial anti-torpedo and mine protection[A 7] and a defence against 28 cm shells and 300 kg bombs.[16][A 8]

Preliminary designs

A draft design was completed by the Construction Department on 11 July 1939,[17] but the Dutch had absolutely no experience in designing or building ships of such a size.[5] Although battleship designs recommended by a Royal Commission in 1913 would have displaced about 24,650 tons, these were never constructed; the largest Dutch vessel was the De Ruyter which displaced only 7,548 tons at full load.[3][18][A 9] With no expertise to draw upon, the draft did not reflect many of the technical developments that had entered capital ship designs after the First World War. In particular its armor protection was utterly obsolete, resembling the designs of 20 to 25 years previously. Deprived of information on more modern vessels, the only material available to the designers came from unclassified sources such as Jane's Fighting Ships.[17][A 10]

Lacking the design experience to produce a modern warship, the Dutch hoped that the French would release to them plans for the Dunkerque class (Richelieu pictured).

The Dutch began to look elsewhere for technical assistance. Although they hoped that the French would release plans for their Dunkerque class of 'fast battleships', they decided to focus their effort on Hitler's Germany. On 24–25 April 1939, informal talks were held where the Dutch proposed that, in return for the complete plans for the Scharnhorst-class ships, they would order all of the necessary equipment for their construction programme from Germany.[17]

The Scharnhorst class filled no real need in Germany's navy; political considerations had limited aspects of the design. Nine 280 mm (11 in) guns were utilized as the main armament because Hitler did not want to alarm the British, but this choice rendered the class inferior to the 14, 15 and 16 inch (360, 380, and 410 mm) guns of British, French and American battleships. In addition, the steam turbines used were much less fuel-efficient than the long-range diesel engines of the Deutschland class. Although giving a higher speed, the turbines limited the maximum sailing range of the Scharnhorst class, reducing their effectiveness as commerce raiders. These characteristics, problematic though they were for Germany, were perfect for the cruiser-killer role the Netherlands had in mind.[14][19][20][A 11]

Despite German interest in the battlecruiser project, the two sides could not agree on terms. The German delegation insisted that orders placed in their country be guaranteed, with financial compensation to be paid to German companies if the Dutch did not construct the ships. They also refused to release a complete set of plans. Further complicating negotiations, the Dutch Cabinet, which would have to approve any deal, did not convene during the summer of 1939.[17]

While awaiting official approval, Dutch planning went ahead. A contract with Ferrostaal A.G. Essen was drawn up, and on 15 May 1939 a list of products for purchase in Germany was submitted.[A 12] Two months later, talks were held in Bremen and Berlin (on 13 and 31 July, respectively) in which the Germans agreed to release plans and drawings that, although not specifically of the Scharnhorst-class, would reveal their ideas on battlecruiser design. Delivered on 21 August of that year, these showed various modern protection schemes that could be used in the new battlecruisers. On 4 October 1939, a German admiral previously appointed as a liaison between the two navies asserted that while Germany could not guarantee punctual delivery dates, it could assure the Netherlands that it would pressure the companies to meet the contractual dates and that the Kriegsmarine would not interfere with orders from the same companies. A month later, Ferrostaal A.G. Essen was formally appointed as the Dutch proxy in most of their dealings with Germany; this appointment did not include Krupp-Germaniawerft.[21]

The design of the 1047s was based on the German Scharnhorst class; this three-view drawing depicts the final configuration of Scharnhorst.

Work on armament for the new designs was contracted to Krupp-Germaniawerft; the Dutch met with the company on 31 July 1939 and supplied the characteristics for the main and secondary armament. Turret armor, main armament depression and elevation (10–45°, obtained through the use of hydraulics), and the muzzle velocity for the guns (850–900 m/s (2,800–3,000 ft/s)) were all specified. Requirements for the secondary armament included a maximum depression of 10°, a maximum elevation of 80°, and approximate armor values for their mounts (80 mm front, 150 mm roof, 50 mm sides). The fire control arrangement was discussed on 6 November 1939 with the Dutch company NV Hazemeyer Signaal Apparatenfabriek.[5][6]

By this time the propulsion plant, which was to be built in the Netherlands, was taking shape. Requirements sent out in August 1939 mandated that the ships have eight boiler rooms, four sets of geared turbines, and 180,000 shp. After further improvements Nevesbu and two German firms (Krupp-Germaniawerft was responsible for the turbines and Deschimag for the boilers) began sketching preliminary plans. These were then incorporated into two different design studies, one by Nevesbu (the Project 1047 design series) and the other by NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (IvS; the Project 323 design series). IvS was purportedly a Dutch company linking Dutch and German designers, but in reality functioned as a front company for German firms.[14][22] Little is known about the IvS proposal, as having begun its own design work and made a detailed submission in mid-November 1939, it then concentrated on the design of the hull.[23]

Design studies

In December 1939 the two studies produced their design proposals; both were capable of 180,000 shp and both had similar boiler capabilities, but the Dutch design was 199 m2 (2,140 sq ft) larger than the German.[24][A 13] Although it had the advantage of smaller size, the Dutch were concerned that the German design's power plant might not be capable of operating without problems (the Kriegsmarine did indeed face plant problems during the war).[14][24] However, questions about reliability soon became moot; it was originally believed that around 84 m (276 ft) of the ship's length would be required for its propulsion plant, but it was discovered that no more than 72.8 m (239 ft) could be spared if the ship's ammunition was to be behind armor—and the German design needed 74 m, while the Dutch design needed 78 m.[24]

December of 1939 saw real doubts start to creep over the project, as a new Navy Minister had been appointed, and he believed that the Dutch would be better off acquiring normal cruisers instead of battlecruisers. Basic characteristics were drawn up for a 29-knot, 16,000-ton ship that had nine 24 cm (9.4 in) guns, a 175 mm belt and a 75 mm deck. Even though these vessels would be superior to any 20 cm (8 in)-gunned, 10,000-ton treaty cruiser, it was felt that too many compromises would be needed. The belt and deck armor were judged inadequate, but to achieve the same protection as the battlecruiser design would mean no armament could be fitted. The smaller design also sacrificed any speed advantage over superior opponents. For these reasons the Navy "strongly recommended against the construction of such a ship", and the proposal was abandoned.[25]

File:De Ruyter C801 1953.jpg
The Eendracht class (renamed the De Zeven Provinciën class post-war; De Ruyter pictured) were intended to enter service alongside the 1047s.

The plan for three battlecruisers based on the Dutch 1047 design was authorized in February 1940;[3] they, along with two light cruisers of the Eendracht class, would be responsible for the main sea defence of the East Indies. The new light cruisers would replace the older Java class, which would then take the role of gunnery training ships from grossly obsolete ships such as the protected cruiser De Gelderland—in service since the 1880s. The Tromp class would be used to support the Dutch destroyers against Japan's "special type" destroyers (like the Fubuki class). The naval yard in Soerabaya would be greatly improved and expanded, with the addition of a large floating dock to facilitate refits of ships based in the East Indies.[14]

Germany's refusal to give the Dutch access to plans detailing the design of the Scharnhorst below the waterline was a major problem. Inexperienced in designing an underwater protection scheme for a ship of this size, the Dutch were forced to "cast about helplessly for assistance" until Italy allowed a "fact-finding mission" to enter the country in February 1940. Although they visited Vittorio Veneto, toured several shipyards, and interviewed the Chief Constructor of the Italian Navy, the Dutch delegation was barred from viewing technical drawings or the battleship Roma, then under construction. However, they obtained enough information to fabricate a version of the Pugliese system as used in the Italian Error: {{sclass}} invalid format code: 6. Should be 0–5, or blank (help)s.[14][26]

Although the issues the Dutch designers were having with a propulsion system were discussed, the delegation came away from Italy entirely uninspired by the Italians' efforts in that area. On the other hand, the visit provoked a drastic reworking of the internal subdivision of the proposed battlecruisers.[26] The designers got rid of the previously-required central longitudinal bulkhead[27] and attempted to raise the double bottom to provide greater protection against magnetic torpedoes. However, due to the requirement for a shallow draft, this modification had to be abandoned.[26]

Final design

When another delegation was sent to Germany to discuss the problems with the battlecruisers, the Dutch took their evolving design with them. Dated 19 April 1940, this was the final version prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.[26] The normal load displacement was now planned to be around 28,482 tonnes (31,396 short tons).[1] Although the propulsion was not yet finalized, the requirements had been re-examined in March 1940 to ascertain if 160,000 shp would be enough, taking into account that "theoretically a plant designed at 180,000 shp in tropical waters would in North Sea conditions actually produce ca. 200,000 shp, driving the ship at 34.8 knots."[2] The updated requirements also called for eight Yarrow boilers[3][2] fitted in four boiler rooms, and four Parsons geared turbines in two engine rooms, to drive four propellers at either 40,000 or 45,000 shp each (40,000 in tropic water conditions, 45,000 in North Sea conditions). Length requirements for the machinery had also been altered, once in early March and again on 20 April 1940; a total length of 79.5 meters was now called for.[2] The armor of this version was light and only adequate to stop projectiles from 8-inch or smaller guns.[3]

Armament

The main guns of Scharnhorst. The turrets and guns of the 1047s would have closely resembled these.

The table of characteristics provided by Lt. Jurrien S Noot for the 19 April 1940 design does not give any armament specifics, as these likely remained unaltered from the earlier 16 February 1940 drawing. This drawing provided the following: a main armament of nine 283 mm guns,[A 2] a secondary armament of twelve 120 mm dual purpose guns, and an anti-aircraft defense consisting of fourteen Bofors 40 mm guns and eight Oerlikon Oerlikon 20 mm cannons.[26]

Work on the main armament was contracted to Krupp-Germaniawerft, which based its designs for the turrets, mountings, and guns of the 1047s on the 28 cm SK C/34 used on the Scharnhorst class. With a 315 kg (694 lb) APC shell, the guns would have had a muzzle velocity of 900 m/s (2,953 f/s) and a maximum range of 42,600 meters (46,590 yd); 120 rounds of ammunition would have been stowed for each gun, and the rate of fire would have been about 2.5 rounds per minute. The guns would have been able to be elevated to a maximum angle of 45° and trained[A 14] to 150°, while the loading angle would have been about 2°.[5]

Secondary armament was planned to be twelve Bofors 120 mm (4.7 in) guns in dual mounts. It is unclear whether or not these were an older version of the gun (which had been mounted as the main armament on Dutch destroyers since the 1920s) or an entirely new version. However, the debate is academic as the new guns were developed in the 1940s during the chaos of the Second World War and were unavailable for warships until after the war's end. Detailed specifics such as range or rate of fire are also unknown; had the older gun been used it would in any case have been updated (including the use of dual instead of single half-shield mounts), and the more modern version did not see service until 1950 by which time it incorporated improvements from the lessons learned during the war.[28][29]

The battlecruisers' smaller anti-aircraft guns were to be fourteen Bofors 40 mm guns mounted in pairs, and eight Oerlikon 20 mm cannons mounted singly. Arguably the best light anti-aircraft gun of the Second World War,[30] the 40 mm Bofors was used for air defense both on land and at sea by the Americans, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Swedish. Produced in the early 1930s, it first entered service with the Royal Netherlands Navy when the cruisers Java and Sumatra were refitted in 1934–35.[30][31] Before the Second World War, Hazemeyer, a Dutch subsidiary of the German company Siemens & Halske, had devised "a very advanced triaxial mounting together with a tachymetric control system" for the 40 mm gun. When the Netherlands fell in 1940 this was brought to the U.K. aboard the minesweeper Willem van der Zaan, where it was copied and put into service as the British Mark IV twin mount.[30] The description of the proposed fire control mechanism for the 1047s, discussed on 6 November 1939, mentions that the 40 mm weapons were "to be controlled autonomously from the gun positions"; this apparently describes Hazemeyer's system, although no direct link is made in the sources.[6] Unlike the Bofors, the 20 mm Oerlikon cannon—believed to be the most-produced anti-aircraft weapon of the Second World War[32]—had not previously been fitted to any Dutch cruiser, as they were fitted or refitted with 12.7 mm (0.50 in) guns instead.[31][33] However, it had been accepted by the British Royal Navy, which had placed large orders for the weapon.[32]

Differences from the Scharnhorst class

Despite their superficially similar appearance, there were many differences between the Scharnhorst class and the final incarnation of the Dutch design. The 1047 was inferior in its armor protection, but in other respects was far superior:[14] the main guns could be elevated 5° higher;[5][34] the anti-torpedo system was thicker; the deck protection better accommodated the ship boilers; and the design did not make use of the problematic German power plant.[8] In addition, the 1047s' anti-aircraft armament was far superior to the Scharnhorst-class. The use of twelve 120 mm (4.7 in) dual purpose guns—able to function in both anti-surface and anti-aircraft roles—as opposed to the German division between 150 mm (5.9 in) anti-surface guns and 105 mm (4.1 in) anti-aircraft guns, was a more effective solution, as it saved needed space and weight on the ships in addition to simplifying logistics by requiring just one size of secondary ammunition.[14][35]

Fate

Tromp, one of the Dutch cruisers who took part in the Dutch East Indies campaign; she missed the decisive Battle of the Java Sea due to previous battle damage.

Although only three battlecruisers had been authorized in February 1940,[3] contracts were given to four yards, suggesting that the navy wanted to fund an additional ship.[14] However, with the outbreak of the Second World War almost all design work was halted, although work on turrets and gunnery arrangements by Krupp-Germaniawerft's designers continued until the German invasion of the Netherlands in May.[5] The first 1047-class ship was originally scheduled to be completed in 1944,[3] so would in any case have been too late to stop the Japanese advance into the Dutch East Indies or take part in the Battle of the Java Sea.[8]

In hindsight, the Dutch projection of Japan's invasion of the East Indies was flawed. Their belief that no battleships or fleet carriers would be used against their colonies failed to recognize that the East Indies was in fact one of Japan's primary targets because, unlike Japan,[36] it possessed abundant valuable resources with the rubber plantations and oil fields being of particular significance.[10][11] In the event, to support their amphibious assaults and to conduct raids on cities, naval units and shipping both locally and around the Indian Ocean, Japan sent four fleet carriers, a light carrier, four rebuilt fast battleships of the Kongō class, thirteen heavy cruisers, and many light cruisers and destroyers.[37]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b c Noot (1980), p. 270 puts a question mark after this number.
  2. ^ a b Although the guns are given as 28 cm (280 mm) in most texts, all 28 cm German guns had an actual bore diameter of 28.3 cm, or 283 mm. See DeGuilian on Navweaps.com.
  3. ^ In addition, the caliber length of the guns is disputed; three sources give three different caliber numbers. Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), p. 388 says 45 caliber, Worth (2002), p. 217 says 50 caliber, and DeGuilian on Navweaps.com gives 54.5 caliber.
  4. ^ Noot (1980), pp. 243 and 245 both remark on missing notes.
  5. ^ The statistics given are for 1935. The top five oil exporters in this year were, in order, the United States, with 6,958 kt, Persia (Iran), with 6,860 kt, Romania, with 6,221 kt, the Dutch East Indies, with 5,139 kt, and the Soviet Union, with 3,369 kt. See: The Way to Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan, accessed 27 February 2009. Full citation given below.
  6. ^ The last Error: {{sclass}} invalid format code: 6. Should be 0–5, or blank (help), Sakawa, was not completed until 30 November 1944; 44 cruisers could have been assembled to attack the East Indies in early 1943 if need be. This count also includes two Chinese light cruisers that were captured in 1937 and a planned hermaphrodite cruiser–seaplane ship (although due to the war, she was completed with a normal catapult and two planes). See: Ōyodo and Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), pp. 191–192
  7. ^ This included "anti-torpedo bulkheads extending to double bottom" that were "able to absorb 53 cm torpedo hits". See: Noot (1980), p. 243
  8. ^ Specific armor values were given in Noot (1980), p. 243; the following is directly quoted from him:
    • main belt from aft to forward turret: 250 mm
    • Remaining waterline belt: 80 mm
    • Main armored belt: 125 mm
    • Splinter deck on top of armored deck: 30 mm
    • Control tower: sides: 300 mm, roof: 150 mm
    • 28 cm turrets: barbette: 250 mm, front: 300 mm, roof: 150 mm, sides: 100 mm
    • 12 cm mounts: barbette: 80 mm, front: 80 mm, roof: 125 mm
      • to be protected against the effect of 200 kg aircraft bombs and 14 cm shell hits
  9. ^ No orders were placed nor were any plans for financing the battleships ever made, mostly due to the First World War. In addition, the ships were not designed by the Dutch; instead, foreign shipbuilders including Germania, Blohm and Voss, and Vickers were invited to submit designs to specifications set by the government. See: Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 366
  10. ^ Noot (1980), p. 247 in Table 1 give the characteristics of this preliminary design as follows:
    • Displacement: 26,000 t
    • Draft: 7.45 m
    • Machinery: Eight boilers (4×2), four propellers, 160,000 shp able to push the ship at 33 kts
    • Endurance: 4500 nm at 20 kts
    • Side belt: 250 mm tapering upwards to 150 mm and 100 mm
    • Side belt forward and aft: 100 mm
    • Main traverse bulkheads: not indicated
    • Main Armored deck: 125 mm
    • Upper deck: 15 mm
    • 28 cm turrets: barbette: 250 mm, front: 300 mm, roof: 130 mm, sides: 100 mm
    • Underwater protection: double bottom, depth of 100 mm, depth of side protection system: 700 mm, depth of main side belt: 600 mm, longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads: 30 mm, one on each side of the ship
    • Armament was the same as the preliminary and final designs
    • Two aircraft
  11. ^ Although the main armament and a smaller cruising radius were problems for the German ships, they were actually benefits for the Dutch: the 280 mm (11 in) guns were larger than the 150 and 200 mm (6 and 8 in) guns mounted on cruisers, and speed—not range—was emphasized in the 1047s' design because they had to be able to outrun normal cruisers.
  12. ^ Noot (1980), p. 249 gives a full list:
    • 37,500 tons of armor, which would be delivered between June 1940 and January 1944 (the majority of this to be delivered prior to January 1943)
    • 18,000 tons of construction material, to be delivered June 1940 through June 1943 (the majority of this to be delivered prior to January 1942)
    • Nine 28 cm triple turrets and twelve 12 cm twin mounts, to be delivered from spring to late 1943
    • Ammunition for both the 28 cm and 12 cm guns, to be delivered from late 1943 through late 1944
    • Six catapults, to be delivered from July 1943 through late 1944
    • Propeller shafts, to be delivered from late 1941 through late 1943
    • Equipment for the propulsion plant, to be delivered from 1940 through 1942
    • 15,000 tons of steel for the construction of a floating dry dock, to be delivered during 1942
  13. ^ The Dutch design took up 1,209 m2 (13,010 sq ft), while the German design took up 910 m2 (9,800 sq ft). See: Noot (1980), p. 253
  14. ^ The definition of "train" from Navweaps.com: "The angle to which a gun or turret can be rotated on the horizontal axis. For instance, a bow gun or turret pointing directly forward is said to be trained to 0 degrees. If it could rotate to point directly astern, then it would be trained to 180 degrees." See: DiGiulian, Tony (25 August 2008; updated 30 January 2009). "Definitions and Information about Naval Guns; Part 1 - Weapons and Mountings". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 4 March 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  15. ^ The design purpose of the 1047s made them "contemporaries" of the United States' Error: {{sclass}} invalid format code: 6. Should be 0–5, or blank (help), and indeed they were similar to that class in "size, speed, armament and concept." See: Gardiner and Gray (1980), p. 388.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Noot (1980), p. 270
  2. ^ a b c d Noot (1980), pp. 253 and 256
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), p. 388
  4. ^ a b c Noot (1980), p. 273
  5. ^ a b c d e f DiGiulian, Tony (09 October 2006). "Netherlands 28 cm/54.5 (11")". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 17 February 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  6. ^ a b c Noot (1980), p. 257
  7. ^ a b Noot (1980), p. 242
  8. ^ a b c d Worth (2002), p. 218
  9. ^ Morison (1948), pp. 281–282
  10. ^ a b Morison (1948), p. 280
  11. ^ a b c Arima, Yuichi (December 2003). "The Way to Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan". ICE Case Studies Number 118. American University. Retrieved 27 February 2009.
  12. ^ Noot (1980), p. 244
  13. ^ Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), pp. 174, 187–191, 387–389
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bennighof, Mike (November 2005). "Dutch Battlecruisers". Avalanche Press. Retrieved 17 February 2009.
  15. ^ "The London Naval Conference, 1930". Timeline of U.S. Diplomatic History. U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian. Retrieved 17 February 2009. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |dateformat= ignored (help)
  16. ^ a b Noot (1980), p. 243
  17. ^ a b c d Noot (1980), p. 245
  18. ^ Gardiner and Gray (1984), pp. 363 and 366
  19. ^ Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), p. 225
  20. ^ Garzke and Dulin (1985), pp. 128, 130 and 453
  21. ^ Noot (1980), p. 249
  22. ^ Noot (1980), pp. 249 and 253
  23. ^ Noot (1980), p. 258
  24. ^ a b c Noot (1980), p. 253
  25. ^ Noot (1980), pp. 258 and 263
  26. ^ a b c d e Noot (1980), p. 268
  27. ^ Noot (1980), pp. 256 and 268
  28. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (21 May 2006). "Netherlands 12 cm/50 (4.7") W-F Marks 4, 5, 6 and 7". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 27 March 2009.
  29. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (14 October 2007). "Sweden 12 cm/50 (4.7") Model 1950". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 27 March 2009.
  30. ^ a b c DiGiulian, Tony (Updated 31 August 2008). "40 mm/56 Bofors". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 28 March 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  31. ^ a b Gardiner and Gray (1984), p. 367
  32. ^ a b DiGiulian, Tony (14 May 2008, modified 30 January 2009). "20 mm/70 Oerlikon". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 28 March 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  33. ^ Gardiner and Chesneau (1980), p. 388
  34. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (13 October 2006). "German 28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 27 February 2009.
  35. ^ DiGiulian, Tony (20 November 2008). "15 cm/55 (5.9") SK C/28". Navweaps.com. Retrieved 25 February 2009.
  36. ^ "The Netherlands East Indies and the Pacific War". Allies in Adversity; Australian and the Dutch in the Pacific War. Australian War Memorial. 1997–2009. Retrieved 27 February 2009.
  37. ^ Morison (1948), pp. 274–276, 296 and 384

Bibliography