Operation Opera

Operation Opera
Map of the attack.
Objective	Destroy the Osirak nuclear reactor
Date	7 June 1981
Executed by	Israeli Air Force
Outcome	Success

Operation Opera (Hebrew: מבצע אופרה, Mivtza Opera, also known as Operation Babylon and Operation Ofra) was a surprise Israeli air strike against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor (French: Osirak; Iraqi: Tammuz 1) in 1981.

In the late 1970s, Iraq purchased an "Osiris class" nuclear reactor from France. Israeli military intelligence assumed this was for the purpose of plutonium production to further an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Israeli intelligence also believed that the summer of 1981 would be the last chance to destroy the reactor before it would be loaded with nuclear fuel.

On 7 June 1981, a squadron of Israeli Air Force F-16A fighter aircraft, with an escort of F-15As, bombed and heavily damaged the Osirak reactor.

Iraq's nuclear program

Main article: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

Iraq had established a nuclear program sometime in the 1960s, and in the mid-1970s looked to expand it through the acquisition of a nuclear reactor. After failing to convince the French government to sell them a gas-graphite plutonium producing reactor and reprocessing plant, and likewise failing to convince the Italian government to sell them a Cirene reactor, the Iraqi government convinced the French government to sell them an Osiris-class research reactor and accompanying laboratories.

Construction for the 40-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor began in 1979 at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center near Baghdad. The reactor was dubbed Osirak (Osiraq) by the French, blending the name of Iraq with that of the reactor class. Iraq named the reactor "Tammuz 1" after the month in the Arabic calendar that the Baath Party came to power in 1968.

It was claimed that the sole purpose of Iraq's reactors was scientific research. Agreements between France and Iraq excluded its use for military use. Observers argued that Iraq did not have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA Director-General confirmed that inspections of the nuclear research reactors near Baghdad revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. Many others believed otherwise; the US private intelligence service Stratfor noted the widespread assessment that the reactor was on the verge of being able to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Israeli diplomatic reactions

Menachem Begin, at the time, Prime Minister of Israel and in charge of the operation.

Israel learned of the existence of the reactor program during Yitzhak Rabin's first term in office, and viewed Iraqi possession of a nuclear reactor, with the possibility that it would be used to produce nuclear weapons, as a direct threat.

Iraq protested that its interest in nuclear energy was peaceful, and at the time Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), placing its reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, the IAEA monitoring program was not universally regarded as sufficient to guarantee that weapon research was not being conducted.

Israel's foreign minister Moshe Dayan initiated diplomatic negotiations with France, Italy (Israel maintained that some Italian firms acted as suppliers and sub-contractors), and the United States over the matter, but failed to obtain assurances that the reactor program would be halted, and was not able to convince the French governments of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand to cease aiding the Iraqi nuclear program.

Operational planning

The distance between Israeli military bases and the reactor site was significant (over 1600 km or 1000 miles), which meant the military forces would be operating without easy resupply capability, and would have to arc across Jordanian and Saudi territory. Additionally, Israeli intelligence could not guarantee accurate intelligence on the state of Iraqi defenses.

After much deliberation, the Israeli military finally concluded that a squadron of heavily fueled, and heavily armed F-16As, with a group of F-15As to provide air cover and fighter support, could perform a "surgical strike" to eliminate the reactor site, without having to refuel.

Israeli military also decided that it was essential to destroy the reactor before it was loaded with nuclear fuel, in order to minimize the effects of the reactor's destruction on the civilian population. Many European scientists were working on the reactor, and Israel decided to strike on Sunday, when most scientists would not be at work. Israel did not want to strain already tense relations with France and Italy.

Having intelligence that the reactor's fuel rods were scheduled to be shipped to Iraq from France, the Israeli cabinet (then under the leadership of Menachem Begin) authorized the operation.

Mysterious deaths

According to the US private intelligence service Stratfor in "the months leading up to the 1981 Israeli airstrike on Iraq's Osirak reactor — which was believed to be on the verge of producing plutonium for a weapons program — at least three Iraqi nuclear scientists died under mysterious circumstances."

The attack

Israeli Air Force F-16A Netz '243', aircraft flown by Colonel Ilan Ramon in Operation Opera.

Nose of F-16A flown by Ilan Ramon in Operation Opera, showing the triangular emblem of the attack.

Operation Opera was carefully planned for a Sunday to minimise the loss of lives of any foreign workers and the late-afternoon attack was designed so as to provide the Israeli Combat Search and Rescue Team (CSAR) all night to search for any downed Israeli pilots.

An Israeli Air Force flight of 8 F-16As (aircraft 107, 113, 118, 129, from 117 Squadron and 239, 240, 243 and 249 from 110 Squadron) was outfitted, each with two unguided Mark-84 2000-pound delay-action bombs, and external fuel tanks. A squadron of 6 F-15As was also assigned to the operation to provide fighter support for the F-16As.

On 7 June 1981 at 15:55 local time (12:55 GMT) the plan was set in motion. The task force left Etzion Airbase, flying at 240 m unchallenged over Jordanian and Saudi airspace.

On the initial flight southward, the planes coincidentally flew directly over King Hussein's private yacht at 100 feet in elevation. Hussein recognized the Israeli markings and reportedly realized instantly what their mission was, and attempted unsuccessfully to alert the Iraqis.

At 1,000 km into their flight, the operation was complicated by the F-16As external fuel tanks. The planes were so heavily loaded that the external tanks were exhausted while the task force was still en route to the Osirak facility. These tanks were jettisoned over the Saudi desert after the attack.

Upon reaching Iraqi airspace, the squadron split up, with two of the F-15s forming close escort to the F-16 squadron, and the remaining F-15s dispersing into Iraqi airspace as a diversion and ready back-up.

The attack squadron descended to 30 m over the Iraqi desert, attempting to fly under the radar of the Iraqi defenses.

At 18:35 local time (17:35 Israeli time/14:35 GMT), 20 km from the Osirak reactor complex, the F-16 formation climbed to 2,100 m and went into a 35-degree dive at 1,100 km/h, aimed at the reactor complex. At 1,100 m, the F-16s began releasing the Mark 84 bombs in pairs, at 5-second intervals. According to the Israeli reports, all sixteen weapons struck the reactor complex, although two apparently did not detonate. As the anti-aircraft defenses opened fire, the squadron climbed to an altitude of 12,200 m and started to return to Israel. According to Israeli reports, the Iraqi defenses were caught off guard, and were slow to react. In any case, the anti-aircraft defenses of the facility did not manage to damage any of the attacking squadron.

Despite the fears of encountering Iraqi interceptors, the squadron remained unchallenged, and returned to Israeli airspace on the reciprocal route.

The results

The reactor complex was heavily damaged, according to plan. Eleven men — ten Iraqi soldiers and one French civilian researcher — were killed in the attack. Since that time, it has been proposed by some commentators that the French researcher, Damien Chaussepied, was actually a Mossad agent who was responsible for placing homing beacons on site for the aircraft to follow, although no incontrovertible evidence for this has yet been presented.

Israel claimed that these casualties were mostly due to stray anti-aircraft fire from the Iraqi defenses, and not from the bombardment itself.

None of the Israeli task force's planes were damaged by Iraqi defenses. Although almost out of fuel, all fourteen jets returned to Israeli territory and landed safely.

International political reaction

Israel was strongly condemned by the international community. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution deciding that Israel committed premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression. Israel was warned not to take such action in the future. The resolution contained a demand that Israel pay prompt and adequate compensation for the damage and loss of life as a result of its aggression.

At the UN debate, Israel was strongly criticized. Some countries expressed that they support the right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but that they firmly opposed the secret development of nuclear weapons by Israel. Some countries such as Syria requested condemnation not only of Israel for terrorism against Arab peoples, but also of the United States for its alliance with Israel.

The representative of France stated that the sole purpose of the reactor was scientific research. Agreements between France and Iraq excluded its use for military use. Britain explained that Iraq did not have capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA Director-General confirmed that inspections of the nuclear research reactors near Baghdad revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement.

Most observers rejected Israel's justification that it acted in self-defense. It was explained that the UN Charter does not give any right to preventive action. Some interpreted the attack as an attack on the IAEA itself. It was argued the UN Charter limits the right of self-defence only to a case of armed attack. Some countries called for mandatory sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In addition, The United Nations Security Council strongly condemned the attack as a clear violation of the Charter and that Iraq was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction caused. The resolution further called upon Israel to place its own nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The United States supported this resolution as it condemned the action, not the nation. Their response was to, temporarily, withhold a contingent of aircraft already promised to Israel. Some countries were not satisfied with the Security Council's resolution because it did not include sanctions. It was recommended that the Council should have taken punitive measures against Israel.

Since that time, especially after the first Gulf War, several US politicians have "retroactively supported" the operation. Those who believe that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons in the 1980s view Operation Opera as necessary action, even if it were considered a clear violation of international law by the U.N. Security Council. Some legal scholars believe that the action did not violate international law since it followed the rule of anticipatory self-defense.

Professor Louis Rene Beres wrote that, "Israel’s citizens, together with Jews and Arabs, American, and other coalition soldiers who fought in the Gulf War may owe their lives to Israel’s courage, skill, and foresight in June 1981."

Cooperation of Iran in Operation Opera

Based on a number of evidences, despite the conflict between Iran's Islamic regime and Israel after 1979's Islamic revolution in Iran, regarding deep historical conflict between Persians and Arabs and also Iran-Iraq war, it is known that the two countries had some cooperation in the Opera operation. It was reported that Israel had used some maps and information which had been prepared by Iran. Confirmed by Ari Ben-Menashe, one month before attack some Israeli positions met Ayatollah Khomeini's representative secretly in Paris and discussed the attack in which they reportedly agreed that in case of any unexpected technical incident during the operation, Israeli bombardiers could even conduct an emergency landing in a military base in Tabriz, a controversial stance, regarding the political enmity between the two states and the official public position of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Israel as an illegitimate state.

Results

The operation was a success. The reactor complex was put out of commission, and the Iraqi nuclear program set back considerably. Iraq said it would rebuild the facility, and France agreed, in principle, to aid in the reconstruction. However, in 1984, France withdrew from the project.

Some Iraqi researchers have claimed since then that the Iraqi nuclear program simply went "underground," diversified, and expanded. Iraq's attempts to create a plutonium-producing reactor (estimated by size to produce up to 1 pound of Weapons grade plutonium a year, or 1 bomb approximately every 10 to 11 months) seemed to have a much lower priority in this new program.

The Osirak facility remained in its damaged state until the Gulf War, when a prolonged series of US air strikes finally destroyed the site completely.

Politically, the operation yielded handsome results for the ruling Likud Party led by Begin as it was reelected to power with a strong mandate in the elections that were held three weeks later.

See also

• Operation Entebbe, the Israeli military's raid on the Entebbe airport to free hostages from terrorists.
• Operation Wooden Leg, the Israeli Air Force raid on Tunisia.
• Operation Orchard, the strike on a purported Syrian nuclear target.
• Ilan Ramon, the youngest of the mission's pilots who later died aboard the space shuttle Columbia in February 2003.

Further information

References

• Jewish Virtual Library,, 2006
• F-16.net, 2006
• Kate Cooch (2006). "Intelligence". Military Heritage. 7 (5): 14–17, 66. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)

Publications

• Timothy L. H. McCormack, Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, ISBN 978-0-312-16279-5
• Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun : Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb, ISBN 978-0-7679-1400-0
• Judy Ellen Sund, Amos Perlmutter Two Minutes Over Baghdad, ISBN 978-0-7146-8347-8
• Clinton Dan McKinnon, Dan McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor, ISBN 978-0-941437-07-3
• Jacques Derogy and Hesi Carmel, Israel ultra-secret, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1989
• Victor Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, Mossad, un agent des services secrets israeliens parle, 1990 (English original: By Way of Deception. The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer, St. Martin's Press, 1990.)

External links

• 26 Years Since the Baghdad Nuclear Reactor Bombing Israel Defense Forces News 07/06/2007
• Attack on Iraq’s Nuke Plant
• Osiraq / Tammuz I, Federation of American Scientists
• Iraq, Israel and the United Nations, Double standards, The Economist (UK)
• isayeret.com — The Israeli Special Forces Database
• Israel's Air Strike Against The Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective (PDF), Temple International and Comparative Law Journal
• Osirak: Over the reactor, BBC, 5 June 2006 (interview with pilots involved)
• Security Council Resolution 487
• BBC Factfile: How Osirak was bombed.
• Pilots Picture
• Operation Babylon Lithograph Print — The Commemorative Lithograph of Operation Opera / Operation Babylon — Featuring Ilan Ramon & Relik Shafir