Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor

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For the defense

I've been going back through At Dawn We Slept, & I'm wondering if there's room (or desire) here for more extensive coverage of both the Japanese disagreement over even attacking Pearl as well as the strength of the defenses. In particular, I'm thinking mention of how many aircraft Nagumo launched, & how many he & Martin lost, but no mention of how many Martin or Bellinger had, is a bit off-kilter, as well as leaving a question just how strong Pearl's defenses might've been, or how effective air search, if alert. (It's a library copy, so I can renew if no answer immediately...) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 14:42, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

I think those bits would be valuable here. Binksternet (talk) 21:27, 20 December 2008 (UTC)

Concur. ww (talk) 01:22, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Let me make a stab at it, then. It'll be a few days... :( TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 03:15, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Third Wave

H.P. Willmott in his 2001 edition of Pearl Harbor (pp. 156-157) quotes Genda's memoirs:

“ According to Dr. Prange's book Tora, Tora, Tora and others, a fierce argument took place on the bridge of the Akagi [after recovering of second-wave aircraft] as regards the proposal for a second strike [i.e. the third wave]. This is not true. The author [Genda] had been on the bridge for some eight hours before the start of operations and remained there over the following four days... Such a proposal was never made. The day before the attack [i.e. 6th December] I suggested [to Nagumo] that a second strike would be necessary should the first strike fall short... This is all that I did, but... Nagumo seemed to have no plan to implement a second strike. Later... Kusaka told me that, even before the start of the operation, he and... Nagumo had decided not to carry out a second strike. ”

The memoirs in question are "Shinjuwan sakusen kaikoroku" (Recollections of the Pearl Harbor Operation) Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1967, reprinted, Tokyo, Bungei Shunjushu, 1998, pp. 300-301.

This seems somewhat at odds with the start of the relevant paragraph of the article: "Several Japanese junior officers, including Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda, the chief architect of the attack, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo[64] storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible." Comments? --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 15:36, 3 January 2009 (UTC)

IIRC, Prange interviewed Genda fairly extensively for his early books (not having it in front of me, I couldn't say for that one). Also, Japanese had a tradition of not criticising SOs' mistakes... May also be Genda's recall is a bit faulty. What's the predominance in sourcing? And where are they getting their info from? TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 05:29, 4 January 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you're referring to above? If you have referenced materiel from Prange of Genda admitting to demanding a third wave, then put it in. It should be noted that Fuchida wasn't above lying and he and Prange spent alot of time together discussing matters after the war. --Harlsbottom (talk | library | book reviews) 15:31, 22 January 2009 (UTC)

The statement in the article that: "At that time, no navy had developed night carrier techniques, so that this was a substantial risk" is not true. Please see Wikipedia's article on the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm night attack on the Italian Navy at Taranto in November 1940: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taranto 60.229.10.145 (talk) 10:12, 9 February 2009 (UTC)

Add note on Pearl Harbor as 'just' a U.S. territory

The Hawaii page can be linked - Hawaii only became a state in 1959, so the attack on Pearl Harbor was not an attack on official U.S. land - that was left to the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. government had overthrown the ruling government of Hawaii to establish the land as U.S. territory. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apology_Resolution —Preceding unsigned comment added by Shmooth (talk • contribs) 15:55, 10 January 2009 (UTC)

Whatever one thinks about the annexation of Hawaii to the US, this position is wrong as regards US law. Land administered as a 'territory' is part of hte US, just as is land which has been organized as a state and admitted as such. Territories do not have mandated representation in Congress, but inhabitants of US territories can generally vote in US national elections, and the US military is charged with protection of territories just as for states. The distinction is limited to the type and style o administration, not to any non-USness of territories as distinct from states. Territory the US administers, but does not claim is often referred to as a 'trust territory', which notes the distinction. ww (talk) 14:40, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

The Japanese page does make this distinction, shouldn't the English version as well? The Japanese page also does not mention any "grand strategic" failure that is in the English page. Although, both pages definitely have bias, the English version is far less neutral in my opinion. We need to put our preferred version of history aside and stick to the facts, certainly the results of Pearl Harbor did not cause the Imperial Empire of Japan to lose the entire war.96.241.121.25 (talk) 01:51, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

A territory can be very closely held and can be considered of high sentimental value, and I think Hawaii could be described that way. The Philippines less so. Certainly Australia's Northern Territory is closely held by those folks from Oz. What if the Japanese had attacked a notional Australian fleet at Darwin, Northern Territory? Would the Aussies shrug it off? I think not. More to the point, the Japanese didn't attack Hawaiian dirt, trees and sand, they attacked US military assets. The Americans would get mad at that no matter where the assets were positioned.

As far as trying to make this article conform more closely with the Japanese one, I see no reason to try and do that. This one has been hammered on by quite a few editors and is necessarily influenced by a great deal of well-documented American anger. Those are the references that are available, and the ones that appeal to most of this article's editors. This page suits its purpose well enough. Binksternet (talk) 02:58, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

Intro claim re declaration of war

The intro currently claims that the attack happened (by accident sue to delay at the Washington embassy of Japan) before a declaration of war was delivered to the US> This is in error. The delayed communication from Tokyo, which was indeed so delayed (the famous 14-part message) was NOT a declaration of war, but a statement of rejection of the US position and negotiatig stalemate. In fact, the Japanese e declaration of war against the US was delivered in Tokyo to Amb Grew some hours after the Pearl attack. I have seen statements (though I can't now recall from just whom) that no declaration was even composed until after word had been received regarding the success (or failure had this happened) of the attack on Pearl. On this point, Calvocoressi (other ample virtues aside such as his early and excellent account of Enigma work at Bletchley Park -- much better than Winterbotham's) has goofed; the reference given in the article is to his history of WWII.

This statement should be enlarged to note the difference between a declaration and the 14-part message, or a statement made about the actual Japanese declaration timing and location. ww (talk) 14:40, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

Wiki continues to astound. To casually suggest in the opening paragraph that the surprise Pearl Harbour attacks were intended to occur after a declaration of war, is the funniest thing I've read since, well, the last Wiki article. Tjamesjones (talk) 09:49, 31 January 2009 (UTC)

you have no idea what you're talking about. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 131.146.72.83 (talk) 07:55, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

alternate history?

Why in the world does this section exist? These stories serve no useful purpose for anyone actually seeking information on the topic and record nothing notable of the incident. for Pete's sake, there's even an account from a video game! Why doesn't someone just add another section spelling out the story line from from the Michael Bay movie? Or how about the story from the movie Final Countdown? After all, what possible criteria could be suggested as to what merits inclusion in this section and what doesn't? I suggest that this section should be removed in its entirety.Vespid (talk) 19:07, 8 February 2009 (UTC)

I suppose that the subject is sufficiently fascinating that alternatives to what actually happened are still interesting. Clearly not evey such should be included here (perhaps a full article on alternative Pearl Harbor history might be on order?), and no extensive discussion is necessary. But some notation of the existence of such material seems relevant to me. ww (talk) 17:55, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

For what it's worth, I agree with Ww. Both the fact that this topic is quite fascinating and the sheer volume of alternate history works associated with Pearl Harbor makes it seem relevant to me. As stated, this section shouldn't be a long one, nor should it necessarily be a comprehensive one but, in its current form (as of this date) and length, it seems about right. In fact, I think two more references should be added:

-Pearl Harbor and Days of Infamy by Newt Gingrich and William Forstchen are the first two books of a planned trilogy that also revolve around the Japanese completing the planned third wave, which along with destroying American fuel reserves and dry dock facilities also leaves the Japanese fleet open to possible counterattack by the yet undamaged American carrier forces.

-1942 by Robert Conroy also makes the assumption that the Japanese completed the third assault wave, with this third attack being so devestating that the Japanese were convinced to change their plans and occupy Hawaii.

In fact, the more I think about it, the more I think a separate article might be in order. Tallkennj (talk) 03:02, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

rollback of change in strategic significance

I rolled this back (undo didn't work for some reason, so no edit summary box was available) because there was no discussion here about changing the fundamental evaluation of this event in this article. Please discuss it here before changing again. ww (talk) 17:55, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Date/time of attack

As the various countries involved straddle the international date line, should it be mentioned in the introduction that the attack was on 7 Dec for the US, and 8 Dec for Japan? I know it says it way down in the text, but it would be clearer if it went in the lead for those looking at Japanese/SE Asian sources and getting confused! Also, the article says The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai) - the Japanese Standard Time wiki article says it is 9hrs+ UTC, not 9.5 as in the text here. Jasper33 (talk) 16:30, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Semi-protected?

Could an editor please add this into the article? The more references, the better. The last paragraph of "Background to conflict" should be changed to:

There has been ongoing controversy due to allegations made by conspiracy theorists and military historians that some members of the Roosevelt administration had advance knowledge of the attack, and that this was purposefully ignored in order to gain public and Congressional support for America entering the war on the side of the British Empire and her allies. Historian and novelist, Thomas Flemming, argues that President Roosevelt, himself, had wished for Germany or Japan to strike the first blow, but did not expect the United States to be hit as severely as she was in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral James Otto Richardson, who was fired by Roosevelt for refusing to dock his fleet in Pearl Harbor, blamed the President for the "initial defeats in the Pacific" as "direct, real and personal."

This paragraph was lacking some references, but the article is semi-protected, so I cannot add them in, myself. Click "Edit" to view the source of my post. 70.121.22.163 (talk) 17:23, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

70.121...,

You can add it yourself, if you like. Accounts are free on WP, nearly trivially easy, and fast, to set up. The semi-protection is due to the impulse to vandalize which afflict this and some other other articles. It's almost a religious sort of question for some, or just evokes the urge to deface. I can't make any more sense out of it myself. The semi-protection bit is something of a speedbump in the path of such.

As for the content of your suggested edit, I think much of it belongs in the Alternative History article. If you review the talk archives of this article, you will see that editors wrestled (for a long time and at considerable length) about how to handle the conspiracy question and resolved it by leaving the "orthodox" account here and putting the assorted alternative accounts in the other article. Your citation is welcome and might be added as a footnote to the paragraph noting that there are many alternative accounts, and therefore some controversy, and/or in the Alternative article. ww (talk) 18:00, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I looked over the "Alternative history" section, but it is about fictional stories and video games about "what would happen if Hitler was assassinated" or "the Japanese land in Hawaii." It does not seem to be about the disputed history or events that led up to the actual historical attack. 70.121.22.163 (talk) 18:13, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I'm sure Ww meant to say Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate, not alternate history. Binksternet (talk) 17:22, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

Rosevelt allows attack on Pearl Harbor

The attack was known well in advance and Roosevelt allowed it.

For more info read http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=179 or google "the truth about pearl habor" and read any articles from the first page(exept this wikipedia page that doesnt even mention it)

Mustanggt5000 (talk) 17:22, 15 March 2009 (UTC)Mustanggt5000

Welcome to the wonderful world of Wikipedia. Though Perloff's derivative 2001 piece isn't represented, your concerns are fully addressed at this article: Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate. Binksternet (talk) 17:47, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

But i dont like how it says surprise attack in the very beginning. Mustanggt5000 (talk) 21:16, 28 March 2009 (UTC)Mustanggt5000

We've been over this already. It certainly wasn't a surprise to the attacking force, was it? The nature of the attack was that it took the defenders by surprise. Surely you agree with that statement. Binksternet (talk) 02:17, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

Nope, Roosevelt knew it was coming. http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=179 Mustanggt5000 (talk) 02:45, 29 March 2009 (UTC)Mustnaggt5000

A not-very-credible source. Try looking through the archives to see what was said about this. Have you even been over to Talk:Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate? There, too, your concern has been hammered on and flattened out. Binksternet (talk) 03:00, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Bink on this point. The question of prior knowledge (what, how acquired, when, and by whom)) has been contentious from the day after the attack. A Congressman, Guy Gillette, is recorded as having said that it was known beforehand, the very next morning. Unfortunately, there really is a considerable amount of contention about all of the prior knowledge allegations, including the one cited here.

This article's editors have been wrestling with these issues for a very long time. The archives of this talk page reflect some of the long dispute. They should be consulted before making a decision ot change the editorial consensus, arrived at after prolonged struggle. The Prior Knowledge article does indeed cover the non-standard allegations about as well as can be managed. It too has been the subject of considerable wrangle; see the talk page and its archives. ww (talk) 04:43, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

To the conspiracy theorists: Roosevelt certainly did NOT know that an attack on Pearl Harbor was coming. Now, to be sure, the U.S. was well aware that the Japanese were preparing to take the offensive throughout the Pacific, and, further, they were quite aware that possible targets included a number of American territories such as Guam, Wake Island and the Philipines. The late November 1941 "war warning" order which covered the entire Pacific theater and directed all commanders (including General Short and Admiral Kimmel in charge of the army and navy, respectively, at Pearl) that the communication should be considered a "warning of war" and ordered them to complete all necessary defensive preparations. Certainly, nobody... not in Washington and not in Hawaii... thought it was even possible for the Japanese to attack at Pearl Harbor. Not only do all known and available records reflect this fact, but there is also no logic to the argument. Quite simply, if Roosevelt "knew" the Japanese were planning to attack Pearl and wanted to "let them" complete the attack, why would he have issued the "war warning"? If Kimmel and Short had been remotely competent, they would have taken necessary defensive precautions required by the war warning order even if they did not think an attack was possible, and, thus, potentially ruin the alleged Roosevelt conspiracy. If Roosevelt had wanted to ensure that the Japanese could complete a "surprise" attack, he certainly would not have allowed his commanders at Pearl to be given a very explicit and very direct order to prepare for an attack. As we all know, in the event, Kimmel and Short essentially ignored the order, and took no particular precautions (except against potential saboteurs). However, it is silly to assume that Roosevelt would issue that order and leave his entire "plan" to the chance that Kimmel and Short would both completely ignore it. It is simply illogical.Tallkennj (talk) 03:04, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Was Josef Stalin Behind Pearl Harbor?

I am new here, so I don't really know the in's and out's of Wikipedia, but I thought this concept must be told: Wasn't Josef Stalin of the U.S.S.R. the man behind Pearl Harbor? Think about it. He had Germany out to get him--he knew it was inevitable. And he also had the militaristic Japan on his right. He was the man in the middle. With the fall of France, whom else was Hitler going to crush? Also, Stalin had a Great spy network. With People like Klaus Fuchs and Julius Rosenberg, Stalin wasn't surprised when Harry S. Truman said to him that he had created the Atomic Bomb because those spies had told him well ahead of time [1]. He would have been able to crack both the U.S. and the Japanese codes and would be able to manipulate them into war. I don't have a source yet but am searching. . . --ItisYouLord (talk) 01:38, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Good effin' luck finding a source! Binksternet (talk) 02:24, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Whether you find a source or not, please do not turn the talk page into some speculative discussion page. This is exclusively for improving the article. Thank you.--Eaglestorm (talk) 16:24, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Speculation along these lines is fascinating, though not very useful for WP purposes. As Eaglestorm points out above, it doens't even fit very well on Talk pages as they are meant for discussion of the related article and improvements/changes/objections therein. Nevertheless, you are correct as to the Soviet situation, strategically. Which makes even more odd, Stalin's hostility and sustained aggressive espionage against the biggest single source of aid around, the US. But by the time of the attack at Pearl, the situation had gotten about as bad as it was going to get. Guderian was just outside Moscow at about the same time. This sugests tht ideology (Communism -- at least the Stalinist version of Lennist Communism) or simply an imperial interest in controlling rivals and potential conquests, was more important to him than potential resources to be used in defense during an existing (or prospective for the preceding period). A possible third alternative is that the man was simply paranoid and that accounted for much of what he did. The Doctor's plot and the purge of the generals and the sho trials generally in the period leading up to WWII and his generally suspicious attitude toward just about everything (Conversations with Stalin by the Jugoslavian dissident Dijlas (sp?) is illuminating on this, from someone outside the Soviet hierarchy). He didn't even trust his spies much (see the Richard Sorge episode about the date of the German invasion in the summer, which Sorge had right, or his reported suspicion about English attempts to warn him about Hitler's invasion intentions, which they also had right).

Last, Soviet behavior with regard to Germany before and after Hitler took power in 33 in respect of providing supplies, a discreet place outside the knowledge of the signatories to the Versailles treaty where the Germans could reconstitute their Air Force and train, doesn't seem very sensible either, and Stalin was in charge for most of that period. The Versailles treaty forbid Germany from having air forces, and had severe limitations on armed forces generally since there was considerable concern about a second war caused by German ambition or resentment or jealousy. Somehow, the Soviet leadership (ie, essentially Stalin during much of the period) didn't see the same sort of danger, though post WWII Soviet leadership seems to have don. At least they claimed that they needed a buffer from the danger of a revived Germany, hence all those buffer states they had to control in Eastern Europe. Probably this last should be seen as public disinformation and so dismissed as merely so much bushwa, but...

The alternative history folks, like Harry Turtledove and others have been exploring such things in fiction for some time.

But overall, for WP purposes, Bink was right. ww (talk) 14:33, 2 April 2009 (UTC)

How many battleships sunk?

In the second paragraph of the article we have:

The attack sank four U.S. Navy battleships...

while in the 'Casualties and losses' section on the right we have 5 battleships sunk.

It may look like a kind of discrepancy...

--Andrzej Gandecki (talk) 13:18, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Hmmmm..... The Myth That “Eight Battleships Were Sunk” At Pearl Harbor By Richard K. Neumann Jr. (not currently cited in the article) says,

Eight battleships were there. Two were “lost in action,” the Navy’s term for damage that permanently destroys a ship’s usefulness. None were “sunk,” which means disappearing below the sea surface (the most obvious but not the only way to become lost in action). Pearl Harbor is shallow, with only a few feet of water separating the battleship’s bottoms from the harbor bottom. No capital ship could disappear below the waves in a shallow harbor.

Here is what happened ...

Looking at the info in that article and in Pearl Harbor Attack Action Report, CINCPAC (Admiral Chester Nimitz) to CINCUS (Admiral Ernest J. King), I glean the following:

• Arizona sank at her berth. Lost in action.
• Oklahoma capsized. Lost in action.
• California sank in shallow water Refloated and repaired with improvements.
• West Virginia sank in shallow water. Refloated and repaired with improvements.
• Nevada was run aground to prevent sinking. Refloated, repaired, returned to action.
• Pennsylvania was in dry dock when the attack began and suffered only superficial damage. Seaworthy within a month.
• Maryland lightly damaged. Seaworthy within a month.
• Tennessee damaged by bombs. Seaworthy early in 1942 -- Boracay Bill (talk) 23:33, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Thanks, this is a very good info - how do we correct the article then? Maybe we change the article in both points to say 'two lost in action and six damaged'? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Andrzej Gandecki (talk • contribs) 14:05, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

None were actually "sunk" in the sense of "disappearing below the surface of the water," but either four or five were sunk in the sense of "no longer floating" depending on whether you count Nevada or not. I think the latter definition is more common so I'm going to be bold and edit. I'm going to not count Nevada and make it four, and add a bit of explanatory text in the paragraph that talks about how many battleships were sunk. Please take a look at what I wrote and see if it makes sense and seems accurate. Rees11 (talk) 18:59, 8 May 2009 (UTC)

Well, IMHO "grounding" = "no longer floating" in the case of Nevada. Also, as to the above info—Nevada was also 'repaired with improvements', just not as extensive improvements as California and West Virginia. —Ed 17 ^{(Talk / Contribs)} 01:17, 9 May 2009 (UTC)

The info box already listed several other ships as "run aground" and that seemed to fit Nevada. So I think we have four sunk, one run aground, and three more damaged. Rees11 (talk) 13:57, 9 May 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure how you count grounded as separate from damaged... Nevada was hit pretty hard, IIRC, even before her CO beached her, which isn't going to leave her without a scratch, either. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:33, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

Agreed—six–ten bombs and one torpedo hit will cause quite a lot of damage. —Ed 17 ^{(Talk / Contribs)} 23:35, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

Yes, but among the categories already available in the infobox, "run aground" seemed most appropriate. And it seemed best to have the number "sunk" in the infobox match the number "sunk" in the text. Rees11 (talk) 01:39, 13 May 2009 (UTC)deam was here