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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Socrates2008 (talk | contribs) at 10:22, 24 September 2013 (→Much confusion: re). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Discrepancy over number of arming devices

The article mentions that five of six arming devices activated, but then also states that the fourth arming device did not activate. Were there a total of four, or six, arming devices?

69.143.71.141 (talk) 04:37, 23 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah, this stub article needs work. Have fixed the immediate problem. Socrates2008 (Talk) 07:51, 23 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Who said that 5 arming devices were activated including the charging caps? Is that in the book, and what source did the book use? Sounds like an exaggeration to me. Paul Studier (talk) 19:41, 12 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you Socrates2008 for the internet accessible reference. I added the military's side, so what one believes will be determined by whether one has more confidence in Daniel Ellsberg or the Military. Paul Studier (talk) 23:58, 13 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It appears evidence is now available that clarifies that there were four stages http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24183879 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.7.195.195 (talk) 09:59, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Discrepancy over yield of weapons involved

This article says the weapons were 24 megatons, which two of the sources debunk and trace the error to a publication in 1961 that probably omitted a dash or a decimal point. This figure has been used ever since, erroneously, in reference to the Goldsboro incident. 24 mt caught my eye because that number is far larger than the vast majority of weapons developed by the United States. The only deployed weapon of that size was the Mk41 of 25 mt yield. The Mk39 involved in this incident is stated by various sources to have a yield of 2-4, 3.5, or 3.8 mt.

I'm removing the 24 mt figure from the text as the weapon named is not of that yield.--SEWalk (talk) 22:38, 22 January 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Intact and breaking up at the same time?!

How could the aircraft have started to break up at 10,000 feet, when it was still intact as the crew ejected at 9,000 feet? Whoop whoop pull up Bitching Betty | Averted crashes 21:35, 1 October 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Bomb pieces in situ

The Army Corps of Engineers purchased a 400 foot circular easement over the buried component. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill determined the buried depth of the secondary component to be 180 feet, plus or minus 10 feet. So its still there today in 2012??? --RThompson82 (talk) 00:07, 28 May 2012 (UTC)[reply]

The switch

Re: "...the pilot's safe/arm switch was the only one of the six arming devices on the bomb that prevented detonation." Only Dr. Strangelove’s pilot saddles up and rides the bomb down, so "his" switch was in the flight station, with the bombardier's in the lower-deck battle station. The W39 was engineered to be compact, so it is entirely possible that the two switches functioned together to activate a single one within the bomb. Nuclear command and control simply redirects to command and control, and Go code to code word while nuclear football makes no reference to a requirement for TWO officers acting independently to first confirm receipt of a valid GO CODE and then to act independently to arm a nuclear weapon. Nor can I find any reference to such a doctrine today. that makes it hard to say it was engineered around. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:06, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

  • This interview of the man who disarmed the bombs, Air Force EOD officer Jack ReVelle, seems to indicate that the arm/safe switch was on the back of the bomb. I find that hard to believe and think it was in the cockpit. Even so, it might make sense to check sources to see where this switch actually was. Mark Turner (talk) 14:18, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Re: "The Pentagon claims ... that two arming mechanisms had not activated." — the pilot's and bombardier's switches, in the aircraft. —Pawyilee (talk) 07:26, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

    • Read the 8-Day Dig, and it is obvious there was one arm/safe switch in each bomb, even if there were two switches in the aircraft from which they had separated; which should have been the only way to activate them, but equally obvious that wasn't true. —Pawyilee (talk) 12:13, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Jack ReVelle interview and photo

The Okalahoma State University has a great interview with the man who disarmed the bombs, former Air Force officer Jack ReVelle. This site has better photographs as well, none of which are credited, unfortunately. A much better photo of the bomb can be found here on the Legend of the Buried Bomb of Faro website. This photo matches the one on the above OK State website about ReVelle, leading me to believe it is the work of ReVelle. Regardless, it appears the photo is a match of the one currently illustrating the article, only much higher resolution, and could potentially replace it for that reason. Mark Turner (talk) 14:25, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Jack ReVelle notes from incident

The Oklahoma State University interview has a link to Jack ReVelle's own notes taken during the bomb recovery operation. Mark Turner (talk) 15:09, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Confusion between bombs

I am confused. The bomb which was apparently armed had deployed a 100 foot retard" parachute. It should therefore have been the bomb which was not buried. It would presumably have been recovered intact. But the article does not say that. It says that the "second bomb" - which was the armed bomb - was deeply buried. Yet that could not have been the bomb which had the parachute.203.184.41.226 (talk) 20:11, 21 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for pointing that out. Any better now? Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:54, 22 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Looking at the current revision it's still confusing. Here's how my reading of the source material shows things:
  • Bomb #1 deploys parachute and lands relatively intact. It's safe/arm switch is in "safe" position. ReVelle says with the switch in that position nothing will happen. He turns his attention to the second bomb.
  • Bomb #2 is found deep in muck, shattered into pieces. It's safe/arm switch is in "arm" position, a find so ominous that it causes these skilled and seasoned EOD team members to become speechless. ReVelle can't explain why the second bomb did not detonate.
The current revision of the article seems to indicate the seconb bomb's safe/arm switch was in "safe" position, which is not what ReVelle has repeatedly said. I will adjust the article accordingly.
Incidentally, the Orange County Register story of Dec. 2012 is one of the best accountings of this incident, outside of Dobson's book on the subject. I highly recommend it. Mark Turner (talk) 14:35, 22 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Which bombs, which stages?

I've read through many of these sources and have to say I'm still somewhat confused about which bombs went through which arming stages. I've read conflicting accounts. Was the parachute bomb through all its stages except the safe/arm switch? Had the buried bomb completed its stages, including the safe/arm switch? Does anyone have any definitive sources for this information? Mark Turner (talk) 15:36, 22 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Actually, it looks like the Hansen Documents on the ibiblio site has the most detailed informaton on the bombs and the stages that completed. Does someone want to integrate this into the article? Mark Turner (talk) 16:11, 22 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, agree this source certainly spells it out very clearly. The ambiguity appears to stem from the fact that both bombs had switches that activated, but the parachute one got further into its arming sequence as it dropped slower, thus allowing the timer-based switch to arm? So it was the parachute bomb that had only one switch preventing the weapon from firing. Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:43, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
But having read this again, I suspect we may still have a problem:

"When I got to the site, we found the parachute had deployed on one bomb," ReVelle said at the campus event. "The parachute caught in a tree, and the bomb was intact and standing upright. When I checked it I found the arm/safe switch was still in the safe position, so it had not begun the arming process."

"That was not the case with the second bomb. Its parachute failed to open and it struck the ground at about 700 miles per hour", ReVelle said.

ReVelle and his crew began digging to recover the second bomb. After five days, they found parts of the bomb and the crucial arm/safe switch. "Until my death I will never forget hearing my sergeant say, ‘Lieutenant, we found the arm/safe switch,’" ReVelle said. "And I said, ‘Great.’ He said, ‘Not great. It’s on arm."

Later tests determined the second bomb had gone through five of six steps toward detonation, ReVelle said.

Socrates2008 (Talk) 13:07, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Dubious

Why exactly are we according so much weight to The Guardian's article about the account in Schlosser's book? According to people who have actually been in the nuclear business, it's overblown hysteria-mongering. I know there's a lot of a "they won't tell you the truth" attitude about stuff like this but we should be sourcing to only the absolute cream of the crop of sources on things like this, not the work of one 'investigative journalist' who may well have an axe to grind. At the very least, we need to provide additional coverage of the official statements that the bomb was safe in comparsion, instead of the current phrasing of the article which very much gives an air of "of course they claimed it was save but this brave investigative journalist has revealed the truth, Nukes Are Bad m'kay!". Also, I've trimmed several self-published sources from the article - two Lulu-published books and one that was sourced to a document on Dropbox(!). - The Bushranger One ping only 21:56, 22 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

  • Ok, Bushranger, this is Wikipedia. You know you can't get away with "according to people who have actually been..." and not cite your sources. You are welcome and encouraged to add your own but to parachute in here with an apparent axe to grind yourself is uncool. If you see a problem with the article, add your changes and show your work. Whining is not needed. Mark Turner (talk) 00:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
  • Now, to address your concern about Scholosser's POV, I see all of one quote from him and the rest of the information coming from that article quotes Sandia Labs nuclear expert Parker Jones's declassified 1969 report. I think it's safe to say that Jones knew what he was talking about so your concern is unfounded. Mark Turner (talk) 00:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
  • I concede your point about Lulu published works. However, the Dropbox link to ReVelle's notes was included in the Oklahoma State article on ReVelle. After studying Wikipedia's self-published guidelines this particular information meets the criteria for inclusion. Mark Turner (talk) 01:13, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
  • I am removing your POV tag as you have not adequately explained your reasoning for including it. There are DoD sources professing the safety of the bomb as well as sources that contradict this. If you see further issues, please let me know. Mark Turner (talk) 01:23, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Factual Article or Indictment of US DOD/Government?

"A [US DOD representative said] that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9] Former military analyst Daniel Ellsberg has claimed to have seen highly classified documents indicating that its safe/arm switch was the only one of the six arming devices on the bomb that prevented detonation.[1][9] Confirmation of this suspicion came in 2013 with the release of new information under the Freedom of Information Act.[10]"

Ellsberg makes a claim, which is later called a suspicion. And no matter how many arming devices there were, or however many functioned properly, they were 100% successful at preventing detonation. The juxtaposition of these comments implies that the DOD representative was making a misleading statement, which is not the case. Frankly, this entire paragraph is problematic, but perhaps:

"The [US DOD] reported that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9] [Ellsberg] claimed, based on classified documents to which he had access, that one of six arming devices prevented detonation[1][9]. Ellsberg's claim that was confirmed upon the release of new information about the incident in 2013.[10]"

Below:

"Schlosser writes that "The US government has consistently tried to withhold information from the American people in order to prevent questions being asked about our nuclear weapons policy," he said. "We were told there was no possibility of these weapons accidentally detonating, yet here's one that very nearly did."[10]"

Scholosser's opinion of the U.S. governments information classification and nuclear weapons policy is irrelevant. Leave it in the reference if people want to follow it. Atrobinson (talk) 02:01, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Multiple safety devices which failed, contrary to claims at the time; long-held suspicions that the safety mechanisms had not worked as designed were confirmed this month with the declassification of a 50-year old report. These suspicions and analysis, which have subsequently been proven true, are perhaps now less important than the facts themselves, but there's still a story to tell around the 50-year suppression of these facts. Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:32, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Socrates2008: There may well be material for another article on the systematic failure of the U.S. government to reveal the details of its classified weapons programs, or of nuclear weapons systems safety, but this does not seem to be the place--and the entire "five out of six didn't work as designed" is misleading emphasis: the safety systems as a whole worked as designed and the weapons did not detonate. Furthermore, the "Schlosser writes..." paragraph remains irrelevant to the body of the article. Atrobinson (talk) 11:45, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
The redundancies in the safety systems largely failed, hence the reason this information was kept secret. The failures were further demonstrated at Palomares and Thule, where it was found that fire compromised the bomb switches. Hence development started on new permissive action links, and insensitive munitions. So I think you're missing the point. Socrates2008 (Talk) 12:32, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Atrobinson: you misunderstand what happened. The "five out of six" or "three out of four" steps are not safety systems or failsafes but are in actuality part of the detonation process. From my reading of the source material, only safety system on the MK 39 was the safe/arm switch(s). While it's true the first bomb's switch was found in safe position, the second's switch was found in arm position (at least one of them, anyway. ReVelle seems to say there was one but Hensen seemed to indicate two). Thus, it can be truthfully said that the second bomb's safety system failed. Fortunately, the detonation process did not complete for other reasons. Mark Turner (talk) 13:35, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I've rewritten the FOIA sentence to clarify what was discovered. I will also remove Schlosser's quote. Mark Turner (talk) 13:35, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
"The Pentagon claimed at the time that there was no chance of an explosion and that two arming mechanisms had not activated. A United States Department of Defense spokesperson told United Press International reporter Donald May that the bomb was unarmed and could not explode.[9]"
This seems redundant, but that is stylistic. I withdraw my NPOV objection. With these edits I believe the article is factual and does not place inappropriate emphasis on either an apologetic or hostile interpretation of the event. It is not clear to me whether I should remove the tag or one of the authors/primary editors should remove the tag.Atrobinson (talk) 14:27, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Removed NPOV tag. Thanks for your input, Atrobinson. It helps to make a better article. Mark Turner (talk) 16:20, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

No danger of a nuclear explosion

MH Maggelet, aka Michael H. Maggelet and author of "Bombs Over Goldsboro" (currently cited as reference 2) in his commentary of March 2 at 8:28am gives a detailed explanation of why there was no danger of a nuclear explosion from either bomb, which hopefully may be read at: Part 2: In 1961, wisecracking Jack ReVelle defused two nuclear bombs that landed on U.S. soil.

—Pawyilee (talk) 15:04, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Much confusion

There appear to be at least three sources worth considering:

  • the initial book "Kill and Overkill" by Dr. Ralph Lapp which says on 127 that five out of six safety devices on the warhead had failed.
  • the actual FOIA document "GOULDSBORO REVISITED or HOW I LEARNED TO MISTRUST THE H-BOMB or TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT" which says that Lapp's report lacked accuracy and objectivity, pointed out it was a bomb not a warhead, with four rather than six safety devices, but that a single safe/arm switch had been the only measure that survived.
  • Whatever document this blogspot cite references [1] which gives an accounting of the various safety devices. It says that the switch on the second bomb showed "arm" but didn't. More to the point, it says that the second bomb was the object of the controversy; it also denies that it was anywhere near activation.

What's strange of course is that I'm left wondering if the switch that showed "arm" is the exact switch that stopped the bomb from going off according to the recent news reports. And whether the other measures would have stopped explosion or not. But I think the article needs some revision to avoid giving the impression that bomb #1 was the one at issue (not sure #2 was definitely the one, but I don't see why #1 is) Wnt (talk) 22:43, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]

  • Welcome to our conundrum! :) There are many conflicting accounts and it's difficult to sort out whom to trust. In ReVelle's interviews he states the second bomb's arm switch was activated. Hensen says it was partially activated, and Michael H. Maggelet says in his comment on the OC Register story that an AEC review found it not to be armed after all. I'm inclined to wonder if ReVelle's recollection is clouded by 50+ years of silence or perhaps the various reporters have misquoted him. Hensen seems like a credible source and his vast collection of FOIA documents are available for review but the cost of the whole collection on CD is $350. If anyone can find links to the particular official documents that would be a wonderful way to clear this up. Mark Turner (talk) 23:46, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
  • Another thing to consider is that since the second bomb disintegrated on impact and its parts scattered into the muck it may be very difficult or impossible to determine what caused the detonation process to fail. I believe I read that the high voltage batteries didn't engage but I haven't found out why yet. Mark Turner (talk) 23:49, 23 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Well, if that's where things stand, I think the section about the switch should be brought to the end and worded as "one of the bombs" in such a way as to avoid giving an opinion which is being discussed. Wnt (talk) 00:02, 24 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, we need to say there's confusion, rather than trying to second guess which way to call it. In terms of reliable sources, Hensen and ReVelle seem closest to the problem, but they disagree.
PS: We now appear to have about 3 active discussion threads on this topic - can we please focus the discussion in one place (here is fine). Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:22, 24 September 2013 (UTC)[reply]
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