Serbo-Bulgarian War
The Serbo-Bulgarian War (Bulgarian: Сръбско-българска война, Srabsko-balgarska voyna; Serbian: Српско-бугарски рат, Srpsko-bugarski rat) was a war between Serbia and Bulgaria that erupted on November 14 1885 and lasted until November 28 the same year. Final peace was signed on February 19 1886 in Bucharest. As a result of the war, European powers acknowledged the act of Unification of Bulgaria which happened on September 6 1885.
Background
On September 6, 1885, against the will of Russia and most of the other Great Powers, Bulgaria and the semi-autonomous Ottoman republic of Eastern Rumelia declared their unification in the city of Plovdiv. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was particularly worried about this course of events as it was in the process of expanding its own influence in the Balkans at the time. Therefore, the Austrians induced Serbia to attack the fledgling Bulgarian state, promising them territorial gains in return for concessions in the Western Balkans. The war officially began when Milan Obrenovic IV declared war on Bulgaria on November 14 1885. The Serbians were hoping to have surprise on their side because Bulgaria was expecting resistance from the Ottomans to the south. Bulgaria was additionally weakened as a result of the Bulgarian-Russian conflict caused partly by the Russian opposition to the Unification. Most Russian officers serving in Bulgaria had been withdrawn and Bulgaria had no officers above the rank of captain. As a result, one of the nicknames of this war was "The War of the Captains".
One additional reason for war was that the heads of the (then) main opposition party in Serbia - Radikal Party (Radikalna Stranka in Serbian), including its head Nikola Pašić, had fled the country after the Timok Rebellion, which they initiated, and settled in Bulgaria where they were allowed to resume their anti-Obrenović activities.
As the immediate cause of the war, a minor border dispute was used: the river Timok was designated as a part of the border between the two countries, but during some years, the river slightly changed its course so that the Serbian border guardhouse near the village of Bregovo found itself on the Bulgarian bank of the river. After some denied requests from Bulgaria to evacuate the guardhouse, Bulgarians expelled the Serbian troops by force. This is known as the Bregovo Dispute.
As it happened, the Ottomans did not choose to intervene and the Serbian army's advance was stopped after the Battle of Slivnitsa. The main body of the Bulgarian army travelled from the border with the Ottoman Empire to the border with Serbia in order to defend the capital. After the defensive battles at Slivnitsa and Vidin, Bulgaria began an offensive which took the city of Pirot. At this point, the Austro-Hungarian Empire warned Bulgaria that if the Bulgarian army did not retreat, it would join the conflict. No territorial changes were made to either country, but Bulgarian unification was recognized by the Great Powers. However, the relationship of trust and friendship between Serbia and Bulgaria, built during their long common fight against Ottoman rule, suffered irreparable damage.
The conflict was used as a backdrop in George Bernard Shaw's play Arms and the Man
Serbian army
The total number of Serbian armed forces expected to take part in the military operation was about 60,000. The Serbian army's infantry weaponry stood up to the most modern standards of the time (Mauser-Milovanovich single-shot rifles with excellent ballistic characteristics). However, the artillery was ill-equipped, having muzzle loading cannons. King Milan IV divided his force into two armies, the Nishava and Timok armies. The first took the main objective, i.e. to overcome the Bulgarian defences along the west border, to conquer Sofia and advance towards the Ihtiman heights. It was there that the army was supposed to encounter and crush the Bulgarian forces coming from the south. Serbia's main advantages on paper were the better small arms and the highly educated commanders and soldiers, who had gained a serious amount of experience from the last two wars against the Ottoman Empire.
However, internal Serbian problems supplemented by king Milan`s conduct of the war, nullified most of these advantages:
In order to collect all the glory for the victory he considered imminent, king Milan did not call the most famous commanders of the previous wars (Gen. Jovan Belimarković, Gen. Đura Horvatović and Gen. Milojko Lešjanin) to command the army. Instead, he took the position of army commander himself and gave the divisional commands to less experienced officers like Petar Topalović of the Morava division.
Furthermore, underestimating the Bulgarian military strength and fearing mutinies for conducting such an unpopular war (and having indeed experienced the Timok Rebellion two years before), he ordered the mobilisation of only the first class of infantry (recruits younger than 30 years), which meant only about the half of the Serbian manpower. In doing so, he deprived the Serbian army of its veterans of the previous wars against the Ottoman Empire.
The timing for the beginning of the hostilities was very bad for the Serbian Army as it was in the middle of rearmament with modern weapons. The new De Bange steel, breach-loading cannons were ordered and payed for, but did not arrive until 1886.
The modern rifles, even though amoungst the best in Europe at the time, still had issues of their own: they were introduced rather shortly (two years) before the outbreak of the war, so many of the soldiers were not very well trained to use them. More importantly, the theoretical capabillities of the rifle often mislead the Serbian officers, still lacking experience with it, to order volleys from distances of a mile or more, wasting the precious ammunition on neglible results. Furthermore, the ammunition was purchased in quantities based on consumption of bullets by the previous, much older and slower firing rifles. The situation was made worse still further by the contemporary Serbian tactics emphasizing firepower, and downplaying hand to hand fighting, which contributed to heavy casualties in such a fight for Neškov Vis in defence of Pirot.
Condition of the Bulgarian Army
Bulgaria was forced to meet the Serbian threat with two serious disadvantages. After the Unification had been declared, Russia had withdrawn its officers who until that moment had been commanding the larger military units. The remaining Bulgarian officers had lower ranks and experience only in commanding platoons. Nobody doubted the Serbian victory. Bulgaria's second serious disadvantage was that since the Bulgarian government had been expecting attacks from Turkey, the main forces of the Bulgarian Army were situated along the south border. In the conditions of 1885 Bulgaria, their redeployment would take at least 5-6 days.
Bulgarian advantages
The main Bulgarian advantage was the strong patriotic spirit and morale, as well as the feeling among the men that they were fighting for a just cause. This is something that could not be said for the Serbians. Their King had misled them in his manifest to the army, telling the Serbian soldiers that they were being sent to help the Bulgarians in their war against Turkey. This was why the Serbian soldiers were initially surprised to find that they were fighting Bulgarians instead, until they understood what was happening. Presumably, lying to his army was King Milan's only means to mobilize and command his troops without experiencing disobedience and unrest.
Furthermore, while Bulgarian small arms were inferior to the Serbian, its artillery was greatly superior, boasting steel, Krupp-designed breech-loading cannons.
Bulgarian strategical plan
There were two views on the Bulgarian strategy: the first, supported by Knyaz Alexander I, saw the general battle on the Ihtiman heights. The drawback of this plan was that in that case, the capital Sofia had to be surrendered without battle. This could very well cause Serbia to stop the war and call in the arbitrage of the Great Powers. For this reason, the strategic plan that was finally selected by the Bulgarian command expected the main clash to be in the area of Slivnitsa. Captain Olimpi Panov had an important role in this final decision.
Military activities
16-19 November
Knyaz Alexander I arrived on the evening of November 16 to find a well prepared defensive position manned by 9 battalions, plus some 2000 volunteers and 32 guns, commanded by Major Guchev. The position consisted of nearly 4 km of trenches and artillery redoubts on either side of the main road on a ridge in front of Slivnitsa village. To the right was steep mountainous terrain whilst the left wing had the easier Visker Hills towards Breznik.
The three Serbian centre divisions also arrived on the November 16 and halted to recover after the fierce Bulgarian delaying action in the Dragoman Pass. The Morava division was at some distance from its objective Breznik which lay to the south. The northern advance was bogged down along the Danube.
The morning of November 17 came with rain and mist but not the expected Serbian attack. By 10 in the morning, Alexander ordered three battalions to advance on the right. They surprised the Danube division, who eventually rallied and pushed them back. The main Serbian attack began on the centre largely unsupported by artillery which had insufficient range. The weight of Bulgarian fire forced them back with some 1200 casualties. A relief column led by Captain Benderev recaptured the heights on the right and forced the Danube division back to the road.
At daybreak on November 18 the Serbians attacked the weaker left flank of the Bulgarian line. Just in time two battalions of the Preslav Regiment arrived to shore up the position. Further attacks in the centre were repulsed with heavy Serbian casualties and Benderev captured two further positions in the mountains.
On November 19 the Serbians concentrated two divisions for an attack on the Bulgarian left in an attempt to join up with the Morava division. However, three battalions of Bulgarian troops led by Captain Popov from Sofia had held the Morava division in the Visker Hills and the flanking move failed. Alexander now ordered a counter attack which pushed the Serbians back on both flanks although nightfall prevented a complete collapse.
19-28 November
Slivnitsa was the decisive battle of the war. The Serbians fought only limited rearguard actions as they retreated and by November 24 they were back in Serbia. The Timok division in the north continued the siege of Vidin until November 29.
The main Bulgarian army crossed the border in two strong divisions (Guchev and Nikolaev), supported by flanking columns, and converged on Pirot. The Serbian army dug in on the heights west of the town. On November 27 the Bulgarian Army flanked the right of the Serbian position with Knyaz Alexander personally leading the final attack. The Serbians abandoned Pirot and fled to Niš.
End of war and peace treaty
This humiliating Serbian defeat made Austria-Hungary take action. On November 28, the Viennese ambassador in Belgrade, count Kewenhuller-Metsch, visited the headquarters of the Bulgarian Army and demanded the ceasing of military actions, threathening that otherwise the Bulgarian forces would meet Austro-Hungarian troops. The ceasefire was signed on December 7 but that did not stop the Serbians from continuous unsuccessful attempts to conquer Vidin with the idea to use it in negotiations later, even after military activities had stopped on demand of their ally. On February 19 1886 the peace treaty was signed in Bucharest. According its terms, no changes were to be made along the Bulgarian-Serbian border.
Bulgaria's victories on the battlefield played the main role in defending the Unification. They spread Bulgaria's name and infused respect towards united Bulgaria on behalf of its neighbours.
With political wisdom, strong patriotic spirit and military prowess, the Bulgarian nation prepared, carried out and defended the cause of national unification. This success raised the Bulgarian nation's self-esteem and opened many paths for the future development of united Bulgaria.
The defeat left a lasting scar on the Serbian military, previously considered undefeated by the Serbs. Ambitious reforms of the army were carried out (which later, in part, contributed to the end of the House of Obrenović). The Serbian Army was underestimated by most observers until the successful conclusions of First and Second Balkan wars.