Civilian casualty ratio

In armed conflicts, the civilian casualty ratio (also civilian death ratio, civilian-combatant ratio, etc.) is the ratio of civilian casualties to combatant casualties, or total casualties. The measurement can apply either to casualties inflicted by a particular belligerent, or to casualties in the conflict as a whole.

According to a 2001 study by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the civilian-to-soldier death ratio in wars fought since the mid-20th century has been 10:1, meaning ten civilian deaths for every soldier death. Mary Kaldor writes that the civilian to combatant casualty ratio was 8:1 in wars in the 1990s, meaning eight civilian deaths for every combatant death. This constitutes a reversal of the ratio at the turn of the 20th Century, which stood at 1:8, meaning only one civilian death for every eight combatant deaths.

In 2007, Israel achieved a ratio of 1:30, or one civilian casualty for every thirty combatant casualties, in its airstrikes on militants in the Gaza Strip. According to Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, "No army in history has ever had a better ratio of combatants to civilians killed in a comparable setting".

Conventional wars

Conventional wars are wars fought between states using conventional war tactics. This basically means regular armies fighting setpiece battles. Conventional wars in the modern era have typically entailed high civilian casualty rates due to widespread economic disruption or collateral damage from artillery or air bombardment.

World War I

Main article: World War I casualties

Some 9 to 10 million combatants are estimated to have died during World War I, along with an estimated 6.6 million civilians. The civilian casualty rate in World War I is therefore approximately 2:3 or 40%. Most of the civilian fatalities were due to famine or Spanish flu rather than military action. The relatively low rate of civilian casualties in this war is due to the fact that the front lines on the main battlefront, the Western Front, were static for most of the war, so that civilians were able to avoid the combat zones. Casualties for the Western allies, consequently, were relatively slight. Germany, on the other hand, suffered 750,000 civilian dead during and after the war due to famine caused by the Allied blockade. Russia and Turkey suffered civilian casualties in the millions—the latter including at least 500,000 Armenians killed in the Armenian genocide.

World War II

Main article: World War II casualties

According to most sources, World War II was the most lethal war in world history, with some 70 million killed in six years. The civilian to combatant fatality rate in World War II lies somewhere between 3:2 and 2:1, or from 60% to 67%. The high rate of civilian casualties in this war was due in part to the increasing lethality of strategic weapons, used to target enemy industrial or population centres, and famines caused by economic disruption. A substantial number of civilians in this war were also deliberately killed by the Axis Powers as a result of racial policies (for example, the Holocaust) or ethnic cleansing campaigns.

Korean War

The median total estimated Korean civilian deaths in the Korean War is 1,547,000. The median total estimated Korean military deaths is 429,827. The civilian-combatant death ratio among Korean casualties is 36:10. One source estimates that 20% of the total population of North Korea perished in the war.

NATO in Yugoslavia

See also: Civilian casualties during Operation Allied Force

In 1999, NATO intervened in the Kosovo War with a bombing campaign against Yugoslav forces, who were alleged to be conducting a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The bombing lasted about 2½ months, until forcing the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo.

Estimates for the number of casualties caused by the bombing vary widely depending on the source. NATO unofficially claimed a toll of 5,000 enemy combatants killed by the bombardment; the Yugoslav government, on the other hand, gave a figure of 638 of its security forces killed in Kosovo. Estimates for the civilian toll are similarly disparate. Human Rights Watch counted approximately 500 civilians killed by the bombing; the Yugoslav government estimated between 1,200 and 5,000.

If the NATO figures are to be believed, NATO achieved a civilian to combatant kill ratio of about 1:10, on the Yugoslav government's figures, conversely, the ratio would be between 4:1 and 10:1. If the most conservative estimates from the sources cited above are used, the ratio was around 1:1.

Unconventional wars

Unconventional wars are wars generally fought between state and non-state entities. Unconventional wars usually have a strong element of asymmetric warfare, meaning that one side is much more powerful than the other, forcing the other to adopt unconventional tactics, such as guerilla war or insurgency. Some wars have elements of both conventional and unconventional war; for example, North Vietnam waged the Vietnam War mostly using guerilla tactics, but also occasionally mounted conventional offensives, such as the Tet Offensive.

Mexican Revolution (1910–20)

Although it's estimated at least 1 million people died in the Mexican Revolution, most died from disease and hunger as an indirect result of the war. Combat deaths are generally agreed to have totaled about 250,000. According to Eckhardt, these included 125,000 civilian deaths and 125,000 military deaths, creating a civilian-combatant death ratio of 1:1 among combat deaths.

Vietnam War

The Vietnamese government has estimated the number of Vietnamese civilians killed in the war at two million, and the number of NVA and Viet Cong killed at 1.1 million - estimates which approximate those of a number of other sources. This would give a civilian-combatant fatality rate of approximately 2:1, or about 65%. These figures do not include civilians killed in Cambodia and Laos.

Chechen wars

During the First Chechen War, 4,000 separatist fighters and 40,000 civilians are estimated to have died, giving a civilian-combatant ratio of 10:1. The numbers for the Second Chechen War are 3,000 fighters and 13,000 civilians, for a ratio of 43:10. The combined ratio for both wars is 76:10. Casualty numbers for the conflict are notoriously unreliable. The estimates of the civilian casualties during the First Chechen war range from 20,000 to 100,000, with remaining numbers being similarly unreliable. The tactics employed by Russian forces in both wars were heavily criticized by human rights groups, which accused them of indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas and other crimes.

Coalition forces in the Iraq War

See also: Casualties of the Iraq War

According to a 2010 assessment by John Sloboda of Iraq Body Count, a United Kingdom-based organization, American and Coalition forces had killed at least 22,668 combatants as well as 13,807 civilians in the Iraq War, indicating an essential civilian to combatant casualty ratio of 1:2. It is not clear what percentage of civilians were killed in the initial (conventional war) invasion, as opposed to the percentage killed in the insurgency since.

US drone strikes in Pakistan

The civilian casualty rate for U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan is notoriously difficult to quantify. The U.S. itself puts the number of civilians killed from drone strikes in the last two years at no more than 20 to 30, a total that is far too low according to a spokesman for the NGO CIVIC. At the other extreme, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution suggests that drone strikes may kill "10 or so civilians" for every militant killed, which would represent a civilian to combatant casualty ratio of 10:1. Byman argues that civilian killings constitute a humanitarian tragedy and create dangerous political problems, including damage to the legitimacy of the Pakistani government and alienation of the Pakistani populace from America. A study by the New America Foundation in February estimated that between 830 and 1,210 civilians in total have been killed by drone strikes since 2004, a civilian fatality rate of about 30%, or 1:2.

Arab-Israeli conflict

1982 Lebanon War

In 1982, Israel mounted a response to PLO after PLO began shelling northern Israel.. The war culminated in a seven-week long Israeli naval, air and artillery bombardment of Lebanon's capital, Beirut, where the PLO had retreated. The bombardment eventually came to an end with an internationally brokered settlement in which the PLO forces were given safe passage to evacuate the country.

According to the International Red Cross, by the end of the first week of the war alone, some 10,000 people, including 2,000 combatants, had been killed, and 16,000 wounded—a civilian-combatant fatality rate of 5:1. Lebanese government sources later estimated that by the end of the siege of Beirut, a total of about 18,000 had been killed, an estimated 85% of whom were civilians. This would give a civilian-combatant fatality ratio of about 7:1.

Israeli assassinations of militants in the Gaza Strip

Israel's military activities in the Israel-Gaza conflict have included a campaign of targeted assassinations of militants in the Gaza Strip since 2000, as well as several concentrated operations, the most severe of which was Operation Cast Lead during the 2008–2009 Gaza War.

The civilian casualty rate of the targeted assassinations was surveyed by Haaretz military journalist Amos Harel. In 2002 and 2003, the ratio was 1:1, meaning one civilian killed for every militant killed. Harel called this period "the dark days" because of the relatively high civilian death toll as compared to later years. He attributed this to an Israeli Air Force (IAF) practice of attacking militants even when they were located in densely populated areas. While there were always safety rules, argued Harel, these were "bent" at times in view of the target's importance.

The civilian casualty ratio dropped steeply to 1:28 in late 2005, meaning one civilian killed for every 28 militants killed. Harel credited this drop to the new IAF chief Eliezer Shkedi's policies. The ratio rose again in 2006 to 1:10, a fact that Harel blamed on "several IAF mishaps". However, in 2007 and 2008 the ratio dropped to an unprecedented level of less than 1:30, or 2–3 percent of the total casualties being civilian.

Figures showing an improvement from 1:1 in 2002 to 1:30 in 2008 were also cited by Jerusalem Post journalist Yaakov Katz. Katz attributes the IDF's low ratio in the year preceding the Gaza War to Israel's investment in special weapons systems, including small smart bombs that minimize collateral damage, and to an upscaled Israeli effort to warn civilians to flee areas and to divert missiles at the last moment if civilians entered a planned strike zone.

Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School stated that the 2008 figure of 1:30 represents the lowest civilian to combatant casualty ratio in history in the setting of combating terrorism. Dershowitz criticized the international media and human rights organizations for not taking sufficient note of it. He also argued that even this figure may be misleading because not all civilians are innocent bystanders.

In October 2009, Dershowitz stated that the ratio for Israel's campaign of targeted assassinations stood at 1 civilian for every 28 terrorists. He argued that "this is the best ratio of any country in the world that is fighting asymmetrical warfare against terrorists who hide behind civilians. It is far better than the ratio achieved by Great Britain and the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan, where both nations employ targeted killings of terrorist leaders." Regarding the practices which might have led to this record and the reasons the civilan death rate nevertheless remained above zero, Dershowitz cited Col. Richard Kemp's statements on the Gaza War:

[f]rom my knowledge of the IDF and from the extent to which I have been following the current operation, I don’t think there has ever been a time in the history of warfare when any army has made more efforts to reduce civilian casualties and deaths of innocent people than the IDF is doing today in Gaza... Hamas, the enemy they have been fighting, has been trained extensively by Iran and by Hezbollah, to fight among the people, to use the civilian population in Gaza as a human shield... Hamas factor in the uses of the population as a major part of their defensive plan. So even though as I say, Israel, the IDF, has taken enormous steps...to reduce civilian casualties, it is impossible, it is impossible to stop that happening when the enemy has been using civilians as human shields.

Israel in the Gaza War

See also: Casualties of the Gaza War

Several analysts have attempted to calculate the Israel Defense Force's cvilian casualty ratio in Operation Cast Lead during the Gaza War. All have noted that the ratio differs significantly depending on which figures are used regarding the total number of casualties and their identity. The main sets of figures are those published by the IDF, essentially corroborated by Hamas, the opposing belligerent in the conflict, on the one hand; and those published by B'Tselem on the other hand.

Journalist Yaakov Katz states in The Jerusalem Post that the ratio is 1:3 according to the Israeli figures and 60% civilians (3:2) according to B'Tselem's figures. Katz attributes the IDF's low ratio in the Gaza War and in the year preceding it to Israel's investment in special weapons systems, including small smart bombs that minimize collateral damage, and to an upscaled Israeli effort to warn civilians to flee areas and to divert missiles at the last moment if civilians entered a planned strike zone. Katz notes that over 81 percent of the 5,000 missiles the IDF dropped in the Gaza Strip during the operation were smart bombs, a percentage which he states is unprecedented in modern warfare.

Journalist and commentator Evelyn Gordon writes in Commentary that the civilian casualty ratio in Operation Cast Lead was 39 percent (2:3) according to Israeli figures; 56 or 74 percent according to B'Tselem's figures, depending on whether 248 Hamas policemen are considered combatants or civilians; and 65 or 83 percent according to the figures of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. Gordon notes that all of these ratios are lower than the normal civilian-to-combatant wartime fatality ratio as given by the Red Cross, and states that the comparison shows that the IDF was unusually successful at minimizing civilian casualty rates. She concludes by charging that terrorists fight from among civilians because they know that the inevitable civilian casualties will result in opprobrium for their victims who dare to fight back, and that this norm will not change as long as this modus operandi remains profitable.

See also

• Collateral damage
• Asymmetric warfare
• Fourth generation warfare
• Loss exchange ratio
• Just war

• Distinction
• Proportionality
• Military necessity

Bibliography

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