NATO Double-Track Decision
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The NATO Double-Track Decision was the decision by NATO from December 12, 1979, to offer the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.[1] It was combined with a threat by NATO to deploy more medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe after the Euromissile Crisis.[2]
Background
The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the signing of SALT I (1972) and the negotiations toward SALT II (1979). The agreements placed constraints on further developments in nuclear capacities.
The SALT agreements were not intended to be considered a form of mutual arms control but merely referred to strategic carrier systems and their warheads, which did not include any tactical nuclear weapons such as nuclear bombs delivered by bombers or midrange missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs).[3]
NATO Double-Track Decision
The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup of Warsaw Pact countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threatening Western Europe. Of special concern was the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces, with the SS-20 missile and the Tupolev Tu-22M, also known as 'Backfire' bomber, being singled out for particular concern.
The European NATO members saw in the mobile launching platform-mounted SS-20 missiles no less a threat than the strategic intercontinental missiles. On December 12, 1979, they took on the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision.
The NATO Double-Track Decision intended the deployment of 572 equally mobile American middle-range missiles (Pershing II and Gryphon BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile) to rebuild the state of Mutual Assured Destruction.[4]
NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed. The Soviet Union was critical of the fact that neither French nor British nuclear weapons had been considered in the treaty.
Protests
Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. November 1980 Gert Bastian and Josef Weber drafted the Krefeld appeal calling for the federal government of West Germany to retract its support for the deployment of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Central Europe. The Krefeld appeal also called upon West Germany to oppose a nuclear arms race, emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the two Cold War superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 the Krefeld appeal had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for the peace movement.[5]
Policy revision
The disarmament negotiations which started on 30 November 1981 remained without conclusion. The German Bundestag agreed to the deployment in 1983, and the Soviet Union aborted the negotiations.
On 8 December 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This treaty reverted the double-track policy.[6] This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of the Cold War.
References
- ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
- ^ "Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision". nsarchive2.gwu.edu.
- ^ "NATO – Official text: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The Double-Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces), 12 Dec. 1979".
- ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
- ^ Frank Biess (2020). German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford University Press. p. 315. ISBN 9780198714187.
- ^ Spencer C. Tucker, ed. (2020). The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 Volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 434. ISBN 9781440860768.