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Norman J. W. Goda

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Norman J. W. Goda
PhD
Born1959 (age 64–65)
Occupation(s)Historian, author, editor
Academic background
Alma materUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Academic work
Era20th century
InstitutionsUniversity of Florida
Main interestsModern European history
History of international relations
Intelligence operations

Norman J. W. Goda (born 1961) is an American historian specialised in the history of the Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. He is a professor of history at the University of Florida, where he is the Norman and Irma Braman Professor of Holocaust Studies.[1]

Goda is the author of several books on the international policy of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust, and the Cold War. He also serves as a historical consultant for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group of the United States National Security Archive, tasked with reviewing the previously-classified intelligence documents of the World War II and its aftermath.[2]

Historian

Goda is the co-author of the book U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, which was published in 2005 by the Cambridge University Press and based on the materials that were declassified under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

Reviewing the book in the journal History, the historian Steven Casey called the book "remarkable" and noteed that book "sheds new light on three controversial aspects of the war and post-war period:" how much US intelligence organisations knew about the Holocaust, the crimes of individual Nazi perpetrators, and the "extent to which US intelligence knowingly collaborated with war criminals during the cold war." Casey noted:[3]

Breitman et al. have used these [declassified documents] to write a series of measured case studies, which, unsurprisingly, confirm that many post-war exculpatory accounts by leading Nazis were highly misleading. Indeed, whereas figures such as SD Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg sought to depict themselves as reluctant Nazis who had tried their best to save the lives of concentration camp victims or to bring the war to a swift conclusion, the new documents confirm that they were actually ruthless individuals who not only had plenty of blood on their hands but also remained wedded if not to the Nazi cause then at least to their Nazi comrades long after May 1945.

Bibliography

  • Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path Toward America, Texas A&M University Press, 1998, ISBN 0890968071.
  • U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, Cambridge University Press. 2005. With Richard Breitman, Timothy Naftali and Robert Wolfe.
  • ''Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 0521867207.
  • "Black Marks Hitler's Bribery of his Senior Officers During World War II" pp. 96–137. In Corrupt Histories, Emmanuel Kreike and William Jordan (eds), University of Rochester Press, 2005, ISBN 978-1-58046-173-3.
  • Jewish histories of the Holocaust: New Transnational Approaches, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014. With Omer Bartov. ISBN 9781782384410.

References