Jump to content

Eric Shinseki

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Zsero (talk | contribs) at 15:21, 26 September 2006 (rv). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Eric Ken Shinseki
34th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (1999-2003)
AllegianceU.S. Army
Years of service1965-2003
RankGeneral (retired)
Unit9th and 25th Infantry Divisions
CommandsArmy Chief of Staff , Commanding General United States Army Europe , Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe , Commander NATO Stabalization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Battles / warsVietnam War
AwardsDefense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (2)
Bronze Star (3)
Purple Heart (2)

General Eric Ken Shinseki (born November 28, 1942) served as the 34th Chief of Staff of the United States Army (1999 - 2003). He is the first Asian American four-star general in U.S. history and the first Asian American to lead one of the four military services. During his tenure, he initiated an innovative but controversial plan to make the Army more strategically deployable and mobile in urban terrain by creating Stryker Interim-Force Brigade Combat Teams. His long-term initiative was called Objective Force and the main long-term weapons program he pushed was the Future Combat Systems.

He is famous for his remarks to the Senate Armed Services committee before the war in Iraq in which he said "something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers" would probably be required for post-war Iraq. Secretaries Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz publicly disagreed with his estimate.

When the insurgency took hold in post-war Iraq, Shinseki's comments and their public rejection by the civilian leadership were often cited by those who felt the Bush administration deployed too few troops to Iraq.

Education and military service

Shinseki was born in Lihue, Kauai in the then Territory of Hawaii. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree and a commission as a Second Lieutenant. He earned a Master of Arts Degree in English Literature from Duke University. General Shinseki was also educated at the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.

Shinseki at West Point in 1965

Shinseki served in a variety of command and staff assignments both in the Continental United States and overseas, including two combat tours with the 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions in the Republic of Vietnam as an Artillery Forward Observer and as Commander of Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. During one of those tours, he stepped on a land mine, which blew off the front of one of his feet.

He has served in Hawaii at Schofield Barracks with Headquarters, United States Army Hawaii, and Fort Shafter with Headquarters, United States Army Pacific. He has taught at the United States Military Academy’s Department of English. During duty with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas, he served as the Regimental Adjutant and as the Executive Officer of its 1st Squadron.

General Shinseki’s ten-plus years of service in Europe included assignments as the Commander, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry (Schweinfurt); the Commander, 2nd Brigade, (Kitzingen); the Assistant Chief of Staff G3 (Operations, Plans and Training) (Wuerzburg); and the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver (Schweinfurt), all with the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). He served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations, Plans and Training), VII Corps (Stuttgart). General Shinseki served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Support, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (Verona, Italy), an element of the Allied Command Europe.

From March 1994 to July 1995, General Shinseki commanded the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. In July 1996, he was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. In June 1997, General Shinseki was appointed to the rank of general before assuming duties as the Commanding General, United States Army Europe; Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe; and Commander, NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Shinseki assumed duties as the 28th Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army on 24 November 1998. He assumed duties as the 34th Chief of Staff, United States Army, on 22 June 1999, [1] and retired on 11 June 2003, at the end of his four-year term.

Shinseki is a native of Hawaii and is the only Japanese American to ever be promoted to the Army's top position.

Tensions with Rumsfeld while Chief of the Army

During the course of Shinseki's tenure as Chief of Staff, there were press reports of tension between the General and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. At the start of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld had to address Shinseki's controversial decision in March 16, 2001 to issue all Army troops black berets, which had previously been worn only by the Rangers. [2] (Rumsfeld publicly supported the decision.)

In 2001, Shinseki reportedly staved off suggestions by Rumsfeld and his aides that the Army be reduced in size. [3] According to one source, Shinseki came close to insubordination [4]. The Quadrennial Defense Review issued in 2001 maintained the existing size of the Army. Another fight ensued in 2002, when Rumsfeld cancelled the XM2001 Crusader, an artillery weapons system supported by Shinseki and members of Congress.

Defense strategist Thomas P.M. Barnett, in a 2005 piece for Esquire magazine, captured the thoughts of Rumsfeld's aides in Office of the Secretary of Defense. Aides felt Shinseki became "too fixated on improving the Army's efficiency in combat without questioning the relevance of the capabilities he was developing, as in, Great force, wrong war". Rumsfeld and his aides believed systems like Crusader, while superb pieces of equipment for a Cold War-era fight, were not relevant to the new threats of the 21st century that required speed and precision. [5]

In April 2002, 14 months before Shinseki was due to retire, Washington Post reported, quoting "Pentagon officials", that his replacement had already been selected. "In another unusual move, Rumsfeld has tapped Army Gen. John Keane, the No. 2 officer in the Army, to succeed the current chief of that service, Gen. Eric Shinseki, whose term runs out next year. Selecting a successor for the current chief so far in advance is highly unusual." [6] This marked departure from precedent, if true, was seen by some as in some way undercutting Shinseki's authority within the Army. However, it has never been established where this report came from, or whether it had any basis in fact; in the event, Shinseki's successor was not Keane, but Peter Schoomaker.

The personality clash between Shinseki and Rumsfeld was well known. Shinseki had a reputation as a quiet, reserved officer, while Rumsfeld had a history of his tough questioning and "wire-brushing" of senior officers. (Esquire contributing editor Thomas Barnett describes wire-brushing as: chewing [officers] out, typically in a public way that's demeaning to their stature. It's pinning their ears back, throwing out question after question you know they can't answer correctly and then attacking every single syllable they toss up from their defensive crouch.) Shinseki and other army officers resented Rumsfeld's rough treatment of officers, while Rumsfeld and his aides felt the military had to be challenged vigorously in order for the civilians to exercise effective control of the department and steer it in the right direction. [5]

Commenting on the personality clash on MSNBC's Hardball with Chris Matthews , General Tommy Franks (ret.) said, "I think, Chris, you will find personalities that get along and you find personalities that do not get along...It was sort of like oil and water...there certainly was friction there". Franks also said that the media had blown Shinseki's comments and his treatment out of proportion. He said Shinseki's concerns about the war plan focused on the logistics support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. [7]

Apart from issues of "personality clash", Shinseki and Rumsfeld approached military dogma with significant substantive differences. For example, following September 11, 2001, Rumsfeld was in a meeting whose subject was the review of the Department of Defense's (Contingency) Plan in the event of a war with Iraq (U.S. Central Command OPLAN 1003-98). (See, e.g., Chapter 1 of Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Gordon and Trainor, 2006)) The plan (as it was then conceived) contemplated troop levels of up to 500,000,, which Rumsfeld opined was far too many. As Gordon and Trainor write:

As [General] Newbold outlined the plan . . . it was clear that Rumsfeld was growing increasingly irritated. For Rumsfeld, the plan required too many troops and supplies and took far too long to execute. It was, Rumsfeld declared "The product of old thinking and the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the military."

* * *

[T]he Plan . . . reflected long-standing military principles about the force levels that were needed to defeat Iraq, control a population of more than 24 million, and secure a nation the size of California with porous borders. Rumsfeld's numbers, in contrast, seemed to be pulled out of thin air. He had dismissed one of the military's long-standing plans, and suggested his own force level without any of the generals raising a cautionary flag.

Id. [8]

While Shinseki was not at the OPLAN 1003-98 review mentioned above, he no doubt hewed to the traditional military view concerning force levels necessary for an Iraq invasion. It is, however, unclear how strongly Shinseki communicated to the DOD head views which diverged from those which Rumsfeld had forcefully communicated to the military command structure. While Shinseki's reticence to publicly speak on the questions of possible conflicts between himself and the Bush adminstration is well-known, he is on record as stating that it is "probably fair" to say that he should have banged on the table and pushed harder to stop Rumsfeld from going into Iraq with too few troops. [9]

File:Gal shinseki.jpg
General Shinseki revealing his estimates of several hundred thousand men for the required complement to occupy Iraq. Senate hearing, February 2003.

On February 25, 2003, four months before the end of his term as Chief of Staff of the Army, Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought an occupying force of several hundred thousand men would be needed to stablize postwar Iraq. He was pressed to provide a range by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI). Below is the exchange:

SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.

Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, called Shinseki's estimate "far off the mark" [10] and "wildly off the mark". Wolfowitz said it would be "hard to believe" more troops would be required for post-war Iraq than to remove Saddam Hussein from power. [11]

Contrary to Democratic candidate John Kerry's claim, in the first debate of the 2004 presidential election, Shinseki was not "retired" for his testimony before Congress. His official term as Chief of the Army ended four months later and he retired as scheduled. [12] However, the tension between the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Shinseki were apparent. No senior civilians attended Shinseki's retirement ceremony. Some Army officers, such as Major General Batiste (ret.) who called for Rumsfeld's resignation, saw this as an intentional slight and sign of disrespect directed toward Shinseki by the civilian leadership. [13]

Secretary Rumsfeld, on the other hand, suggests that Shinseki did not invite any civilians to his retirement ceremony, although that claim cannot be verified since Shinseki has not commented on the issue. [14] There have been unconfirmed reports that Rumsfeld was on pre-arranged travel during the time of Shinseki's ceremony.

Show of Support by Army officers

Shinseki has been cited by numerous retired Army officers as a prime example of Secretary Rumsfeld's disregard for military advice and abrasive treatment of senior officers. Newsweek magazine reports "RIC WAS RIGHT" caps were on display at the 40th annual reunion of the West Point Class of 1965 (Shinseki's class). [9] Retired generals such as John Batiste who called for Rumsfeld's resignation have cited the treatment of Shinseki.

Shinseki, for his part, is not comfortable with this "martyr's" role. Stoically, he has declined to make public comments on the Iraq war, Rumsfeld, or troop levels in the three years since his retirement.

Decorations and Badges

Notes

  1. ^ Fahrig, Jody T. "Army welcomes Shinseki as new chief", Army News Service, June 23, 1999. (URL retrieved May 27, 2006)
  2. ^ Kozaryn, Linda D. "Defense Leaders Uphold Army's Black Beret Decision", DefenseLINK News, March 16, 2001. (URL retrieved May 27, 2006)
  3. ^ O'Hanlon, Michael E. "History Will Credit Shinseki", The Japan Times, June 19, 2003.
  4. ^ Babbin, Jed "Purge of the Princelings?" National Review Online, August 14, 2003.
  5. ^ a b Barnett, Thomas P. M. "Donald Rumsfeld: Old Man in a Hurry", Esquire, July 1, 2005. Cite error: The named reference "esquire" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  6. ^ Ricks, Thomas E. "Bush Backs Overhaul of Military's Top Ranks", Washington Post, April 11, 2002. Page A01.
  7. ^ Interview with General Tommy Franks, on Hardball with Chris Matthews, April 14, 2006.
  8. ^ Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq], 2006. Book excerpt from the Denver Post.
  9. ^ a b Hastings, Michael, et. al. "Anatomy of a Revolt", Newsweek, April 24, 2006. Cite error: The named reference "newsweek" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  10. ^ Engel, Matthew. "Scorned general's tactics proved right: Profile of the army chief sidelined by Rumsfeld", The Guardian, March 29, 2003.
  11. ^ Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size", New York Times, February 28, 2003.
  12. ^ Burlas, Joe. "Shinseki bids farewell to Army", Army New Service, June 12, 2003. (URL retrieved on May 27, 2006)
  13. ^ Generals Speak Out on Iraq, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, April 13, 2006.
  14. ^ Radio interview with Secretary Rumsfeld on the Bill Cunningham Show, 700 WLW, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 17, 2006.

References

  • Official U.S. Army biography, in Bell, William Gardner. COMMANDING GENERALS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF 1775-2005: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army's Senior Officer, Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005. (ISBN 0–16–072376–0)

Further reading

Preceded by Chief of Staff of the United States Army
1999–2003 		Succeeded by
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Eric_Shinseki&oldid=77917119"