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Five Fingers of Tibet

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Five Fingers of Tibet
Chinese西藏的五指
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXīzàng de wǔ zhǐ

The Five Fingers of Tibet (Chinese: 西藏的五指; pinyin: Xīzàng de wǔzhǐ) is a Chinese foreign policy[1] attributed to Mao Zedong that considers Tibet to be China's right hand palm, with five fingers on its periphery: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North-East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh), that it is China's responsibility to "liberate" these regions.[2][3]

It was never discussed in official Chinese public statements, but external concerns have been raised over its possible continued existence or revival. An article in a provincial mouthpiece magazine of the Chinese Communist Party verified the existence of this policy in the aftermath of the 2017 China–India border standoff.[4]

Background

Imperial China claimed suzerainty over Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan as an extension of its claim over Tibet.[5] These claims were asserted by the Chinese amban in Tibet in 1908, who wrote to the Nepalese authorities that Nepal and Tibet, "being united like brothers under the auspices of China, should work in harmony for mutual good." He suggested the "blending of five colours" representing China, Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan as part of his program to assert the Chinese claim in the face of British opposition.[6] On 15 November 1939, the founding chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong termed Bhutan and Nepal as China's tributary states.

After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China, as well as a part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hongkong; France seized Annam; even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us. At the same time that they took away part of her territory, the imperialists obliged China to pay enormous indemnities. Thus heavy blows were struck against the vast feudal empire of China.[7][a]

— Mao Zedong

Origin

The "Five Fingers of Tibet" policy has been widely attributed to Mao's speeches in the 1940s,[8][2][9] but has never been discussed in official Chinese public statements.[10] This construct considered Tibet to be the palm of China's right hand, with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and North-East Frontier Agency (now known as Arunachal Pradesh) being its five fingers. In 1954, Chinese officers in Tibet claimed that they would "liberate Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh, and the NEFA, which were wrongfully being held by the Indian imperialists."[11]: 55 

In 1954, the Chinese government published a book called "A Brief History of Modern China" for school students, which included a map showing the territories allegedly taken by "imperialist powers" between 1840 and 1919, terming them as "portions of China that must be reclaimed." This map included Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the entire Northeast India.[10] This was noted in the memoirs of Indian diplomat Triloki Nath Kaul who was serving in Peking (now known as Beijing) at that time.[2] Scholar B. S. K. Grover said that this map was a "serious reflection of Peking's ambitions" and not mere propaganda or "idle-boasting".[10]

The claims over the "five fingers" were asserted "emphatically and frequently" from 1958 to 1961 over the Peking and Lhasa radio systems.[11]: 96 [b] During a mass meeting in Lhasa in July 1959, Chinese lieutenant general Zhang Guohua said: "Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united and taught the communist doctrine."[10][12][13][c]

Relevance to 21st century policy

The policy, which was never discussed in Chinese public statements,[10] is officially dormant now. The Chinese claims remain only on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin region that India claims as part of Ladakh but has been under Chinese administration since the late 1950s.[17] However, fears have been expressed regarding its revival.[17][18]

After the 2017 China–India border standoff at Doklam, an article in Qunzhong (mouthpiece magazine of CCP's Jiangsu provincial party standing committee) invoked the "five fingers" construct.[4] The article, which was written by Nanjing University researcher Liu Litao, alleged that India's covert support to the Tibetan independence movement stems from the fact that it was impossible to fully control the "five fingers" that India had allegedly taken away without the "palm". The Tibetan culture was said to be the "centripetal force" on the "five fingers".[4] The article added that as China's investments, trade, and economic relations with these regions increase, the Chinese influence in these regions will overtake that of India and will eliminate it to a "great extent".[4]

Lobsang Sangay, the leader of the Central Tibetan Administration, linked the policy with the Doklam standoff.[19] He also cited it as the reason behind the 2020 China–India skirmishes,[20] Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury (Indian National Congress leader in the Indian Parliament),[21] Seshadri Chari (former foreign affairs cell head of the Bharatiya Janata party),[22] and M. M. Khajuria (former Director General of Police of Jammu and Kashmir)[23] have also voiced similar views.

According to commentator Saurav Jha, the "five fingers" policy arises from the historical geography of the Himalayas which allows bi-directional territorial claims between Tibet and the southern regions. This leads to tensions between the trans-Himalayan powers which is "ultimately tempered by a balance of military capability," and is the reason behind the longstanding Sino-Indian border dispute.[24]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ The official version—in Mao's Selected Works, Vol III—omits mentions of Korea, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Annam.
  2. ^ The author does not cite any source.
  3. ^ The statement attributed to Zhang Guohua (or Chang Kuow-Hua), the head of the Chinese Mission in Tibet, made in a public meeting in Lhasa on 17 July 1959. This passage was apparently deleted from the version reported in China Today, but it was reported in The Daily Telegraph by George N. Patterson, its Kalimpong correspondent and later repeated in the Hindustan Times.[14][15] Patterson reports that when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru raised the matter with China, "he was bluntly informed that China’s claims to these border territories were based on the same claim as for their invasion of Tibet."[16]

References

  1. ^ "India, China and the Nathu La India, China and the Nathu La Understanding Beijing's Larger Strategy towards the Region" (PDF). Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2020-06-25. Retrieved 2020-06-29.
  2. ^ a b c Haidar, Suhasini (18 June 2020). "History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 19 June 2020. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
  3. ^ Theys, Sarina (25 January 2018). "Running hot and cold: Bhutan-India-China relations". Archived from the original on 1 July 2020. Retrieved 3 July 2020.
  4. ^ a b c d Litao, Liu (26 September 2017). "重新审视"印度象"". Qunzhong. Archived from the original on 16 July 2020. Retrieved 18 July 2020.
  5. ^ Jain, Girilal (1960). "Threat to India's Integrity". Panchsheela and After: A Re-Appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection. Asia Publishing House. p. 158.
  6. ^ Jain, Girilal (1959). "Consequences of Tibet". India meets China in Nepal. Asia Publishing House. pp. 105–106.
  7. ^ Schram, Stuart R. (1969). "China and the Underdeveloped Countries". The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Praeger Publishers. pp. 257–258.
  8. ^ Muni, S. D. (2009). "The Nehruvian Phase: Ideology Adjusts with Realpolitik". India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension. Foundation Books. p. 31. ISBN 9788175968530. Archived from the original on 2018-06-15. Retrieved 2020-06-19.
  9. ^ Srivastava, Sanjay (19 June 2020). "India-China Face-off : क्या है चीन की 'फाइव फिंगर्स ऑफ तिब्बत स्ट्रैटजी', जिससे भारत को रहना होगा अलर्ट" (in Hindi). News18 India. Archived from the original on 8 February 2021. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
  10. ^ a b c d e Grover, B. S. K. (1974). Sikkim and India: Storm and Consolidation. Jain Brothers. pp. 152–153.
  11. ^ a b Belfiglio, Valentine John (1970). The Foreign Relations of India with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal Between 1947–1967: An Analytical Framework for the Study of Big Power-Small Power Relations (PhD). University of Oklahoma.
  12. ^ Benedictus, Brian (2 August 2014), "Bhutan and the Great Power Tussle", The Diplomat, archived from the original on 22 December 2015
  13. ^ Smith, Paul J. (2015), "Bhutan–China Border Disputes and Their Geopolitical Implications", in Bruce Elleman; Stephen Kotkin; Clive Schofield (eds.), Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia, M.E. Sharpe, p. 27, ISBN 978-0-7656-2766-7
  14. ^ Desai, B. K. (1959), India, Tibet and China, Bombay: Democratic Research Service, p. 30, archived from the original on 27 August 2017
  15. ^ "Delhi Diary, 14 August 1959", The Eastern Economist; a Weekly Review of Indian and International Economic Affairs, Volume 33, Issues 1–13, 1959, p. 228, archived from the original on 27 August 2017
  16. ^ George N. Patterson, China's Rape of Tibet (PDF), George N. Patterson web site, archived from the original (PDF) on 27 August 2017, retrieved 23 August 2017
  17. ^ a b Bradsher, Henry S. (1969). "Tibet Struggles to Survive". Foreign Affairs. 47 (4): 752. doi:10.2307/20039413. ISSN 0015-7120. JSTOR 20039413.
  18. ^ Jha, Purushottam (19 June 2020). "China – A desperate state to change the narratives and contexts". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 8 February 2021. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
  19. ^ Basu, Nayanima (17 October 2017). "'Doklam is part of China's expansionist policy'". Business Line. Archived from the original on 28 May 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
  20. ^ Siddiqui, Maha (18 June 2020). "Ladakh is the First Finger, China is Coming After All Five: Tibet Chief's Warning to India". News18. Archived from the original on 24 June 2020. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
  21. ^ Chowdhury, Adhir Ranjan (17 June 2020). "Chinese intrusion in Ladakh has created a challenge that must be met". The Indian Express. Archived from the original on 8 February 2021. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
  22. ^ Chari, Seshadri (12 June 2020). "70 yrs on, India's Tibet dilemma remains. But 4 ways Modi can achieve what Nehru couldn't". ThePrint. Archived from the original on 29 June 2020. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
  23. ^ Khajooria, M. M. (5 June 2020). "Maos' open palm & its five fingers". State Times. Archived from the original on 22 June 2020. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
  24. ^ Jha, Saurav (30 May 2020). "India must stand firm". Deccan Herald. Archived from the original on 8 February 2021. Retrieved 19 June 2020.
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